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GENERAL SOCIOLOGY

GENERAL SOCIOLOGY

BY

HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

Professor of Sociology
New York University

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PREFACE

To justify the launching of one more general sociology text upon an already congested academic sea the author, at least, should be convinced that it offers something new, if not better. There ought to be some hope that it will meet the requirements of a number of teachers, and a much larger number of students, more exactly than any existing work. I sincerely believe that this book of mine has several rather important features that are distinctive—whether they are improvements or not remains to be determined by others whose opinion is important. Some of these involve unusual subject matter, but probably more of them are the result of novel emphasis, approach, or treatment.

To facilitate the appraisal of these innovations, some of the more important are listed below:

The significance and diversity of group relationships.
Classification of groups on the basis of volition.
The reciprocal and rotatory nature of social relations.
The prehuman character of society and its basic institutions, and the consequent exclusion of their origins from the field of sociological study.
Analysis of interests, and use of interests as the basis for sociological classification.
The nature and importance of belief in overt behavior and theoretical analysis.
The dynamic character of sociological theory, and the inclusion of the time element therein.
The significance of ultimate values, and their axiomatic character.
Analysis of applied sociology.
The concepts of normality and abnormality.
Analysis of the nature of social problems.
Distinction between social reform and social engineering.
The inclusion of economic relationships as a legitimate part of sociological analysis.

Analysis of the four basic factors in the material existence of society.
Fundamental character of population factors, quantitative and qualitative.
Idealization.

Let me repeat that it is not so much from the originality of these concepts that there arises whatever merit to consideration this book may possess, as from the composite of their interpretation, treatment, and integration. This is evidenced by the fact that, in spite of my recognition of the importance of novelty and without any special effort on my part to follow a pattern, this book does in fact conform very closely to the outline of the introductory course recommended by a committee of the American Sociological Society, of which Professor Cecil C. North was chairman, and accepted by the Society at its annual meeting in 1933.

This fact seems to justify my determination to omit from my text as much controversial material as possible. I have acted on the conviction that if we cannot find enough basic material upon which we are in general agreement to fill an elementary text we ought not to try to write elementary texts at all, and we ought not to apply the term "science" to our field of study. I have made every effort to avoid juxtaposing the opinions of Professor A and Doctor B. Important as these independent judgments are, and indispensable as they are to the progress of sociological science, to confront the beginning student with too large an array of them serves merely to confuse him unnecessarily, and to create an unwarranted impression of disunity and inconclusiveness. This does not mean that I expect complete agreement from my colleagues, or from students. The adoption of this principle involves a large degree of dogmatism in statement, and I should be greatly disappointed if my book did not evoke abundant challenge and opposition. Herein, perhaps, we may find one answer to the objections to the "standardization" of sociology texts; the use of reasonably uniform *books* does not by any means necessitate stereotyped teaching, or preclude free discussion, argument, and exploration in the classroom, and out of it.

Perhaps a special word of extenuation is needed for the large place given to the economic aspects of social life, and the inclusion of many analyses that are usually left to books and classes in economics. Personally, I regard this as one of the chief merits of my book. It has long seemed to me scientifically indefensible to omit from the scope of sociology some of the basic and determinative relations of men to their human environment, simply because a group of fellow scientists had previously devoted themselves to these phenomena and reduced them to a systematic analysis. In their truly *sociological* aspects, the phenomena of economic life seem to me to fall within the scope of such a text as this just as truly as those of the family, or of recreation, or of domination. Their inclusion makes possible a comprehensiveness, a consistency, of treatment, and a thorough exposition of fundamental laws and principles that cannot be attained otherwise.

The attentive reader will discover a considerable amount of repetition and overlapping in this volume. "As will be explained later," "As has been shown," "As we have seen," and similar expressions occur frequently on these pages, and the same themes turn up for consideration repeatedly. This seems to me both unavoidable and innocuous. The necessity for it seems to arise out of the nature of the material. The very pervasiveness of the principle of "reciprocalness" seems to make it impossible to systematize sociological material in such a way that a definite starting point can be chosen and then an orderly progression arranged that does not need to traverse any ground a second time. Fortunately, there seems to be a distinct value to the student in meeting familiar concepts and relations in new settings, and finding his tentative definitions and assumptions modified by new insights that he could not have acquired at the beginning.

I am indebted to my colleagues C. G. Dittmer, R. E. Baber, E. A. Hoebel, W. C. Headrick, and P. A. Robert, who have read parts of the manuscript and made valuable suggestions. I am under special obligation to Mr. Headrick and Mr. Robert for rendering invaluable assistance with the Bibliography. I also desire to express my hearty appreciation of the courtesy extended to me by various publishers in permissions to quote, and particularly to the firms of John Wiley and Sons, Harper and Brothers, and The Macmillan Company for permission to draw liberally on certain books of my own published by them.

H. P. F.

New York,
March, 1934

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CHAPTER I

GROUP REALITIES. INVOLUNTARY GROUPS

On a certain page in "Who's Who in America" there appears a sketch of a man who in many ways might be considered a representative American—representing the best that is in American life, perhaps, more than the average man, but still truly typical. He is recorded as being a member of the following groups: Cabinet of the United States, United States Senate, Loyal Order of Moose, Liberty Bond and Mortgage Company of Pittsburgh, Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers of America, Masons, Odd Fellows, K. P., Elk, Americus Republican Club, Duquesne Club, Pittsburgh Athletic Club, Chevy Chase Club, Congressional Club. There were doubtless many others not mentioned.

GROUP AFFILIATIONS

Most of us do not have as rich and varied group affiliations as this man, but there is none of us in whose life group connections do not play a continuous and important part. These relationships are such an integral part of our existence that we seldom stop to think of them, and if we were to sit down and draw up a list of the different groups to which we belong we should probably be surprised at their number, and even so we should probably miss several of them, including some of the most important.

Yet our membership in groups affects practically every incident in our daily lives, and conditions every feature of our careers, from the most superficial to the most fundamental. Not one of us would be the same person he is if any one of these group relationships were to be altered or removed—not to speak of the whole of them. Historically speaking, most of these group divisions and connections of humanity have grown up without deliberate planning or management. They are a part of the products of social evolution. They have not until relatively recent years been subjected to any considerable amount of objective study or rational analysis. But as soon as man's mental development reached a point where he was capable of analyzing himself and his activities somewhat critically, the subject of his relations with his fellow men came in for no little attention, as some of the finest examples of classic Greek and Roman literature testify. But for a long time these researches were largely speculative and philosophical, and the conclusions inclined to be rather dogmatic and arbitrary.

With the dawn of the age of science, however, and the rapidly intensifying desire to submit all forms of knowledge to treatment by the scientific method, the question arose in the minds of certain leaders of thought, and became steadily more insistent and wide-spread, whether human group relations were not included in the legitimate field of scientific research, and whether it were not possible to express these relations in the forms and terminology of established science. This attitude has expanded until today the study of social science, or the social sciences, occupies a very prominent place in the intellectual life of modern societies.

As a first step in entering into this field of thought and study, it will be helpful to review some of the basic facts of group affiliation, and to consider some of the commoner and more important types of groups that exist or have existed, beginning with the most general, that is, those that affect the largest number of individuals. As usual in dealing with a diversified body of data it will be useful to subject them to some form of classification. Indeed, classification, as we shall see, is an essential part of the scientific method. Several classifications of human groups have been worked out, each with its own peculiar merit.[1] Suppose we start with a very simple and comprehensible classification based on the element of choice or will that governs membership in the group.* This is a particularly appropriate basis, because the element of choice or will, as ordinarily understood, is distinctively human.

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* For a discussion of the concept of choice and will, see below, pp. 127-138.

CLASSIFICATION OF GROUPS

On this basis, all human groups may be divided into three categories—the involuntary, the semi-voluntary, and the voluntary. The first class includes all those groups in which membership is determined entirely without the will of the individual. The second includes those where the will plays a minor or delayed rôle. The third includes those groups which the individual joins as the result of a definite decision on his own part.

It is interesting to note, in passing, that among members of an involuntary group there is community of interest because they belong to the same group, whereas in the case of voluntary groups the members belong to the same group because there is community of interest. For instance, the general group that we call "Japanese" is an involuntary group. The individual Japanese is sympathetic with others of the group because he recognizes that he and they are all Japanese. It is membership in the group that creates the unity. On the other hand, a choral society is a voluntary group. The individual members join with each other and form a group because there is community of interest—they want to sing together. The significance of this point will become clearer as the nature of interests is better understood.

INVOLUNTARY GROUPS

In the first category, the most important group is humanity itself. Indeed, this is much the most important group of any type whatsoever. It is membership in the species somewhat optimistically designated *Homo sapiens* that underlies and conditions affiliation with any of the other groups. Any being which falls outside this group is automatically excluded from the field of study in question. It needs no argument to prove that membership in this group is wholly involuntary. No one yet was ever asked in advance whether he wished to be a man, or a chimpanzee, or a skylark, nor even whether he wanted to *be* at all. There is no invitation to join, no period of rushing, no pledging in this fraternity.

The second most important group in this category is sex. Membership in the species *Homo* necessitates membership in either the group man or the group woman. Here again there is obviously no element of choice. No one has the opportunity to decide whether his group will be a fraternity or a sorority. In many primitive tribes, to be sure, there is a very formal ceremony of initiation into full sex-hood, but it is only a ritual confirmation of a status that already exists. And yet what a tremendous influence this membership has upon the life of every individual! How completely different his career as a male must be from what it would have been as a female. And the idea of group unity in this particular is by no means fictitious, but very real. The phrase "sex solidarity" is not at all a fanciful figure of speech. Nor, indeed, is "sex antagonism." The manner in which these alignments display themselves, and the degree to which they influence social relationships, vary greatly among different societies, but they are never entirely absent.

The third group in the first category is race. This is a category much less well understood, though just as truly universal, as humanity or sex. Every human individual is a member of some race, though it is very rarely that he can tell precisely what race it is. This subject is both so difficult and so important that it requires somewhat extended discussion, which will be presented a little later. For the moment, it will suffice to recognize that race is a matter of physical descent and kinship. In the familiar but rather inaccurate phrase, members of the same race are more closely united to each other by "blood" than they are to the members of other races.

There thus emerges the rather striking fact that all of these involuntary groups are strictly biological in character and origin. They are expressions or consequences of man's character as an animal. As such, the study of their origin and development does not strictly belong within the field of sociology. This is quite in harmony with their involuntary character. For, as will be pointed out later, all the phenomena which furnish the true data of sociology are volitional in character. Nevertheless, these groups constitute some of the materials with which sociology works, and consequently some knowledge of their basic character and qualities is indispensable to progress in that study.

Gradation

Every group has characteristics which distinguish it, as a group, from other groups. Usually the differentiation from some groups is less marked than from other groups. That is, the principle of *gradation* is characteristic of pretty much all of creation as we know it. This is in harmony with the general essence of evolutionary development. Very frequently, also, the gradation between two related groups is so gradual that it is difficult or impossible to discern any sharp dividing line between them. This, as we shall see frequently, is particularly true of the field of human affairs. In the relations of men with men it is very seldom possible to draw a hard and fast dividing line, so that all the units may be definitely set on one side or the other. The division between human categories is usually an area, not a line. This often leads to the assumption that classification in human relations is either impossible or insignificant. Thus, for example, we often hear it said that there is no use in talking about races because there are no pure races, and there is no sharp dividing line between one race and another. This attitude is both unscientific and misleading. It would be foolish, for example, to say that there is no practical use in making a distinction between water and milk because some of the liquids that are sold in milk bottles or cans have had such an intimate acquaintance with the back-yard pump that it is impossible to say whether they are milk or water, and are in fact neither.

Humanity

Accordingly, when we undertake to identify the most important of all the groups that affect our lives, humanity itself, we discover first that the basis of identification is certain traits which are characteristic of men in general, as contrasted with all other groups, whether closely or remotely related, and second, that many, if not most, of these traits are not exclusive to man, or are exclusive only in the extent to which they are developed. In other words, the distinguishing features of *Homo sapiens* are almost universally human only in the relative sense. There is very little that man possesses, in himself, that is not possessed in greater or less degree by some other groups, particularly certain of the higher animal species. So true is this that in the case of some of the most primitive types of man that have ever been discovered—*Pithecanthropus erectus,* for instance—it has been difficult for the scientists to determine whether they were men or apes; probably they were neither, just as the dubious liquid referred to above is neither water nor milk.[2]

In brief, it is quite impossible to define humanity in simple positive terms—to say that man is the creature that has this or that trait, or combination of traits. Virtually every portion of the human body, bone, muscle, or vital organ, has its counterpart in the body of other animals. Even the human mind, or intelligence, is not a thing entirely apart from that of other creatures. The distinctively human traits are characterized almost solely by the degree of their development. If the general theory of evolution in its human application is accepted it implies that these traits were originally not appreciably different from those of man's closest non-human ancestors, but that for one reason or another they proceeded to develop to an unparalleled degree. Four of these traits may be selected as of particular importance. These are erect stature, an opposable thumb, vocal organs, and foremost of all, a flexible and expansive thinking apparatus.

No one of these traits, as a distinct concept, is exclusive to man. Some of the apes have opposable thumbs, many of the other animals possess the rudiments of speech,[3] penguins stand erect in their own fashion, and all the higher species of animals have brains. But the vicissitudes of the evolutionary process determined that the progenitors of man should not only possess these traits in a special combination, but also that the traits themselves should be capable of a progressive development and refinement such as have not even been approximated by any other species. No other creature has an extremity capable of such accuracy and delicacy of manipulation as the human hand; no other animal stands so erect, and has such ease and scope of movement upon its lower limbs alone, leaving the upper pair free for other uses, as man; no other being is endowed with a means of expressing so effectively such a wide gamut of thought and feeling, and certainly none other has a comparable equipment for carrying out mental processes, and experiencing such a rich variety of thoughts and feelings.

Along with the development of these four salient traits have gone a perfection, specialization, and refinement of many other characteristics to a degree unparalleled by any other animal. It is the combination of all these features that makes man. Not all of this development, it should be noted, is advantageous to man. Some of man's most characteristic and cherished traits carry undesirable concomitants with them. Thus, man's upright posture is by no means an unqualified blessing. The structure of the human torso, and the arrangement of the vital organs, are much better adapted to a horizontal than a vertical posture, and many of the ills to which human flesh is heir are caused or accentuated by the strains occasioned by keeping a body erect that was not originally designed for that position.

So far we have been discussing the biological and psychophysical traits of man. It must be recognized, now, that many of the characteristics that distinguish humanity most sharply from all other groups are not inherent in its bodily structure at all, but are the cumulative products of this unique equipment that it enjoys. They are the artifacts, the cultural constructs, the ideas and knowledges, the arts, literatures, and philosophies which only man has created. Though external to the human body, these can hardly be thought of otherwise than as integral portions or aspects of humanity itself, and are at least as much the objects of study in social science as the immediate physical features.

Membership in the group *Homo sapiens* automatically sets the individual man in certain alignments, enlists him in certain types of struggle with nature, creates in him certain loyalties, and imbues him with certain purposes and interests common to other members of the group. This composite of affiliations, as already observed, is more important than that associated with any other group to which a human being can belong.

Sex

The next most important of the involuntary groups is sex. Long before man actually appeared upon the earth it was predetermined by the evolutionary process that humanity, when it did appear, should belong to the bisexual type of animal. Sex is itself an evolutionary product, and is both an evidence of, and a means to, the attainment of a high position on the evolutionary scale. The significance of sex is, of course, primarily connected with the reproduction of the species. Its basic evolutionary utility is that it provides for a higher degree of variation, and therefore more extensive specialization, than is possible on the asexual basis.[4] Accordingly, the distinctive traits that differentiate the sexes into two groups are mainly centered about the reproductive systems, and determine that the rôles of the male and the female, respectively, in the perpetuation of the species shall be quite different. But associated with these primary traits are numerous other features, some physical, some intellectual and emotional, that make man and woman two very different creatures, thereby providing for an exceptional variety, interest, and richness in human life and experience.[5] In the present connection, the point of importance is that these sex realities create two of the most important of all groups, to one or the other of which every human being is inescapably and irrevocably assigned, and membership in which has a predominant influence on his or her whole career.*

* It is true that even in the matter of sex the principle already alluded to, that group divisions in human affairs are seldom absolutely rigid, holds good. Not only are there those rare individuals, known as hermaphrodites, whose reproductive structure combines the traits of both male and female, but also there are more numerous persons in whom the emotional and affective characteristics lean strongly toward those of the opposite sex. Modern psychology is revealing many unanticipated facts in this field. There is even at least one apparently well-authenticated case of an actual change of sex with the aid of modern surgery.[6]

RACE

The third of the chief involuntary groups is race. This is a differentiation almost as generally recognized, and commonly mentioned, as humanity or sex. Many of the most acute and perplexing problems of modern life revolve more or less directly about the realities of race. And yet, unfortunately, the true nature of race is very poorly comprehended even by many who assume to write authoritatively about it, and is subject to the widest variety of misconceptions and confusions on the part of the general public. Almost every one is ready to talk more or less dogmatically about race, to assign various specific traits to different races, and to express his preferences for this race or that. But if you ask him to give you a definition of a race, or to tell precisely what kind of a group he has in mind when he refers to race, he usually looks at you with amazement or resentment, and flounders hopelessly if he undertakes to answer.*

Race, in its strict sense, is purely a biological concept. To get a clear notion of its precise meaning, the simplest way is to approach it from the evolutionary point of view. Let us think of man in the earliest stage of his distinct existence. Humanity, in this epoch, was represented by a single group of creatures, with a uniform physical ancestry, closely akin to one another, and highly similar in their physical and intellectual traits.† This small group probably mated exclusively, and without important restrictions as to choice‡ within itself, thereby preserving its homogeneity of type. It grew slowly in numbers until finally its original habitat or range became completely occupied, and any further expansion meant spreading out into new, and more or less different, habitation areas.

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* A remarkable instance of this situation was furnished in connection with a study of ''race distance'' that was undertaken some years ago by a group of prominent sociologists. Their list of races was a most curious hodge-podge. When asked what definition of race was adopted in the study, one of the leaders replied, in effect, ''Why, we have no definition of race. Whatever people think of as a race we regard as a race.'' And this was supposed to be a scientific study!

† For a somewhat different interpretation, see below, p. 47. This is of no great importance, in the present connection, for the adoption of the polygenetic theory of man's origin simply throws the beginning of the basic races of man back into the prehuman era. It does not in the least affect the meaning of race, or the basic process of its formation.

‡ Assuming whatever rudiments of family organization there may have been; see below, pp. 56-57.

RACE FORMATION

It is the nature of every living species, driven by the implacable reproductive urge,* to increase to the maximum numbers. Every possible resource will be tried, and every opportunity for increase offered by such resources will be availed of. But the limits of such expansion, set by nature itself, are definite and rigid. They inhere in the familiar principle of adaptation to environment. The nature of life on this globe is such that each species of organism is fitted to eke out its existence in a particular physical environment, characterized by certain features of land and water, temperature, rainfall, elevation, wind, etc. Every-day observation abundantly confirms this truth. Not only do we take it for granted that a fish cannot live on dry land or an apple tree grow in mid-ocean, but we do not expect a sperm whale to survive if transported to Lake Champlain or a polar bear to thrive on Miami Beach. Consequently, the numerical size, or population, of every species is limited by the extent of the available area to which it is organically adapted, and the features of this environment dictate the essential characteristics of the species. Thus the physical environment both limits the expansion of any species and preserves its organic homogeneity and conformity to type. The only way by which a species can expand beyond its appropriate environment is by making whatever physical adaptations are necessary to enable it to survive in a different environment. If the new environment is sufficiently different to constitute a really new habitat, the adaptations that are required to enable the organism to survive in it are usually so great as to transform it into a new species.

The human species, almost certainly, went through the primary phases of this process. Originally a single, homogeneous group, it expanded in response to the universal reproductive urge, until its original habitat was crowded with as many human beings as it could support on the level of economic activity which they had attained.* It was then faced with the universal dilemma. Either it must resign itself to a fixed numerical population (except as improvements in the arts of life created greater resources) or it must achieve sufficient adaptations in type to enable it to live in a somewhat different environment. As already suggested, every species will adopt the latter alternative as far as possible, and man was no exception. But man, apparently, had one advantage over all other species, at least of the larger animals—he was able to make the adaptations necessary for a gradual expansion into new territory without losing his specific unity. Why this was so, we can only surmise. A reasonable guess is that, by the time this extreme pressure of population on environment was reached, man had progressed sufficiently in intellectual capacity and the mastery of natural forces so that he was not as immediately and inflexibly dependent on external physical factors as other organisms are, and as he had been at the beginning. In other words, he was already able, to a limited degree, to substitute *cultural adaptation* for organic adaptation. This explains the seeming paradox of his expansion. For if it be true that the physical environment dictates, and in a certain sense creates, the organic types that live within it, while on the other hand a close adaptation to environment is essential to existence, how can a species survive in a new environment long enough to respond to its requirements, and make the necessary adaptations?—for organic modification is a slow process. Man must have moved as he adapted, and adapted as he moved. Neither factor was exclusively cause, and neither was exclusively effect. The relationship was one of those interesting reciprocal or circular ones which we shall find exhibited repeatedly in our study of social phenomena. This means that man must, by this time, have achieved a certain *margin of survival,* or margin of adaptation. He was already somewhat above the level of ordinary animal existence. This margin was virtually identical with what, in modern societies, we are in the habit of calling the standard of living.* At any rate, man appears to have been able to make such adaptations as were necessary not only to enable him to move into the next adjacent environments, but eventually to spread over the entire surface of the habitable globe, and still remain a single species.†

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* See below, pp. 307-308.

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* For a full discussion of the principles of population growth, see below, Chapter XVI.

It appears, at any rate, that the moving mass of humanity did actually undergo physical modifications that broke it up into three quite well-defined types, which are generally regarded as the basic races of man, the yellow or Mongolian, black or Negro, and white or Caucasian—also called the Indo-European. These races are described, classified, and identified by certain physical traits or features, known as race criteria. Thus the Mongolian race is said to have a yellowish skin, a medium stature, slanting eyes, high cheekbones, long, straight, black hair with a circular cross-section, stocky build, etc., along with certain intellectual, emotional, and temperamental traits. This whole matter belongs primarily in the field of anthropology, and should be followed up in the abundant literature of the subject.[7] But it should be recognized clearly that these distinguishing features are not the cause of racial affiliation, but the result of it. The possession of the features described above does not *make* a man a Mongolian. It is because he is a Mongolian that he has these features. If by chance a couple of parents belonging to the white race should bear a child with a yellowish skin, long, straight, black hair, slanting eyes, etc. (and strange things do sometimes happen in the realm of heredity), the child would not be a Mongolian. It would still be a member of the Caucasian race. There is, as a matter of fact, a certain type of feeble-minded individual that is occasionally born of white parents, that has such distinctly Oriental features that it is known as the "Mongolian idiot."

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* See below, Chapter XV.

† The concept of species is the object of much discussion among biologists as well as sociologists. A few decades ago it was regarded as a rather definite and rigid biological reality. The origin of every species (presumably the bisexual ones) was assigned to a single pair of animals, whose offspring never mated except among themselves, and the crucial test of specific unity was the ability to mate at random within the group and produce offspring that were indefinitely interfertile with each other and with any of the types included within the presumed species. The offspring of different species were hybrids, and had limited fertility, if any; the offspring of different types within the species were mongrels. Latterly, the tendency has been to modify this rigid and clean-cut notion of species, or even to abandon the concept altogether.

What determines the racial affiliation of an individual is his biological ancestry. The members of a given race are more closely related to one another in physical kinship than they are to the members of other races. If the genealogies of all the members of a given race could be traced backward, they would be found to unite in a single pair of individuals or a small group (probably the latter) before they merged with the ancestors of other races in a common humanity. The "family tree" is a much more accurate representation of the actual nature of race than most popular figures are. The formation of races is a process of branching off of the human stock from a single original trunk. The details of the branching that actually took place are not known with complete certainty, but we can reconstruct them with sufficient accuracy to serve our present purpose of understanding race. Let us suppose that the original human trunk developed in central Asia, which seems to be as near the probable truth as we can come at present.[8] From this region successive waves of population have flowed out in different directions from time immemorial down close to the present. The one which was responsible for the formation of the Negro race made its way into Africa, either across a continent which has since sunk beneath the waters of the Indian Ocean, or else through Asia Minor into the northeast corner of the continent. In this "area of characterization" it proceeded to develop the specific traits which are now regarded as characteristic of the Negro race. Another very early human current flowed into Europe, very likely passing through North Africa on its way, and there developed into the white race. Through northeastern Asia, in all probability, another stream flowed into the American continents by way of Alaska, and there developed the set of traits that identify the American Indian. These examples will suffice to illustrate the general process.

In the very primitive stage of human civilization at which these movements took place, it is easy to understand that each offshoot, once separated from the parent stem, would remain in a state of almost complete isolation. The means of communication and locomotion were of the most elementary sort, and the difficulties and effort of travel so great that extensive movements would not be undertaken except in response to the most urgent necessity. Furthermore, since the pressure at home continued, there would be little inducement or opportunity for a reverse current. Accordingly, the influences of the new environment would be augmented by general inbreeding. Any hereditary tendencies to peculiar variations with which chance had endowed each group would tend to be intensified and perpetuated. The direct relationship of the different main habitation areas to the traits that were characterized in each respectively has never been explained in full detail. There is general agreement that the heavily pigmented skin of the Negro is a valuable protection against the moist heat and intense light of the tropics, and it has been suggested that the kinky hair of this race provides air pockets which help to insulate the skull from the direct rays of the sun. But beyond a few such simple interpretations little has been accomplished in tracing the various traits of the different races to specific causes. It would be difficult to explain, for instance, why environments so similar as Europe and North America should have favored types as diverse as the Caucasian and the American Indian.

RACE REALITIES

However, the causation of race is not of so much importance in the study of sociology as the *fact* of race considered as a matter of closeness of kinship, and community of ancestry and descent. By now, enough should have been said to make it clear that race is strictly a biological concept. If the question arises as to what degree of kinship is sufficient to constitute a race, or how large a kin-group must be to be considered a race, or how far back the common origin of a true race must lie, all that can be said is that the answers to these questions are largely matters of convenience and custom or convention.

There is no question that the first three, four, or five major groups into which the human species divided itself are appropriately to be called races. It is reasonable to consider that the first, or even the second, subdivision of any one of these may also be called races. But how much further than this it is helpful to go is doubtful. It may have occurred to you that the single modern family falls logically within the definition of a race, and this is true. But it is not practically helpful to subdivide the concept to this extent. An idea of the customary practice of anthropologists may be gained from the following example: The human species as a whole may be divided into the yellow, black, and white races. The white race may be divided into the Indian and European branches. The European branch may be divided into the Mediterranean, Alpine, and Nordic races. The Mediterranean race may be divided into the Libyan, Iberian, Ligurian, and Pelasgian races. Any further subdivisions, even though conforming to the criteria of biological kinship, would hardly be designated races according to accepted practice.

Now if these racial groups, each segregated in its respective area of characterization, had remained permanently and completely isolated, the race problem, both theoretically and practically, would have been immeasurably simpler than it is. All races would have been pure. They would have been easy to describe and identify, and there would have been little difficulty in assigning practically every individual to his appropriate race. But in point of fact, from very early times men began to wander about, overlap each other's territory, and mingle biologically to a very great extent. The paleontological history of mankind is replete with the evidences of innumerable and far-reaching shifts. As to the total frequency, range, and significance of these early wanderings anthropologists differ.[9] But in any case, there is a considerable approximation to truth in the assertion so often made that there are no pure races today, if by that is meant a group of people which has had no admixture of outside germ plasm from the time when it first branched off from the original human stock, or one of its primary subdivisions. But this fact by no means justifies the inference so frequently drawn that racial realities are today of no practical significance, and that racial differences might as well be ignored in the discussion of contemporary problems. For even though race mixture has taken place for ages, it has not taken place in just the same way in all parts of the earth, and the ingredients of the mixed races of today are by no means the same. Now a mixed race, if composed of definite elements in fixed proportions, may have its own distinctive traits, just as characteristic as those of a pure race. This may be illustrated by the case of certain well-known dogs. All dogs are supposed to belong to the same species, and the types of dogs that we know are the various races of the species.* Possibly there may be some pure races among the dogs of today. But most of the breeds that we know are the product of crossings, sometimes of various crossings; yet they have very definite and permanent traits. For example, the Boston bull is one of the most distinctive and individualistic breeds of dogs familiar in the United States. Its traits are constant and permanent as long as the strain is kept intact. But it is by no means a pure race, but a very complex product. Into its making went contributions from the English bulldog, the fox terrier, the Pit bull, and the English bull terrier. So, to come back to the human field, the Anglo-Saxon population of England and the Japanese are both mixed races; yet they are as distinctive, and as different from each other, as if both were pure.

The significance of race in the problems of contemporary life, both national and international, will be clearly exemplified later in this study. For the present, it is sufficient to recognize it as one of the most vital and influential of all the groups to which we belong.

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* It is clear that the concept of race is one which is not confined to man, but may be applied to any organic species. It is, in fact, so used by biologists.

CHAPTER II

SEMI-VOLUNTARY AND VOLUNTARY GROUPS

THE FAMILY

Turning now to the second general category of groups, the semi-voluntary, it is not surprising to find that the first to be considered is a definite combination of the biological and the sociological. This is the family. Looking backward, membership in a family is distinctly biological; looking forward, it is sociological. No one chooses the family into which he is to be born, any more than he chooses his humanity, his sex, or his race. He comes into this world a member of a certain family, and biologically he must remain a member of that family as long as he lives. In this sense the family is obviously just the smallest subdivision of the general category of race, as already suggested. It is the end product of the process by which races are created. Any pure race, however numerous, could rightly be regarded as a great family, since all its members would be descended from the same ancestors. Indeed, it is impossible logically to draw a dividing line indicating just where the concept of race ends and the concept of family begins. Our customary practice in that respect is essentially a matter of habit, convenience, and common sense.

But looking forward, membership in a family is distinctly a voluntary and sociological affair. In the first place, as soon as an individual reaches a degree of mental development where choice is possible his continued membership in a given family group becomes subject to his will. And this comes early. Boys and girls run away from home at very tender ages. Of course they are still subject to the will of society, which ordinarily returns them to their parents if it can catch them. But nevertheless, in essence their membership is determined by their own choice. In the second place, when a member of a given family reaches the conventional age of marriage it is fully expected that he will break away from the parental roof-tree and establish a family of his own in a voluntary way. The precise degree to which the will involved in this act is "free," and also the location of the volitional power, differ greatly in different societies. In the United States, the choice is supposed to be left almost entirely to the two persons directly concerned. This is an essential part of our mores.* "The girl of my choice" is to be taken quite literally. But even here, certain limitations on choice are imposed by society, particularly with respect to age and degrees of kinship, sometimes mental development and health, and the parents may assert other restrictions on the basis of wealth, race, occupation, social status, or a thousand and one other considerations.

In other countries, such as China and Japan, the parents play a much more decisive part in the arrangement of marriages, reaching such an extreme, for instance, among the pre-War Armenians, as the actual betrothal of two young people (conditioned, of course, upon sex) before the birth of one or both of them. Again, in some primitive societies, such as the aboriginal Australians, the conventional societal regulations on the choice of a mate are so strict and so elaborate that in extreme cases there is only one girl in the whole tribe that a given young man can legally marry.

The biological features of the family, being so nearly identical with those of race, call for no further consideration here. The sociological features are such an integral and important part of the whole study of sociology that they will need to be taken up in considerable detail later.

The Church

The second important group in the semi-voluntary class is the religious group. This is a strictly sociological group—there is nothing biological about it. Yet in a certain sense, particularly in certain countries,[1] an individual is "born into" his religion. Membership in a particular religious body is so completely a part of the family unity that long before the new individual has attained either the capacity or the opportunity for choice he has come to take this religious affiliation for granted. It has become so thoroughly ingrained in his nature that any departure from it can be carried out only at the cost of some amount of effort and suffering. To be sure, innumerable individuals, as they enter into full command of their deliberative and discriminating faculties, may make such a breach, some attaching themselves to other religious groups, and more, perhaps, allowing the religious tie to lapse or to fall into a position of relative inconsequence. Theoretically, therefore, religious membership may be considered as potentially a matter of the will as soon as the power of choice has developed, and it is therefore accurately described as semi-voluntary.

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* See pp. 189-191.

The Political Party

Another group, very similar in this aspect to the church, is, in the United States, the political party. Most of us "get our politics from our parents" in much the same way as we do our religion, and the great majority never change this affiliation. But on the other hand, a great many individuals do change their party, and such a course is always potentially open to any one of sufficient maturity. So these groups are also semi-voluntary.

Occupation

In the days of feudalism, trade or occupation formed a semi-voluntary class of much the same sort as religion and politics. It was assumed, and practically enforced by the customs of society, that a young man should follow the same occupation as his father. This was so completely a matter of convention that neither parent nor child often questioned it. But even at the height of feudalism the opportunity to exercise choice in this matter was at least theoretically present.

Society

But far and away the most important group in the second class, from the point of view of this study, is society itself.

Since society is, by common consent, an important part of the subject matter of all treatises on sociology or social science, it has received a vast amount of analysis and discussion. There are almost as many definitions of society as there are writers on sociology. In common parlance, the word is used to include groups of diverse types, all the way from a little "sewing society" that may not have half a dozen members and may "meet" only once a month, to the whole of humanity itself, as indicated by the term popularized by Graham Wallas, "The Great Society." The definitions adopted by some of the leading writers are as follows:

Blackmar and Gillin:[2]

> Society then may be defined as any group of sentient beings who are more or less alike, who recognize more or less clearly that fact, and who have recognized common interests in their social relationships.

Edward A. Ross:[3]

> Therefore, we cannot do better than adopt the definition framed by Giddings: "Any group or number of human individuals who cultivate acquaintance and mental agreement, and who, knowing and enjoying their own likemindedness, are able to work together for common ends, is a Human Society."

Frank H. Hankins:[4]

> MacIver defines society as "every willed relationship of man to man." . . . We may for our purposes here define a society as any permanent or continuing grouping of men, women, and children, able to carry on independently the processes of racial perpetuation and maintenance, on their own cultural level.

MacIver in a later work offers a modified definition, as follows:[5]

> In sum, then, society is the system of social relationships in and through which we live.

Numerous other writers do not attempt to formulate a definition of society in a concise sentence, but prefer to build up a picture by describing its salient features, or to let the concept develop progressively out of the study of its various aspects.

It is not absolutely essential to have a definition of society explicitly phrased before one can start a profitable study of group relationships. Yet some kind of a working definition is helpful, and for that reason the following is suggested: A society is a group of human beings cooperating in the pursuit of a number of common interests, including some, at least, of the basic interests. The meaning and nature of interests will be made clearer in due time; for the present the every-day interpretation of the term will suffice.

This is evidently a pragmatic definition. Of all the groups to which an individual may belong, society is that which has most to do with his existence and career, and which most immediately conditions his activities and development. Society is the group with which the individual deals most intimately in getting things done which interest him, and conversely society is the group that most positively restrains and restricts him in doing things which he, as an individual, desires to do.

The comprehension of the meaning of society will grow naturally as we proceed; for the present, it will suffice to think of it as definitely the "functioning group" of human beings.

Included within society, and often so closely coterminous with it as to be mistakenly identified or confused with it, or with one another, are three other groups of the semi-voluntary type. These are the state, the nationality, and the nation. All of them have tremendous influence upon the individuals and subgroups that compose them. Each has a distinct and characteristic rôle, an understanding of which is essential to a grasp of many theoretical and practical issues.

THE STATE

The state is one of the most concrete, objective, and clearly recognized of all social groups. Yet it is one of the most difficult to understand—perhaps a full comprehension of it is beyond the scope of the human mind. It is one of the earliest groups to receive careful and analytical study, and some of the finest classics in various languages have had it as their theme. Yet even today there is no approach to unanimity among scholars as to its origin, nature, and functions. There are perhaps even more definitions of the state than there are of society.

Perhaps a first step toward the grasp of its essential nature is the clear realization that the state, in spite of the frequent confusion alluded to above, is not synonymous or identical with society. There have been societies where there was no state.[6] Yet the individuals affiliated with the state are usually to a large extent identical with those that compose the corresponding society. Perhaps the best way to think of the state is as an aspect of society, and more explicitly as an *instrumental aspect* of society. Perhaps, also, it is best to conceive of the state in terms of its basic function. So considered, the state is that aspect of society which is authorized and equipped to use force.

At first thought, this may seem like a very narrow, inadequate, and even brutal conception of an institution that is so diversified, and performs so many beneficent functions, as the modern state. But, as we shall see later, the essential nature of society's relations with its members is control; and the foundation, and final resort, of control is always force. We shall also see that society has other resources, far more extensive in their operation than force, for holding its members in line, but some of these could not be fully effective without force in the background, and control in general could never be complete without the expedient of force. But the exercise of force, whether by individuals or groups, is always dangerous, and must itself be rigorously restricted. Consequently society, the central functioning group among humanity, very early apprehended the necessity of confining the authorized use of force to itself, and this, in turn, involved the delimiting of certain aspects and agencies of society to assume this responsibility.

All of this can be more easily understood when we have looked a little more deeply into the springs of human conduct, and the necessity and means of control. The full consideration of the state, therefore, can best be postponed until later.

NATIONALITY

The distinction between society and nationality is essentially one of feeling, emotion, and sympathy. Keep in mind the basic principle that society is the functioning group. It is the group so unified as to get results, the practical results upon which rest the existence, comfort, and material security of human beings. Within an adequately functioning society there may be many subordinate groups among which the attitudes vary all the way from indifference to bitter hatred and enmity. Take, for example, that society which we call "The United States of America." As a whole, it can easily be recognized as a unit, functioning with respect to all the great interests of life. There is an American family system, an American industrial organization, an American government, American public schools, an American system of transportation combining railroads, roads, and canals, a system of communication by mail, telephone, and telegraph, and so on down an extended list. Each of these systems is integrated on a society-wide basis, and without destructive friction serves the needs of the society as a whole. But within this society there are innumerable groups whose characteristic attitude toward each other, if operating independently, would be more or less thoroughly disruptive. First of all there is the great racial division between the whites and the Negroes. In response to stern necessity these two races have worked out a *modus vivendi*, and are able to participate with some degree of harmony in the great task of keeping American society operating efficiently. Yet who can doubt that if they were perfectly free to follow their inclinations they would separate and set up independent bases of existence. Then there are the numerous other racial or pseudo-racial groups, among which various degrees of hatred and hostility prevail, Semites and non-Semites, Turks and Armenians, Chinese and Japanese, Italians and French, English and Irish, all held together in some degree of cooperation by the necessities of a common existence. Time would fail to enumerate even a fractional part of all the intrinsically antagonistic subgroups in the great American unit—Democrats, Republicans, Socialists, and Communists; manufacturers' associations and trade unions; Daughters of the American Revolution and Radicals; Yale, Harvard, and Princeton; the American League and the National League; Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Christian Scientists; adherents of the Culbertson system and the Lenz system; free traders and high-tariff exponents, etc., etc. Enough has been said to show that the basis of societal unity is not emotional fellow feeling or sympathy, but practical expedience or necessity.

But fellow feeling and sympathy are very powerful factors in human affairs, and there are groups in which they form the essential principle of unity. These groups may appropriately be called nationalities. A nationality is a group the members of which spontaneously *feel* that they belong together because of their sympathy with one another respecting a number of the great interests of life. It is a spiritual unity, in the truest sense of that word.

To grasp the idea of nationality one should ask himself, What is it that makes me feel that I belong with other people, that makes me sympathize with them, that makes me react to their experiences in much the same manner (though in lesser degree) as if they were my own? Why, for instance, when you read of a railroad accident in a foreign country, are you more moved by the death of two fellow countrymen (though you never heard of them before) than of fifty natives of the country? Why did the heart of every American get a special thrill from the fact that the first solo flight across the Atlantic was performed by a youth named Lindbergh?

Traits of Nationality: Language

If you look into these questions carefully you will discover that there are certain fundamental aspects of life, or phases of activity, identity in which creates a definite bond of sympathy between people. Probably the foremost of these is language. The rôle of language in human affairs is an extensive and fascinating field of study in itself. Its indispensability in conducting practical negotiations is easily recognized, but its emotional character is not always fully understood. And yet, when we stop to think about it, we realize that there is scarcely anything else that so automatically serves to establish a bond between ourselves and others as community of language, or which creates such a serious barrier as diversity of tongue. This is not surprising when we reflect that language is the primary medium for the expression, in any definite way, not only of ideas and information, but, also of feelings, emotions, and sympathies. Not only do we recognize that no close comradeship is possible with others where no language bridge exists, but we also come to feel subconsciously that our own native language is the finest, the only really "right," language in the world. We are amused or even irritated by the way the Germans string their words together in sentences with the verb at the end, by the absurd way the French pronounce their language, by the rapid monosyllables of Chinese, by all "guttural," "nasal," or "sing-song" languages. The author had a striking illustration of this in his own experience. He was walking up one of the long platforms in the Grand Central Station in New York when he was suddenly conscious of an intense feeling of irritation. At first the cause of the feeling was unknown, but he soon became conscious that three men behind him were talking in a strange tongue. Now the writer had heard many different foreign languages and was entirely familiar with the sound of several. But on this occasion the mere impact of these strange sounds on his ear was sufficient to set up an acute emotional disturbance. Our language becomes a very part of ourselves, an indispensable feature of the spiritual environment necessary for our normal existence. It is doubtful if any single factor is more potent in causing homesickness than the absence of the familiar language. Anyone can testify to this statement who has been even a week completely away from the sound of his native tongue, even though he knows the local language.

TRAITS OF NATIONALITY: RELIGION

Perhaps the second most important bond of this kind is religion. This point hardly needs elaboration. Religion, by its very nature, is emotional, exclusive, and self-assertive. The distinctions between believer and heretic, orthodox and renegade, the true faith and heathenism, belief and superstition, deism and atheism are virtually inseparable from every known religion. From infancy up, the children of the faithful are taught by precept and example to shun, pity, scorn, loathe, or fight the followers of false gods. The extremes at the two ends of this gamut of emotions are exemplified by the activities of genuinely altruistic and devoted missionaries, seeking to convert the benighted pagans from the error of their ways, and relentless religious wars of extermination. Two strangers meeting in a foreign land who wear the same emblem, or cross themselves in precisely the same way, or murmur the same incantation in the face of danger are immediately drawn to each other, however much they may differ in other respects. All this, as observed above, is commonplace. The reason for it is of less importance in the present connection than the fact of it. But it may be worth while to observe in passing that one reason is that religion is essentially a matter of belief. The postulates, dogmas, and forms of religion are never susceptible of proof, and very seldom subject even to rational argument. Now, strange as it may seem, the more a proposition is a matter of sheer belief or faith, and the less it is susceptible to proof or demonstration, the more intensely does the average individual feel about it, the more passionately does he uphold its verity, and the more outraged is he by one who maintains a different view. And consequently, the greater is the difficulty of getting together. You may convince a man that he is wrong about a matter that is subject to overt evidence and demonstration, but it is well-nigh impossible to get him to give up his convictions in matters of faith. For, in the nature of the case, his belief, to him at least, is just as good as yours, and there is no possibility of proving otherwise. We may be induced to change our "minds," but it is very hard for us to be persuaded to change our "hearts." Compare, for example, the case of two engineers arguing as to the relative merits of hardwood and aluminum for the propeller of an airplane, or two economists debating free trade and high tariffs, with that of two religious leaders discussing the claims of Buddhism and Confucianism. True, conversions do take place, and have taken place by the hundreds of thousands. But quite generally there are various other factors involved than the relative merits of the two religions—the recognized superiority of one representative group over the other, economic or political considerations, fear or force, practical inducements, and so on. Frequently, also, there is doubt as to how far or how deep the actual emotional transformation goes. Very often conversion is merely the substitution of one set of names or formulas for another. And anyway, we are not talking about impossibilities, but about relative facility.

Traits of Nationality: Dress

Dress is another group feature which is purely a matter of feeling, but generally quite intense feeling. Our attitude toward those who dress differently from ourselves is more likely to be one of amusement or derision than loathing or hatred, but it is none the less potent in creating the "we-feeling" among those who dress according to the same mode, and the "you-feeling" toward those differently attired. Nothing is a surer cause of shame, embarrassment, and self-consciousness, particularly among children, than to be dressed at variance with a group with which one wishes to establish an *entente cordiale.* To be sure, we may profess sincere admiration for the grace, beauty, or convenience of the costumes of certain other people, and we may travel many weary miles to see them, but we feel mighty queer when we put one on, and nothing could drive us to walk down the streets of our native town in one of them.

OTHER TRAITS OF NATIONALITY

Other items of varying importance in this list of spiritual bonds are the family system, educational customs—note the attitude of students in segregated colleges toward their compatriots in coeducational institutions, and vice versa—food, recreation, ornament, manners, and so on. Many of these are closely associated with the folkways, a concept that will be discussed later. The points that they have in common, and that are important in grasping the idea of nationality, are that they are features of a type of group that does not necessarily coincide with any other group, that they have a high unifying or separative potential, and that this potential is emotional rather than intellectual or rational. How completely irrational many of these factors are may be realized by consideration of the shifting styles in dress, particularly among women, in one's own country. These go through endless changes and fluctuations, often of a rotatory character, duplicating with more or less precision the modes of an earlier generation, but with no consistency or adherence to any general principles of beauty, hygiene, or convenience. Yet at any given moment the authority of the current mode is absolute, and fully as much embarrassment is caused to the young débutante who departs from it as if she appeared in the garb of some foreign land—perhaps more. At the moment when these words are written* the styles in women's dress seem to be verging directly toward the "puffed," or "leg-of-mutton," sleeves which were so popular in that much-ridiculed decade of the "gay nineties." Of course, the modes of today are "sweet," "ducky"—no, it was in the nineties that things were ducky—"trick" and "chic," but no more so than were long sleeves, or cap sleeves, or three-quarter sleeves, or sleeves puffed at the elbow or at the bottom, or no sleeves at all, when each respectively was in fashion.

The nature of fashion will be discussed more fully in a later section, as will the much more important question of the moral code and related standards of conduct, which are also significant factors in nationality. But one who has grasped the real nature of the items already discussed will be able to form a workable concept of nationality. A nationality is a group, the unifying and distinguishing features of which are a composite of these various human concerns about which people feel alike or differently. The members of a nationality spontaneously feel that they belong together, they crave a common life, they react in similar ways to the same stimuli, they feel at home with one another. There is some difference of usage as to whether the term nationality should be applied to the people themselves or to the composite of customs, beliefs, traditions, habits, conventions, modes, standards, and values. That is, shall we say that a certain body of people *are* a nationality, or that they belong to a nationality or embody a nationality? This question, however, is mainly of mere academic importance. The difference in usage is generally made clear in the context, and if the central notion of nationality is grasped, no confusion need result.

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* This prospect was not fully realized.

Relation between Society and Nationality

The relation of society to nationality is of much importance, but it is somewhat difficult to comprehend at first approach because of the frequency with which the two virtually coincide. Thus, the society that we call France is virtually coincident with the French nationality. That which we call the United States, or, illogically enough, "America," is much less closely paralleled by an American nationality. If nationality and society were always identical, one definition would suffice for both, and both the theoretical exposition and real life would be much simpler. But very frequently they are not, and in fact the lack of coincidence is responsible for a great deal of the actual friction and disturbance in what are called "international" relations. Neither is nationality identical with the state. In fact, the state is more closely coterminous with society than is nationality. The state, as already pointed out, can best be considered as an aspect or even an organ of society. A given nationality may exceed the bounds of any one state or society in the commoner sense, or it may cover several states and societies. On the other hand, a single state or society may include several nationalities. A good example of the former situation is afforded by the British nationality, which includes not only England, Scotland, and parts of Ireland, but also Canada, South Africa, and Australia, which are virtually independent states and separate societies, although willingly enmeshed in the tenuous strands of British imperialism. India is also a part of the British Empire, but by no means a part of the British nationality—hence the trouble. An example of the second situation is afforded by pre-War Austria-Hungary, or by post-War Yugoslavia. The former empire constituted a functioning society with a powerful state. But within it were included such diverse nationalities as Germans, Czechs or Bohemians, Poles, Slovenes, Slovaks, Croatians, Jews, and Italians. The bonds of its unity were therefore partial, and its status as a group unstable. It was held together mainly by the external pressure of surrounding rival states. It was inevitable that the concussions of the Great War should shatter it to bits, and leave the once proud empire nothing more than a page in history. The Peace Conference, with how much disinterestedness we need not stop to inquire, undertook to reconstitute these fragments into new societies and states. One of these was Yugoslavia, the correct title of which—the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—is sufficiently ominous of internal disharmony. It soon became evident that the bonds of nationality within this new unit were so much stronger than the artificial ties of statehood that it was necessary to set up two separate capitals, Belgrade in Servia and Zagreb or Agram in Croatia,* with a considerable duplication of departments, bureaus, and officials. What the future of this heterogeneous unit will be time alone can tell. Another new state set up by the Peace Conference was the Republic of Czechoslovakia. Here the clash of nationalities is not so serious as in the case just described, but the feeling toward the large German population is far from cordial, and the Czechs and Slovaks are by no means a single nationality. In fact, if one were required to sum up in a single word the basic realities that make the Balkans the trouble center of Europe, he could find no better term than "nationality."

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* The influence and characteristic behavior of nationality are excellently illustrated by the numerous changes in place names that took place when, after the War, various nationalities gained control of cities which had formerly been dominated by outside powers. Spalato was changed to Split, Agram to Zagreb, Ragusa to Dubrovnik, etc. In a somewhat similar spirit Christiania was changed to Oslo, St. Petersburg first to Petrograd and then to Leningrad, and Constantinople to Istanbul.

Relation between Nationality and Race

The relation between nationality and race is another source of much confusion, and is perhaps more intricate than that between nationality and society. The key to correct thinking on this point is that race is strictly a biological reality, whereas nationality is strictly a cultural reality. All race traits are acquired by physical inheritance, and in no other way. One's membership in a certain race is predetermined for him by the facts of his ancestry, and he has no power to change it, or alter it in the slightest degree, during his lifetime. Neither can the individual exercise any influence over the race of his offspring, as far as his own contribution is concerned. If one wishes his children to be of a different race from himself, the best he can do is to mate with someone of another race, in which case the offspring will probably have a combination of the two sets of traits, though what precise form the mixture will take no one can foretell. Race is one of the great unalterable constants with which, as will be shown later, society has to deal.

One reason for the confusion between race and nationality is that they so often go together. This is natural enough. If one recalls how races were developed, and how cultural traits grow, he will see readily that the two are often inevitably associated. Imagine an early offshoot of the great human stock established in its area of characterization, and undergoing the physical transformations that the situation calls for. They will at the same time be developing cultural characteristics, of language, religion, sex customs, etc., which are distinctly their own. If their isolation, and segregation from outside influences, were absolute they would in time develop cultural traits that were absolutely unique. A stranger visiting them for the first time would discover both physical and cultural features which were to be found nowhere else in the world. He would naturally recount them as the interesting traits of this people. Unless he were a well-trained anthropologist and ethnologist he would not make a sharp distinction between the physical or hereditary, and the cultural or traditional. He would describe them in some such fashion as this: "On the island of Sumtum, in the southern mid-Pacific, lives an interesting tribe known as the Yugubgub, who have never before been visited by a white man, or, as far as can be discovered, by any other outsider. They are of very small stature, with a dark, yellowish brown skin, black eyes, black hair that hangs in tight spirals over their shoulders, and thick lips. The lobe of the left ear is missing, and there are deep longitudinal furrows across the forehead. The head has a peculiar conical shape. They speak a language remotely related to that of the Dyaks of Borneo, they worship a large bird of the vulture family, have a musical system corresponding to one of the numerous Chinese scales, and wear a loincloth made of the twisted bark of a certain kind of palm tree. They are necessarily endogamic as far as the tribe is concerned, but in addition there is a rigid family system which requires them to marry within the second degree of kinship. The birth-rate is low, only about one pregnancy in three resulting in a live birth." Etc., etc., etc. Now the reader of this interesting commentary would get a vivid picture of an exotic group of people, with many strange traits, which it would be quite exciting to visit. But he would not have any notion which of these traits were hereditary and which were cultural. They would all be the distinguishing features of the Yugubgub. Are the missing lobe of the ear and the furrowed brow peculiar anatomical traits, or are they artificially induced early in the existence of each new individual? Is the frequent premature termination of pregnancy due to inherited structural or functional characters, or to the practice of close inbreeding, or is artificial abortion employed? Are the tight spirals of the hair natural, or are they the result of a curling process? Is the conical head due to genes in the germ plasm or to peculiar methods of cradling or binding infants? Is the short stature truly biological, or due to malnutrition or some dwarfing element in the diet?

Very much this sort of thing actually happened in the early stages of the accumulation of ethnological and anthropological data. To a large extent the sources of the original knowledge about remote peoples were the writings of missionaries, explorers, navigators, and commercial travelers. The authors were not trained in the human sciences, even to the limited extent that they were developed in those days. Many of them were keen and accurate observers, and hence their writings were seized upon with avidity by would-be scientific analysts and systematizers. Even as relatively late writers as Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner were compelled to rely largely on data of this sort. Inevitably, therefore, there developed a wide-spread confusion, laxity, and indifference in the use of these terms, and a lamentable failure to distinguish between traits latent in the germ plasm and those that were transmitted by tradition, custom, precept, or education. This error affected not only the casual lay reader or student, but even those who professed to speak with authority. Such egregious absurdities as the "Aryan race" or the "Celtic race" became current even in supposedly scientific literature.* Once more, it should be emphasized that these distinctions are not of mere academic interest, but are of the most vital practical significance. Many of the most difficult and menacing problems of modern life on the wide scale revolve around group realities, and it makes all the difference in the world what kind of a group is involved. A concrete illustration is furnished by the matter of immigration. This phenomenon involves the movement of people from one group to another. Naturally, they bring their traits with them. The traits that are truly racial cannot be got rid of during the lifetime of the immigrant, nor of his descendants of the same race, for indefinite generations. But the traits that are national are at least susceptible of modification under favorable circumstances. An instance of the characteristic confusion in this field is afforded by Frances Kellor's book, "Immigration and the Future," in which the indiscriminate and interchangeable use of the terms race and nationality vitiates much of the discussion.

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* Both Aryan and Celtic are strictly cultural concepts. There is no such thing as an Aryan or Celtic race. As Max Müller graphically expressed it, it is as absurd to talk of an Aryan race as of a dolichocephalic dictionary or a brachycephalic grammar.[7] But Herr Hitler would probably not subscribe to this.

Nationality an Acquired Trait

It is because nationality is an acquired trait, and can therefore be changed within a lifetime, or between generations, that it is classed with the semi-volitional groups. Every individual is born into a nationality, just as truly, but not in the same way, as he is born into a race. He starts his existence surrounded by social forms and influences, which, in the natural course of events, will irresistibly determine many of the features of his personality and life. He will speak the language of the group, he will worship their gods, he will play their games, he will wear the same kind of clothes (or none) that they do, he will practice their vices and emulate their virtues. To this extent his membership in the group is involuntary. Up to this point he has exercised no choice.

To visualize these distinctions one can hardly do better than to use the familiar old illustration of a child born of parents belonging to one group, but brought up within an entirely different group. Let us imagine, for instance, a couple of Swedish explorers, Mr. and Mrs. John Martinson, who have a baby born in a remote region of central Africa. The mother dies in childbirth, and on the same day the father is killed by a lion. The little boy is adopted by one of the native tribes of the district, and brought up as their own. What would he be like when he was ten years old? We feel certain that some of his features would be the same as if he had been born in northern Europe. He would have the fair hair, blue eyes, and light skin of his Scandinavian parents. His skin would doubtless be darkened to a deep brown, but the coloration would be tan, not the permanent pigmentation of the Negro race, and if he were to go to a colder and darker climate it would eventually disappear. His stature would approximate that of his ancestral stock, unless it had been stunted by poor feeding or other unfavorable conditions. The shape of his head, and its separate features would conform to the Nordic type, unless artificially mutilated or deformed in accordance with some tribal custom. The quality of his intellect, and his emotional and temperamental disposition, would be Scandinavian. All of these things would be derived by biological heredity from his parents. But his language, dress, games, religion, ideas of nature, moral notions, dexterity in hunting, attitude toward his neighbors, etc., would have been inculcated in him by his adoptive parents and their group. Out of courtesy to his parents, his last name might be Martinson, but his given name would probably be Mbwanga. His cultural equipment would be that of a central African tribe.

But this situation need not necessarily be permanent. Soon after Mbwanga's tenth birthday another party of European explorers might arrive in the village, notice this obviously unusual child, and from records or trinkets left by his parents and preserved by the natives identify him as the son of Mr. and Mrs. Martinson. With the consent of the tribe, he might be taken back to Sweden. What then would happen? We may be sure of one thing—there would be a very difficult and trying period for little Mbwanga. He would be desperately homesick for the sights, sounds, and smells of the village that had been his home. He would miss the daily routine of worship, hunting, and recreation. He would rebel against the restraints and artificialities of his new surroundings, and would resent the efforts to wean him away from his old ideas and habits, and to induct him into new ways of behaving and expressing himself. But in time the new environment and the new educative influences would win out. His skin would gradually bleach out, the wild look would fade from his eyes, he would become fluent in the Swedish tongue, his deportment and attitudes toward others would be essentially the same as the other boys of the neighborhood, and long before he reached maturity he would be a perfect little Swedish gentleman.

Possibly in the deep places of his mind and emotions there would still lurk some reminiscences of his early experiences, but to the casual observer he would be indistinguishable from the rest of his group.

In brief, an individual cannot change his race, but he can change his nationality. As soon as he reaches the age of discrimination and deliberation he may make a choice about his nationality. Or, without any choice of his own, he may find himself introduced into circumstances where his nationality is inevitably modified. Or, again, he may, by a deliberate choice, change his residence with no intention of changing his nationality, and eventually wake up to the fact that such a change has actually taken place. These changes are associated with the great phenomenon of social assimilation, which can be considered more effectively at a later point, particularly in connection with immigration.

Relation between Nationality and Nation

Perhaps the most difficult of all distinctions with reference to nationality is that between nationality and nation. The similarity of the words, and their frequent interchange in current discussions, make the dividing principle between them very elusive. But it is vitally important.

The key to this distinction may be found in the difference between aspiration and realization. We have already observed that the dominating feature of nationality is a harmony of feeling with reference to a number of the great emotional realities of life, a sympathetic response to the experiences of other members of the group, an intense desire for a common life and group self-determination. It is when this desire comes to fruition that a nation is born. In a compact expression, a nation may be defined as a nationality that has a piece of land and a state of its own. Obviously, such a group will almost automatically conform to the requirements of a society, for it will have all the essentials for smooth and efficient functioning. Indeed, it is virtually necessary for it to be a society in order to have a state or to be able to possess and control land. It follows that the ideal human group, from the point of view of security, stability, and efficient functioning, and the most nearly complete satisfaction of the desires and cravings of social man, is realized when society, race, and nation coalesce, when the functioning group, the biological group, and the spiritual group are identical.

PERFECT NATION RARE

It need hardly be observed that such ideal groups are very rare in the annals of history or in modern life. Very seldom are the group unities of race, territorial establishment, culture, and function entirely coterminous. Almost every conceivable combination and intermingling of these group affiliations could be found among social units that actually exist, or have existed. The outstanding example of a nationality that has not for centuries been identified with nation or society is furnished by the Jews. There is scarcely any other group of equal size within which the spiritual bonds are as consistent and as powerful as among the Jews. But, scattered over the earth as they are, they have no territorial establishment, and lacking both this and governmental autonomy, they cannot possibly constitute either nation or society. But their craving for group self-realization and identity, and their tenacious cleaving to their distinctive culture, give a peculiar ruggedness to their group unity, and naturally and inevitably cause them to be disturbing elements in whatever societies they attempt to incorporate themselves with. For it is inherent in the nature of society to distrust, resent, and resist the presence in its midst of groups with too strong self-centered or separatist tendencies, which will inevitably impede the smooth functioning which is the *raison d'être* of society. In these facts is found the strongest logical argument for the Zionist movement. The emotional attitude of the Jews, the world over, toward Palestine is one of deep reverence and affection. It is inextricably intertwined with the proudest phases of their national history and tradition. There is not the slightest probability that any considerable proportion of the modern Jewish population would ever go to live in Palestine, even under the most favorable circumstances. Setting aside, for the purpose of the argument, the existing Arab population, and their reasonable claims to the territory, it is hard to see how the land could be made to support a very large number of people. Furthermore, very few Jews, relatively, would choose to make their residence there. Certainly not all the leaders of the Zionist movement themselves have taken up their domicile in Jerusalem or its environs. But every nationality craves a focus for its loyalties. It yearns for a land that it can think of as "home," whether or not the individual member has the least expectation of residing there, for a government to which it can yield fealty, for a society in the achievements of which it can take pride. If the Jewish people had such a center in which their own distinctive culture could be cherished and brought to its more perfect efflorescence, it would go far to remove their restlessness and discontent in other lands, and diminish their insistence on the preservation of their own national individuality in the midst of hostile or unfavorable social environments. But, unfortunately for the just realization of such a desirable goal, there is the Arab population, with its own nationality, and its own natural and logical claims to the land.

Another similar illustration on a smaller scale is furnished by the Armenians. They are an ancient people, biologically one of the most ancient among the white races, but for centuries they have had no territorial autonomy and no group self-determination. Established on areas included in the Turkish Empire, they have been subject to the will of their Turkish rulers. But their intense nationalistic feeling constantly spurred them on toward the vision of nationhood, or some measure of national independence. The revolutionary spirit was strong within them, and the Turkish officials were well aware of it. Hence the massacres. Religious differences had very little to do with the matter, although used by the Turkish authorities to incite the soldiers to extremes of brutality and ruthlessness. That the Armenians were, nevertheless, an integral element in Turkish society is evidenced by the fact that the massacres were never carried to the point of complete extermination of the Armenians in the various regions where they took place. The Armenians were, to a large extent, the bankers, the organizers, and leading business men of the community, and the Turks always took pains to leave enough of them alive to keep the economic affairs of the communities going. Eventually, with the far-reaching disturbances of the World War, the Turks took the opportunity to get rid of the Armenian problem once and for all through the expedients of approximate extermination and banishment.

Austria-Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia have already been cited as groups that exhibit the essential features of a society, and possess a state, but are in no sense true nations, because composed of too many diverse nationalities. An interesting case of a nationality that kept itself alive during long centuries of oppression and outside domination is that of the modern Greeks. This group is characterized by a high degree of racial heterogeneity, and there is a great deal of friction and disharmony on minor matters among various of its elements. But it possessed sufficient coherence to maintain its spiritual unity under the almost intolerable conditions of Turkish rule, and finally, when the time was ripe, to throw off the foreign yoke and establish itself as an independent society with a government, unstable enough within itself to be sure, but with sufficient continuity and permanence to maintain itself as a recognized unit among the states of the world. In other words, the Greek nationality was never destroyed, and although modern Greece is by no means a perfect nation, there is an adequate nucleus of sympathetic feeling to preserve the identity of the group. It is interesting to note that the two specific factors that held the Greek people together during the period of their oppression were their language and their religion, which, as we have seen, are two of the basic elements in nationality.[8]

VARIETIES OF COMBINATION

So it would be possible to run over the list of the countries of the world, appraising them on the basis of their approach to nationhood. Seldom would we find the specifications completely fulfilled. Some divisive feature of race, cultural tradition, moral standards, esthetic values, or other national qualities would almost always appear. The fact of their existence as societies with independent states demonstrates that perfect and complete nationhood is not indispensable for societal existence and continuity. But we should inevitably observe that the greater the degree of racial and national heterogeneity that exists in any society, the less stable is the position of that society, and the more likely it is to undergo drastic readjustments, or even dissolution, in the near future.

VOLUNTARY GROUPS

The third category of social groups is the voluntary. This includes all those groups in which membership is assumed by what is usually called a choice, or act of will. These are the groups that we deliberately "join." This choice is frequently a twofold one, an act of will on the part of the individual who desires to join, and a reciprocal choice made by the group itself, or some designated representative of the group. The number and variety of such groups are very large. They include obviously such organizations as clubs, lodges, literary societies, fraternities and sororities, musical organizations, etc. Another type, and a very important one, is composed of the occupational groups. In the modern society an individual decides to be a lawyer, a teacher, an engineer, a store-keeper, a clerk, or any other of the 534 separate occupations listed in the United States Census.

OCCUPATION

Membership in such groups clearly exerts a very great influence on one's life history. The choice of an occupation is one of the most important choices the average individual ever makes. Of course this influence is not traceable exclusively to the group connection, but a considerable part of it is. It has already been pointed out that in many societies in the past, and in some today, one's occupational status is not a matter of individual choice. In medieval Europe, and in India today, the average individual is "born into" his occupation much as he is into his religion, and it is perhaps even more difficult to break away from it. The caste in India is essentially an occupational group, unified by an endogamous marriage system, and an actual or mythical common origin. Other groups in this class are those based on geographical or territorial location. An individual chooses his place of residence, and thereby becomes a member of a neighborhood group, or of the Tenth Ward, or of a certain parish, and so on.

The catalog of voluntary groups might be prolonged almost indefinitely, but nothing would be gained thereby. There are, in fact, almost as many groups in a modern complex society as there are common interests among its members. To a large extent it is the interests, indeed, that determine the groups, as will be explained later, and such bodies may therefore be described as "interest groups." So true is this that such groups are frequently referred to simply as "interests"—the steel interests, the oil interests, the banking interests, the agricultural interests, and so on. These play an enormous part in the deliberate control exercised by a modern society.[9]

Other Classifications of Groups

As suggested above, any body of data as large and multifarious as human groups may be subjected to a number of different classifications, each legitimate and possibly useful provided it rests upon some logical and clearly delineated basis. Another popular classification of human groups is that developed by Professor Cooley, and used with more or less endorsement and approval by a number of other sociologists.[10] It is based on the size and degree of intimacy of the group. The series starts with the "primary group," which is defined as follows:[11]

> A primary group may be defined as a group of from two to possibly fifty or sixty people—*i.e.*, a small number—who are in relatively lasting face-to-face association for no single purpose, but merely as persons rather than as specialized functionaries, agents or employees of any organization. Type examples of the primary group are the family, or household group, the old-fashioned neighborhood, and the spontaneous play-group of children. In such groups all children every-

something inherent in the very nature of group unity, involuntary or semi-voluntary, something inseparable from the developmental processes that have created the unity, that causes a fellow feeling among the members of each kind of group. With this as a starting point we may profitably turn to a consideration of the development of the more specifically human types of groups, the ties that bind them together, and the methods of their operation and functioning. The most important of these is society itself.

CHAPTER III

SOCIETY: ITS GENESIS

> But whatever the aggressor, the [castle] is no sooner attacked and a breach made than the enormous head of a defender is seen to emerge and give the alarm. . . . Immediately the troops on guard rush up, followed by the whole garrison; and all proceed to stop the hole. . . . If the attack is prolonged, the soldiers are seized with fury and emit a shrill piercing sound. . . . This kind of war-song or hymn of anger . . . has its own special rhythm and is kept going from minute to minute. A certain number of [the enemy] sometimes succeeds, in spite of the heroic defense, in slipping into the citadel. Then a sacrifice is made. The soldiers hold up the invaders as best they can, while at the back the workers hastily wall up the openings to every passage. The warriors are sacrificed, but the enemy is shut off.[1]

This passage might easily be taken for a description of the defense of some medieval fortress by a band of faithful retainers. It is, in point of fact, with a change of the three words in brackets, Maurice Maeterlinck's account of the characteristic mode of procedure when a termitary of white ants is attacked by an invading army. It is introduced here as a vivid illustration of the high social development attained by this particular species of organism. Their military system is characteristic of the whole group organization of the white ants. The degree of socialization displayed in the termitary is in many respects far beyond anything to be found in human groups. In every department of life, economic, political, reproductive, as well as military, the integration of the units into an effective whole reaches an almost incredible degree of perfection. With social integration goes individual specialization, which is carried to such a point that the various types of individuals are incapable of carrying out anything but their appointed rôle. The soldiers cannot even feed themselves, on account of the extreme development of their organic weapons, their mandibles. There is only one egg-layer for the entire community, who is entirely incapable of self-support and would perish if deprived of the care of her numerous attendants. Of the social development of this species Maeterlinck says:

> Their civilisation, which is the earliest of any, is the most curious, the most complex, the most intelligent, and, in a sense, the most logical and best fitted to the difficulties of existence, which has ever appeared before our own on the globe. From several points of view their civilisation, although fierce, sinister, and often repulsive, is superior to that of the bee, of the ant, and even of man himself. . . . Not excepting the bee and the ant, there is no living creature, I repeat, at the present moment on this earth that is at once so remote from and so near to us, so pitiably, so wonderfully, so fraternally human.[2]

The white ants are by no means the only non-human organism that has reached a high degree of social development. The examples of the bees and ants are familiar, and have been described by many writers. In fact, some form of social organization is observable in many types of animals even as low in the evolutionary scale as the coral.

Society Is Prehuman

It is therefore clearly erroneous to think of society as an exclusively human characteristic. A study of animal societies, furthermore, makes it evident that the fundamentals of social reality are the same, wherever found. Without arbitrarily introducing the word "human" it would be impossible to frame a definition of society, which would include all communities of men, and which would not also include many groupings of the so-called lower animals.

The question still remains, however, whether social organization has been universally characteristic of man, since his earliest appearance as a separate species, and in all the multifarious subdivisions of the species. Because ants, bees, and termites have societies, it does not necessarily follow that man emerged upon the scene already equipped with community relationships. It is much more important to know whether man's immediate ancestors, his prehuman precursors, whatever they may have been, were social animals living in definite societies.

In all this analysis, obviously, the general evolutionary interpretation is accepted and taken for granted. The grounds upon which this assumption is justified have been variously set forth elsewhere.[3] It is not a part of the task of sociology to inquire into these matters in detail. Sociology limits itself to the study of man, and therefore begins with man. The origin of man is of significance only as it throws some light on the nature and meaning of various human attributes, physical and social. Because all the best evidence afforded by other sciences points to that conclusion, sociology assumes that man, as man, emerged gradually from a long, unbroken series of organic antecedents, each growing out of the preceding by an unbroken process of development, and the origin of humanity being not essentially different from that of any of the earlier types.

The element of gradualness is important. Probably man never had an origin in the sense of a definite point of departure. There never was a first man and a first woman, or even first men and women. There was only a long succession of slowly modifying organic forms* of which, at one point, it could be definitely stated that they were not human, and at a later point, far removed in time, it could be affirmed that they were human. There was no sharp dividing line at which it could be said that non-humanity turned into humanity any more than there is a particular day upon which the boy becomes a man.

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* It seems preferable to assume that there was only one such succession, rather than several. In other words, the *monogenetic* theory of man's origin is much more convincing than the *polygenetic*. It is supported by the great bulk of authoritative students of the subject, though there are a few eminent writers who maintain that man originated in two or more separate localities independently. The point is of no great importance for strictly sociological study, since man, wherever he is found and whatever his origin, displays sufficiently uniform characteristics to be treated as a unity.

Primitive Man

It is important, however, to know as much as possible about what man was like socially when, at last, he could really be called human. Did he live in a society, or societies? Did he have a family system, a state, an army? Was there a moral code? Was there a religion? The answers to these questions are important, first, because such knowledge aids in an understanding of the modern aspects of these social forms and institutions, and second, because it is essential to know whether these social realities are inherent in human nature and therefore could never have been avoided, or whether things might have been different in the past and therefore might conceivably be different in the future.

Prehistoric Evidence

Unfortunately, man left no clear record of his mode of life in these early stages of his existence. Even the records of his physical make-up are of the most fragmentary and inconclusive character. We have as yet virtually no positive knowledge of original man's appearance or behavior, and are even less certain about his societal organization. The best we can do is to build up a scientific belief, based largely on inference, this inference in turn resting upon the best available information of every sort. In constructing this belief the most effective mode of procedure is as follows: We begin with human society as we know it today and trace back its salient features through the long course of their evolutionary development, utilizing every possible source and type of information which can supply us with pertinent facts. As this inquiry extends back into more and more remote periods of time the facts become scarcer and more scattered, and the evidence vaguer and less convincing. Eventually we come to a point where no more facts are attainable.

If, now, the facts thus assembled reveal clearly marked and definite lines of development in consistent channels and in positive directions, we may say that the recorded evolution of human society shows certain trends, and we may describe these trends and depict them in definite terms. We also feel justified in concluding that if we could get still earlier facts we should find these same trends running backward in a consistent manner.

Next we turn to that succession of organic forms which is believed to be antecedent to man, and, starting fairly well back, we proceed to trace it forward in time and in evolutionary development. If in this inquiry, also, we detect definite trends and directional lines of development we may conclude that beyond the point where our investigation has taken us these same trends will continue essentially unmodified.

THE MISSING LINK

Now between the extreme limits of the backward tracing of human traits, and the forward tracing of prehuman traits, there exists a great gap, covering countless hundreds of thousands of years. It is this gap that we eagerly wish to fill in. Since facts are not available, we are compelled to rely on inference. Certain inferences, fortunately, are thoroughly justified. The most important is this: If it should be found that the trends which we have discovered running forward in prehuman life seem to "match," or point to, the trends which we have found as we trace back in human life, it is reasonable to conclude that the missing period would represent a consistent continuation and joining of these two sets of trends to form a continuous whole. It is as if you were tracing a brook down the side of a mountain, and came to a point where the configuration of the country made it impossible for you to follow the brook closely for a while. But a mile farther on you picked up the brook again, and followed it down till it joined the river. You would have no hesitation in assuming that during the missing mile the significant features of the brook were what you had observed them to be above and below. You would not for a moment imagine that during part of the missing mile the brook had been flowing up-hill instead of down, that it had been getting smaller rather than larger, or that the water was pink and made no noise falling over stones, or any such absurdities. Or again, if you have watched a tree growing for twenty years, and then, after an absence of ten years, come back and watch it for another twenty years, you feel confident that the general process of growth was the same while you were away as while you were present. This is almost precisely the method followed by statisticians under the name of "interpolation." If a statistical curve is based on incomplete data of such a sort that a gap is necessarily left in the middle portion of the curve, and if the form of the two portions of the curve that can be constructed is of such a sort that one seems to be the consistent and symmetrical prolongation of the other, then it is assumed that if the missing data could be supplied they would establish a symmetrical connection between the two existing parts of the curve. Therefore, the missing portion of the curve is constructed symmetrically without the data. Similarly, traits that were clearly developing among man's prehuman ancestors, and are found somewhat more highly developed among the most primitive known types of men, may be assumed to have been in a process of development during the intervening period.

Lack of Knowledge

However, one of the things about which we have no positive knowledge is just who were man's immediate ancestors, and just what they were like. It is generally assumed that their nearest living parallels are to be found in the various species of anthropoid apes. Not that man is to be thought of as descended from any of the existing anthropoid, or simian, species—no well-informed person any longer believes that. Rather, that, if we could trace back the physical descent of man and of the gorilla, chimpanzee, and other apes, we should eventually come to a point where these various lines of descent merged into a single type, which could be regarded as the common ancestor of both the anthropoids and man. How far back we should have to go to discover this common ancestor no one is sure.* But most scientists agree that it would be high enough up in the scale of organic evolution so that it would bear a fairly close general resemblance to both the anthropoids and man. It is also assumed that the apes have deviated from this ancestral type very much less than man, so that the gorilla and chimpanzee may be regarded as the closest living representatives of original man.

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* Dr. Henry Fairfield Osborn believes that we shall have to go much further back to find this common ancestor than has usually been supposed.

Primitive Society

Assuming still further that the social development of a species tends to follow its organic development, it seems probable that the social life of the modern anthropoids will give us the best clue to the social life of man's immediate prehuman ancestor, and therefore indicate the culmination of an upward trend in man's evolutionary background. It is therefore of great interest to know as much as possible about the social characteristics of the living apes. In this connection the notable work of Professor and Mrs. Yerkes is of high importance. Although the comparative study of social life among the apes and the lowest known types of humans is still in an elementary stage, it has already revealed some striking resemblances between the elemental forms of association in the two types of groups. Not only the family and the horde, but also the phenomenon of dominance out of which the state presumably developed, are clearly discernible among various of the anthropoid species.[4]

It seems probable, therefore, that the continuous trend of evolution had produced a definite social organization in man's ancestry before it reached the point where it could be considered human, and that this trend was in the direction of greater complexity, richness, and stability in the community life. The logical expectation would be that this same trend would continue in the same direction, as long as the course of physical evolution was unbroken.

Ethnology

The next step is to inquire into the results of the backward tracing of human social evolution. It is not in place here actually to undertake or to review this tracing process. Far too much time would be required, and it is an expert and technical enterprise at best. What we are interested in is the results, and these have been established for us with a high degree of authority by competent workers in that special field. These results may be briefly summarized by saying that no evidence has been found of any time when men were not organized into societies. As we go back into more and more remote periods of human existence the social organization tends to become less complex and intricate, but the simplest known human societies are more highly developed than those of the most socialized apes.[5]

Society Ante-human

The general conclusion, therefore, seems fully justified that social organization has been continuous from prehuman times right down to the present. In other words, society is ante-human. Man came into the world already endowed with society, just as he was endowed with an opposable thumb, a tendency to upright posture, a relatively capable and flexible brain, and the rudiments of speech. Society may accordingly be considered as inherent in human nature. It calls for no explanation, sociologically. Sociology may take society for granted, and confine itself to the study of its development, its forms and functions, its control, and all the other theoretical and practical questions that the modern development of community life suggests.[6]

For our purposes the most useful procedure is to accept the fact of human social evolution from an original, simple, rudimentary community life up to the modern intricate complex of social relationships, and to review this evolution hastily to see what light it may throw upon the fundamental elements in social organization, and to get whatever help it may give us in the understanding of contemporary social facts and problems.

Evidence of Living Primitives

What was the original human society, or societies, probably like? In seeking the answer to this question, one further assumption is useful. This is that all existing human societies, of every sort, have developed out of the same primitive beginnings, and that the simplest, most elementary societies of today are the result of the slowest, most retarded, evolution, and therefore represent the least deviation from the original type. Accordingly, the best concrete illustrations of what the first human society was like are to be found among the most primitive peoples of today. This does not mean that the existing primitive societies necessarily give us an identical picture of what things were like in the beginning. It is quite possible for evolution to proceed along lines of diversity, while still remaining on a very low plane, and there are, in point of fact, great variations among the most primitive peoples of today. Nor should it be understood that the study of primitive living peoples is the only source of evidence about original society. Various sciences approach the problem in other ways. Philology utilizes the evidence of language. Paleontology and archeology interpret the material relics—tools, weapons, ornaments, works of art, burial devices—that have been preserved to us from very ancient times. Anthropology draws some inferences even from the physical appearance of early man. In the attempt that follows to depict the typical successive stages of human social development all of these sources of information will be utilized—the actual illustrations, however, must perforce be taken from living or recent societies.

As we have seen, it is almost certain that the first living creatures that could be called human were already living in a group, or groups, which functioned toward the satisfaction of some basic human needs. This group may therefore be considered as the earliest human* society, and in it, accordingly, we may expect to find the elementary and indispensable factors of social organization.

UTILITY OF GROUP

What was the nature of this group? What held it together? What advantages accrued to the individual from being so closely associated with others of his kind? It is implicit in the evolutionary theory that nothing so wide-spread as group life could have come into existence and persisted so long if it had not had some positive utility. On the face of it, there would seem to be certain disadvantages in such close association. Life in nature is basically competitive. The struggle for existence is primarily a struggle for food. Food exists in nature in limited quantities, and it is to the advantage of each individual creature to have an area to roam over large enough so that he can secure his necessary food without coming into contact with any other creature of his kind. The economic ideal of the individual in nature is to be alone in the wilderness, and the economic motive is one of the most powerful motives in life. There must then be some notable advantages in group life to compensate for its infringement on economic freedom. Some advantages of a trivial sort may be observed among domestic animals. Sheep huddle together for warmth. On a sultry summer afternoon you may see two horses standing in a pasture side by side, facing opposite ways so that the tail of each may help to keep the flies away from the naturally inaccessible parts of the other. Among wild animals there is doubtless also the element of better protection from enemies. Certain species which are relatively defenceless against their natural enemies as individuals may efficiently protect themselves by a mass front. We are told, also, that certain animal groups station sentinels to watch for danger while the rest are peacefully feeding. There appear, likewise, to be some cases of economic cooperation in the form of group pursuit of game, and the securing of food supplies that would be out of reach of the individual. Of course, as we have seen, among the highly socialized animals the development of community life has reached such a point that existence itself would be entirely impossible to the individual apart from the group. But these do not concern us in the present connection, since they were not the immediate precursors of man, and there is no reason to suppose that the first human society was at all of this character.

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* From now on the word "human" will be dropped in ordinary references to society, and, unless otherwise specified, it may be understood that we are discussing societies of men.

HERD INSTINCT

But all the advantages already named, and others like them, seem inadequate to explain the strength of the group impulse, or to offset the manifest disadvantages of group life. How powerful the group tie may be, and how completely it may supplant individual self-seeking, is illustrated by the fact that a herd of deer will share their food supplies evenly, so that if the grazing on their range becomes deficient on account of drought, instead of the stronger ones appropriating the food and crowding the weaker ones out to starve—as one would expect from the common notion of the struggle for existence—the available food is regarded as the common property of the herd, and is shared by all as long as it lasts. This toleration extends even among different species.[7] The simple fact seems to be—and of course it is no explanation at all—that among creatures of this type the individual *wants* the group, craves association, just as he wants food, or warmth, or sexual experiences.

This impulse toward association has been frequently called the "gregarious instinct," or the "herd instinct," and has received a great deal of attention from psychologists and others. One of the most thorough studies ever made of it is the well-known book, "Instincts of the Herd in War and Peace," by J. B. Trotter, which portrays man as a thoroughly gregarious animal from the beginning. It is true that the recent progress of psychology has tended to modify the old concept of instincts, or even to discard the term instinct altogether. This is a point too technical to concern us here. What is of importance for us is that there did probably exist among the first human groups a natural urge to association which, from the sociological point of view, calls for no explanation. Instead of seeking to discover any practical utilities that might account for the existence of the social impulse, sociology looks upon it as one of the features taken for granted in man's constitution, one of the things that make society inherent in human nature, and proceeds to examine the ways in which society has used this impulse to accomplish certain socially useful purposes, and build itself up into more and more complex forms.

PRISTINE GROUP

So we find the earliest societies existing because of this pre-existing, and innate, social impulse. To such a society one would like to give the name "primary group," were it not for the fact that that term has already been appropriated by Professor Cooley, and very interestingly expounded, to apply to a group of an entirely different sort, as already explained.

Let us call this original group the "pristine group." It was already in existence at the beginning of human life. All other groups—and, as we have already noted, there are many different kinds of groups in society—start with this group, and rest upon it as a foundation. The force that created it still survives and plays its part in the most complicated modern societies, however much it may be obscured by the more refined and elaborate features of highly civilized communities.

The first human society, then, was simply a natural group of gregarious animals. Such a group is frequently referred to as a "horde." The common activities were of the vaguest and most intangible sort. Very few cases of concrete well-defined community activities could have been observed. Of course there was the periodic union of the sexes, necessary to perpetuate the species and gratify the mating impulse. But simple sex relationship is not a genuinely social phenomenon. It takes place among all kinds of bisexual species, the non-social as well as the gregarious, and is essentially biological. It is only when the group begins to concern itself with the manner or conditions of sexual union, or with its preliminaries or consequences, that we get the beginning of that great social institution generally known as the family.

PREHUMAN FAMILY

Just to what extent the family was developed in the first human society, and what was the form of its development, if any, is one of the great moot questions of sociology. We have seen that the apes show definite rudiments of a social organization. Prominent among them is a well-developed family relationship. Robert M. and Ada W. Yerkes, who are the foremost American authorities on the intelligence and social organization of the great apes, speak repeatedly, and in a matter-of-course way, of the family as a feature of ape life. They quote with acceptance Descamps' account of the anthropoid family as composed of male, female, and young, who leave the parents at about three years of age. It is less stable than the family of savage men, and the old males spend most of their time alone, while the females stay with the young.[8] Doctor and Mrs. Yerkes give their own opinion that the chimpanzee is apparently monogamous, as is possibly the lowland species of gorilla, whereas the mountain species of gorilla is presumably polygamous. They also speak of the "patriarchal family" among the gorillas. The conclusion is:

> Permanency of mating, although not definitely established for any infrahuman primate, is rendered increasingly probable from lemur, through monkey, to ape, by the nature and abundance of pertinent evidence. The same may be said of monogamy, for although it may exist in any of the four groups which we are comparing, so also, according to pertinent observations, may polygamy. Whether there is definite phylogenetic tendency toward the one or the other type of family it is impossible to say. But in any event the family as social unit seems to become more prevalent and also more stable as we progress from lemur to man.[9]

As this represents a mature, cautious, scholarly judgment on all the available evidence we are justified in assuming for sociological purposes that the family is an evolutionary product which had reached a well-defined stage among the infrahuman species immediately antecedent to man, and that humanity emerged as an identifiable separate species already equipped with an elementary family institution.

But a definite pattern of sex relationships, even though it be monogamous, and even though it is associated with an established relationship between parents and offspring, does not constitute a sociological phenomenon. If we call the group resulting from such relationships a family—and it is doubtless correct and expedient to do so—it simply means that the family itself was a biological phenomenon, and a well-established one, before it became a sociological phenomenon. As observed above, it is only when the larger group takes a hand in affairs, either by prescribing and enforcing certain types of relationship, or by utilizing these relationships for group purposes, that the family takes on a truly sociological aspect. Had this development already taken place in the pre-human stages of evolution? Is the family life of the apes partly ordered and enforced by the will of the group? Did the first human beings conduct their sex lives exclusively on the basis of biological urges, or partly in response to the mandates of the group? Who knows?

CHAPTER IV

SOCIETY: ITS STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

COLLECTION STAGE

It has already been observed that man's social development has always been closely correlated with—in fact, largely dependent on—his physical development. During the long ages of horde life the human animal was undergoing progressive and relatively extreme physical changes. Its posture was becoming more erect, its hand more capable, its brain more efficient, and its whole nervous system more sensitive and intricate. But for tens—perhaps hundreds—of thousands of years these changes were not sufficient to raise it much above the level of its next of kin among the other animals, nor to emancipate it from the stern and rigorous mode of existence so characteristic of the economy of nature. The central fact of this mode of existence is that, for all the material supplies which are essential for the survival of any living thing, reliance must be had upon nature itself. For food, for drink, for housing materials, every animal has to rely upon those things which nature offers ready to hand. It has no way of increasing or modifying them. Economic life, in all its phases, is primarily a matter of collection from nature's great storehouses. The fish swims about looking eagerly for such smaller fish or minute organic life as there may be in his range. The fox spends his days seeking rabbits and field mice. The bird gathers the sticks, grasses, and fibers for its nest. Because of this dominating feature, existence of this kind has been described as life on the *collection stage.* The first societies were those which were consistent with the collection stage of existence. This meant, first of all, that the community relationships were necessarily of the crudest and most elementary sort. As already observed, one of the outstanding features of nature is the strict limitation of her supplies. As a result, life on the collection stage is unavoidably competitive. At a given time, the amount of food of any particular kind in existence is a fixed quantity. Any portion of it that one animal gets, other animals of the same kind—or of any kind—cannot get.

The meaning of this is that under such conditions, the economic life, which is the basic form of activity, is necessarily non-cooperative. You can easily illustrate this by imagining yourself picking huckleberries, or fishing in a favorite pool. Under such circumstances, another individual or party can be of no assistance to you, but their advent is greeted with a good deal of coolness, not to say resentment.

Now when the economic life is non-cooperative, the possibilities of social development are exceedingly meager. When every other individual is primarily a competitor, the less you have to do with him the better. Furthermore, when the whole physical basis of society depends merely upon the materials furnished by nature, the possibilities of social development are extremely limited. As a consequence, during the long ages of horde life, man's existence was sordid, narrow, and crude almost beyond imagination.

Economic Invention

To enable man to raise himself out of the degraded existence of the collection stage, the one essential was to discover some means of appropriating larger and more varied portions of those natural supplies which were adapted to his needs, or better still, some means of increasing those very supplies themselves. The former of these tasks was inherently simpler than the latter. But before he could make any such discoveries it was necessary that his brain and his hand should develop far beyond their pristine form. As we have seen, this development was actually taking place. It is quite possible that the capacity was there a long time before the discoveries were actually made. There is a big element of chance in human affairs, and we often have to wait for a favorable conjunction of circumstances before we can realize our inherent abilities in a practical way.

It would be immeasurably interesting if we could know just what the first discovery of this kind was. We do not know, and probably we never shall. But we feel virtually certain that it was something in the way of a tool or weapon. In these early days there was no significant difference between the two. A tool is a material device used, not to serve immediately some human need, but to make some other material object more available or more useful. A tool is intermediate between material objects and the ultimate human wants that those objects are capable of satisfying. For example, a hickory nut is capable of satisfying human hunger. But before it can accomplish that end it has to be cracked, and it is difficult or impossible for a human being to crack a hickory nut without using some other material object in an intermediate way. The only significant distinction between a tool and a weapon is that the latter is used against living objects instead of lifeless things. As already intimated, the first devices of this sort were probably used indiscriminately against animate and inanimate objects, just as they often are today. The modern Cuban uses his *machete* equally handily to cut sugar cane or human throats.

We should not suppose that even during the collection stage men used no material devices to aid them in getting a living. In all probability they used sticks and stones in various ways—to crack nuts, dig up turtle's eggs, extract honey from a bee-tree, and so on. The higher apes behave similarly today.

It is wholly probable that man carried over habits of this kind from his prehuman ancestry. The old-fashioned description of man as the "tool-using animal" is by no means distinctive or exclusive. But all these tools used by apes and by the earliest men were themselves natural objects. Their use was itself a phase of the "collection" system of life. The real human achievement consisted in modifying the form of a natural object, or in putting two or more natural objects together in a form that does not exist in nature, and thereby getting a tool more useful than anything Nature has to offer. In other words, it consisted in elementary *manufacture.*

The Stone Hammer

Although we do not know positively what was the first manufactured tool, we are certain that a very early one, which was also very important, was the stone hammer. This primitive hammer was made by attaching a piece of stone to some kind of a handle, usually a piece of wood. Thus this basic manufactured tool was a combination of the two most useful natural tools—a stick and a stone. The invention consisted of two parts, first, the *idea* of putting a stick and a stone together, and second, the *means* of combining them into a unit. What wouldn't we give to know just how this was done! Did some low-browed genius think out, all at once, the possibility and the process of binding an appropriately shaped stone to the end of a stick? Or did some one with an unusually inquiring and observing mind, in an hour of idle leisure, notice a young sapling which had been upturned, showing its roots closely intertwined about a small stone, as often happens? And if so, did he immediately recognize its utility, or did he carelessly pick it up to play with, and suddenly realize from the feel of it in his hand what a useful device he had acquired?

The first advantage which a stone hammer gave to its possessor was to increase his command over the food supplies offered by his environment. He could utilize many objects not previously available to him—harder nuts, larger animals, tougher vegetable substances, etc.—and he could get many of the old objects with less expenditure of time and energy. This meant that a man could get his living on a much smaller area than previously, or, conversely, that more men could live on the same area.

In the second place, the possession of a stone hammer gave a man a tremendous advantage over his human enemies and rivals. Naturally, this advantage would not long remain the exclusive possession of any single individual. Man, like his simian kinsmen, is a highly imitative animal, and any device or process that has appreciable value will soon be copied. The idea of a hammer, and mastery of the art of making it, must have spread throughout the immediate societal circle of the first inventor until in the course of generations the stone hammer became one of the characteristic features of the group.[2] The advantage would then become a societal one. In a highly competitive world the tendency would be to eliminate the hammerless men and leave the field to the more advanced groups. This is an early instance of the general tendency of material achievements to promote the survival and ascendency of those groups that have the brains and the good fortune to make them. This is one of the agencies that have worked toward the improvement of human capacity clear down to the present.

STONE AGE

The hammer was not the only instrument of stone manufactured and used by early man. Knives and scrapers were made by clever modes of chipping or flaking from special kinds of stone such as flint and obsidian. Indeed, the use of stone was so important, and so generally adopted all over the world, as to give the name "stone age" to a certain period of social evolution. We shall see, as we go on, that the phenomena of cultural development have been classified in several different systems. Each one of these may be useful, and is legitimate if it rests upon some single definite and logical *basis of classification.* The series that begins with the collection stage has for its basis of classification the characteristic mode of economic activity. The series that begins with the stone age has for its basis the characteristic material used for instruments.

The stone age covered a vast stretch of human existence. In the very beginning the stones chosen for hammer heads or other purposes were probably used just as they were found in nature. The only application of human intelligence was in selecting those of appropriate size and form. But gradually the idea and the art developed of shaping the stones into more convenient and suitable forms. At first, and for a long time afterwards, the improvements were of the crudest sort, just a rough chipping off of humps and corners, and a general shaping into the appropriate form. Little by little, however, the art improved. The examples that have been preserved to us show a regular progression toward more and more technically correct forms, more symmetrical outlines, and smoother surfaces. Eventually specimens appear that show unmistakable evidence of love of beauty and pride of craftsmanship. In other words, the stone hammer served not only as a means of increasing economic efficiency but also as a medium for the expression of the esthetic feelings. Thus, in these early ages, industry and art were linked together. On the basis of this progression in technique, the stone age as a whole is customarily divided into two periods, the old stone, or paleolithic, age, and the new stone, or neolithic, age. There is, of course, no sharp dividing line between the two, as there seldom is in human developments. But the divergence between the two extremes is very striking.

Progress of Invention

Once developed in the human mind, the capacity for invention proceeded to display itself in innumerable directions. From the hammer developed the hatchet, and from the two of them the long, twofold series of heavy-headed, handled instruments, blunt in one series (hammer, maul, sledge, mace, etc.) and sharp in the other series (hatchet, axe, adze, etc.). From the pointed stick—long used for digging, scratching, poking, etc.—there developed a very important series of implements consisting of a staff with a sharp, pointed head, including the lance, spear, javelin, and bow and arrow.

Hunting Stage

Probably the most significant single result of these beginnings of material invention was to give men command over the larger animals which previously had been unavailable because of their speed, size, or toughness of skin, when they were not actually a source of terror and danger because of their carnivorous habits and ferocity. The ability to kill and use these large animals not only added greatly to man's food supply, but also provided him with materials for clothing, decoration, and other useful purposes. So great was the change involved in these new powers that it lifted society to an entirely new, and far more elaborate plane, commonly known as the *hunting stage.* Man on this stage is now no longer compelled to rely solely on the things that nature offers ready to hand. He can reorganize certain of these materials in such a way as to make others far more accessible. Perhaps no other accomplishment in all human history so definitely raised man above the level of the other animals.

The hunting stage, therefore, is characterized by two achievements of the greatest social significance, first, the creation and accumulation of what we have come to call technically "capital," that is, material objects used not for the direct satisfaction of personal wants, but for the production of other objects of direct utility, and second, the habit of cooperation in economic activities. These two phenomena have accompanied the development of civilized society down to the present moment and have been closely connected with many of the most important blessings, problems, and evils that humanity has known.

PASTORAL STAGE

Living by hunting is a great improvement over living by collection. But, at best, hunting is an arduous and uncertain occupation. Even the amateur hunter or fisherman knows that. Some days, game is plentiful, and luck is good, and one may feast bountifully at nightfall. But on other days long hours of patient and laborious effort bring no returns at all. And at all times the amount of time and energy required to maintain life by hunting leaves little surplus for less necessary but more enjoyable activities. So society on the hunting stage could not and did not rise to very high levels of civilization. The hunter is of necessity a savage—and by no means the happy savage that romance and a naïve philosophy picture him. In certain seasons the basic game supply falls short, and starvation stalks through the land, taking heavy toll of the weaker and less fortunate. Almost always food is more abundant at certain times of year than others. In the Temperate Zones the cold months bring added burdens and dangers.

O the long and dreary Winter!
O the cold and cruel Winter!

What a tremendous improvement it would be if a stock of animals could be kept on hand, maintained from month to month, and drawn upon as needed! Eventually this idea found lodgment in man's developing brain. Just how, as usual, we do not know. There is some reason for believing that the first animal men learned to tame was desired not so much for food as for its company—the dog. Even so, in times of stress there was a terrific temptation to convert the companion into provender. Jack London, in his book, "Before Adam," gives an entertaining and realistic account of a primitive effort to domesticate the dog. After recounting the difficulties and dangers of capturing a wild puppy, he concludes as follows:

> I was quite taken up with him. He was something new, and it was a characteristic of the Folk to like new things. When I saw that he refused fruits and vegetables, I caught birds for him and squirrels and young rabbits. (We Folk were meat-eaters, as well as vegetarians, and we were adept at catching small game.) The puppy ate the meat and thrived. As well as I can estimate, I must have had him over a week. And then, coming back to the cave one day with a nestful of young-hatched pheasants, I found Lop-Ear (another boy) had killed the puppy and was just beginning to eat him. I sprang for Lop-Ear,—the cave was small,—and we went at it tooth and nail. And thus, in a fight, ended one of the earliest attempts to domesticate the dog. We pulled hair out in handfuls, and scratched and bit and gouged. Then we sulked and made up. After that we ate the puppy. Raw? Yes. We had not yet discovered fire. Our evolution into cooking animals lay in the tight-rolled scroll of the future.[3]

It is a noteworthy fact that most of the animals which primitive man learned to domesticate were those which not only provided a palatable meat supply, but were capable also of furnishing relatively large quantities of milk. As the elements of economics began to be understood, men learned that it was much more efficient to draw the food supplies of society from milk and milk products than from meat. Meat is, in its very nature, the most elaborate and costly of all the great food staples. Animal flesh is made from the same general materials as human flesh, i.e., edible plants. A certain number of pounds of grain may be converted into a certain number of pounds of human flesh. But if the grain is converted first into animal flesh, and then the animal flesh into human flesh, there is a heavy loss all along the line, and a great shrinkage in ultimate nourishment. So it is with the milk produced by various types of animals. You may kill the animal and get a certain fixed amount of meat. But if you leave it—or rather her—alive, you have a source of food lasting for years which in the aggregate far exceeds the simple carcass. This is really the story taught by the fable of the goose and the golden eggs. A remarkable variation on the usual procedure is furnished by an African tribe, the Masai. They rely for their food supply almost entirely on their large herds of cattle, which are made to yield not only milk but blood, the two being drunk in a warm mixture. To secure the latter, the throat of the animal is bound tightly until the jugular vein stands out. This is then punctured, and the blood drawn off, after which the wound is plugged up and the animal released.[4]

In the use of animal products rather than the animals themselves, the notion of capital enters in. A full-grown cow may be looked upon in two ways. She may be regarded as so many pounds of beef, in which case she is *consumable* or *consumption* goods. Or she may be considered and treated as an instrument for producing consumable goods (milk) in which case she is capital. What is true of edible animals, is true, as we shall see, of many other kinds of commodities. They may be either consumable goods or capital, according to the way they are used. To utilize them as consumable goods usually means an abundant immediate satisfaction, but danger of shortage for the future. To treat them as capital means buying security and assurance for the future at the cost of deprivation and scarcity today. This is a fact of the highest importance, for out of it has grown one of the greatest of all social forces, saving or parsimony based upon foresight and self-control.

So it is a mistake to think of stock-raising people as meat-eating people. Meat is ordinarily with them a luxury. Their staples are milk, cheese, and butter. And it is easy to imagine how great was the strain upon their self-control when a period of scarcity came, and the milk supply began to fall off. To kill a sheep or a goat would mean not only relief from the pangs of hunger, but a glorious feast. It was a genuinely human trait that enabled our nomadic ancestors to gird their loins a little more tightly, cut down the daily ration a little further, and hold on grimly in the hope of better days. In extreme cases this attitude develops to the point where people will die of starvation rather than kill their cattle for food.[5] No wonder that the feeling of the sanctity of capital and the merit of thrift is deeply imbedded in our modern consciousness.

At the same time, the sense of social solidarity was being strengthened and enlarged by the experiences of pastoral life. A grazing herd seems by its very nature to strengthen the herd sentiment among its owners. There is a vast economy in the care and protection of stock if they can be thrown together into large groups instead of being left for each individual owner to look after his own. This probably accounts in part for the fact that nomadism and the large patriarchal family so often go together.

One of the most vivid portrayals of pastoral society ever presented to the twentieth century eye is that extraordinary moving picture entitled "Grass." It depicts the semi-annual migration of the Baktyari, and is full of concrete illustrations of the mode of life of such a people. But nothing is more striking than the tremendous sense of community interest displayed on every yard of the film. As the animals are being guided through that rushing torrent nobody stops to ask whether any particular sheep or goat is his own property.

Any animal that is in danger is helped by the nearest man, often at the risk of the latter's life. As the deeply snow-covered passes are reached, all work in harmony to get the results that mean life or death to them all alike. A more accessible version of the story can be found in the book by the same name.[6]

AGRICULTURAL STAGE

During these long ages when primitive societies were learning the arts of domestication and breeding of animals, and the social virtues of saving and thrift which made those arts practicable, men were continuing to derive a part of their food supplies from wild, or undomesticated, animals and another part from vegetable supplies of various sorts. Here we see exemplified one of the general principles which have contributed toward the development of a full and relatively luxurious culture. The upward stages of economic evolution have characteristically been by *addition*, not by *substitution*. The discovery of a more efficient system of making a living has not usually meant the abandonment of the old, but merely its relegation to a subordinate or contributory position. So the economic activities that give their names to the various stages of cultural evolution are not to be regarded as the exclusive methods of getting a livelihood, but merely the characteristic or dominant ones.

So even after man learned to domesticate animals, and to use milk products as his staple of diet, he still continued to hunt and to collect vegetable food where he could get it without a disproportionate expenditure of time and energy. Among foods of this kind were various wild grass seeds, nuts, and fruits. Eventually, an idea made its way into the human mind at some place or other, closely analogous to the idea that led to the pastoral mode of life. This was that plants, as well as animals, might be artificially bred and cared for, and in that way made to yield a greater supply of human food than they would in their natural state. Thus was initiated the *agricultural* stage. The basic processes of this stage are two-fold: first, the substitution of food-yielding plants for those of no food value, and the clearing away of the latter to make room for the former, and second, the improvement of the food-yielding qualities of the former type.

EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC ADVANCE

Like every important improvement in the technical arts of life, these discoveries had a profound influence on the customs, social habits, and general mode of life of the societies that adopted them. Some of these plants, like the fruit and nut trees, live from year to year; others, like the grasses that were developed into wheat and corn, have to be planted anew each year. But in both cases, the use of such plants introduced a new attitude toward land on the part of social groups. It tended to encourage a settled mode of life, and it fostered a sense of ownership and permanent tenure of land. Pastoral peoples, as we have already seen, are almost of necessity wandering, or nomadic, peoples. Their annual movements may take them over a fairly regular range of territory, year after year, but all the conditions of life necessitate ease and readiness of movement. Even their habitations must be of a sort that can speedily be reduced to portable shape, and carried expeditiously over long distances. The Huns, who invaded Europe during the fifth century A.D., furnish an excellent example. It has been said of them that they did everything on horseback, even to eating and sleeping.[7]

STABILITY

But a society that is fortunate enough to have established primitive orchards or groves of fruit-yielding trees will be loath to forsake them, and will have nothing to gain by doing so. Similarly, a group that has cleared away or killed an area of useless trees, roughly cultivated the ground, and planted it to some form of annual food crop, will naturally wish to stay by their land, protect the vegetation, and harvest the crop when it is ripe. Such a society will come more and more to regard its land as its most precious possession, and to resent and resist, with its maximum physical force, any encroachment or aggression on this land by an outside group.

Thus the institution of territorial ownership on the part of society was greatly intensified by the development of the agricultural stage.

Development of Economic Mind-sets

Like the domestication of animals, the pursuit of agriculture tended to strengthen and emphasize the social virtues of parsimony, self-denial, and thrift. Particularly in the case of the annual plants, the seed which must be kept for the next season's planting was the fruit of the plant itself; that is, it was identical with the food yielded by the plant. Thus provision for the future had to be made at the expense of present gratification. It is a little hard for us, accustomed as we are to abundant agricultural yields and the matter-of-course saving of seed, to realize how great must have been the temptation of primitive cultivators, especially after a lean crop or during a hard winter, to dip into the precious seed supply. But only as a sufficient number of individuals resisted the temptation could provision be made for the next year. Failure to make such provision meant not only that the following season would be an even harder one, but also, in extreme cases, that the whole society might have to drop back onto a lower plane of existence, and face a long period of struggle before it could get back to its present situation.

Thus frugality, self-denial, and thrift early established themselves as primary duties that the individual owed to society, as well as safeguards of individual comfort and survival. The wastrel, the sluggard, and the self-indulgent logically incurred from society contempt and derision, if not harsher treatment.

Expansion of Population and Standard of Living

But perhaps the most important effects of these various improvements and discoveries were the basic and obvious ones that they enabled a larger number of people to live on a given area of land, and enabled them to live on a higher level of comfort and well-being. They lifted man progressively out of his immediate and direct dependence on nature.

Not that he could cut himself loose from nature, or accomplish anything that nature did not make possible—far from it. But he was not limited in satisfying his bodily needs and wishes to the supplies that nature herself provided ready for the taking. He bade farewell forever to the collection stage. All these advances were expedients either for making natural supplies more easily and abundantly available for man's uses, or for changing their forms so as to be more adaptable to man's needs. The primary gains were, of course, in the food supplies. But along with them went all sorts of material additions to man's ease and comfort, in the way of shelter, clothing, ornamentation, amusement, and esthetic self-expression. They were the instrumentalities of a true advance in civilization, for no matter how immaterial, spiritual, or even ethereal some aspects of civilization may seem they all rest ultimately upon an indispensable material basis. Even the artist must have his pigments, brushes, and canvas, the sculptor his clay or marble, and the musician his violin or piano. The art that is most nearly emancipated from material entanglements is singing. But except in its most pristine form, even this requires some material support. So in the realm of the spiritual, practically every religion uses some material supplies, be it nothing more than the holy book, or tablets of clay or stone.

Fire

So man's upward march along the pathway of civilization, and the social forms in which his civilization has expressed itself, have been inseparably associated with a few major, and numerous minor, inventions and discoveries in the field of economic activity. There remained one more great achievement to be realized, before civilization could burst into the efflorescence of material splendor upon which we pride ourselves—or did, until recent years.

The pastoral and agricultural stages were both characterized by human domination over living creatures, animals in one case and plants in the other. They both resulted from man's taking control of the great reproductive processes of nature, and manipulating them to serve his own ends. The hunting stage had been made possible by an elementary mastery of inert materials, of the simplest and most accessible sort, stone, wood, fibers, etc. Of the less obvious constituents of the earth's surface, and of the physical forces that were inherent in them, man knew virtually nothing.

Of man's long quest for knowledge and understanding of the forces and principles back of the physical phenomena which obtruded themselves upon his attention, more will be said later. In advance of any such real understanding he empirically acquired a partial mastery and utilization of some of the forces. Unquestionably the most important of his achievements in these early stages—if not for all time—was the control of that fundamental chemical process called combustion. Fire! What an epic could be written of its service to man, had we only the facts!

It has already been emphasized that an indispensable part of the equipment for studying human affairs intelligently and constructively is the habit of thinking carefully, analytically, and critically about the aspects of life which we usually take for granted. This is one respect in which sociology differs somewhat from the physical sciences. This distinction arises from the fact that we are ourselves a part of the subject matter of social science, that the forces with which social science deals flow through us continuously, that the phenomena of social science repeat themselves in us every day. It does not occur to us, in our ordinary routine, to inquire into these matters. They make no particular impress on our consciousness, and when someone does bring them to our attention explicitly and objectively it seems like a rather silly and childish procedure, as if one should observe, with an air of great profundity, "When you eat, you open your mouth." But, as will be explained more fully later, social science must base its conclusions precisely on these every-day relationships, and the more commonplace they are, the more important they are for science.

So it is with fire. Few of us, unless our attention has been called to it, have ever stopped to consider how large a part of the things we value are traceable directly or indirectly to fire. It would be as hard to make a complete list of them as of all the groups one belongs to. But it is amusing to try it when one has a spare hour. It is also interesting to try to reconstruct the life of primitive man before he had fire. No outside source of warmth except the sun, which, as was observed long ago, "goes away at just the time you need it most." No artificial means of light to cheer the long dark nights, peopled as they were with actual dangers and vague, imaginary terrors of every sort. No cooking of foods to render them more palatable, nutritive, or digestible. No burning, or heating, or melting to aid in the simple industrial processes that were beginning to develop.

ORIGIN OF USE OF FIRE

The origin of man's use of fire has been the subject of much speculation. Where did man first get his fire? Fires occur in nature. Permanent sources of fire are furnished by volcanoes. Lightning frequently starts fires, and it has been suggested that fires may be started by the rubbing together of the dead, dry branches of two trees.[8] Fires started by lightning in *natural* objects are very rare, however, and those due to natural friction even more so. Furthermore, recalling the characteristic attitude of fear that most wild creatures display toward fire, and toward spectacular and violent natural events in general, it would be remarkable in the extreme if a group of savage men, or even an exceptionally intrepid individual among them, should have had the temerity to approach a tree that had just been struck by lightning in the midst of a thunderstorm and take possession of the mysterious power that was flaming there, or that they should know how to keep it alive after they had got it. It seems much more probable that a tribe, living near a volcano, should have become habituated to its threatening majesty, and that eventually someone should have dared to appropriate some of the divine "element." The classic myth of Prometheus and his theft of fire from the gods might very possibly have derived from some such actual event. Another possibility, given considerable weight by Müller-Lyer, is that man discovered fire as a result of the wide-spread practice of boring holes in wood or stone by rotating a pointed wooden stick for hours at a time. The wood-dust thus produced, heated by friction, might easily catch fire, as it does, in fact, in the case of the pump-drill.[9] It is not likely that we shall ever know the exact answer to this fascinating question. But the fact remains that, in one way or another, man did get fire, and proceeded to use it for a constantly increasing variety of purposes.

FIRE MAKING

It should be noted that the use of fire is an entirely separate matter from the ability to make fire. It is probable that men knew how to use fire, and did use it, long before they learned how to create it artificially; and even after they devised fire-making methods the process was so arduous that the preservation of a nucleus of fire was a matter of the highest individual and social concern. Thus fire acquired high significance in religion and in the social amenities. The perpetual sacred flame is a familiar religious symbol even in cults that are not based primarily on the worship of fire, and the sharing or lending of fire was an important mode of expressing friendship and extending hospitality. The keeping of the fire must also have had a profound influence in developing social responsibility, especially among tribes that were frequently on the move, and had to carry their fire with them. Eventually men learned how to make fire by various devices, utilizing the principle of friction in the motions of sawing, planing, or boring—as exemplified in the pump-drill familiar to every good Boy Scout—by compression, as in the fire pistons used in the East Indies, by the flint and iron, and finally by the chemical methods of modern science.

USES OF FIRE

The dependence of primitive man upon fire was much more intimate, and more deeply charged with emotion, than our own. Professor Sumner believed that the first great use made of fire was to frighten away ghosts and wild animals. The more commonplace uses for heat, light, and cooking unquestionably developed early. The hearth therefore became the center of all comfort, permanence, pleasure, and stability for the early man. It was to it that he returned for rest and nourishment after his day of hunting or fighting. Here his woman was waiting for him, with the children toward whom he felt an elementary but genuine affection. Within its magic circle he could sit in security, undaunted by the gleaming eyes of wild animals that prowled about in the darkness, or by the even more menacing unseen presences that he felt certain were flitting about in the murky shadows. From its glowing coals would be drawn half-charred hunks of meat or vegetables which represented his ideal of gastronomic delight. Soothed by its warmth he would finally curl up to sleep, taking turns, perhaps, with the woman to wake up and add new fuel—though in all probability leaving that menial task entirely to her. Is it beyond the range of possibility that some lingering racial memories, deeply impressed on our subconscious emotional being during this long period of dependence on fire, may account for the intense pleasurable reaction that most of us experience toward an open fire, particularly if it be outdoors, and the sense of intimacy and relaxation of conventional restraints that a modern group feels when gathered around a friendly blaze?

Varied Uses

As time passed, however, other uses of fire, of an entirely different character, rose to importance. It has been suggested above that man's cultural development has been closely associated with, and largely dependent on, the increasing mastery of natural materials. This mastery has been made possible to a large extent by fire. The utilization of any of the metals was limited indeed before fire made possible the processes of smelting, melting, softening, and hardening. Many other materials have to be subjected to heat treatment of one kind or another to make them fully useful. Finally, the discovery of new fuels, coupled with the invention of new power generators—particularly the steam engine—and new mechanical devices for utilizing power, ushered in the modern manufacturing or machine age. Designated as the industrial stage, this epoch stands as the last item in the classification of social evolution which begins with the collection stage, and runs through the hunting stage, the pastoral stage, and the agricultural stage. This latest stage is one in which the production, distribution, and exchange of wealth are dominated and characterized by machines in the place of the human hand or simple tools, by the application of power derived in vast quantities from new types of fuel, particularly coal, gas, and oil, and the transmission of this power through devices that are themselves essentially machines, by the massing of production in large units, and all the other features that are familiar to every student of the Industrial Revolution. In the last few years, a still further transition has been observed, which, as frequently described, is leading us out of the machine age into the power age. The full significance of this change need not be discussed here. It should be noted, however, that in this latest advance, as in the previous ones, the adoption of a new means of providing for material wants has not involved the complete abandonment of the old. Even in this industrial age men still practice collection, they still hunt, raise animals, and carry on agriculture. The era takes its characteristic features, along with its name, from the new methods of production, but many survivals of older ways still continue.

Bronze Age

It should be observed in passing that fire is also responsible for the passage of human culture into the two later ages recognized in the other classification which has been mentioned, and which is based, not on the characteristic method of production, but on the characteristic material used for tools and implements. It has been pointed out that this series begins with the stone age, which doubtless covered the major portion of man's existence, measured chronologically. But increasing knowledge of the resources of the earth, coupled with the mastery of fire, enabled men to extract copper and tin and melt them into a very useful compound called bronze, which proved so superior to stone for the making of tools and implements that it was widely adopted, and gave its name to an era that affected the more highly civilized groups of men all over the world. But with all its merits, bronze is not an ideal material for the majority of implements. Its components are relatively rare; tin, in particular, is found in quantities in only a few regions, such as England, Saxony, Bohemia, Bolivia, Nigeria, China, Siam, the Dutch East Indies, and the Federated Malay States. It was therefore decidedly expensive. Furthermore, it does not take a perfect cutting edge. For many purposes it is either too soft or too brittle. A much more satisfactory metal is iron, and as soon as men learned to develop fires with a sufficiently intense heat to melt iron, or at least to soften it to a workable consistency, it displaced bronze almost completely in the mechanical and military fields. Subjected to the refining and hardening processes that make it steel, iron is still the dominating metal in the modern era.

The Industrial Stage

All these successive inventions and discoveries, all this accumulated knowledge and experience, were brought together to produce the characteristics of the final (to date) stage of cultural evolution, the industrial. This is the stage in which we are now living, and its dominant features are familiar to us—all too familiar, one is sometimes tempted to say. They will be discussed in much detail in subsequent pages. Prominent among them are mass production according to the factory system using machines and extra-human power, the development of a world market, credit, high specialization of labor, the corporate system of ownership, the prevailing principle of contract, the rise of a labor class, etc.

Cultural Interaction

Emphasis has hitherto been laid on the fact that the characteristic modes and materials of production give tone, color, and distinctive form to the societies that utilize them. It should not be forgotten, also, that it is the development of culture in quite diverse aspects that makes possible the creation and utilization of these instruments and techniques of production. Both intellectual and social progress is necessary to enable a group to advance from its existing methods of production to higher ones. The hunting stage could not come into existence until men had developed sufficiently mentally to conceive and perform the simple operations necessary to manufacture a stone hammer or a bow and arrow, nor until the cooperative spirit was strong enough to induce them to participate in group attacks on their prey. Neither the pastoral nor the agricultural stage could have been realized, no matter how high man's intellectual development, unless both the individual and society had acquired sufficient self-control to practice the degree of parsimony and abstinence necessary to preserve the herds and to carry a supply of seed over into the new season. The modern industrial and commercial system requires for its functioning not only the individual traits of industry, endurance, scientific knowledge, technical skill, and manual dexterity, but also certain social qualities of altruism, honesty, toleration, and sympathetic understanding of the other man's situation and point of view. Recently it has begun to look as if the supply of these latter qualities was proving inadequate, and many of the most baffling problems of the day might be directly traceable to this deficiency—but more of this later.

The foregoing is a brief and summary sketch of the more important steps in the development of the functioning groups of humanity which we call societies, as they have developed all over the world. Naturally, innumerable exceptions might be found were we to study all actual societies, past and present, in detail. Not all societies have followed precisely the same pathway of development, even in its major features. For instance, it appears that the North American Indians at the time the white man first made their acquaintance were in the process of passing from the hunting stage to the agricultural stage without going through the pastoral stage. Of course, not all societies have reached the same stage of development. The industrial stage is practically unknown to many living peoples, and some of the more backward tribes are still on the hunting stage. Diverse features of topography and of the general physical environment must obviously have affected the sequence of development among different peoples.

Societal Consequences of Technological Development

The fundamental principle that stands out as a result of this hasty survey is that the development of human society, in all its cultural and even spiritual aspects, is inextricably bound up with man's increasing knowledge of the materials and resources of his mundane setting, and his progressive mastery of the means and processes of dealing with them, appropriating them, and working them over into forms suited to his various needs. This suggests the possibility that the academic distinction between economics and sociology, familiar to every college student, may be purely arbitrary and illogical, and that those phases of group activity that deal with the provision for man's material wants are merely portions of an intricate network of social relationships which cannot be unraveled into separate strands without destroying the real meaning of the whole.

Three major lines of development, each with its own consistent direction, can be seen to run through all these stages of societal movement which we have traced. The first, which has already been suggested, is that more and more people have been enabled to live on a given area of land. In other words, societal development has been associated with a growth of population. Secondly, people have been enabled to enjoy a greater amount of material comfort and physical well-being, and along with it an enlarged degree of intellectual, esthetic, and spiritual expansion. That is, societal development has been associated with an elevation of the standard of living. Thirdly, the relationships between human beings, which exist in society and constitute the social fabric, have grown more and more intricate and complex with each successive stage of societal evolution. The bearing of individual conduct on group solidarity, and of group organization upon individual welfare, has grown steadily more intimate.

Genesis of Social Science

It was a realization of these facts, and a sense of their importance in human existence, that led a few advanced thinkers to ask whether it was wise or safe to leave the understanding of societal relationships, and attempts to manipulate them deliberately, to the undirected and casual play of untrained and undisciplined individual minds, or whether, on the other hand, it was not possible, and immeasurably more helpful, to subject these relationships to study by the same scientific methods which were producing such admirable results in the physical world, and eventually to construct a science of social relations which could stand on a par with the sciences of geology, physics, chemistry, and biology. Faint previsions of this effort may be found in the work of some of the ancient philosophers of Greece, Rome, and other historic lands. But no concrete realization of it could take place until the advanced studies of the physical world had established the fundamentals of the scientific approach and methods, and had furnished prototypes in certain well-authenticated and integrated sciences. The science of sociology, therefore, in even its tentative and provisional stages, is a relatively recent affair. It is still far from exhaustively elaborated or completely standardized. There are still many Doubting Thomases who question whether human group relationships are actually of such a nature that they can be reduced to a correlated and dependable system such as constitutes the other sciences, or who go even further and deny positively that sociology is or ever can be a science. Obviously, these questions are of primary importance to one who is interested in the study of social phenomena at all, and our next task may well be to examine the status of sociology as a claimant to a recognized position in the hierarchy of sciences.

CHAPTER V

SOCIOLOGICAL SCIENCE

We live in an age of science. The achievements of science are all about us on every hand. Scarcely anything we do in the course of a day's routine is not affected by science in some way. The past one hundred and fifty years have witnessed scientific accomplishments of such a stupendous nature that we are dazzled, hypnotized, overwhelmed by the power that lies back of them. Science has become a fetish, a religion, a god. We are prone to believe that there is no problem of human life or welfare, individual or social, for which science cannot be trusted to find a remedy.

The attitude has consequently become wide-spread that no truth is important but scientific truth, that no method of searching for truth is valid except the scientific method, that nothing is really worth studying but science. Naturally enough, then, the various studies that deal with men in their social relations have attempted to follow scrupulously the scientific method, to establish themselves as sciences, to win for themselves a recognized position on a parity with the other sciences. Large portions of numerous books on sociology, particularly of an earlier generation, are devoted to the discussion of "sociology as a science," and "the relation of sociology to the other sciences."

Is sociology a science? Or if the sociology of today fails to merit that designation, can there be a science of sociology?

ESSENTIALS OF SCIENCE

The first step in seeking the answer to these questions is to determine clearly what are the essential elements in any science. What is science in the abstract? What are the requirements in order that a science may exist?

Using science in its ordinarily accepted sense, it appears that the following requirements must be present before any particular science can exist: First, there must be a definite field of potential knowledge, more or less sharply delimited from the fields of other sciences. Within this field, the operations of the particular science in question are to be confined; no single science can be expected to, or is warranted in seeking to, cover the whole range of knowledge. Second, within this field there must be a set of phenomena that belong specifically to it, that have common features which separate them from the phenomena of other sciences. In fact, it is the common features of the phenomena that really constitute the field. Third, these phenomena must be capable of observation by those human instrumentalities ordinarily referred to as the five physical senses. Intuition, introspection, and all similar processes are rigidly barred from the realm of science. Nothing belongs to science that cannot be seen, heard, felt, smelled, or tasted.

Scientific Method

Where these three fundamental requirements exist, science may begin. They do not constitute a science, nor does their presence necessarily guarantee the possibility of science. But they do provide the essentials for the application of the scientific method. The next requirement for a science, then, is that the scientific method be applied to these phenomena. What is the scientific method?

Observation

The scientific method, in its own turn, divides itself into certain uniform and indispensable stages. First of all there must be observation. This means the study of the phenomena that fall within the given field. This study must be accurate, impartial, objective, unselective (one fact must be accepted as having the same basic value as any other fact), and so on through a list of adjectives that might be prolonged almost indefinitely to indicate that the phenomena are to be perceived exactly as they are. Second, the observations thus made must be recorded, with the same precision and accuracy that were used in making them. Third, the data thus collected and recorded must be classified. This is one of the most difficult steps in the scientific method. Classification implies the recognition of significant likenesses and differences among the data; in other words, every sound and logical classification rests upon some predetermined *basis*, that is, some principle of likeness or difference which is adopted in advance as being useful for the purposes of the science.

CLASSIFICATION

A given body of data, especially if each unit has a variety of qualities, may be capable of several different classifications, each logical, and potentially useful for different purposes. A humble example will make this clear. Suppose that a grocery store has received a consignment of apples, and the proprietor is instructing a clerk to sort them out, that is, to classify them. There may be three barrels or bins into which the apples are to be placed, marked A, B, and C. The proprietor may say, "Put the red apples in A, the yellow apples in B, and the green apples in C." Obviously this would be a classification based on color. Or he might say, "Put the summer apples in A, the fall apples in B, and the winter apples in C." This is a classification based on the time of ripening. Or the instructions might be, "Put the tart apples in A, the medium apples in B, and the sweet apples in C"—a classification based on taste. Or again, "Put the large apples in A, the medium-sized apples in B, and the small apples in C." Here the basis is size. Each one of these classifications is logical, because the basis is consistent, and the same load of apples could be distributed according to any one. The basis actually adopted would depend upon what distinction the proprietor anticipated that his customers would be most likely to make, or to regard as important. (In point of fact, he would probably classify them according to variety—Baldwins, Pippins, etc.) But if the proprietor should say "Put the tart apples in A, the red apples in B, and the winter apples in C," the classification would be meaningless, and the clerk would be justifiably confused. For the same apple might be tart, red, and a winter apple, or all the red apples might be sweet summer apples, etc. A notorious example of a bad classification in the sociological field is that which divides socially troublesome individuals into dependents, defectives, and delinquents. This classification has been popular, partly, perhaps, because of its pleasing alliteration. But it is completely illogical because there is no uniform basis. The first category is based upon the source of support, the second on physical or mental traits, and the third upon conformity to the law. Every juvenile court judge knows that the same child may be, and very frequently is, dependent, defective, and delinquent. There is good reason to believe that this illogical classification has actually retarded the development of the scientific treatment of socially inadequate individuals —nobody knows how much.

It may be noted that the very establishment of a basis of classification in turn implies some knowledge about the material which, in theory, could hardly be expected to exist until the study had been completed. The practical solution of this dilemma is that no science ever starts from nothing at all. There is always a body of pre-existing general knowledge of a more or less haphazard sort, which nevertheless is adequate to serve as a guide for the inauguration of the scientific method. Indeed, without this body of general knowledge it would never occur to any one that the possibility of a science was there. With the progress of scientific study the original classifications may have to be altered or even abandoned. But without some rough and ready classifications the scientific method would come to an absolute *impasse.*

Analysis

The next step in the scientific method is analysis of the data thus observed, recorded, and classified. Upon the results of this analysis depends the possibility of the existence of a science in the specified field. The earmark of science is generalized truth. Where no generalization is possible there can be no science. If, after the complete observation, recording, classification, and analysis of the data, it is not possible to make any general statement that is true of all the phenomena, or of certain definite groups of phenomena, or of the relation of the phenomena to one another, then there is no science. The knowledge so painstakingly accumulated may be interesting, it may be suggestive, it may even be useful; but if it cannot be generalized it is not science.

MATERIAL BASIS

Now it is quite clear that what the analysis of the data reveals, depends ultimately upon the nature of the substance or materials out of which the phenomena arise. The phenomena are nothing more than the external expression of the nature of these materials. The materials of all sciences are, as the word itself suggests, *matter,* for only matter can be perceived by the physical senses. And the basic quality of matter that causes it to create phenomena, and to serve as the basis of sciences, is that it is dynamic, that is to say, that forces are inherent in it. The three forces, as ordinarily understood, that inhere in matter are physical attraction, chemical affinity, and life. It may be that in the end all of these reduce to electrical energy, or even to something still more elemental than that. But for practical purposes this threefold classification is useful. The three basic sciences are, therefore, physics, chemistry, and biology. Mathematics is often included in the hierarchy of the sciences by various writers, and frequently designated as the basic science. But mathematics is not a science; it has no phenomena. It has no basic materials. Mathematics is a method, a very valuable method—indeed, a method indispensable to all the sciences, but not to be confused with a science. The truths of science, then, are generalized statements as to the way the various dynamic qualities, or forces, of various kinds of matter express themselves in phenomena under certain conditions.

DESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE

The question naturally arises at this point, is there not such a thing as descriptive science? Does not a body of data, carefully collected and recorded, especially if it is effectively classified, constitute a science? Certainly it is a contribution to science—an indispensable one, as has already been pointed out. But whether it can be called a science or not obviously depends on the definition of science, and it is always unprofitable to insist too rigidly on any particular definition. Let us suppose that a reliable worker has gone out and collected one thousand specimens of rock. He has carefully classified these specimens on the basis of color. He has given a very vivid description of the color groups—one a shade of red between crimson and vermilion, another a jade green, another a steel gray, and so on. Or he may have classified them on the basis of texture, or of specific gravity, or of hardness. Is this science? If so, it is at least reasonable to say that it is very incomplete and sterile science.

But now let us suppose that our worker proceeds to study his classified materials, and discovers that all the red rock has a certain degree of hardness and a definite specific gravity, while the green rock divides into two types, both of which have the same specific gravity, but very different degrees of hardness. It is obvious that science has now moved a long way ahead, for the worker has begun to analyze his materials.

Well, without pursuing these queries too far, there can hardly be disagreement that the only complete science is that which includes a full analysis of the data and takes account of the display of forces involved in them.

CONSTANCY

The final question remains to be asked, what is the nature of the qualities of the ultimate materials of science, and of the forces that inhere in them, that makes scientific generalizations possible? The answer is simply—constancy. The materials of every science are resolvable into ultimate particles of definite types, and the essence of science is that within each type each of these particles should be precisely identical with every other particle, and the forces that inhere in each particle—physical, chemical, or biological—should always behave precisely the same under the same conditions. The reliability, the dependability, the immutability of matter constitute the rock bottom upon which every science rests. If things fell down on some days, up on others, and occasionally southwest by west; if a pound of feathers was sometimes heavier than a pound of lead and sometimes lighter; if electric currents without warning began to leave copper wires and to run along rubber hose and through porcelain walls, there would be no science of physics. If oxygen spasmodically left the hydrogen to which it is supposed to be firmly wedded and proceeded to unite itself enthusiastically with the wooden planks or steel plates of vessels, there could be no chemistry. In brief, if matter were inconstant, whimsical, and capricious, science would vanish into thin air.

But how do we know that matter is constant and reliable? *We do not know it.* We only believe it. We believe it because in the past our observations have invariably shown it to be so. As to what it may be in the future, to what extent the qualities we have observed in the past will continue to manifest themselves hereafter, we have nothing to rely on but scientific belief.* Indeed, the whole tendency of modern science is to state its generalizations in terms of very high probabilities rather than of immutable certainty. But for the practical purposes of the average layman, matter is regarded as constant, and may very wisely be so regarded, because hitherto it has always proved itself so.

NATURAL LAWS

The foregoing considerations pave the way for an understanding of what we call "natural laws." The only natural laws that can be known by the human mind are derived from the generalizations of science. They rest, therefore, ultimately upon observation of the phenomena of matter. A natural law is an explicit statement of the way things have been observed uniformly to happen. It can be nothing more. We *believe* that this uniformity and invariability of phenomena are to be accounted for in the last analysis by some basic principles established in the very constitution of the universe. But we can know nothing about these principles except that which is revealed to us in the behavior of material objects. Our natural laws, therefore, as we formulate them and discuss them, are nothing more than statements of sequences.

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* See below, pp. 143-145.

In ordinary discussions of logic or argumentation it is customary to discredit and ridicule what is called the *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* type of argument. This is simply the argument that assumes that because one thing occurs after another thing, or follows another thing, the antecedent thing is the cause of the consequent thing. This is, indeed, a very unreliable and absurd form of argument as it is all too often used. But the striking thing is that all scientific explanations of causation, in one sense, are *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* arguments. The only difference between the common and fallacious explanation and the scientific explanation is that the former is based on only one or two cases, whereas the latter is based on many cases, all showing identical features. The only reason why a scientist can say that if you touch a match to a can of gunpowder it will explode is that it has always done so. If he attempts to give an explanation by dilating upon the properties of saltpeter, sulphur, and carbon, and the effect of heat in stimulating chemical action, all he is doing is to push the *post hoc* argument a little farther back. For all he knows about any of these things is that in the past they have been observed to behave in certain ways when certain antecedent conditions were set up. This does not in the least discredit the findings of science, properly understood and handled. For the application of science does discover and establish reliabilities in nature, and constant sequences based on them, whereas the snap judgments of the unscientific observer are likely to miss the truth completely. But it does reveal the inescapable limits of science.

The fact is that science never explains anything in the deep sense of that word. Science can tell "how" but it can never tell "why." Science discovers and formulates dependable sequences that run farther and farther back in time and extend out into ever wider and more complex ramifications. But science always assumes some antecedent for every consequent.

And the antecedents must contain all the potentialities of the consequents. Nothing new ever appears out of nowhere in a scientific process. Consequently there is always just as much mystery in the antecedent as in the consequent, in the cause as in the result. No matter how extensive and elaborate and far-reaching a scientific "explanation" may be, it always leaves just as much to be explained in the end as there was in the beginning. Science can never solve the riddle of the universe.

But for the practical purposes of existence on this mundane sphere, as well as to satisfy the native yearnings of the human intellect, it is highly important to be familiar with as many as possible of the established sequences that govern the relations of things to each other in this environment in which we are doomed to spin out our existence. And this is obviously just as true with respect to our human environment as to the physical, provided there do in fact exist any such reliable sequences in the realm of human relations. Whether or not there are, in truth, any such realities is another way of asking whether there is, or can be, a science of sociology.

The Human Environment

All the older and so-called "exact" sciences deal with the physical environment of man, and in their practical aspects deal with the relations between man and this physical environment. A helpful way to think of sociology is as dealing with the human environment of man. But since the human environment is composed of men themselves, there is not the same basis of distinction between the theoretic and the practical aspects of social science that there is of physical science. It is this fact, indeed, that accounts for much of the difficulty and complexity of social science. And yet we do differentiate between man as an individual and men, or the human environment, in the aggregate. A good working definition of sociology, then, may be formulated thus: Sociology is the study of man and his human environment in their relations with each other.*

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* This seems a more realistic and inclusive way of stating it than to say "the study of the relations of man and his human environment to each other," because it is impossible to conceive of the relations apart from man and humanity.

SOCIOLOGY AS SCIENCE

To what extent does sociology, so defined, present the indispensable requirements of a science?

About the first requirement there can be no doubt—sociology certainly has a field all to itself. Its field is the relations of human beings with their human environment, while the other sciences have as their field the relations of non-human materials to each other, or, in their practical aspects, the relations of non-human materials to man. The second requirement is also fulfilled; there are specialized phenomena in this specialized field—an abundance of them. In the third place, these phenomena are capable of observation by the physical senses. Men in their relations with one another can be seen, heard, and felt. It is therefore entirely possible to apply the scientific method to the materials of sociology. These phenomena may be objectively observed, accurately recorded, and systematically classified.

NATURE OF ULTIMATE PARTICLES

But what happens when we come to the analysis of these classified data? Do we find the same basis for positive and immutable generalizations that the physical scientists find? Can we establish a similar set of natural laws? As already pointed out, the basis of our formulations of natural law is the constancy of the elementary particles of matter. This constancy displays itself in two ways. First, each particle of matter of a given sort is precisely like each other particle of the same sort. There are countless billions of atoms of lead in the world, and each may be expected to act precisely like any of the others under the same conditions. In the second place, each ultimate particle of matter retains the same properties or qualities as long as it exists, and since it is indestructible, that means forever. Do we find anything comparable among the ultimate particles of sociological material?

DIVERSITY

The ultimate particles in the field of sociology are individual human beings, men, women, and children. They are often referred to as the "social atoms." Perhaps in these days we ought to call them the social "ions" or "electrons." But whatever we call them, it needs no elaborate research or argument to demonstrate that they lack the same constancy and uniformity that we observe among the atoms of matter. In fact, diversity and change seem to be the universal rule. Nowhere in the entire mass of humanity are there two human individuals exactly alike, or who will behave in precisely the same manner under all identical circumstances. Nor do the separate individuals remain the same throughout their particular existence. They start as infants,

> Mewling and puking in the nurse's arms

and pass through the stages of childhood, youth, maturity, and senility with ever-changing traits and qualities all along the line. Still more striking, the human particles are not indestructible, but are renewed from time to time in perpetually changing forms.

The inconstancy of one half of these particles—the feminine half—has long been the subject of cynical epigram. In the words of a modern operetta,

> You never can tell about the women,
> Perhaps that's why we think they're all so nice.
> You never see two alike any one time,
> And you never see one alike twice,

Or, in more ancient and dignified terms,

> Varium et mutabile semper femina.

But it would be difficult for the more self-complacent half to demonstrate that it was any different in this particular. Diversity, variation, and change are characteristics of all humanity, not of any one part of it.

Sociology a Distinct Science

This being the case, how can there be any finality or exactitude in the generalizations based on the behavior of such particles; how can there be any immutable sociological laws? If inconstancy, whimsicality, and capriciousness would destroy physical science, why do they not preclude social science? The answer is, bluntly, that there cannot be fixed generalizations and laws in the field of social relations in the same sense that there are in the realm of non-human matter. If sociology is a science, it must be an entirely different kind of science from physics and chemistry. This being true, it is decidedly unfortunate that sociological writers in the past have felt impelled to draw so many analogies with these sciences, and to adopt so many terms bodily from them, particularly from physics and chemistry. Doubtless this was inevitable. Science having started in the physical realm, and its methods and terminology having been built up there, it was natural enough that the pioneers of social science, in their effort to raise it to a genuinely scientific level, should have borrowed freely from those fields in which science was firmly entrenched. But the result has been to give a false and misleading aspect to sociological classifications and analyses, to misrepresent social processes, and in the end to retard the consistent and discriminating handling of sociological materials. It is doubly unfortunate that, in so far as such borrowing was inevitable, the science chosen should have ordinarily been physics rather than chemistry. In many ways, the phenomena of chemistry present a much closer analogy to social phenomena than do those of physics. The concepts of affinity, valence, and chemical combination are much more closely akin to human relations than those of cohesion, gravity, and mixture. However, all this is a matter of the past, and cannot be undone, and it must be granted that some useful analogies have been drawn from both. The task of the present and the future is to discover the true and indigenous laws and processes of social relations, and to devise a definite and appropriate specialized terminology to describe and identify them.

SOCIOLOGICAL REGULARITY

Fortunately, the fact that sociology is far from identical in character with the physical sciences does not preclude it from being a science at all. As has been stated, the physical scientist, in formulating his laws, simply states the manner in which things have been observed uniformly to behave. The regularity of the laws rests exclusively on the regularity of this past behavior. Consequently, if it appears in fact that the past behavior of human beings in their relations with one another, as far as it has been observed and recorded, shows certain constancies and uniformities, these regularities may be expressed in sociological laws of precisely the same primary order as the laws of matter. It is not necessary to inquire how it comes about that creatures so diverse can and will behave in such uniform patterns.* The fact that they do is all that is required. And this is precisely what we find.

Let us take a few simple examples. Wherever and whenever in the past men and women have come together in groups they have united to form families. We may therefore set up the generalization that in groups of men and women the family appears, in just the same sense that the chemist says that when hydrochloric acid and zinc are put together hydrogen appears, for the simple reason that that is what has always happened in the past. In like manner we may say that among groups of human beings some will rise to positions of authority and power while others fall to positions of subordination and deference, just as the physicist says that when certain mixtures are left at rest some constituents will sink to the bottom and others rise to the top. Other similar generalizations, taken almost at random, are that in groups of human beings some system of economic cooperation will be established, trade will be carried on, religion will be practiced, conflicts of various sorts will arise, and so on.

REPETITIOUSNESS

Does it seem, perhaps, that commonplaces such as these are too trivial and hackneyed to be dignified by the name of scientific generalizations? This illustrates precisely one of the difficulties that social science has to face, as has already been suggested. Because we are part of the material of sociology, and are incessantly participators in sociological phenomena, it is difficult for us to realize how important and significant these every-day occurrences and experiences are. But if we recall the nature of science, we realize that the commoner an event is the more important it is for science. As already pointed out, it is the very repetitiousness of phenomena that differentiates the procedure of the scientist from the *post hoc* argumentation of the layman. The oftener an event happens identically the firmer is the generalization that describes it. It is in order to secure this repetition that the physical scientist sets up laboratories and performs experiments. Wherever repetitious identity occurs naturally under observable conditions experimentation is unnecessary.

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* Questions of this sort fall within the field of psychology.

Experimentation

This brings up one of the arguments that is frequently adduced to show that sociology is not, and cannot be, a science. It is alleged that experimentation is an indispensable step in the scientific method, and that no experimentation is possible in sociology. This allegation is false in both particulars. In the first place, experimentation is not essential to the scientific method nor to the establishment of a science. The essentials of science are observable phenomena based on constant forces. If such phenomena exist in repetitious form, no experimentation is necessary. The best illustration of this truth is furnished by astronomy, which is one of the most exact of all sciences and yet allows of no experimentation whatever. The allegation is false in the second place because experimentation, within limits, is possible in sociology. Indeed, we are all of us performing sociological experiments almost every day. When a housewife who has bought milk of a certain dealer every day for a year "tries" another dairy, she is performing a sociological experiment. So is the automobilist who habitually gives a cigar every morning to the traffic cop at the corner, or the gay young blade who accosts every pretty girl he meets on the street, or the store-keeper who runs the same advertisement in half a dozen papers every day for six months. Of course, in none of these cases are the conditions ever absolutely identical; but neither are they in even the most carefully controlled physical or chemical experiment. In each field, the conditions have the *degree* of identity or similarity that is necessary for the characteristic generalizations in its respective science. Other examples on a larger scale are furnished by the "Noble Experiment" in social control by legislation represented by the Prohibition venture in the United States, upon which some important generalizations in the way of hypotheses might be based; the Soviet "experiment" in Russia which has established certain conclusions with enough probability to lift it out of the purely experimental stage; and the somewhat haphazard group of spectacular experiments which constituted the "New Deal" under Franklin D. Roosevelt, and which at this writing have not progressed far enough to justify the erection upon them of even tentative hypotheses.

The whole trouble lies in the pervasive illusion of the commonplace. When one starts out studying sociology as a science he naturally expects something new and startling. He is on the lookout for novel and unusual events. What really differentiates sociology from ordinary, rule-of-thumb appraisal of human relations is not the phenomena with which it deals, but the attitude it displays toward those phenomena and its method of analyzing and interpreting them. Every human being starts making sociological observations from the earliest dawn of consciousness, and keeps on making them to the day of his death. By the time any young person has finished college he has made more sociological observations than he will ever make in physics or chemistry if he should devote the rest of his life to one of them. Compared with other sciences, elementary sociology presents the student with very few new facts.

NATURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Sociology is, then, or at least can be, a science. But it is a very different kind of a science from physics or chemistry, or even biology. Sociology is essentially dynamic, because the ultimate particles on which it is based are in a state of constant change. Its very foundations are shifting. It requires, therefore, an entirely different set of concepts and principles. Everything in sociology is conditional, ephemeral, transitory. Every sociological generalization ought to be dated—including this one. Most such generalizations should be stated as trends, not as finalities. For the mind trained in the exact sciences it is difficult even to grasp the idea of such a science, to conceive of its spirit, tone, and quality. But until this is done, until sociologists themselves train themselves into the mastery of such a set of concepts, there can be no adequate science of society.

Change in Human Nature

One of the important points involved in this whole situation is obviously the actual rate, degree, and character of the change that takes place in the basic qualities of the human particles, generation after generation, and age after age. This is a much-debated question. It is frequently asserted that "human nature does not change." Whether there is a grain of truth in this statement depends entirely on what is understood by "human nature." If the term means nothing more than some very general, basic qualities of the human animal that are passed on by heredity from generation to generation and serve as the starting point for certain types of social behavior, then perhaps it does not change. The elemental feeling of hunger may not be very different now from what it was a million years ago. The same may be said of the elemental urge to mate, or to strike back when struck, or to laugh at someone else's discomfiture. But if by human nature is meant the manner in which the individuals of a given generation actually react to the various stimuli of their environment—and this is the only meaning that has any validity or significance for sociology—then it certainly does change. What concerns sociology as a science is the dynamic qualities of the ultimate particles in its field. Each of these particles is a man-as-he-is, not a man-as-he-might-be, or a man-as-he-was-at-first. Sociology is not primarily concerned with any assumed—or even proved—innate qualities that reappear unaltered in each infant at birth. For none of these qualities (if such there be) remains unchanged for more than a very brief period after birth. From the first moment of consciousness the innate qualities begin to be altered, modified, trained, affected by experience and environment—in brief, "conditioned"—so that long before the individual begins to engage in any truly social conduct he is a very different particle from what he was in the beginning. In order that human nature should not change, it would be necessary that all the environing circumstances that produce this conditioning should remain identical from generation to generation, age to age. To realize how far from the truth this is, one need only contrast mentally the environment of a cave-child with that of an infant just born in a great modern city. It is a commonplace that the character of a man is the combined product of heredity and environment. Whether or not heredity changes—and we need not stop here to enter into that question—environment, in its human phase, assuredly does change. Civilization is cumulative. Every item in the human environment is dynamic. Thus there is a twofold basis for the "moving" character of social science. Sociology studies both man and his human environment, and both are in a constant state of flux.

Change in Environment

The phenomena of sociology arise out of the relations of changing man with a changing environment. The phenomena themselves, therefore, must be characterized by change, and everything based on them must be expressed in terms of change. It is partly for this reason, probably, that so much emphasis in recent sociological writing has been laid on "process," even to the extent of making society itself almost synonymous with process.

To illustrate the difference in the characteristic reaction to like stimuli of men at different stages of social evolution we need only visualize the behavior of a group of savages when one of their number has made a killing, and then a group of modern society leaders at a formal dinner party. The former fall upon the carcase of the deer, or whatever it may be, tearing the body apart with their fingers and eating the flesh raw, even to the entrails. The latter, attired in strictly conventional garb, approach the viands with an air of seeming indifference, carefully observing the rules of precedence in entering the room and taking places at the table, and then proceed through the long menu with a formality of bearing and manners that justifies the description of such an occasion as "an attempt to get a square meal without letting anybody see you do it." The basic urge in the two cases is the same, hunger, supplemented by some feeling of sociality. But the behavior is entirely different. Something has changed, and if it is not "human nature" then it is something more influential and important in determining social phenomena.

SOCIAL FORCES

It has already been observed that in the materials of every science there is a dynamic element, and that this dynamic element consists of force or forces. The laws of the science consist in a statement of the characteristic behavior of these forces. What are the social forces?

The forces with which sociology deals are those impulses which lead to social action on the part of human individuals. As will be explained more fully later, these impulses are desires, which become identified with interests. But an isolated desire on the part of a single individual does not necessarily constitute a significant social force. This is for two reasons. In the first place, the phenomenon that arises out of the desire may not be truly social, that is, it may have no bearing on any other human being—but this is exceedingly rare, if for no other reason, because every action modifies the actor to some degree, and makes him an altered member of the social group. In the second place, the phenomenon, though social, may not be scientifically significant. As we have seen, the only phenomena that science can use for its generalizations are repetitious ones. A very considerable portion of human behavior is so particularistic, or occurs under conditions so atypical, that it cannot be combined with other, similar cases of behavior into a significant class. A boy taking a walk through the woods may in an hour perform a thousand acts of no sociologically scientific significance—breaking a twig from a tree, throwing a pebble in a pool, whistling at a bird, smelling of a flower.

SELECTION OF MATERIALS

Sociology, therefore, probably more than any other science, must be selective in the handling of its materials. In a way, this is fortunate, for if sociology were under obligation to utilize every item of human behavior it would be hopelessly swamped by the sheer abundance of its materials. More than any other science, accordingly, sociology has to rely on the preliminary guidance of pre-existing, common-sense knowledge of its field and its objectives. It is really pseudo-science that leads many an ardent young would-be sociologist, and possibly some older ones, to go about assiduously making observations at random without the slightest notion as to whether any systematic use can be made of them, or what that use will be. This does not mean, in the least, that the sociologist should collect his data with the intention of proving something by them—this is as thoroughly unscientific in sociology as in any other field. What it does mean is that he should have some reasonable idea that something can be proved by them, that is, that they can be combined into some sort of a generalization. Theoretically, of course, one can conceive of an enormous sociological organization, some members of which spent their time merely collecting every sort of heterogeneous sociological observation, while others sorted and classified these observations, and still others analyzed and interpreted them. But the total field of sociology is too vast, and the phenomena too nearly infinite in number and variety, to allow any practical value to such an enterprise, particularly because, as has been pointed out, sociology is so dynamic that long before any such mass of data could be assembled and tabulated and analyzed it would be entirely out of date.

COMMON SENSE

Sociology, therefore, to be a valid science, must be emphatically a common-sense science. It must not allow itself to be too closely restrained and hampered by the regulations, standards, and techniques of the physical sciences. It must, without apology or misgiving, develop its own safeguards, codes, and degrees of longitude and latitude. It must be empirical in the highest sense of the word.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN APPLICATION

PURE SCIENCE

Like every other science, sociology has its pure or theoretic aspect, and its applied or practical aspect. Pure science is that department of science that devotes itself to the pursuit of truth for its own sake. It studies the materials in its appropriate field and the nature of the forces inherent in them. It observes, records, and classifies the phenomena that arise out of these forces. On the basis of this systematic knowledge it formulates generalized truths or laws about the objects in its field, and their relations to one another. In all these processes pure science takes no account of any meaning that its truths may have for human welfare; it gives no consideration to any uses that may be made of its truths; it does not think of them as being applied to any of the problems of human life.

APPLIED SCIENCE

Practical science, on the other hand, starts with a problem. It is set in motion by the existence of a purpose that someone wants to accomplish, an achievement that someone wants to get done. Just as pure science has to have a certain body of common knowledge before it can get started, so applied science must know enough about the nature of its problem to know what science to turn to for aid. A person whose radio is out of order does not choose a biologist to help him, nor does a person who wants to know about the next eclipse of the sun seek out a chemist. The former turns to a practical physicist, and the latter to an astronomer. Applied science starts with a particular case with reference to which a specific end is to be accomplished. It wishes to know what are the truths that govern the particular situation, what generalization applies to the problem in hand. For the entire set of available generalizations it turns to pure science. It selects the one that summarizes the type of relations and the characteristic behavior that promise to achieve the desired end. It then sets these processes in motion with respect to the particular matter that demands attention.

Take an example. A couple of boys have made a toy dirigible from thin sheets of rubber that they have cemented together. They want to set it afloat. They know by hearsay that hydrogen is lighter than air, and will float their ship. But they do not know how to make hydrogen. They take their problem to their chemistry teacher. The chemist, as the repository of knowledge based upon thousands of previous observations of a certain type of phenomena, knows precisely the generalization that covers the case. He says, "If you put zinc and hydrochloric acid together, they make hydrogen." This is merely a statement of a generalized truth of pure chemistry. In his rôle of applied scientist, the teacher then proceeds to show the boys how to set up their apparatus with flask, stopper, and rubber tube ending in a glass nozzle. He cautions them to let a little of the gas escape to get rid of the air. He then attaches the nozzle to the gas bag, and in due time the little toy floats away. The scientist has applied a general truth to a particular case, and the problem is solved.

Induction and Deduction

It is clear, then, that the distinction between pure and applied science is closely parallel to that between the inductive and the deductive methods. Pure science proceeds from the particular to the general; applied science, from the general to the particular. Pure science determines that a liquid composed of certain chemicals, when sprayed into the air, will kill insects. Applied science sees a big mosquito approaching, and shouts, "Quick, Henry, the Flit."

No Value Judgment in Science

Now it is exceedingly important to realize that in all this procedure science, in either its pure or its applied aspect, passes no judgment whatever upon the purpose or objective, and takes no responsibility for it. Pure science, of course, haughtily ignores the objective. Applied science says, "If you wish to accomplish such and such a purpose, here is the way to go at it." But in so doing applied science makes no appraisal of the merits of the objective, assumes no sponsorship of the enterprise, and accepts no accountability for the character of the result. If any expert refuses to give advice because of the way he knows it is to be used, he does so, not as a scientist, but as a moralist, a preacher, an ethicist, a philosopher, or what have you. It is quite possible that the two boys in our example are intending to launch their little dirigible in the midst of study hall, to see how much disturbance they can create. But if the chemistry teacher finds this out, and refuses to help them accordingly, he does so not as a chemist, but as a disciplinarian.

Objectivity

This distinction is of paramount importance in sociology. The subject matter of sociology, being human relations of every sort, is immeasurably more shot through with emotion, feeling, and moral and ethical implications than that of any other science. It is almost impossible even to imagine any social act that is entirely colorless with respect to the welfare of some other individual or of society. Furthermore, it has been a very common practice with sociologists in the past to combine the rôles of social mentor and technical adviser, without realizing that they were doing so, or making any differentiation between the two. This is partly because sociology, in its early stages, was so thoroughly entangled with social work, and so frequently confused with "carrying baskets of food to the poor." Now it is no more the business of the sociologist, as scientist, to carry baskets of food to the poor than it is of the plumber, or the banker, or the bootlegger. It is not even his business, as scientist, to say that baskets of food *ought* to be—or ought *not* to be—carried to the poor.

In fact, it is not the function of sociology, in either its pure or applied aspects, to say what ought to be done in society, by individuals or by society itself. The simple reason is that science can never determine what ought to be done—such a determination lies outside the range of science. The notion of "ought" implies an objective. This objective may be based on another objective, and this on another, and so on indefinitely. But eventually any such chain winds up in a final objective, which is the explanation and justification of all the other objectives.

An argument between a "wet" and a "dry" might run thus:

Wet. "Why do you want Prohibition?"

Dry. "In order that there may be less drunkenness."

"Why do you want less drunkenness?"

"In order that there may be fewer accidents, and more responsibility on the part of husbands to support their families."

"Why do you want fewer accidents?"

"In order that fewer people may be killed."

"Why do you want fewer people killed?"

"Of course we want fewer people killed"—the final objective has been reached along this line.

Wet (once more). "Well, then, why do you want more responsibility on the part of heads of families?"

"So that there may be fewer hungry women and children."

"Why do you want fewer hungry women and children?"

"So that there may be less suffering."

"Why do you want less suffering?"

"Just because I do, stupid. Everyone does"—another final objective.

Axiomatic Character of Ultimate Values

The key to this whole analysis is found in the fact that all final objectives, all ultimate values, are axiomatic. They cannot be proved or disproved. They exist just because man is what he is, just because society is society. It is impossible to prove that human beings should want to live, that they should seek pleasure and avoid pain, that men and women should want to come together in love, that parents should cherish their children, that everyone should seek power and recognition, or should be kind, fair, honest, jealous, vain, or happy. These things are the accepted postulates of all sociological procedure. They are among the qualities that pure sociology discovers in the materials with which it deals. Pure science may prove that they are so—it cannot prove that they should be so. In brief, the final objectives of social action cannot be prescribed by sociology.*

Every problem presented to the applied sociologist, however, rests in the last analysis upon one of these ultimate values. Its validity as a genuine social problem depends upon the generality of acceptance of the ultimate value. The reason why such things as vice, pauperism, tuberculosis, child labor, and unemployment have been so widely recognized as legitimate social problems is that almost everybody accepts the ultimate values involved, and it has not been felt necessary to challenge or defend them. So thoroughly are these values taken for granted that almost nobody ever stops to inquire explicitly what they are. When we come to such problems as divorce, woman labor, minimum wages, and universal suffrage the ultimate values are both less obvious and less generally accepted. Procedure along these lines, therefore, is much more tangled up with controversy. And when we come to such problems as socialism, Bolshevism, disarmament, old age insurance, and the ''dole'' it seems at first as if there were no room whatever for scientific applied sociology.

RÔLE OF THE SOCIOLOGIST

But the sociologist should not let himself be confused or dismayed by any of these side issues. He is under no obligation to pass judgment on any of the objectives. His is ''not to question why.'' The moralist and the ethicist, every time they hear ''ought,'' are entitled to ask—indeed, in justice to their rôles, should ask—''why,'' and keep on asking ''why'' until they come to the ultimate value. But not the sociologist. If a given individual combines in his own person the functions of sociologist and moralist, he ought to distinguish sharply between them in his own mental processes, and make it quite clear to outsiders in just which rôle he is operating at any given time—both very difficult things to do. (The word "ought" has been used in the foregoing sentence. The final value is "scientific integrity.") All the sociologist needs to ask is, "What is it that you are trying to accomplish?" Having got this clear, his task is then to indicate what line of procedure will get the desired result. Of course the problem presented to him may be, and very frequently is, a query as to the bearing of some proposal upon some ultimate objective which he, as well as his questioner, recognizes to be virtually universally accepted. But his attitude, as scientist, should not be any different toward this objective from his attitude toward any other. Quite frequently, also, unless he is on his guard, the sociologist may use the word "ought" without intending any moral judgment, but simply indicating the correct mode of procedure, just as a doctor will say to a patient, "You ought not to sit in a cold draft when you are in a dripping perspiration," assuming the unspoken conclusion of the sentence, "if you want to keep healthy," but not passing any judgment as to whether the patient ought to want to keep healthy.

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* This question will be discussed more fully in a later section in connection with the concept of Progress.

Comparison with Physical Scientist

The truth of these propositions should become perfectly clear by comparison with any of the material sciences. A few years ago a project was started to build a bridge across the Hudson River from up-town New York. The point at which the span was to start was determined. Engineers were called in to draw up the plans and specifications for the bridge. These engineers were scientists, presumably of the highest order. They were familiar with the generalizations about strength of materials, tensions, strains, gravity, wind currents, rock strata, etc., which could be applied to this particular problem. They may or may not have had opinions about whether it was conducive to human welfare to build a bridge at that particular point. It is conceivable that some of them might have disapproved of it—"there are too many Jerseyites coming to New York already, and why should anybody who lives in New York want to go to New Jersey?" But that was none of their affair. Their business was to tell how to build the bridge as solidly and economically as possible.

Similarly, a scientific chemist might be approached by a man with a request for a formula for paint to be applied to a rock cliff, requiring brightness of color, durability, cheapness, etc. Knowing the problem, the chemist could work out the formula. It might occur to him incidentally to ask what the sign was to be. If he were told that it was to be an advertisement of a soda-fountain drink heavily charged with a habit-forming drug, he might be scandalized as a humanitarian, but that would not affect his duty as a chemist. So if, later on, the advertiser came to a sociologist and asked him for advice as to how to organize groups of hikers who would tramp past his sign, it would be the duty of the sociologist, if he accepted the commission, to give him the best counsel possible, and, *purely as sociologist,* he should have no hesitation in accepting the commission.

The Japanese government once asked Herbert Spencer to advise it upon the desirability of race mixture from the Japanese point of view; his reply has become a classic. It is not inconceivable that, when the little affair in Manchuria has been attended to, the present Japanese government might ask some expert in larithmics for advice as to how to handle its population problem. The scientist might take up the various possibilities—emigration, industrialization, land aggression, birth control—pointing out the probable efficacy of each, and the incidental consequences that might be expected to accompany each. He would leave it to Japan to decide which method she preferred. He would certainly not presume to tell Japan which she *ought* to prefer or which she *ought* to adopt. He would discuss with the same degree of objectivity the advantages of introducing modern textile machinery or the military conquest of Australia. As a part of his analysis he might explain what the probable emotional reactions of other states might be, and what tenets of social morality or international ethics they might invoke in support of their position. But he would neither endorse nor disclaim this attitude. He might tell Japan that other nations would regard a certain kind of behavior as wrong; he certainly would not declare that it was wrong.

Sociologist and Social Reform

The main justification for the large figure cut by sociologists in the arena of active social reform is the fact that there is actually a considerable number of basic ultimate values upon which agreement is so nearly universal that they may be taken for granted; and the sociologist may be presumed to know better than the unspecialized layman what is the probable bearing of various proposed measures upon these ultimate values. For example, if a scheme is proposed for the reduction of the tuberculosis rate, the sociologist does not waste time asking the world to tell him why it wants the tuberculosis rate reduced, nor even to assure him that it really does want it reduced. He merely assumes that a valid reason exists for reducing the tuberculosis rate, and proceeds to use his technical skill in determining whether the proposed measure will be effective; and if his decision is affirmative he may lend his enthusiastic support to the project.

Constant Application of Sociology

Just as every normal person knows a great deal of pure sociology without ever having studied it, so everybody practices applied sociology every day of his life. That is, he applies to a particular problem that confronts him some established generalization about the behavior of human beings in their relations with one another. Of course, he seldom consciously formulates the generalization in his mind before making his decision or taking action. When you step up to a news-stand to get your morning paper you have really said, "Newsdealers will sell a copy of the *New York Times* for two cents. This man is a newsdealer. Therefore he will give me a *Times* for my two cents.'' You hail a taxi, saying subconsciously to yourself, ''Taxi drivers take people where they want to go for the fare indicated by the taximeter, and an expected tip. This man is a taxi driver. Therefore he will take me to the Grand Central Station for what I should reasonably expect to pay him.'' A young man brought up in the United States, contemplating matrimony, says to himself, ''In this country young people are permitted to choose their own mates. Mary Smith is the girl I want for my wife. Therefore nobody will object if I propose to her,'' and he proceeds to do so, provided fear of general objection is the only thing that is holding him back. In countries like Japan or pre-War Turkey the syllogism would have run differently because the social particles there have different qualities. If all social relations were as simple and commonplace as the foregoing there would be little need of studying sociology at all. But unfortunately (or fortunately, for sociology teachers) many are not. The real, practical function of applied sociology appears when some problem of definite importance arises for which there is no routine counterpart, and which must be decided upon the basis of a wide knowledge of social generalizations, and a full understanding of social forces and laws. In modern society there is a vast and increasing number of such problems.*

SOCIAL WORKERS

Like every applied science, practical sociology must have its craftsmen, artisans, technicians—skilled workers who have the training and dexterity necessary to put the specifications of the scientist into effect. These workers need not be scientists themselves. Their basic qualification is the ability to receive and understand instructions, and carry them out accurately. In the building of the bridge mentioned above, an army of riveters, carpenters, painters, stationary engineers, etc., was required. Probably very few of them had even as much as a smattering of the fundamentals of the various sciences which really governed their operations. The craftsmen of applied sociology are what are ordinarily known as social workers. They are the ones that put the prescriptions of the scientist into effect in the lives of actual men, women, and children. They may know something about scientific sociology —a great many of them know a great deal—but such knowledge is not an essential part of their equipment. They must be masters of the practical art of dealing with human beings. If baskets of food are to be carried to the poor, persons can be trained to do it gracefully, faithfully, and tactfully, without knowing anything about sociology, or even knowing why they do it. Only a practical sociologist can decide whether baskets of food shall be distributed in the furtherance of some definitely postulated social objective. Without the guidance of applied sociology the activities of social workers must be simply rule-of-thumb, matter-of-fact, benevolent deeds, like those performed by the conventional "Lady Bountiful," and may literally do more harm than good.*

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* See chapters XXIII and XXIV.

Just as some individuals combine in their own persons the qualities of social scientist and social mentor, so others combine the applied sociologist and the social worker. Many social workers are their own scientists. Such persons may be the highest and most useful type of social worker, provided they do not have too much confidence in their competence as scientists, but on the contrary take adequate precautions to keep fully in touch with the progress of scientific sociology, and to keep their daily activities subject to the guidance of scientific principles, rather than their own experience and observation. Their immediate contact with personal problems fits them to make very useful contributions to the knowledge of ultimate values.

Any science that touches in any degree upon the problems of human welfare—and what science does not?—must of necessity have its applied aspects. Its generalizations are built up out of innumerable individual cases. If sound, they may always be applied, by a reverse process, to specific instances. This is particularly true of sociology. To say that there is, and can be, no scientific applied sociology is equivalent to denying that there is any science of sociology at all.

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* See below, pp. 478-481.

Sociological Induction

If theoretic sociology, like other pure sciences, is built up out of innumerable detailed observations, the question naturally arises, who makes the observations? Who does the inductive work in sociology?

The answer is, in the first place, that we all do. As already observed, every normal human individual is busy making sociological observations all his life. Far and away the most important body of sociological data is gathered in this way. More than in any other science, the task of sociology lies in interpreting data already known.

But in every science, progress depends upon observation of cases that vary from the known and the familiar, that contain some element of the novel or exceptional. To create such instances is, in large part, the purpose of experimentation. Although it is true, as already stated, that the basically important phenomena for scientific purposes are the repetitious ones, nevertheless the point is eventually reached when further repetition can add little certainty or enlightenment. Advance in knowledge requires some alteration in the factors and forces. Only in this way, oftentimes, can the basic or relative significance of each specific factor be determined. Of course these variations must themselves be repeated before they furnish the grounds for scientific certainty. Furthermore, phenomena are constantly occurring that do not fit into any of the established patterns, and call for special study and observation.

Similarly, in the field of human relations, the observations contained in the mental compendium of the ordinary man do not by any means provide all the data necessary for complete and inclusive scientific generalizations. There are many questions, often of vital importance, that cannot be answered except on the basis of data specially collected for the purpose. Since experimentation in the sociological field is necessarily confined within limitations that are easily perceived (though not entirely precluded, as is sometimes stated), it follows that progress in social science must involve the organization of special study into bodies of data that promise to reveal relationships hitherto unknown or poorly understood. The variety and scope of such scientifically useful pieces of research are almost infinite. Consequently, the group of scientific sociologists includes an ever-increasing number of research workers, delving away into all sorts of unusual, remote, and inaccessible areas of human relationships, and bringing forth data to be added to the total accumulation of observations, and thereby enlarging the possibilities of sound generalizations. Some of these research workers are well-rounded scientists, competent to proceed with the classification and analysis of their own material. Others lack the ability or the training for comprehensive scientific work, though they may be wholly reliable observers and recorders. The ranks of social workers furnish many of the latter class. In fact, an enormous amount of valuable intensive observation and recording is being done by social workers of the better type in the course of their routine activities. These records constitute a mass of basic and primary sociological material that has been strangely ignored or neglected by the group of theoretic sociologists in general.

Limits of Inductive Method

The question is frequently raised whether all truly scientific study of sociology, even in its elementary aspects and by beginners, must not be inductive in method. It is pointed out that every basic science is inductive, that particularized observations in great number must be made before any classification or analysis is possible. Any approach that takes these observations for granted, or accepts them ready to hand from some outside source, seems to be essentially unscientific. This attitude seems rather impressive at first thought, and is indeed quite defensible in the abstract. But practically it is not tenable in the field of sociology. The individual study of general sociology by the strictly inductive method is impossible. In the first place, the mass of data is too enormous. The materials of sociology include every act ever performed by a human being that had any bearing on the interests of any other human being. To observe even the most infinitesimal portion of these data is obviously a physical impossibility for any student, or group of students, in a lifetime. In the second place, the phenomena are too nearly infinite in their variety. No two acts of two human beings—or of the same human being—are ever precisely identical. Sociological induction, therefore, on the part of any individual must be indescribably partial in scope, far too partial to permit of any inclusive scientific generalizations. Even though one or more generalizations may clearly arise out of his own data, he has no way of knowing personally whether they would apply to the data of other students.

But, it may be asked, cannot the observation be confined to limited but representative bodies of phenomena, and original inductions be legitimately drawn therefrom? The difficulty with this proposal is that in the presentation of *representative* data someone must make a preliminary selection, and the study of selected data is never truly inductive. The inductive method involves, ideally, the observation of all the phenomena within the given field, or practically, the observation of phenomena as they present themselves at random and without choice. The introduction of the element of selection automatically precludes the inductive method. It implies the existence of a generalization already formed, which makes the data "representative." What is really referred to by this proposal is the *case method.* This is something quite different from the inductive method, and may have much to recommend it. Its use, however, is merely a matter of practical expediency under given conditions, not a question of scientific procedure.

PERSONAL INDUCTION NOT NECESSARY TO SCIENCE

Fortunately, it is possible to be entirely scientific in the study of sociology without relying on personal inductive observation. This is for two reasons. The first is, as has been repeatedly stated already, that every student is already armed with an enormous number of sociological observations, which can be subjected to classification and analysis. The second is that there is available a vast mass of observations, made and recorded by other reliable students. As stated above, research projects in sociology are becoming daily more numerous and more significant. Literature is also full of sociological observations, particularly history, but also essays and even fiction. There are many more sociological phenomena recorded and accessible than the beginning student can possibly find the time to deal with inductively. Of course, caution must be used as to the sources of this material, the reliability of the original observer, the faithfulness and impartiality of the recording, etc. Such verification is usually possible, or if it is not in the case of a given body of material, there are plenty of other data that are reliable.

PREDICTION

Another assertion that is often made to disprove the claim of sociology to rank as a science is that it is not possible to make predictions about human relationships. The implication that prediction is a valid test of a science is perfectly accurate, as is evident from what has been observed about the nature of a science. If prediction is interpreted as the statement of very high probabilities rather than absolute certainties, the ability to predict the future, granted a full knowledge or control of present conditions, is an invariable feature of every true science. But to state that there is not, and cannot be, prediction in sociology is to display a flagrant subjection to the illusion of the commonplace. If one heeds the admonition to focus his scientific attention on the every-day events of life he realizes that he is making sociological predictions all the time. Imagine that you are staying in a hotel in New York. You wake up in the morning, and turn on the water at the wash-bowl. You have already predicted that the water will flow, hot (or at least warm) from the tap marked "Hot" and cold from the other. You do not stop to think of the enormous sociological complex upon which you are relying for that insignificant stream of water—the workmen and watchmen up at the reservoir in the Catskills, and all along the system of aqueducts, conduits, and pipes that brings the water to your bathroom, or of the engineers down in the sub-basement that keep the fires going, the coal-heavers that deliver the fuel for the fire, the coal companies that distribute the coal, the mining companies and miners that get the coal from the earth, and so on indefinitely. When you say subconsciously, "If I turn on the left-hand faucet I will get hot water," you have made a sociological prediction involving a vast number of human particles of a variety of different types that would compare favorably with the most elaborate chemical or physical experiment.

You make your toilet and go down to the dining-room. You order grapefruit, bacon and eggs, toast, and coffee. In so doing you predict that a sociological organization in the kitchen and pantry will presently put itself in motion to produce the result you have predicted. You make a sort of *ex post facto* prediction that an innumerable host of wheat farmers, stock-raisers, packing-house operatives, fruit growers, Brazilian coffee planters, railroad workers, steamship crews, wholesale and retail dealers, delivery trucks will already have cooperated to put the simple supplies for your breakfast into the storeroom. Did you ever know your prediction to fail? Possibly yes, sometimes. The grapefruit may be "out," and all too often the coffee or the eggs are not quite what you anticipated. But, for that matter, many a carefully arranged physical or chemical experiment does not turn out just as was expected. By and large, you place your breakfast order in a good hotel in virtual certainty that it will be carried out. You ask the waiter to bring you a copy of your favorite paper. You have no doubt that at whatever special price this particular hotel may charge you will be able to get the *Times* or the *Herald-Tribune.* You are positive that if you went outside to a news-stand you could get either one for two cents. Will Rogers once said that every time a New Yorker sees a hole in the ground he grabs a nickel and ducks down it. Following the custom of the region, you go down into the subway, drop your nickel into the turn-stile, and step onto the platform, subconsciously predicting that in a very few minutes a train will come along that will take you where you want to go, assuming that you feel reasonably familiar with the intricacies of the New York subway system—or lack of system. There is no use prolonging this narrative throughout your whole day's experiences. Once you approach the subject from this angle, you realize that your entire day is one series of sociological predictions, involving a host of participators so stupendous that if you stopped to try to visualize them before you acted you would be as effectively paralyzed as the allegorical centipede who was asked in what order he moved his legs.

Confidence in Predictions

Striking examples of the unquestioning confidence with which we risk our lives on these predictions are furnished by any automobile trip. Suppose that you are driving at night along a newly constructed country road for the first time. The headlights of your car turn the highway into a broad white ribbon, gradually fading into obscurity in the distance. Presently you find yourself going up a rather steep hill that drops off sharply at the top. To all appearances the road ends abruptly at the brow of the hill. Do you stop your car, and get out and walk ahead to where you can see the descent, or throttle down your engine to five miles an hour and creep along until you can see whether the road really does go on past the summit? Not at all! You sail gaily ahead at whatever speed you regard as reasonable, absolutely certain that no gang of road builders would have left a road unfinished at a point like that—or any other point—without leaving a conspicuous warning sign to stop the motorist. In fact, every time you meet a car on a highway you make a prediction—that its driver will keep on the right-hand side of the road as he sees it, and that, however much of a road-hog he may be, he will leave you enough space to pass him without going into the ditch. This is absolutely a sociological arrangement. There is nothing inherent in human nature that makes us keep to the right. In many countries they keep to the left. But in the United States society has decreed the right-hand rule of the road, and, with rare and disastrous exceptions, drivers stick to it.

Prediction Based on Repeated Sequences

But by this time someone is very likely saying, "Of course (watch out for that 'of course!' in your sociological investigations) we make all these predictions, if you want to call them that, and take all these things for granted. But what has this to do with sociology? Everybody who has passed the stage of infancy does them, though he has never studied an hour of sociology, and doesn't even know what the word means, just as much as the graduate student who has just finished his doctor's thesis on 'The Theoretical Concepts of Auguste Comte.' " Be patient, dear critic. The truth that you have stated does not mean that there is no science of sociology, but on the contrary that the science of sociology is so pervasive that every individual with a modicum of intelligence and experience is familiar with some of its practical conclusions, though he has never given the slightest formal study to it.

What objectors usually have in mind when they make allegations of this kind are predictions about novel, unfamiliar, unprecedented events—things that have never happened before. What would happen if Henry Ford should decide to employ only married men between the ages of twenty-five and forty-five, and pay them a minimum of ten dollars a day? What would be the effect on world politics if England should go Bolshevik? How would complete free trade affect the prosperity of the United States? What will be the final effect of President Roosevelt's attempt to cheapen the dollar by buying gold at rising prices? It would indeed be delightful and profitable if we could make explicit and infallible predictions about these and kindred hypotheses. But it is not fair to expect *more* of sociology than of the physical sciences. It should never be forgotten that the predictions in the "exact" sciences are absolutely limited to things that not only have happened, but have happened repeatedly, in the past. No physical scientist would venture to predict anything but the repetition of past sequences that have been thoroughly studied and verified. What appear to be predictions of unprecedented events in the material sciences are never more than novel *combinations* of established sequences, if we except an occasional inspiration or "hunch," which is not a real prediction, but an expert guess.

Limits on Sociological Prediction

Nevertheless, it must be granted that the physical scientist has a great advantage over his confrere in the sociological field in that the pre-existing conditions with which he has to deal are immeasurably less complex, and more amenable to comprehension and control. Also, as already pointed out, there is the fundamentally important difference that the ultimate particles of physical science are uniform and constant whereas those of social science are infinitely variable and diverse. But it is no exaggeration to say that if the social scientist could know *all* of the factors governing a given future sequence with the same completeness and certainty that the physical scientist may, he could predict with the same confidence. And as long as the social scientist confines himself to predictions based upon uniform and relatively invariable past sequences he can make predictions of a high degree of verity and potential usefulness. The study of sociology concerns itself largely with determining the scientifically justified generalizations upon which such predictions can be based.

Statistical Method

Prediction is closely associated with the use of the statistical method. In their eagerness to make sociology an exact science many sociologists have gone to extremes in emphasizing statistics, and mathematics in general, in their analyses.[1] The fact that sociology is distinctly a science of mass phenomena adds plausibility to this procedure. But there are dangers. Statistics in general displays two aspects. First, it is a method of arranging and presenting mass data in such a way as to make them as clear and comprehensible as possible. This is based on observed facts, and is merely a form of recording. A table of birth-rates or of imports of rubber, or of miners' wages or of gasoline consumption per mile of automobile travel falls into this category. The second consists of efforts to predict future phenomena, or to estimate past or present phenomena, in areas that are not covered by observed and recorded facts. Here reliance is placed on the law of probability or chance. Thus if the data on birth-rates are lacking for the years from 1923 to 1926, the attempt is made to estimate them on the basis of those that are recorded before and after that period. Or an attempt is made to estimate the imports of rubber in 1940 on the basis of the recorded imports up to 1933. The usual method is to construct a graph or curve on the basis of the known facts, and then to fill in the missing portions of the curve in the past or in the future by the processes known as interpolation or extrapolation.

DEPENDENCE ON ULTIMATE QUALITIES

This process obviously bears a close relation to the reconstruction of man's biological history, as previously explained.* It rests upon two related assumptions, first, that a well-established trend that has been consistent over a considerable period of time will not suddenly vary in an erratic manner, and second, that mass phenomena tend to occur in an orderly general pattern that corresponds to the curve of normal frequency, which is the overt expression of the law of probability. These are two valuable assumptions, if used with due precaution. But there is great danger that the precautions will be neglected. In the first place, there is danger of forgetting that overt phenomena, which are the data on which all statistical tables, charts, and curves are based, are merely the outward expression of the dynamic qualities of the ultimate particles of the science in question. The statistics can be regular only so long as the phenomena are regular, and the phenomena can be regular only so long as the dynamic qualities are constant, *and so long as the environing or stimulating conditions remain unchanged.* Thus if an ordinary pair of dice is thrown a large number of times it may be anticipated that the different sides will come up with about equal frequency. But if the one-spots are made of cleverly inserted plugs of lead there will probably be a surprisingly large number of double-sixes. Again, a tree standing alone in a fertile meadow may be expected to grow in a relatively symmetrical shape. But if the prevailing winds are strongly in a definite direction the form of the tree will be distorted.

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* See p. 50.

Law of Chance

A second, even more insidious, error is to regard the so-called "law of chance" as a force, that is, to think of it as a dynamic quality of the ultimate particles of all sciences. But no true law is a quality, but merely a statement of the way in which real qualities have been observed to express themselves. At best, the law of chance or probability is merely a statement of a general type of behavior that has been observed to arise out of the qualities of many different kinds of ultimate particles. The point that requires particular notice is that the law of chance is never applied when any other law is available; that is, if there have been sufficient observations with respect to a certain relationship so that we feel scientifically confident just what phenomenon will arise out of it we never state the situation in terms of the law of chance but of certainty. All the laws contained in ordinary scientific textbooks are of this order. No elementary chemistry teacher would think of saying to his pupils, "If you put dilute nitric acid and copper together there is a chance that you will get copper nitrate." Nor would a biologist say that the offspring of a bull and a cow would probably be a calf. In other words, recourse to the law of chance is merely a confession of ignorance. If we knew enough about the forces and factors involved in any phenomenon, or group of phenomena, we should not need to use the law of chance.

Normal Frequency

One of the standard illustrations of probability is a large number of leaves picked at random from a tree. If they are carefully arranged in a series according to length it will be discovered that at each extreme there will be, of course, one, and that as we move from the extremes toward the center the number of leaves of approximately the same length becomes greater and greater, or, putting it the other way around, the difference in length between each leaf and the one next to it tends on the whole to become less and less. This would be graphically expressed as follows:

CHART I.—CURVE OF NORMAL DISTRIBUTION.



This is a curve of normal frequency, and we customarily say that its shape is determined by the law of chance. But if one believes in general causation at all, that is, if he accepts an orderly and scientific conception of the universe, he must recognize that the size of every leaf is the result of a definite and continuous sequence, which, if we only knew enough, could be stated just as precisely as the sequence that results in copper nitrate or a Jersey calf. The fact that one leaf is two and one-eighth inches long, while another is three and nine-sixteenths inches long, could be traced to the relative positions of the leaves on twig and branch, the amount of sun, air, rain, and sap that each received and the influence of insects, birds, and various other minute factors. The fact that the majority of the leaves fell between three inches and three and one-quarter inches could be "explained" by the fact that the combination of forces that determined that length was more frequent than any other. But we do not know completely what these forces are, or why they occur more frequently in certain combinations than others, and so we refer it to the law of chance.

Human Chance

When the phenomena in question arise out of human activity, and seem nevertheless to be beyond human determination, it frequently means that the forces back of them are too minute to be controlled by the ordinary neuromuscular system. The conventional illustration is the process of tossing a coin, usually a cent. It is a familiar fact that if such a coin is tossed a large number of times heads and tails will come up with about equal frequency. We accordingly say that the fall of the coin is governed by the law of chance. But in point of fact, the fall of the coin is governed by a muscular impulse, distance from the surface on which it falls, the resilient quality of that surface, air currents, etc. These are all minute factors which we are not able to measure. But the fall of the coin on each separate toss is just as positively a matter of causal determination as one of Babe Ruth's home-runs into the bleachers, a perfect bull's-eye in a rifle meet, or one of Willie Hoppe's incredible billiard shots. It is quite possible, theoretically, to construct a delicate machine that will toss heads or tails consistently. Indeed, if you will take a larger coin, say a half-dollar, and turn it only once or twice, using a dead surface, you can easily train yourself to get whichever side you wish much more than half the time. The forces will then be gross enough so that you can control them. A college professor, who, for the first time, was watching a fairly expert tennis player drive balls into the corners of the opposite court, remarked, "That must be luck, for you certainly couldn't have the skill to do it deliberately." And he was a professor of mathematics!

Statistical Pitfalls

Chance or probability, therefore, is merely a convenient catchall into which we throw all the odds and ends of phenomena for which we have no acceptable scientific explanation. Properly used, as stated above, it is a very convenient device, just as a duffle bag is a handy receptacle for miscellaneous travel equipment. These minute and intangible forces do, in many cases, distribute themselves more or less evenly about a central mean or mode. In such cases, if you do not know how a given phenomenon is going to display itself, it may be helpful to assume that it will follow the law of averages. The trouble is, of course, that the most carefully elaborated statement of the law of chance or probability never tells you how the *next* item, or any particular item, will turn out. Such validity as it has is limited to mass phenomena, *in the mass.* You may have flipped a penny fifty times, and got heads every time—there is just as much chance that the next turn will be heads as there was at first. "Lightning never strikes twice in the same place" simply means that it is not likely to, in view of the large number of places where it might strike. It does not in the least mean that if your house has been struck once you are justified in taking down your lightning-rods, and canceling your insurance policy. There is precisely the same chance that your house will be struck as there was before.

The besetting sin of professional statisticians is not only to fall into the habit of thinking of chance as a force, but of regarding their curves, charts, and mathematical formulae as actual causes. Not that they would say so, if the matter was put to them point-blank. But having painstakingly, and with great erudition and accuracy, established a curve that shows a definite trend running back symmetrically over a long period of time, they are likely to forget that this curve is merely a representation of phenomena that are dependent on the qualities of matter and are governed by conditions, and that, no matter how constant the qualities and the conditions may have been in the past, if either factor changes in the future the phenomena will change, and the projection of the curve will not correspond to the facts. In sociological phenomena, as we have seen, both the qualities and the conditions —which are for the most part features of the physical and human environments—are always changing. If these various changes were harmonious, consistent, and all at the same rate and in the same direction, it would still be possible to establish definite trends. But, as will be shown more fully later,* they are not. Consequently, prediction in sociology on the basis of statistical representations must at best be tentative and provisional. Oftentimes it is the best that can be done. But whenever it is possible, by other methods of research, to achieve an understanding of the actual shifts that are taking place in human attitudes, sentiments, opinions, and personal qualities, and in the significant features of the two environments, this process often gives a more reliable basis for previsioning future phenomena than the simple application of the statistical method. Best of all is a combination of the two methods, whereby each checks, supports, or corrects the other. For example, the death-rates in the registration area of the United States for the last three decades, omitting the years 1918, 1919, 1920, and 1921, were as follows:

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* See Chapters XVIII and XIX.

1900	17.6	1911	14.2	1922	11.8
1901	16.5	1912	13.9	1923	12.3
1902	15.9	1913	14.1	1924	11.8
1903	16.0	1914	13.6	1925	11.8
1904	16.5	1915	13.6	1926	12.2
1905	16.0	1916	14.0	1927	11.4
1906	15.7	1917	14.3	1928	12.0
1907	16.0	1918		1929	11.9
1908	14.8	1919		1930	11.3
1909	14.4	1920			
1910	15.0	1921			

A simple statistical interpolation would have supplied figures for the missing years about as follows:

1918	13.8
1919	13.4
1920	12.9
1921	12.4

But this would have been a serious error, for the changed conditions caused by the World War and the influenza epidemic produced phenomena represented by the actual figures of

1918	18.1
1919	12.9
1920	13.1
1921	11.6

There was nothing in the death statistics previous to 1913 to indicate that a World War was going to break out, or that we would enter it. But a close study of social, political, and economic conditions on a world scale might have led a competent observer to anticipate such an event, and then a knowledge of the general effect of war on the death-rate would have enabled him to forecast the figures for the war years with a fair degree of accuracy.

The present marked tendency of the physical scientists to state their generalizations in terms of high probabilities rather than of positive finalities should not be interpreted as an exaltation of chance into a force or cause, but rather as an admission of the incompleteness and limitations of science in even its most exact fields.*

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* For a further discussion of chance as a sociological concept, see below, pp. 257-258.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL FORCES

It should be clear by now that any comprehensive and penetrating understanding of human relationships must be based upon adequate knowledge of certain characteristics of the ultimate particles of social science, that is, individual men, women, and children. The characteristics that are important are the dynamic continua,* that is, the traits that predispose to movement. The traits that are germane to the field of sociology are those that lead to social movement, that is, behavior that affects some other individual or group. In this connection, it should once more be emphasized that it is not requisite for sociology, even in its most scientific aspects, to inquire into the origin, or even the innate nature, of these traits. What concerns sociology is their overt expression in those phenomena that constitute the subject matter of sociology. In this respect, sociology does not differ from the other sciences. No science is under the obligation to explore the origins of the dynamic elements with which it deals. It may be interested in them as a matter of general knowledge, and some grasp of them may help to vitalize the science, just as it is interesting for a portrait painter to know enough geology to understand the origin of the pigments with which he deals. But every science, within its field, must confine itself to certain dynamic elements, the origin of which always lies outside its field. This corresponds with the principle, already set forth, that no science ever *explains* anything in the fullest sense of the word, and that the discovery of ultimate origins, the origin of the universe, must forever lie beyond the reach of science.

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* One would like to use the simpler word "constants" in this connection, were it not for its suggestion of fixity and unchangeability. It has already been pointed out that one thing that distinguishes sociology from other sciences is that the ultimate forces with which it starts are continually changing. The word "continuum" suggests a reality which has an unbroken and integral existence, though it may be in a state of perpetual change.

DESIRES

In accordance with the idea already established that sociology must be a common-sense science, each one of us may ask himself what is the general nature of the forces that lead him into behavior that associates him with other people. We will discover that always there is something that we want that can be secured only through other people, or that will affect other people. We have many wants that do not involve other human beings, a breath of fresh air, a stroll in the woods, an hour's relaxation in the warm summer sun. In fact, many such wants can be gratified most effectively, or even exclusively, in the absence of other people. Except as these acts produce changes in our own character or personality, and thereby indirectly affect other persons, they lie outside the scope of sociology. Perhaps as good a general name as any for these dynamic impulses is "desires." It is neither possible nor important to make a sharp distinction between desires that lead to social action and those that do not. A very similar desire may be sometimes social and sometimes not. On certain days you may want a companion for your stroll in the woods. It is the overt manifestation of desires that creates sociological phenomena, and unless the manifestation itself is social, sociology need not bother with it.

DYNAMIC CONSTANTS

It is important, however, to inquire whether the desires of human beings are different in any respect from the dynamic elements of the particles of other sciences. It has been pointed out above that it is the dynamic quality of matter that creates phenomena, and makes science in general possible. One such dynamic quality is common to all particles of matter, the attraction between itself and other particles of matter, that is, the tendency to draw them to it, or itself to them. The simplest and most fundamental of all sciences, accordingly, begins with the phenomena that arise from this universal force. Another force widely distributed among all types of matter is the tendency for its ultimate distinctive particles, or atoms, to unite *selectively* in fixed patterns with unlike atoms. This is what we call chemical affinity. In one sense, it may be considered a *higher* force than basic physical attraction or gravity. For in all chemical reactions there is something corresponding closely to choice. Pour hydrochloric acid into a bowl containing a miscellaneous lot of substances, and it will pick out the copper, zinc, and soda, and leave the glass, the porcelain, the salt, and the gold alone.

Both of the foregoing types of dynamic constant are found in inanimate, or lifeless, matter. For the next "higher" form of dynamic constant we have to turn to another kind of matter, that which is endowed with life. This brings us into the field of the science of biology, of which the ultimate particle is the protoplasmic cell. Here again we find characteristic tendencies toward certain kinds of movement. The simplest kind of biological movement is reaction to a stimulus. Different kinds of cells, respectively, display a tendency to react to specific stimuli in characteristic uniform ways. As we ascend the scale of organic forms we find these reactions becoming more and more selective, until finally they reach the point where they may be described by the familiar word "choice." In the meantime, the relation of the organism toward itself and the external world has been becoming more and more refined until it reaches the stage commonly designated "consciousness." At the summit stands man, endowed with that presumably unique quality that we call "free will," or the power of independent choice.

It appears, accordingly, that throughout all forms of matter there are universal tendencies to movement, action, or behavior of certain distinctive types, and that the differences in these tendencies are an important part of the criteria by which we divide materials into separate classes for scientific purposes. Throughout these tendencies there is a more or less regular progression from the "lowest" to the "highest" forms of dynamic impulse. It has been said above that the typical form of dynamic impulse among human beings is "desire." But where does desire begin? Is it exclusively a human trait? Or does the cat "desire" the mouse that it pursues so enthusiastically and so cleverly? Does the dog desire its master's caresses? Does the bell animalcule desire the food particle that it seizes upon with such a fascinating movement? Does the plant desire the nitrogen that it gets from the soil and the carbon that it gets from the surrounding atmosphere? Is the dividing line between desire and that which is not desire the line of life? Or shall we say that the magnet desires the iron filings, the earth desires the baseball that has been knocked out into center field, and the atom of oxygen desires that bigamic but very stable union with two atoms of hydrogen that makes life possible on this earth?

These are interesting and suggestive queries, but not of fundamental importance in the study of sociology. However we may interpret the concept "desire," the central fact remains that desire in human beings is something radically different from the motive impulses in other forms of matter, living or lifeless. And it is no refutation of this statement to assert that the difference is not one of kind, but merely of degree.

Differences of Kind and Degree

In arguments on a great variety of subjects it is commonly taken for granted not only that a difference in kind is entirely separate from a difference in degree but also that it is decidedly more significant. In point of fact, however, there are innumerable instances in which it is impossible to tell whether a given difference is one of kind or of degree, and in which a seeming difference in kind is the product of a gradual, progressive change in degree. For example, water and ink are clearly two different kinds of liquid. But suppose I have here a bowl containing a glassful of pure water. Into this I drop a single drop of ink. The fluid is still water. You could drink it, or wash your hands in it, or use it for any of the practical purposes to which water is put. I add another drop, and these conditions still remain true. But if I continue drop after drop in the course of time there will be a liquid which obviously is not water, but would admirably serve the purposes of ink. Yet it would be impossible to indicate the particular point at which a change in kind took place. An even more striking example is furnished by water itself—that is the chemical compound known as H_2O. To one who did not know their relationship, there would seem to be a greater difference in kind between ice, water, and steam than between, say, lead, butter, and cloth. But the only difference between ice, water, and steam is one of degree—degree of temperature—and in this case each change in seeming kind comes suddenly at a fixed point. The truth is, then, that in many cases what is for all practical purposes a radical difference in kind may be the result of long-continued minute changes in degree.[1]

The whole theory of evolution, of course, assumes the principles of gradualness and continuity. Every change that accords with the evolutionary formula is a change in degree, not in kind. There are no sudden breaks in an evolutionary sequence, even though the changes seem sometimes to be mutations, rather than minute variations. Accordingly, if we consider man the product of an evolutionary process, there can be nothing in humanity that is different in kind, in the extreme sense of the term, from other animals, or from any other objects in nature. But our common sense tells us that for the purposes of intelligent discussion, there is a difference in kind between Gene Tunney and a granite boulder, between Einstein and a comptometer, between Lindbergh and a golden eagle.

Consciousness

One of the significant differences between inanimate and animate objects is found in the trait called consciousness. It is the task of the psychologists to expound this concept adequately and convincingly. For the purposes of sociology it is enough to think of it as a definite awareness of the external world, and of one's reactions to various features of that world. This includes an awareness of one's own existence and identity. Here again the principle of gradualness and change in degree manifests itself. Modern psychology inclines to trace consciousness much further down in the organic scale than formerly, even to the plants. But it would be mere pedantry to ignore the fact that consciousness in man is something very different from that in other animals. It was not by a mere coincidence that Giddings based his whole sociological system on the concept "consciousness of kind."

Selectivity

Coupled with consciousness is another human trait which is a high refinement of a feature which occurs, as has been pointed out, in the most elementary forms of matter—selectivity in reaction. This trait displays itself not only in chemical reactions, but in some physical phenomena. The piece of magnetized iron selects particles of ordinary iron, and some related substances, to the exclusion of most forms of matter. If, therefore, one defines choice in its broadest sense it becomes virtually a universal quality of matter. But it should be quite clear by now that these expanded and inclusive concepts, reached by a process of rigid and undiscriminating logicality, are not very helpful in coming to a practical working understanding of things. Much the most illuminating procedure is to think of choice as a quality confined to the higher forms of animals, which displays itself in quite characteristic and specialized forms in man.

Freedom of Choice

But now the great question presents itself, to what extent, if at all, is the choice "free"? This obviously leads us straight up to the portentous problem of will, a theme which has engrossed the best minds of all ages and all climes since men first began to think about themselves philosophically at all. In the minds of many thinkers, unless the will is free, man is nothing more than a highly developed beast, with no governance over his own conduct, and therefore no accountability to himself, to his fellow men, or to God. Let us not enter into this controversy. Experience supports the rule that when you find yourself in the midst of a discussion of free will, the wisest thing is to hunt the nearest cyclone cellar, and remain there till the storm blows over. You will not find any significant change in the philosophical landscape when you emerge. It must have been after listening to some such discussion that wise old Omar Khayyam wrote

> Myself when young did eagerly frequent
> Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument
> About it and about: but evermore
> Came out by the same door where in I went.

Much more helpful is it to fall back once more on common sense, and to recognize that we are all conscious of making decisions, and that invariably *society treats us as if we did enjoy free will*, and could make choices for which we could justly be held responsible. If our consciousness of choice is an illusion, society's treatment of us is not.

"Practically all the coercive agencies of society act on this principle. Suppose, for example, that on a hot summer day, while a group of women and children are refreshing themselves about a fountain in a public park, a man suddenly appears, divests himself of his clothing, and plunges into the fountain. The police will be on the spot in an instant, and the man will be arrested. He has committed an abnormal act, and society has laid its hand upon him. But the first step taken after his arrest will be to determine whether or not he is mentally responsible—that is, whether he has the ordinary power of choice. And on the determination of this question will depend the treatment meted out to him. If it appears that he is an escaped lunatic, he will be sent back to the asylum. If he has been temporarily deranged by the excessive heat, he will be sent to a hospital. But if, on the other hand, his faculties appear to be in good working order, and he has deliberately chosen to refresh himself in this way, in the face of all conventions, he will be fined or sent to jail.

"This distinction holds with reference to practically every form of social injury. For instance, to deprive others of their wealth without giving an equivalent is an abnormal act. The burglar and the pauper both deprive others of wealth—the burglar by cracking a safe and helping himself to valuables, the pauper by increasing the tax rate to pay for his support. But the treatment accorded them by society is very different. Again, the murderer and the consumptive both take life—the former by putting arsenic in somebody's food, the latter by spreading contagion. Both require social treatment, but of a very different sort.''[2]

And since we are engaged in the study of sociology in a scientific spirit, it is the overt and observable phenomena that interest us. And these may pragmatically be considered acts of the will, choices, or decisions. So true is this, and so important, that MacIver declares, ''All such willed relations are the primary social facts, and their consequences are the secondary social facts,''[3] practically excluding from sociological phenomena every type of behavior that is not willed.

For the alternative to free will or choice is simply the balancing of impulses or desires. The opponent of free will asserts that human behavior simply represents a parallelogram of forces, and that any act unconstrained by external forces is determined by the play of internal forces, the strongest desire, or combination of desires, winning out. But as far as practical social control is concerned this makes no difference. In one case society is considered as attempting to bring to bear influences that will cause an individual to choose a certain line of conduct; in the other case, it is encouraging or stimulating one set of desires as against an opposing set. But the actual incentives and inducements used by society will be the same in either case. President Coolidge once declared, ''I do not choose to run.'' If his party had wanted him to run, the forms of persuasion that it used upon him would have been precisely the same, whether the Republican solons believed in free will or in the preponderance of desires.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF CHOICE

If you wish a simple refutation of the frequent assertion that what seems to us to be free choice is merely the yielding to the most powerful of the composite of forces that is pressing on us at a given moment try this experiment: Lay a pencil or similar object on the table before you, and decide that you are going to move it to either the left or the right. This is obviously a matter of absolutely no interest to you. The amount of energy required is the same in either case, and is negligible anyway. There is not the slightest benefit to you dependent on your decision. When you are ready, make up your mind, and move the pencil right or left. If this is not a free choice, what shall we call it? Another simple example of the nature of will is furnished by some of our bodily functions. We know that we can, "by an act of the will," hold our breath, or suspend the movement of the organs of breathing for a time. We know that we can not do the same with the heart or the stomach. Therefore we say that we can control our lungs by an act of the will, but not our heart or stomach. And even in the case of the lungs, we say that after a time they pass out of the control of the will. Of course most of our decisions are concerned with matters that are of interest to us. There are desires and impulses impelling us in diverse directions, and our future depends more or less importantly on which one we follow. These decisions actually represent our judgment as to what line of conduct will result in our greatest benefit. In one sense, therefore, the decision may not be free. It is doubtful if one can ever decide to do something that he does not "want" to do in some sense of the word. But in deciding what we want to do we humans seem to follow a unique line of procedure, which may or may not be freedom, but which at least involves a mental balancing deserving to be called choice of a distinctive type.

HABIT

When the same set of circumstances, calling for the selection of a line of conduct, arises over and over again, and the same line of conduct always is selected as the best, the sense of conscious selection tends to disappear, and action takes place almost automatically. The result is what is called a habit. Habitual behavior seems to have a minimum of volitional content, but this is only because there have been so many repetitious volitional acts in the past, that behavior has become canalized.

PREVISION

There does seem to be one feature of human choice that is unique, possessed by no other animal. This is the capacity for prevision or imagination. Granting that man, like other animals, acts in response to stimuli, he is not limited to the stimuli of the external material universe as it impinges on his sensory apparatus, and of the internal stimuli that arise from the state of his bodily organs. He can *create* stimuli in the form of mental pictures of future situations or events, which operate just as powerfully in the parallelogram of forces that determines his action as any of the objects or tensions immediately present to his senses. When making decisions, the normal man is forever asking, ''What will happen if I do so and so?'' In other words, he creates an imaginary situation, puts himself in that situation, and then reacts to it. We provide illustrations of this process to ourselves a hundred times a day. When you sit down to the breakfast mentioned in a previous illustration, you find the menu placed before you. On it are printed the names of various articles of food and drink. But these are merely black spots on a piece of white paper—symbols. Your imagination proceeds to create in their place an array of viands—grapefruit, baked apple, sliced peaches, ham and eggs, griddle cakes and sausages, fried potatoes, coffee, etc., and—if you happen to be in the ''pie belt''—mince, apple, and lemon. Your direct reaction suggests peaches and cream, sausages and griddle cakes with maple syrup, fried potatoes, and coffee. But your imagination does not stop there. It travels forward some two or three hours and creates a situation that might arise at that time, and you say to the waiter, ''Bring me some orange juice, dry toast, and tea.''

Or, to take a more important example, you are planning your summer vacation. You have the choice of a canoe trip with a guide through the wilds of Maine, or a month at a fashionable hotel at the seashore. Inevitably, your imagination reconstructs the two experiences in advance. You see yourself reduced to the bare essentials in clothing and equipment, helping to lug the canoe across the carries, being bitten by mosquitoes and black-flies, sleeping on beds of fragrant balsam boughs, paddling mile after mile with blistered hands that finally become calloused and tough, waking in the morning with your nostrils filled with fresh, pine-scented air, emerging from a plunge in the sparkling water to a savory breakfast around the campfire, and then paddling with the guide to a deep pool where sixteen-inch trout rise to your fly. The scene changes. You awake in a hotel bedroom with the tang of salt air about you. Making your toilet in a comfortable bathroom, you don your white flannels and descend to an elaborate and beautifully appointed breakfast, accompanied by the murmur of many voices, discussing last night's dance at the Club, deciding whether to go motoring or aquaplaning, or to play tennis or golf. You lazily face the same possibilities, with the added alternatives of drowsing all the morning on a sunny beach, or sitting in a rocking chair on a shaded porch and reading *The New Yorker.* In the evening there is the prospect of a seven-course dinner enlivened by music from the orchestra behind the palms, with a masquerade dance following. In your imagination you live through these varied experiences, reacting to them one after another, and finally, with a sigh of regret that you cannot be in two places at the same time, you dig out your fishing tackle, and reach for a Boston and Maine timetable.

It is this power of imagination and the creation of anticipatory stimuli that makes human life such a complex affair. The other animals, as far as we can learn from the comparative psychologists, react only to the material stimuli that are present at a given moment. They have more or less well-developed memories, and their behavior becomes "conditioned" through experience, but this simply means that they do not react to a certain stimulus in the same way that they did the first time they encountered it. But their choices are governed solely by the immediate factual conditions that surround them. For them the future does not exist. Contrast with this the degree to which your own actions are governed by glimpses of possible futures and you will have no difficulty in realizing that your volitional life is spun out in a realm far remote from that of any subhuman animal.

An entertaining illustration of the complexities into which this capacity for choice leads the human animal may be found in a not ostensibly scientific book called "Consider the Consequences." In it the leading characters are led up to a critical situation where two or three possible lines of action are open. The reader is asked to choose one for them, and according to his choice turns to a specified later paragraph, where the narrative is continued, and the characters brought face to face with another dilemma. The reader then chooses again, and so on. The differences in destiny that depend on a single choice are made strikingly clear.[4]

CLASSIFICATION BY DESIRES

Since desires, then, are the starting point of sociological phenomena, and exercise an initial influence upon the phenomena, they afford one fairly logical basis for a primary classification of sociological data, or division of the field of sociology. Several of the pioneers of sociological theory have adopted this practice. Foremost among them are Lester F. Ward and William Graham Sumner, though both of these used the somewhat more subjective concept of "feelings." Ward's classification of the social forces was presented by him in tabular form as follows:[5]

THE SOCIAL FORCES ARE:	Physical Forces (Function bodily)	Ontogenetic Forces	Positive, attractive (seeking pleasure)
			Negative, protective (avoiding pain)
		Phylogenetic Forces	Direct, sexual
			Indirect, consanguineal
	Spiritual Forces (Function psychic)	Sociogenetic Forces	Moral (seeking the safe and good)
			Esthetic (seeking the beautiful)
			Intellectual (seeking the useful and true)

Sumner discerned four major feelings with their associated desires, which he called hunger, love, vanity, and fear of ghosts. On the basis of these feelings he divided social activities into four great categories, self-maintenance, self-perpetuation, self-gratification, and the mental reactions.

Other systematists have adopted the feelings or desires as the basis of sociological classification, but have differed in their analysis of the fundamentally important desires. Thus W. I. Thomas distributes the impulses to action among four great wishes or desires: the desire for new experience, the desire for security, the desire for response, and the desire for recognition.[6]

There was a stage in the development of sociological theory when a great deal of attention was paid to instincts, and long and elaborate lists and classifications of instincts were offered by various writers. Now, as suggested above, the whole concept of instinct has been relegated to a rather dubious position, and certainly, if sociology is to be the study of distinctively human behavior, instincts, which are shared by all the higher animals, are not a very useful foundation for analysis.

Desires Psychological

The chief difficulty with using the feelings or desires as the basis of the classification of sociological phenomena is that feelings and desires, as such, still lie in the field of psychology rather than sociology. They are not overt phenomena in the relations of men with one another, nor do they, by themselves, create such phenomena. Before a feeling or desire can be transmuted into an objective sociological phenomenon it must become active, and before it can become active it must link itself up with some object; in other words, it must aim at something specific. And in order that the resulting phenomenon may be truly sociological, the object must be of such a nature that movement toward its attainment will affect the relations between the individual in whose personality the desire dwells and his fellow men.

Interests

This brings us to the subject of interests, one of the most important concepts in all sociological theory. An interest may be defined as the relation between an individual and some object which he believes will satisfy, or resolve, some one of his desires. This definition merits careful study. First of all it may be observed that the psychic process that brings about a sociological phenomenon is somewhat complicated, and may be separated into distinct, though related, phases. First there is the feeling, a sense of discomfort, uneasiness, unfulfilment, or craving, that predisposes to action. Closely associated with the feeling is the desire, which introduces the additional factor, vaguely at first, of an objective. Next comes the determination of the objective, a process which in the human being, as indicated above, is believed to be distinctly different from that in any other organism, primarily because of man's power to create imaginary stimuli, or to visualize future contingencies. Finally the object becomes identified specifically and concretely, and then the impetus to movement is complete. Obviously, the phenomenon with which sociology concerns itself does not arise until this process has been fulfilled. To illustrate; one has a feeling of hunger, which immediately becomes transmuted into the undifferentiated desire for food. Then the distinctly human faculties begin to visualize various kinds of food until finally, through the process of choice, one becomes convinced that he wants a chocolate marshmallow banana split. He is now ready to act, if possible. Again, one has a feeling of sleepiness, which expresses itself in the desire to lie down and close one's eyes. He then faces the alternative of dropping down wherever he may be—under a tree in the country, or on a park bench—or of going home and taking his clothes off and getting into bed. When he has reached a decision on these points, he is likewise ready to act.

The processes which underlie sociological phenomena, therefore, are these universal and perpetually recurring decisions as to the objects which are calculated to satisfy desires. Immediately the individual has determined upon such an object, there arises a relationship between himself and it. This relationship is what has been defined as an interest. The object of desire may be a thing, a movement, or a state. Hunger and thirst demand material food and drink; the normal sex urge demands a companion; the play desire demands running and jumping; weariness demands relaxation and cessation of movement. But whatever the nature of the object may be, an interest is the nexus between it and a desirous human being.

Belief

One further feature of the definition demands particular attention. This is the factor of belief. It would be a gross error to say that an interest is the relation between an individual and some object that *will* satisfy his desire. For at the same time the interest is created the individual does not know whether the object will satisfy his desire or not. The best that he can do is to *believe.* This is a truth that is all too often ignored, both for correct theoretical interpretation and for practical success in life. It involves the whole concept of knowledge, something about which a vast amount of carelessness and misconception exists. We frequently hear it said in an ironical vein, "The only trouble with So-and-So is that he knows too many things that aren't so." Now of course it is impossible really to know something that isn't so. But it is very easy to think we know something that we do not know, to delude ourselves into accepting as knowledge what is really mere guess, hope, or anticipation. This becomes clear the moment we recognize that we can never know the future. We can know the past, in such of its aspects as have come directly under our own observation. We can know the present, if it is logically possible to distinguish the present from the past. We may make excellent prognostications as to what is going to happen, based on familiarity with past events, or an understanding of the laws of probability. But true knowledge stops at the threshold of the future. Ahead of that ever-advancing line of present experience, all our expectations, anticipations, hopes, and fears are necessarily matters of belief.

Inevitability of Belief

It must be recognized that there is an element of belief in even the most rigidly scientific knowledge. A modern novelist, writing in a university publication, made the statement,[7] "The scientist is in the enviable position of the man who, believing nothing to begin with, is therefore ready to believe anything sufficiently proven, while the mass thinker is in the pitiful position of the man who, to begin with, believes so much which afterwards turns out to be fraudulent that he usually ends by believing nothing.'' Nothing could be more misleading than to say that the scientist begins by believing nothing. All scientific procedure rests upon certain fundamental beliefs. First and foremost the scientist believes in the reliability of his own organs of perception. When he looks at a thing, he believes that it is what he sees it to be. There is no proof of this, nor can there be. There is no proof that when you and I look at an object that we both call red you see the same thing that I do. In the second place, as we have seen, the scientist believes in the constancy and dependability of the materials he works with. An older novelist saw the truth more clearly. ''And so my hero returned almost to the point from which he had started originally, namely, that the just shall live by faith. And this is what the just—that is to say reasonable people—do as regards those daily affairs of life which most concern them. . . . There can be no doubt about faith and not reason being the *ultima ratio.* Even Euclid, who has laid himself as little open to the charge of credulity as any writer who ever lived, cannot get beyond this. He has no demonstrable first premise. He requires postulates and axioms which transcend demonstration, and without which he can do nothing. His superstructure indeed is demonstration, but his ground is faith. Nor again can he get further than telling a man he is a fool if he persists in differing from him. He says 'which is absurd,' and declines to discuss the matter further. Faith and authority, therefore, prove to be as necessary for him as for anyone else.''

This emphasis upon belief is salutary because, as has been observed, we are all prone to fall victims to the scientific obsession of the day, and to idolize knowledge. The essence of idolatry is to magnify its object, attributing to it virtues which it does not possess, until it eventually becomes deified. Such an object is a fetish, and scientific knowledge is a fetish in contemporary society. We have come to look upon science as an end in itself, whereas, properly regarded, it is only a means to an end. The end itself is supra-scientific. No delusion is more deadening to intellectual attainment than the assumption that nothing is true that cannot be proved. The true basis of conduct, whether or not it should be, in fact must be, belief.

VARIETIES OF BELIEF

Having gone to this extreme in depicting the qualified character of what passes for scientific knowledge, it is now necessary to observe that there are various forms of belief, differentiated by the basis upon which they rest. There is belief that rests merely on intuition and introspection. There is belief that rests upon desire—"wishful thinking." There is belief that rests upon all kinds of inconsequential evidence—hearsay, rumor, tradition, superficial seeming. Finally there is belief that rests upon the totality of the best accumulated knowledge available. This last is what fully deserves the name "scientific belief." There is no fundamental antagonism, no irreconcilable discord, between belief and science. Just as all science rests ultimately upon fundamental beliefs, so all practical belief makes use of the testimony of science. The truly wise and fortunate man is neither one of the persons mentioned in the passage quoted above. He is neither the man who starts by believing nothing nor the man who starts by believing everything. He is the man who starts by believing just so much as is necessary to start at all, and then proceeds to enlarge, amplify, and enrich his belief by all the contributions that he can induce science to make him. Sound, constructive, reasonable belief takes cognizance of all the accumulated knowledge purveyed by personal experience, accepts everything certified as knowledge by those whose testimony merits faith, including expert specialists at one extreme and the great mass of common humanity at the other, constantly checks itself up against new experience and new evidence, clings to nothing and forsakes nothing just because it is either old or new. In short, the wise and fortunate man is the truly educated man. The essential function of education is to provide men with the soundest, most reliable equipment of beliefs possible. To this end it provides access to all the amassed facts that the scientific research of the world has unearthed. It familiarizes its devotees with all the intelligent interpretations of these facts. It suggests the possible implications of various interpretations. It expounds the beliefs that the great men and women of all times have accepted as guides to their lives. But in the last analysis it leaves the individual free to check up his own beliefs against the facts and the interpretations as best he can, and to govern his life accordingly.

Scientific Security

As brainy animals destined to live out our careers upon this mundane sphere, we may be profoundly thankful that scientific research has detected an amazingly high degree of regularity in the behavior of objects in nature, and that each new extension of the scientific method tends in general to confirm the dependability of nature rather than to undermine it. We do not need to know what the future will be. It is enough that the probabilities are almost as infinity to zero. In fact, we are in a stronger position if we say we believe than if we say we know. For if we act on the assumption that we know, there is a chance that we may be wrong, whereas if we act upon belief we will not be overwhelmed by an improbable but not impossible eventuality.[8]

The more you revolve these matters in your mind, the more you are impressed with the astounding part played by belief in most of what ordinarily passes for knowledge. Even excluding the element of belief in the reliability of one's own senses, mentioned above, which must be conceded in our definition of knowledge, else there would be no knowledge at all, it still remains true that most of the accumulation of information which we derive from our educational experiences or otherwise is heavily infused with belief. Do you know that there was ever a man named Alexander of Macedon? You have spent weary hours learning what the history books have to say about him, you have heard of a city in Egypt named after him, perhaps you have seen coins with his profile embossed on them, and if you have ever been in Constantinople (or Istanbul) you may have seen the beautiful marble sarcophagus in which his body is alleged to have lain. But probably not one iota of evidence of his actual existence has ever come within the scope of your own five senses. You believe that what the history books and history teachers tell you is true. But how do they know? They, too, have got their knowledge from somebody else, or from records the authenticity of which rests upon belief. These facts illustrate the tremendous rôle played by authority in the acquirement and transmission of knowledge, and emphasize both the extreme care that should be exercised in accepting authorities, and the heavy responsibility that rests upon those who assume to act as authorities for others. Without authority, and belief in it, science and knowledge of every sort would very nearly stand still. It would be folly to scorn belief, and fatal to attempt to get along without it. But it is immeasurably important to recognize the pervasiveness of belief, and to distinguish between it and knowledge. It is also imperative to recognize that there are various types and shades of belief, and to be able to distinguish among them.

Faith

In this connection, it may be well to make a distinction between belief and faith. As has been shown, belief is essentially an intellectual function. Belief not only utilizes evidence, but, at its best, demands it. A given belief may be supported by so much, and so unquestionable, evidence, that it approximates absolute certainty, and to refuse to act upon it would be sheer, unscientific folly. Faith, on the other hand, is more of an emotional matter. It may rest upon some evidence, but its strength derives primarily from other sources.

Sources of Belief

There are two main sources of beliefs, experience and inculcation or indoctrination. Experience begins at birth, and is at first so intimately associated with instinctive impulse or reflex action that there is no sharp dividing line between the two. Having once found its mother's breast, the infant develops a realization that it is the source of a welcome satisfaction of its feeling of hunger. It would be impossible to say at what point this mental state could properly be considered a belief.

Having learned by one or two experiences that a fit of crying will cause it to be picked up, or rocked, or fondled, the infant develops a belief that crying is the way to gratify one of its interests. But it is a very rudimentary form of belief. The behaviorist would call these, and much more elaborate and mature reactions, merely conditioned reflexes. From such simple beginnings the process of transmuting experience into belief goes on progressively, becoming in time infused with the elements of conscious memory, rational analysis, and imaginative stimulation. The point has already been made, but is worthy of reiteration, that the efficacy of a belief in causing action is dependent entirely upon its concreteness and intensity, not at all upon its accuracy. Once a belief develops, it serves as a stimulus to action quite regardless of its relation to the facts of life. It has already been pointed out that belief is not, or at least need not be, mere guesswork. Fortunately, in the case of routine beliefs, it is possible to check our beliefs against the facts. Even a limited intelligence is able to accomplish this. "Experience teaches a hard school, but fools will learn at it." Every person of normal intellect is continually going through this process, and in that way bringing his complement of beliefs more and more into accordance with the unalterable laws of nature, and the established laws of human society.

A correct, or accurate, belief is one that indicates the true relation between a certain line of action and an object which is sought for the resolution of a desire. It needs to be repeated that this relation can never be actually known in advance. The methods of developing beliefs, and the ground upon which they rest, are discussed more fully later.*

FEAR

The rôle of fear in sociological causation is an interesting and somewhat complex one. Sometimes fear is included as one of the social forces, and in a certain sense this may be correct. But fear is certainly not desire; it is the antithesis of desire. And herein, perhaps, is found the most illuminating way to think of fear. Fear may be thought of as the obverse of desire; for every desire there is a correlative fear. Fear is merely the dread that some desire may not be realized. The fear of death is the opposite of the desire to live, the fear of pain is the opposite of the desire for pleasure, or at least for the absence of pain, the fear of punishment is the opposite of the desire for comfort and liberty, and so on.

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* See pp. 378-392.

Distinctly Human Fear

It is worth while to note in passing that fear, in the sense in which we are now using the term, is a distinctively human trait. There are obviously two kinds of fear. The first may be called instinctive fear, and consists in a reaction of flight or withdrawal in the presence of an object or stimulus which the evolutionary experience of the species has proved to be dangerous. It is this sort of fear that the mouse feels for the cat, the sparrow for the hawk, the minnow for the pickerel, practically all animals for fire. So far as we know, this is the only kind of fear that the lower animals experience. We cannot believe that the mouse has a generalized fear of cats that governs its actions when there is no cat present. It may have forms of instinctive behavior which have been developed out of long racial experience with cats, just as many animals display great timidity when emerging from their holes, or moving into a new spot, even when there is no actual source of danger present. But this may be considered as fear of the open space or of the unfamiliar, which is actually present to their consciousness. The animal, for instance, cannot be thought of as having any fear of death in the abstract.

At any rate, we may be virtually certain that animals are free from the second type, what may be called anticipatory fear, the fear of possible future events. This is associated with the exclusively human capacity for prevision, for imaginative experience, for the creation of subjective stimuli. It is probable that by far the greater bulk of the total fear of mankind falls into this class. Man's fears must of necessity be just as diversified and just as vivid as his desires. For every interest that the mind of man can create there is a correlative fear that it may not be achieved. For every good that we can visualize and crave there is the fear of lack or failure. A very large portion of the mental states of civilized man fall into the category of fear. *We* fear death. We fear sickness, unemployment, loss of wealth, kindred, or friends. We make plans for our own advancement, and fear that something will happen to prevent our carrying them out. We fear accident, shipwreck, gossip, ridicule, bad weather, misunderstanding, our own incapacity.

Fain would I climb, but fear I to fall.

President Roosevelt displayed his characteristic insight into human nature when he said, ''All we have to fear is fear.''

Burden of Fear

It is a grimly ironical fact that this staggering burden that we have to carry is directly traceable to those distinctively human endowments on which we chiefly pride ourselves, and which have contributed to our cultural achievements. Fear is, in point of fact, one of the penalties of intelligence. That being the case, we proceed to use our intelligence in the effort to devise means of freeing ourselves from fear. We try to construct every possible preventive device against the evils that we can so readily visualize. Advertisers play upon this theme with excruciating cleverness. Posters, billboards, and the advertising pages of magazines abound in graphic illustrations and gruesome descriptions of what may happen to us—a severe cold, pyorrhea, baldness, dependent widow and orphans, a home burnt to ashes, a car wrecked by a blow-out, a lover lost through B.O., a wife alienated by a stubbly beard, a business opportunity missed because of inability to discourse fluently on Plato, Ming pottery, Beethoven symphonies, and the war debts—along with explicit instructions as to what to do to escape these disasters. And how we pay for such advice! The whole institution of insurance is based upon the expedient of transforming the fear of possible future losses into certain present payments. Almost every conceivable contingency can now be insured against—for example, the wrecking of your house through an airplane falling on it—and insurance agents manifest great skill in impressing you with the likelihood of its happening. Indeed, things have reached such a pass now that if a man insures himself adequately against all the dangers that a good agent is able to remind him of he will have very little income left for current needs. But after all, insurance, moderately indulged in, is an indubitable blessing.

To sum up then, sociological phenomena are acts whereby the individual is brought into relations with another individual or a group as a result of his pursuit of some interest, which, in turn, is created by his belief that some determined object will satisfy some desire of his. Interests, accordingly, are perhaps as satisfactory a basis as can be found for the classification of sociological phenomena.

Chapter VIII

INTERESTS

It is obvious that a mass of data so enormous and so diversified as all the interests of all human beings admits of an almost unlimited variety of classifications. In the first place, they may be classified on the basis of the desires in which they originate or of the objects toward which they are directed. The former method would bring a result closely similar to the classifications of Sumner and Ward. We could distinguish the hunger interests, the love interests, the esthetic interests, and the intellectual interests. The latter method would produce a much more complex classification. For instance, the hunger motive may lead to barter, purchase, creation, theft, murder, or war. The sex urge may result in phenomena involving courtesy, bravery, the selection of a good tailor, lying, abduction, secrecy, murder. The esthetic or recreational motive directs different individuals toward the most heterogeneous lot of objects or activities.

Rather than attempting to set up a single and inclusive classification of interests, it will perhaps be preferable to indicate some of the more important categories, including particularly those that lead to social relationships of an especially significant sort.

Basic Interests

First and foremost, comes the interest in life, corresponding roughly to the familiar "instinct for self-preservation." This is presumably a part of the native endowment of every normal human being, and remains with him throughout life. In fact, so basic is it that when it departs we are inclined to say that the individual is no longer normal. Closely associated with this is the generalized interest in pleasure, or the avoidance of pain. These are so inclusive that practically all particular interests might be subsumed under one or the other of them, which means that they are too general to be of much use for expository purposes. Another grouping that has more value is a threefold one—interest in material things, interest in personal activities, and interest in states. The first of these categories might be subdivided into interest in human beings, and in non-human things, including animals and lifeless objects. The former of these would obviously occasion the phenomena of love, marriage, the family, friendship, and many acts of bravery, devotion, and loyalty, and also of murder, assault, and rape. The latter might in turn be subdivided into interest in the things that belong to oneself and interest in the things that belong to others. This last would produce the phenomena of barter, exchange, theft, donation, and a host of related items, many of which fall particularly within the province of the sub-science of economics. The distinction between interest in present goods and interest in future goods is obviously a vital one, leading to the phenomena of saving, interest, self-denial, investment, etc.

Classification of Interests

Another type of classification of interests, which has an immediate bearing on the social relations involved, is based upon the relation of the interests to each other, as represented in different members of a community. On this basis, interests may be designated as convergent, parallel, and divergent.

Convergent Interests

Convergent interests exist when different persons have the same objects of their desires. Parallel interests exist when they have similar objects but not the same objects. Divergent interests exist when they have different objects. Convergent interests create the most difficulties.

These fall into two distinct classes, conflicting interests and common interests. Conflicting interests exist when the object of desire is of such a sort that if one of the "desirers" gets it none of the others can get it; in other words, they are monopolistic. Common interests exist when the object of desire is of such a sort that all the "desirers" can get it together, and usually it is difficult or impossible for any one to get it unless the others do.

Conflicting Interests

Illustrations of conflicting interests abound in every-day life. Thus the presidency of the United States creates conflicting interests every four years. The football championship of the Big Three created conflicting interests in the days when there was a Big Three.

Every race, every competition involves conflicting interests. An auction is an admirable example of conflicting interests. Taken by themselves, conflicting interests are dissocializing. They tend to keep men apart, or, if they bring them together, it is on terms of rivalry and hostility. If conflicting interests were the only kind there could be no society. This was nearly the exact situation when men were living on the collection stage. When all material supplies consist in the limited provisions of nature, the attitude toward those supplies is distinctly monopolistic. The ideal of the collection man is to be alone in the wilderness, so that whatever he finds may be undisputedly his own. This is one of the reasons why society was so rudimentary on the collection stage.

Common Interests

Common interests, on the other hand, are definitely socializing. They bring men together into cooperation; in fact, they are almost exclusively what brings men together into cooperation. They are the great social cement. Without them there could be no society. We have seen that the dawn of a genuine human society is coincident with the origin of the hunting band. The big game animals were objects of desire of every savage. But each knew by experience that he could hardly hope to capture one alone. The only basis upon which he could get it was that the others should get it also. This meant that when they did get it, he could not have it all. But some elephant is better than no elephant, and so a drive was organized. So in modern life, the President of the United

States becomes an object of common interest when a speaker is needed for the opening of a state fair; the Yale-Harvard game is an object of interest to all who hope to witness it; the necessity of electing a president provides a common interest for the members of all parties.

COMBINED INTERESTS

Some of the most interesting of all sociological phenomena are provided by the very frequent cases where the same object enlists both conflicting and common interests. This usually means that before the common interest can be achieved the conflicting interests have to be harmonized. The football arrangement of the Big Three represented a great common interest between Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. Before this could be accomplished, various conflicting interests of the three institutions had to be harmonized. When the conflicting interests became stronger than the common interest, as the event proved, the arrangement collapsed. Every presidential election involves an almost incredible harmonization of conflicting interests for the sake of a great common interest. The common interest is that the United States should have a president for the next four years. The immediate conflicting interests are between the two or more parties and the two or more candidates. But previous to the election it has been necessary to harmonize the conflicting interests of the various aspirants for nomination in each party. If these conflicting interests are too stubborn, as the Democratic Convention of 1924 showed, the common interests of the party may be sacrificed. Behind the National Convention there is a long series of successful harmonizations, in the state conventions, the caucuses, the primaries, the ward meetings, the committee meetings, and all the various agencies of representative government.

Take one more illustration. In a certain suburb there is a need for a branch line to be run out by the electric railroad. In current conversation everyone agrees that it would be a good thing. It is learned that before the railway company will undertake the enterprise there must be assurance that the community really desires it. So a mass meeting is held, and it is proposed to send in a petition. Immediately difficulties arise. It appears that nobody wants the line to run too near his house. Everybody would like to have the station near his residence but not too near. There is a decided difference of opinion as to when the express trains ought to be run. And so it goes. Unless these differences can be reconciled the petition will not be signed and the suburb will not get its railway. In many cases the stubborn insistence of one or two people can block an enterprise with reference to which the great majority have come to an agreement. One of the best illustrations of this is afforded by the United States Senate. The necessity of securing the common interest in such cases is what causes governments to give certain public enterprises the right of "eminent domain" or "condemnation."[1]

The Great Antithesis

It is interesting, in passing, to observe that the phenomenon of conflicting interests displays itself in the experience of the single individual, as well as among individuals in society. It is, in fact, the cause of much of our perplexity and distress on this finite globe. The principle of dualism has been recognized by philosophers from ancient times. It has usually been represented as the opposition between Good and Evil, Light and Darkness, Right and Wrong. Ormuzd and Ahriman, God and Satan, are the two forces whose contention for the mastery of the human spirit causes so much difficulty. The idea has been that it is the persistent and multifarious necessity of choosing between Good and Bad, Duty and Pleasure, that creates the chief burden of human life. But this is a very partial and unrealistic doctrine. Seldom is any insuperable problem created by the necessity of choosing between Good and Evil, when they can be identified in their true character. The terms of such a choice are, in the nature of the case, clear. Those who choose to choose Good, choose Good, and are happy in their choice. Those who choose to choose Evil, choose Evil, and are equally happy in their choice. The real problem arises when we have to choose between two mutually exclusive goods, or when we seek to avoid two evils which are related in such a way that escape from one will inevitably plunge us into the other. The human spirit rebels at such alternatives. As a race, we are inveterately disposed to eat our cake and have it too. Thus we hesitate between two conflicting goods until the chance of securing either is past, or we kick stubbornly against two sets of pricks, one of which—but only one if we would but choose—is unavoidable. Or we make a choice, and then destroy its benefits by vain regrets over the blessings that were forgone in its attainment. Many a marriage that might have been happy has gone on the rocks because one party, or both, could not reconcile himself to the fact that the joys of celibate self-determination are the price that must be paid for connubial bliss. Many a college career has been ruined by too constant dwelling on the fine business position that was refused for the sake of a freshman cap. Many a fortune has been lost because its owner could not bear to say good-bye forever to the sum already foolishly invested, and insisted on throwing good money after bad.

This same sort of dilemma often confronts society, as well as the individual, in the necessity of following one or the other of two programs, or adapting one of two alternative policies, neither of which is intrinsically desirable.[2]

INTEREST IN LIFE

Naturally, a classification of interests bears a more or less close resemblance to some of the more logical of the old classifications of instincts, desires, or feelings. Thus the primary interest, the interest in life, is analogous to the old "instinct of self-preservation." But it is much more definite and concise, for the instinct of self-preservation obviously overlaps or includes such other instincts as fear, flight, and pugnacity. But life is a definite though highly intricate thing, and a human individual has, or has not, an interest in it. The high suicide rate shows that many have not.

Interest in Things

The second chief interest of the human animal is a very broad and inclusive one. It might be broken up into several independent interests, but it seems more illuminating to treat it as a single one, with many subdivisions. This is the interest in non-human material things. In some of its basic manifestations it corresponds with the old concept of the hunger instinct. But this was a very unsatisfactory category, for either it was inadequate, or else it had to be stretched so greatly as to become inaccurate or amorphous. Thus if taken in its strict sense, the urge for food, it omitted entirely the urge for drink which is equally strong and fundamental, as well as the urge for clothing, shelter, and a wide variety of other things. If, on the other hand, these were all dragged in under the cover of "hunger" the word became so distorted as to be almost meaningless.

The interest in material things corresponds roughly with Professor Sumner's "self-maintenance" group, but is more objective and descriptive. It may, obviously, be subdivided almost indefinitely, in accordance with all the various classifications of material things that it might be expedient to make for various purposes. Only a few of these subdivisions may be noted in this connection. First come the interests in food and in drink. These lead to the primary self-directed activities of the individual, indispensable for his own personal survival. After them come interests in shelter, clothing, the means of securing warmth, ornaments, instruments to facilitate the attainment of these and other interests, and so on down a long line, increasing in variety and complexity with the development of civilization, until it culminates in radios, newspapers, airplanes, television sets, and moving color cameras.

Interest in Sex

Next comes interest in sex activity and sex relations, corresponding obviously with Sumner's self-perpetuation group, or the "love," "reproductive," or "mating" instincts of the other classifications. For the individual this is almost as imperious, though by no means so continuously insistent, as the interest in food and drink. Its place in the general scheme of things, however, is quite different. It is the indispensable dynamic for the continuation of the species, just as the others are for the survival of the individual. Closely associated with this interest, though entirely distinct from it, is a peculiarly human interest which was practically ignored or unrecognized in the old classifications—the interest in offspring. This is of vital significance in human affairs, and will receive considerable attention later.

Interest in Well-being

Another tremendously important interest is one which is so poorly understood and has been so little studied that there is not even a satisfactory name for it. Perhaps the best that can be done is to call it the interest in well-being. Well-being, and consequently the interest therein, divides itself into two main aspects, physical, and mental or emotional. Physical well-being includes health, vitality, and the absence from pain. It obviously is a sort of background for many of the other more specific interests. Mental or emotional well-being may perhaps be better understood as a sense of self-satisfaction or a good opinion of oneself. This suggests Sumner's concept of ''vanity.'' The deficiencies of this word, and the social significance of this interest, will be discussed more fully later.

Interest in Play and Religion

Another interest somewhat akin to the foregoing is the interest in play. There also seem to be interests in such things as capacity, mastery, achievement, each for its own sake. Finally, without prolonging this list into too great detail, there is the interest in knowledge and understanding, which is the foundation stone of science, and the interest in the good will of supernatural beings, which is one of the factors, if not the basic element, in religion.

Egoism and Altruism

There is another somewhat peculiar classification of interests that cuts across the foregoing. This is based upon a differentiation between the persons whose desires are to be satisfied. There are immediate interests and vicarious interests, or egoistic interests and altruistic interests. One person may desire that another person's desire may be gratified, and may exert his efforts accordingly. Of course the first person is also following a desire and an interest, but in a roundabout way. There is clearly an especially high element of belief in these vicarious or altruistic interests. The active party has to believe not only what will satisfy his friend's desire, but also what that desire is. There are abundant opportunities for error, that is false beliefs, in this particular. It is very easy to assume that other persons desire exactly what you do yourself, or even to go to the extreme of thinking that a certain person "ought to want" this or that.

Misguided Altruism

There was a poignantly tragic story in a recent magazine which excellently illustrates this truth.[3] A young couple is returning after a delightful six months' European wedding journey to the home of the young man's parents in a middle western city. The father-in-law is a successful, highly unimaginative business man of the extreme Main Street type. After dinner, the young couple are taken for a ride in the family automobile, during the course of which the father-in-law in a somewhat casual way points to a new residence of yellow brick with a green roof, which he explains as one of the proud products of the Empire Lumber Company. "It's one of their complete jobs—everything from foundation to decorations. They even do the furnishing . . . you can give them the order and they'll turn you out a house ready to cook your dinner in." Eventually the group winds up at the house in question, to which the father-in-law seems to have full access, and upon inspection it is found to be absolutely complete even to the radio, player piano, electric fan, and bed linen. After time has been allowed for the expected admiring appreciation, the father-in-law announces that the whole unit is a wedding present to the young couple and that they are now "fixed for life." Only one who could look through the eyes of the young bride, with her highly developed individuality, fine taste, and love for self-expression in the personal things of life, could appreciate the intensity of the tragedy, or even understand wherein the tragedy lay.

Because all such efforts, whether wise or stupid, to promote the interests of other people, arise out of a desire on the part of the active individual, there has developed a common doctrine that unselfish behavior is impossible for any human being. All voluntary behavior represents the preponderant desire of the individual, and one desire, as far as he is concerned, is just as self-directed as another. This is an interesting theme for speculation but is of no particular importance in sociological analysis. The fact is that there are both egoistic and altruistic ways of behavior, and that the social implications of the two are very different. What the implications as to their merit or admirableness may be belongs in the field of ethics rather than of sociology. The relation between egoistic and altruistic behavior is one of the most interesting and illuminating aspects of sociological study, and is met with at various points in the complicated scheme of human relations.

In the mass of interests that characterize the human particles that make up the social aggregate lies the possibility of human control. These are the ultimate dynamic factors in social behavior, and through them, and them alone, can society exert its influence to secure the type of conduct that it desires. How society comes to desire certain types of conduct, and how it organizes its influence so as to elicit the required behavior on the part of individuals, are matters for further analysis.

Repetitiousness of Desires

In the discussion of science in an earlier section it was pointed out that the possibility of a science depends upon uniformity in the dynamic qualities of the ultimate particles of the science in question. By this time there should remain no doubt that the ultimate particles of social science—men, women, and children—display sufficient uniformity in their dynamic endowments to provide sound foundations for a genuine science of sociology. Exactly 1,866,975,767 times in the year 1932, persons in the New York Metropolitan Area had desires that they believed could be resolved by a trip in the Subway or "L" and were willing to risk a nickel on the accuracy of their beliefs. About 177,000,000 persons (not separate individuals, of course) manifested a desire for the *New York Times*, about 528,000,000 for the *New York Daily News*, and 140,400,000 for the *Saturday Evening Post*. In the same year, in the United States as a whole, the birth of 1,961,618 infants testified to the antecedent similar (though not identical*) desires of twice that number of people, while 981,903 couples manifested their desire to enter the married state, and 160,338 to get out of it.

These desires are the forces that make the science of sociology possible. Whether they should themselves be called "social forces" is largely a matter of definition. Numerous writers, as suggested above, have thought that they should. Thus Ward says, "Feeling is a true force and its various manifestations constitute the social forces."[4] Other writers, on the contrary, are very dubious about the whole concept of social forces.[5] But most of us, probably, think of "force" as being essential to "movement," and if we admit that there are social movements there must be social forces. Nevertheless, it is easy to recognize the weight of the objection to calling pristine feelings or desires "social" forces, for many such desires do not lead to sociological phenomena, and the same desire may, under different circumstances, lead sometimes to sociological, and sometimes to non-sociological, phenomena. Take, for example, the simple hunger impulse. This may lead to action, and may be satisfied, even though the possessor is alone on an otherwise uninhabited island. But on the other hand, it does in fact lead to many of the most highly socialized activities of the human species. The same may be said of the primary sex urge, which may take forms which can be satisfied in solitude, and yet underlies many of the basic institutions of society. The same is true of many others of the fundamental feelings and desires. They are essentially *life* forces, rather than *social* forces. It is partly for this reason that interests are a much better basis for analyzing social phenomena than feelings or desires. For when a dynamic impulse has reached the stage of an interest, it becomes relatively clear whether it has social implications or not.

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* See pp. 342-343.

TRUE SOCIAL FORCES

These considerations prepare the way for a logical, though restricted, concept of social forces. True social forces are those that animate more or less important common interests on the part of various members of society. When a number of individuals are in harmony with reference to some objective the fundamentals exist for a social movement. And if these individual interests become consolidated some social movement is bound to take place. It may not be the precise movement contemplated or desired by the individuals in question. It may be impeded, diverted, or even neutralized by some other social force. But once such a force is actualized, the aspect of society can never be the same again. Of course, it could be said very logically that, if one social force is precisely neutralized by an opposing social force, the result is not movement but stagnation. This may be granted. The point is that social movement is forever transpiring, and back of it there must always be social force, and that the genuine social forces inhere in common interests. It must not be inferred that these common interests are always organized, formulated, expressed, or even comprehended by those who embody them, or by others. Society, like divinity, "moves in a mysterious way, its wonders to perform." Sumner emphatically discounted, minimized, even denied the consciousness, purposefulness, and objectivity of social movement, likening it to a mass of drifting clouds, without form, pattern, or direction. But if our analysis hitherto is correct, it follows that back of every phenomenon there must be an adequate force, whether or not we understand it or can describe it, and that the force back of all true social movements is the harmonious interest of a sufficient number of individuals to produce results. Those who attempt deliberately to influence social change, and to produce directional social movements, are well aware of this principle, and are successful in direct proportion to their ability to apply it intelligently.

Desire for Good Opinion

There is, however, one desire that is, by its very nature, essentially social, and which expresses itself in interests of the highest sociological significance. This desire has received far less attention than it deserves by students of the field. Indeed, it has been so unrecognized and neglected that as already noted, there is no explicit and accepted word to express it. Practically the only way to designate it is by the object of the interest that rises out of it. This is *the desire for the good opinion of one's fellow men.* This is, itself, one aspect of a still more generalized desire, the desire for a good opinion of one's self, or self-approbation. This latter desire is unquestionably the supreme spring of action in the whole dynamic equipment of the human individual, dominating even the fundamental urges of hunger and love. The one emotional state that is intolerable to all human beings is the lack of a good opinion of one's self. To escape it, and to win or preserve its positive antithesis, self-approbation, men have given up, and will give up, their lives, by starvation, burning at the stake, and violent deaths of many sorts. They have forgone love and the companionship of their fellow men, and retired to the fastnesses of the desert. They have immured themselves for years of study in museum or laboratory. They have undergone untold hardships and performed Herculean labors. Every other interest must yield when it comes into direct opposition with this.

CONSCIENCE

It is apparent at once that this interest bears a close connection with the old-fashioned concept of "conscience." Conscience, according to the older "moral philosophies," is that inner voice that imperiously commands us to do right. Conscience, in itself, so we were taught, does not tell us what *is* right; that is a matter of judgment and reason. But once we have determined what is right, this unflagging mentor whips us on to its performance. But what other basis has the individual, within himself, for judging what is right than an assurance of what sort of conduct will win him self-approval? In the last analysis, every individual who is endowed with normal ethical faculties must in every instance decide for himself what is right and what is wrong. He may seek any amount of outside guidance, counsel, and advice, he may have recourse to eminent authority, but if, in the pursuit of righteousness, he follows this external leading it is because he, himself, has decided it is right to do so; in other words, that it is right to shift the burden of decision to someone else. If, on the other hand, he acts counter to all outside pressure it is because he can see the right only in the opposite direction. And does not our own self-examination convince us that what seems right to us is that which experience and our vision of the future assure us will leave us at peace with ourselves, or as near so as is humanly possible?

GROUP ESTEEM

In actual life, however, self-approbation and social esteem are well-nigh indistinguishable. The social character of modern man, and probably of very primitive man also, is so highly developed that it is virtually impossible to enjoy self-satisfaction unless one is assured of the high estimation of his fellows. This does not by any means imply *all* his fellows—this is a very important point in the whole analysis. Here is where the factor of group affiliation exercises a profound influence. Every human being is a member of many groups in addition to his society or community. Almost universally from the voluntary groups, and quite generally from other kinds of groups, he craves a favorable reaction. But there are always certain groups, perhaps only one, the esteem of which he prizes far above the others. If he can be assured of the approbation of this limited human environment, the rest can if necessary be disregarded. The group which any given individual prefers is not by any means always the one ranked highest by society, or the one whose esteem is most conducive to social welfare. Herein lies one key to the strength of gangdom, and the behavior of the criminal and the racketeer. When the ordinary citizen reads the life records of such men as Al Capone it is almost impossible for him to conceive that creatures who belong to the same species as himself can with such apparent calmness participate in successive acts of such callousness, cruelty, and barbarity. That is because you and I are unfamiliar with the innumerable sub-environments that exist in our own society, and the special, and to us perverse, sets of standards that prevail among them. Another partial explanation is found in the fact that to certain types of minds notoriety or public attention passes for esteem. To see his name in the headlines is all in the way of social recognition that many an errant individual requires for his satisfaction. For these reasons, the same narrative, recounted in one group is a confession of shame, and in another a vainglorious epic of prowess.

But esteem and approbation from somewhere practically all of us must have. It is only the extreme of eremitical or fanatic disposition that will enable a man to preserve his own self-esteem if he is conscious that he stands absolutely alone in the world, without the approbation of a single other individual. It is not difficult to understand, even in advance of detailed study, that this desire and its attendant interests are of immeasurable importance in determining the processes and means of social control.

In its overt manifestations, the craving for esteem becomes intricately bound up with religious interests, family loyalty, patriotism, scientific ambition, sexual longings, political and economic activities, and in fact practically all the specific interests of social man. This is partly what makes it so important and fundamental. There is practically no interest-pursuit that is not shot through more or less vitally with the yearning for approbation. All intelligent and constructive social policies must take account of this fact. The activities of Mahatma Gandhi, to take a single example, are motivated, as far as can be judged from the exterior, by a zeal for social justice, a particular sympathy with the "untouchables," an abhorrence of machine production and all its concomitants, and a feeling of identity with the Indian nationality (visionary though it may be) rather than the British. But it would be a safe guess that underneath it all is a driving necessity to live on good terms with himself, and to feel assured of the good will and admiration of those elements in his country which he himself regards as worthy.

VANITY

It has already been noted that this desire which we have been discussing bears some relation to that basic feeling which Sumner designated as vanity. But "vanity," in the first place, is a very unfortunate word for a natural and universal human endowment, because it has become, in popular speech, so inseparably connected with an unfavorable connotation. Furthermore, vanity, in its conventional usage, is not a desire but a state. It therefore cannot be a source of action; it is not dynamic. Vanity is the characteristic of an individual who *is* well pleased with himself. This is something very different from the *desire* to be pleased with oneself. The humblest man in the world may have the strongest desire for self-approval. The very stringency of his judgments of himself, the very elevation of his standards, may keep him forever from achieving, or even approaching, complete self-esteem. Vanity, in its ordinary sense, is virtually the object of the interest arising out of the desire we are discussing. It may seem paradoxical that the desire should be such an admirable and useful thing, while the attainment of the desire is usually so odious. Yet such is the case. The desire for esteem is one of the most indispensable agencies in the social process; without it, organized society would immediately disintegrate. It is the striving that is salutary. Perhaps one reason why we have learned to despise the attainment is that when it is fulfilled the striving ceases.

Of course, Sumner was not using the word in its ordinary popular sense, but was trying to give it a restricted scientific meaning. But this seems to be a case where the traditional connotation is too deeply entrenched to make it wise to attempt to give the word a radically different meaning for scientific purposes. Until a more satisfactory term is devised and established it seems preferable to designate the dynamic continuum in question simply as the "desire for esteem," which is subdivided into the "desire for self-esteem," and the "desire for social esteem."*

The nature of this desire, and its importance, have been more or less clearly perceived by other writers than Sumner. We have seen that the desires for recognition and response are two of the fundamental impulses recognized by Thomas, and an even more elemental conception is presented in the

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* Sociology, more than almost any other science, is handicapped in its quest for a concrete, specific, uniform scientific terminology. Like every science, such a terminology is indispensable for accurate and intelligible exposition and analysis. But sociology, dealing as it does with the familiar affairs of every-day life, finds words already in use that correspond more or less closely to the concepts that it wishes to define and standardize. The family, love, interests, institutions, conventions, assimilation, crime, gang, and so on down practically the whole long list of sociological concepts, are words referring to realities with which sociology must deal. But in common parlance, the words, and usually also the ideas, are vague, unstable, and unstandardized. They mean different things to different people at the same time, and to the same person at different times. Scientific sociology, however, must have definite and standardized concepts, and equally definite and uniform terms to designate them. There seem to be only two alternatives: the first is for sociology to take the best possible words from the current language, give them the most precise and restricted meaning possible, and then use them consistently in that way. The other is to coin artificial words, usually using Greek or Latin derivations. Ward made large use of the latter expedient, but his attempt has not proved notably successful. Of all the elaborate lexicon that he introduced, only a few terms such as "telic" and "symbiosis" have achieved even a limited currency. The tendency of most writers has been to make the best possible use of the former expedient. This has undoubtedly been an obstacle to uniformity and precision thus far. But it seems to be the lesser of two evils—illustrating the type of inescapable choice already discussed.

''herd instincts'' emphasized by Trotter. Two eminent English writers, Sir Norman Angell and J. Swinburne, agree that the desire for the approbation of our fellows is ''by far the most powerful inducement in our behavior'' and ''the true motive of nearly all our actions.''[6] A similar concept underlies the work of Adler.

CHAPTER IX

INTERESTS: SOCIETAL

Society, as well as the individual, has its interests. These are much more than the sum total or aggregate of individual interests. Indeed, as is pointed out elsewhere, the interests of society are often in conflict with those of individuals. It is out of this conflict that many major social problems, and a large part of *the* social problem, arise.

There are two chief interests of society, continuity and welfare. These may, in one sense, be regarded as categories into which the various special problems fall. Or they may be regarded as wholes, of which the separate problems are parts.

CONTINUITY

The foremost and primary interest of society is continuity—the desire that its own existence may be perpetuated, integral and unbroken, into an indefinite future. This is not a rational interest, deliberately worked out by society. It calls for no explanation by sociology; indeed, it is probably incapable of explanation. It simply *is*. This interest is closely analogous to the interest of personified nature in the perpetuation of the species. Just as nature subordinates everything to the perpetuation of the species, and is relatively indifferent to the amount of suffering, hardship, or destruction imposed upon individuals in the achievement of this great end, so society subordinates all other interests to the ultimate objective of its own persistence.

The continuity of society is dependent upon two chief requirements, the life and the reproduction of individuals. Fortunately for society, these two requirements coincide closely with the two basic interests of individuals, the interest in life and the interest in mating. If there were conflict between society and the individual on these basic points the development and maintenance of society would be immeasurably more difficult than it is—it might even be impossible.

Around these two basic interests, accordingly, society has built up many of its most weighty and stable institutions and its most efficient sanctions. Broadly speaking, the preservation of life is the final objective of the entire economic system. All the agencies and mechanisms of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption aim primarily at the preservation of life. All the medical, therapeutic, and hygienic activities of society drive in the same direction. Likewise with reference to reproduction, there is the whole series of activities and devices that cluster around the family and the sexual code. Closely correlated with both the foregoing, and scarcely subordinate to them, are the various protective systems, all the great military and naval organizations, the basic purpose of which is to save society from destruction.

Welfare

Compared with this primary multiple interest, society's concern about welfare is relatively weak and inconsiderable. If, after the continued existence of society has been amply provided for and guaranteed, there are any energy and resources left, very well, they can be devoted to improving the quality of life. But until then, little attention is paid to the level of comfort and happiness upon which existence is dragged out. Indeed, any active interest on the part of society in the welfare of its members in general is probably of very recent origin, at least in western society. The "panis et circenses" of the Roman Empire were granted not so much to create happiness among the proletariat as to subdue an active discontent that threatened to shake the foundations of the state.

Conflict Between Societal and Individual Interests

Many of the clearest and most insistent interests of society are, in their very nature, contrary to the interests of single individuals. Society looks at mankind in the aggregate. But the well-being of the aggregate requires that everybody, or nearly everybody, should do certain things that no individual, if left to himself, would choose to do. Innumerable examples could be cited. It is to the interest of society that established property rights should be protected. This is because of the fact that unless all rights are protected, no individual can be sure that his own rights will be protected. Thus far the interests of society and the individual are harmonious. But looking in the other direction, each individual would like to be free to appropriate any piece of property that his fancy might indicate. Similarly, it is to the interest of society that automobilists should be controlled as to speed and manner of driving, and most drivers recognize that this is in harmony with their own interests. Yet each individual driver would like to be free to drive exactly as he pleased. Again, societies have invariably found that their interest in continuity requires some regulation of sex relationships. Yet the innate interest of every individual is to follow his own sweet will in these matters.

In other words, there are numerous and varied kinds of behavior that each of us would like to see imposed on everyone but himself. But unless each individual is restrained, all individuals cannot be restrained. To bring such influence to bear upon every individual that he will submit tractably to the regulation that is necessary for all, and display the kind of behavior that is requisite of all, is the greatest problem that society has to face—it is *the* social problem.

Group Standards

It is for reasons such as this that human beings in groups often manifest, or at least profess, a more highly developed social sense than they display in their separate personal conduct. And this may not be sheer hypocrisy, but a disparate functioning of the mind in distinct areas. This is particularly true of legislative bodies. A member of Congress may leave the Senate in which he has just cast his vote in favor of Prohibition to keep an appointment with his bootlegger. A wealthy manufacturer who is a member of a state legislature may work and vote enthusiastically in support of a measure to raise the minimum legal age for child labor, while in his own factory he is attempting to outwit the existing law in every possible way. A federal representative on his return from a European trip may aid and abet his wife in smuggling in a diamond necklace and some choice pieces of *point d'Alencon* lace in direct violation of a tariff law which he has been instrumental in putting on the statute books. A prominent member of the American Consular Service in Europe once remarked that a large part of his morning mail each day consisted in requests—almost demands—from various members of Congress that he make exceptions in certain individual cases to the immigration regulations which they themselves had helped to put into the law.

Such legislators may be keenly sensitive to their feeling of responsibility as representatives of the people. They may sincerely believe that, for the country as a whole, Prohibition, a diminution of child labor, a high tariff, and immigration restriction are distinctly advantageous. But outside of legislative halls their interests as private citizens assert themselves, and their conduct conforms to about the same pattern as that of ordinary citizens of average social conscientiousness. Perhaps the word "may" is the most significant word in the foregoing sentences; perhaps there is at least a slight element of hypocrisy in the public acts of some of our governmental officials. At any rate, it would be a safe guess that the official enactments of all the legislative bodies in the United States display a distinctly higher level of social sensitiveness than the average of the individual conduct of the members of these bodies.

Expectation

Every society's conception of its own interests, and of the means and methods of their attainment, is consolidated in a complex mass of requirements of many kinds which are imposed upon the individual members—sanctions, codes, taboos, laws, and prescriptions of many sorts. The nature of these pressure-agencies and the manner of their functioning will be examined in some detail later on. For the present it will suffice to note that, in the aggregate, they constitute an *attitude* of society toward the individual. This attitude may be called expectation. The attitude and behavior of the individual who lives up to this social expectation may be called conformity. This is not a wholly satisfactory term, as its common usage conveys a notion of unreflecting and supine passivity; but there seems to be nothing better. The primary obligation, therefore, of the individual to society may be summed up as conformity to expectation. This at once raises questions as to the place of criticism, the rôle of originality, and the relation of individual independence to social progress. These are vital questions, the full consideration of which can best be postponed to a later section. For the present, there will hardly be disagreement with the generalization that the fundamental thing that society requires of its members is that they should do as they are supposed to do.

NORMALITY

Another manner of presenting much the same truth is by means of the concept of normality. This is one of the foundation stones of sociological theory, simple in itself, and yet one which seems to present some difficulty not only to novices, but also to experienced students of the field. Few writers on social theory make any attempt to define it, and many deny either the reality or the utility of the concept. There accordingly seems to be justification for explaining it in some detail.

Normality is one of numerous words in current use in every-day conversation with more or less uniform and standardized meanings which come so close to central sociological concepts that the best thing to do is to adopt them, incorporate them into sociological terminology, and attempt to give them as restricted and definite a meaning as possible. This is often difficult, and particularly so in the case of the word in question because the notion with which it is associated is itself vague and confused. The word "normal" as used in common speech really refers to two entirely different, and to some extent contradictory, ideas. The first is closely equivalent to the average; the other to that which is wholesome, healthy, sound, sometimes verging closely on the ideal. Thus, on the one hand, statisticians speak of the "curve of normal frequency." This is obviously using the word in a strictly mathematical sense, with no implications whatever of desirability or undesirability. In the sense of the average, indeed, the term may be applied to conditions that are definitely undesirable. Thus reference may be made to a "normal typhoid rate." Obviously it would be vastly preferable if there were no typhoid at all. In this connection the word simply means that which prevails when there are no exceptional or anomalous conditions.

In the other sense, the word is used in such connections as "normal intelligence," "normal sex impulses and sex practices," and so on. This use approximates closely that which is appropriate for sociological analyses. It is difficult to reduce the precise meaning of the word to a concise definition, expressed in a single sentence. Its significance, however, may be indicated in a preliminary way as follows: Any item in the structure or functioning of a society is normal when it is harmonious and consistent with the entire structure and functioning of the society at the time in question, and is therefore conducive to the stability and smoothness of operation of the whole mechanism. Abnormality, on the other hand, tends to produce friction, retardation, distortion, or strain. It is clear, therefore, that the term cannot be logically applied to a society as a whole, except as it is regarded as a part of "the great society" of mankind. All that could be said would be either that every society is always normal, or that it is impossible to think of societies as normal at all; in either case the word is meaningless in such an application.

The Average

Particular care is required in its sociological usage to differentiate the normal from the average on one hand and the ideal on the other. An excellent analogy which will clarify the distinction between normal and average is furnished by the temperature of the human body. We habitually say that normal temperature is 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit. This is not the average bodily temperature, for the average would include persons who are sick and those who are well alike, so that there would be some low temperatures and some high ones. Since it is probable that, at any given time, more people are suffering from fevers than from depressed temperatures, the actual average would be somewhat above 98.6. This temperature is normal because it represents precisely the degree of bodily heat which is harmonious with the health of the body as a whole. It is at this temperature that the various bodily functions go on most smoothly and wholesomely. The writer was once conversing with a medical friend and commented on the extreme variations in weather which had recently taken place. "Yes," said the doctor, "and have you ever taken off your hat to the extraordinary mechanism inside of you that keeps your bodily temperature at exactly the same point in spite of all these external changes?" Normal temperature for a frog, however, would be something entirely different, because his is a different type of organism.

So what is normal in one society may not be normal in another, because they are differently constituted. And what was normal in one society, such as the United States in the "gay nineties," may not—almost certainly will not—be normal in the fourth decade of the twentieth century. The *concept* of normality is precise and constant, but the *aspects* of normality are in a state of constant change and flux.

The Ideal

On the other hand, normality needs to be carefully distinguished from the ideal. An ideal is an imagined picture of something better than that which is. But ideals are usually conceived of in detached and unrelated terms. The reality they represent might be very inappropriate if applied to the existing society. It would be an ideal situation to have no policemen in a community—they cost money, they suggest force, and they interfere with free action. But the absence of policemen could be tolerated only in a society where there was no crime, or any tendency to anti-social behavior. In other words, there would have to be an ideal society before this particular ideal could be normal.

Another illustration is furnished by the institution of child labor. It would be ideal if no child had to engage in ordinary wage labor until he was at least eighteen years of age. But if that situation were suddenly introduced into American society in a period of ordinary business activity incalculable disaster would ensue. Many families would be left destitute, many businesses would be disrupted, hundreds of thousands of children, in the absence of adequate educational and recreational facilities, would find themselves "all dressed up with no place to go," and would be subject to all the temptations of idleness and disorganization. Our whole social and economic system is geared up to a certain amount of child labor, and that amount is therefore normal. Before any such ideal as that mentioned can be attained there must be a vast amount of preparation and sweeping alterations in the other aspects of the social organization that must necessarily be affected by the change. The N.R.A. program has paved the way for some of these alterations.

A similar illustration is furnished by coal mining. It certainly is not ideal that tens of thousands of men should have to spend their entire working time far below ground in the sunless, damp, dusty, dangerous galleries of coal mines. But modern society must have coal—our whole civilization is predicated on it—and so far no method has been found of getting coal without the underground work of human beings. Consequently, in the present stage of industrial culture, coal mining is normal, and any high-powered enthusiast who succeeded in getting a law passed that suddenly closed the pit-mouths to human descent for all time to come would do a good deal more harm than good to humanity. On the other hand, many of the specific conditions that surround coal mining are doubtless abnormal.

The distinction between normal and ideal may easily be verified by reflecting that if the two were identical either one of two conditions would have to exist: either there could be no normality, because the ideal is always ahead of that which is, or else there could be no progress, because the ideal would be synonymous with existing realities, and any change would be for the worse.

DESCRIPTION OF NORMALITY

The task of actually describing or cataloging the normal features of a society is an extremely difficult one. This is partly the result of our conventional training. We are much more habituated to emphasis on the abnormal than the normal. But it is also partly due to the difficulty of appraising the familiar and the commonplace. It is always hard to see the woods for the trees. Furthermore, normal features are seldom so conspicuous, so spectacular, so vivid as the abnormal. Many social workers and even social theorists deny both the possibility and the utility of forming any comprehensive, or detailed, picture of the normal aspects of a society. This is, however, a dangerous error. If there is to be any conscious and purposeful effort for social improvement there must be a preconceived and pre-acquired picture of the normal conditions to serve as a pattern or set of specifications with which the existing conditions are to be brought into conformity. Otherwise, the direction of attempted change must remain a matter of blind guesswork, or else of simple rule-of-thumb common sense—and even the latter does actually presuppose a concept of normality. One must have some idea of how things ought to be before he can attempt to change things as they are. It would be just as reasonable to assert that doctors and surgeons need have no knowledge of the aspects of a human body in a state of health, and that the teaching of anatomy in medical schools could be confined to diseased bodies.

As intimated some time previously, a detailed account of normal features in a society would correspond closely with the items in social expectation. Society expects its members to be normal and to act normally. It has a fundamental interest in keeping them and their actions normal. To attempt such a detailed account in this connection would be onerous and superfluous. It would include in the United States, for example, such major features as monogamy, private property, public education, democracy, parental authority, responsibility of the husband and father for the maintenance of the home, freedom of association of the young of both sexes, separate domiciles for independent families, and so on, and innumerable minor features of dress, fashion, decorum, decency, convention, etc.

PREDOMINANT EGOISM

One feature, however, which might easily escape notice, is of deep importance and should therefore receive special attention. This is what may be called the expectation of "predominant egoism." The ordinary distinction between egoistic and altruistic interests is clear. Every individual acts in accordance with both of these types. But the distribution of the two may vary widely among individuals. A society can tolerate these individual differences up to a certain point. It is a matter of common observation that some people display a much larger proportion of altruism in their behavior than others. But every society has a norm in this respect. It expects a certain minimum of altruism on the part of all its members, and any individual who displays less than this minimum is recognized as a menace to social stability. The general trend of social evolution has always been in the direction of more altruism and less egoism in the conduct of the average man. The gunman of today would have been the hero of a few centuries ago. Someone has expressed this change by saying that the typical medieval gentleman would rather kill a dozen persons than lose his own right arm, whereas the modern gentleman would rather give up his life than deliberately cause someone else the loss of his right arm. This may be an extreme statement, but there can be no doubt of the essential truth that it expresses.

The extent of this change may be perceived by considering objectively, and in the light of modern standards, the characteristic behavior of a "perfect knight" of the days of chivalry. Tennyson's Sir Galahad thus describes his own activities:

> My good blade carves the casques of men,
> My tough lance thrusteth sure,
> My strength is as the strength of ten,
> Because my heart is pure.

Shorn of its poetic romanticism, and expressed in the language that would be used by the typical exponent of similar behavior today, this sentiment would be expressed about as follows:

My automatic gets the mutts,
My aim is quick and sure,
My good machine-gun rips their guts—
And so my heart is pure.

Balance of Egoism and Altruism

The whole structure of normality, and the whole complex of expectation, in any given society at any given time are always tuned up to a certain balance between egoism and altruism on the part of the average man. Too wide and too frequent deviations from this norm in either direction are socially injurious. In spite of the trend already mentioned, in such societies as the United States the balance still dips strongly on the side of egoism. We are not really expected to love our neighbors as ourselves, in the sense of seeking their interests as enthusiastically as our own. As intimated above, excessive altruism may be almost as much of a nuisance as excessive egoism. Society expects each of us to look out for Number One. Somebody has to, and if Number One does not do it himself it simply lays an irritating burden on somebody else. In other words, the norm at present is still "predominant egoism," and it will probably remain so for a long time. Increasing social complexity seems to require increasing altruism, and doubtless the trend will continue in the direction of altruism, but there still remains a wide margin to cover before the point of equilibrium is reached.

Normality is particularly vital and germane to society, as compared with any other group, because of the fact, already stressed, that society is *par excellence* the functioning group. Normality, as revealed in its definition, is the very essence of smooth functioning. Normality, accordingly, in any society is just as complex as the functional organization of that society—which is to say, in the case of modern societies, very complex indeed. So important is function in the concept of society that Herbert Spencer, in one of his most famous passages, was led to propound the doctrine (which the alert reader cannot help feeling he did not really believe himself) that society actually *is* an organism, basing his arguments on a very ingeniously developed analogy between the essential activities of a complex society and the principal functions of a living organism. At any rate, normal functioning, in accordance with a definite pattern of organization, is essential to both the continuity and welfare of every society. This functioning, in turn, depends upon the orderly and efficient performance of his appointed part by every individual member. But the orderly and routinized behavior of the individual in conformity to the functional pattern of a highly complex society necessarily involves restraint upon the individual. For although every normal member of a society is inherently interested in the continuity and welfare of the society itself, he also has numerous personal interests which are not necessarily harmonious with his rôle as a minute particle of the social structure, but may, in numerous instances, run directly counter to that rôle. As suggested above, every individual recognizes it as desirable that society should require conformity to its diversified expectations on the part of every person but himself, but is also well aware that many of his particular interests could best be served by a more or less wide departure from conformity. And to the extent that self-interest is a more powerful dynamic than social interest, it follows that individuals can be held to the necessary degree of conformity only by pressure from society. This indispensable pressure takes many forms, and will be more thoroughly studied under the general theme of social control.

CONFIDENCE

The conformity of every individual is particularly important to society because of the high degree to which the efficient functioning of society is dependent upon *confidence* in its functioning. This is a field where the importance of belief displays itself impressively. Many of the processes of society take place only because the majority of the members of society believe that they will take place. As a characteristic example, take a typical business transaction. You go into a jewelry store and buy a gold watch. Presumably, you know little if anything about the minutiæ of watch-making. You select the works on the basis of the name attached—Elgin, Waltham, Howard, as the case may be. You believe that the name is a guarantee of excellence. As for the case, the dealer tells you that it is fourteen carat gold, or perhaps you find a little mark indicating the same. In either case, you have to accept it on belief. The dealer will not let you take the case to a chemical laboratory and submit it to analysis, even if you were qualified to do so. You ask to have the watch delivered to your house, and charged to your account. Up to this last item the transaction has been a matter of your belief in the dealer; now it becomes a matter of his belief in you. At the end of the month you receive a bill, and draw a check for the specified amount, which you return to the dealer. He sends back a receipted bill, believing that your check will be honored by your bank. Eventually he deposits your check in his bank, and it is credited to his account, the bank also believing that your bank will accept it, or if not that the dealer will make it good. In the meantime, various other instances of belief have occurred—the dealer has believed that the delivery boy would leave the watch at your house, you and he have both believed that an envelope with the proper stamp on it would be accurately and promptly handled by the Post Office Department, and so on. A similar network of belief may be discerned in almost any activity of your day's experience. A trip on the railroad is based on a series of beliefs—belief that the fare is reasonable, that the timetable can be relied on, that the train is going where the gate-man says it is going, that the engineer and all the operating officials are competent and will do their jobs conscientiously, that the car is solidly built, that the porter will call you in time to get off at Buffalo, that the meals in the diner will be prepared of wholesome food, and at least passably well cooked, that the dining-car steward will be satisfied (at least externally) with a ten per cent tip, and so on down an interminable list. The monetary system of a modern society is predominantly a matter of belief—so much so that counterfeit money is just as good as genuine until it is discovered.

Now the reason why these beliefs are so universally held is that they are almost universally justified. The thing that is expected to be done is actually done in all but an infinitesimally small fraction of cases. As to that infinitesimal fraction, we are willing to take a chance. We have to take a chance, for there is nothing else that we can do. Anybody who undertook to manage his day's activities on the basis of absolute certainty would never get beyond his own doorstep. The entire functioning of society, the very structure of society itself, are based not only upon the maintenance of innumerable regularities, but upon the confidence that they will be maintained. If checks were not habitually honored, what would become of the credit structure of the nation? If bills were not paid, what would become of the retail organization? If the credit structure and the retail organization collapsed, what would become of the banks? If the banks failed, what would become of the whole economic system? And if the economic system went to pieces, what—well, we are getting so close to actual conditions at the time this is written (1933) that the illustration takes on a painful semblance of reality.

BETRAYAL OF CONFIDENCE

Unfortunately, the very facts that society rests so heavily on confidence, and that confidence is so largely justified, make it peculiarly profitable for certain ill-disposed individuals to betray confidence as long as they can get away with it. The check forger, the defaulter, the smuggler (though perhaps confidence is not a conspicuous trait of customs inspectors), the stock promoter, as well as the "confidence man" who trades upon gullibility in cruder ways, all derive their gains from trading upon the established and habitual trust of individuals in a multiplicity of social transactions. The seriousness of such conduct, obviously, is to be judged not simply by the immediate loss that it occasions to the victims, but by the weakening that it causes to the very foundations of the social edifice. Whenever any particular form of betrayal of confidence becomes so wide-spread that confidence itself is undermined, and persons begin to refuse to behave according to the established routine, then society itself sinks to a lower level of efficiency and stability. This is the peculiar menace of many of the phenomena of abnormality that are so conspicuous in the present era—racketeering, political faithlessness, business trickery, etc.

An illuminating illustration of these truths is furnished by certain types of hold-ups of automobiles. One of the most characteristic and highly cherished traits of modern societies is the response to the demands of "common humanity," exemplified, for instance, by the impulse to go to the relief of any one who is seen to be in distress, no matter who he is, friend or stranger. In accordance with this motive the average person driving in an automobile along an unfrequented road will stop at the sight of someone lying motionless, or writhing with apparent pain, by the side of the road. As a result, a certain type of "confidence man" capitalizes this impulse and, feigning injury or death, stops some passing motorist, who thereupon finds himself confronted with the business end of an automatic revolver and is promptly relieved of his valuables, and then given the opportunity to see his pseudo-beneficiary drive off in his car. So common has this practice become that many automobilists, confronted by such a situation, now step on the gas and dash ahead without stopping to determine whether the injury is genuine or simulated. Carried to its full fruition such a procedure results in a definite lowering of the level of sociality. The possibility that something of an analogous sort prevailed along the highways of ancient Palestine would throw a new light on the parable of the Good Samaritan, adding, of course, extra credit for his benevolent deed, but palliating in a measure the conduct of the priest and the Levite.

Once more, in this connection, arises the delicate question of the responsibility of the reflective individual with respect to regulations and conventions which he does not believe to be ethically justified, or even socially constructive, in the long run. The answer can be given, if at all, better after further study.

Chapter X

SOCIAL CONTROL:

MORES. MORAL AND LEGAL CODES

About the sheer fact of social control there can be no two opinions. Anyone who doubts that his conduct is governed to a greater or less extent by his group setting would probably waste his time studying sociology at all. But there is ample room for uncertainty as to the nature of the control. There are two main conceptions. The first regards all social forces as cosmic in character, that is, as inherent in the very nature of things, and consequently essentially automatic in their operation. Forces of this kind cannot be thought of as having any definite objective, certainly no consciously perceived objective. Their control over the individual would be analogous to the control of an autumn gale over a mass of dead leaves. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth." There is no doubt that the leaves are controlled by the wind, or that at any given moment it is blowing them in a certain direction. But with reference to the leaves the wind cannot be said to have any objective. They are both simply manifestations of great cosmic processes. This view obviously corresponds closely to Sumner's conception of social forces, already set forth. It tends to discount all ideas of social reform, social engineering, or purposeful social activity of any kind—virtually denying not only their utility but even their possibility.

Inherent Self-direction

This view, however, appears to ignore the fact that society is composed of human individuals, and that human individuals are endowed with consciousness and some form of self-direction. And since the constituent particles are conscious and self-regulating, it is logical to suppose that the group should also have some form of consciousness and self-direction. The wise solution of this question would seem to be similar to the solution of the question of free will—a common-sense, realistic recognition of the fact that society does display every evidence of consciousness, purpose, and recognition of direction. This will be the conception adopted throughout the present volume.

This does not commit us to the concept of a "group mind," as something separate from, and superior to, the aggregate of the individual minds. The notion of a social mind existing by itself is just as visionary as the notion of a social body. What it does mean is that, in the course of social evolution, there has developed a consensus of individual desires so compact and coherent with respect to a given group that it becomes possible to say, "Society desires this and that" in much the sense that we say an individual desires certain things. In like manner these social desires fix themselves upon certain objects. In a word, as already recognized, there are social interests very similar in nature to individual interests. (Social control represents the sum total of society's efforts to secure such types of individual behavior as will promote its own interests.) This is by far the most important of all society's manifestations. It is so inclusive, indeed, that social control may very accurately be considered as virtually the equivalent of the social process, for it is through the control of individuals exclusively that society can achieve any results whatsoever.

MYSTERY OF CONTROL

As such, it necessarily presents very difficult problems of analysis. At times it seems completely to baffle human comprehension. The mystery of control is the great mystery of society. Naturally it reaches its culmination where society itself is most intricate and complex. Nowhere is it better visualized than from the top of one of the great towers in the center of Manhattan Island. Directly below run the great arteries of the metropolis, crowded with vehicles of many types. For the moment all those headed in two opposite directions are motionless. Suddenly lights change, and they dash forward, weaving in an out a pattern of wonderful beauty, but also of purpose. Each of them is going somewhere, and for some definite reason. On the sidewalks, and dashing across the street intersections, are myriads of pedestrians, immaculately clad business men with silk hats and spats, women with children in their arms, beggars, messenger boys with telegrams, country visitors with their necks craned upwards in speechless wonder. Street vendors with their push-carts or trays stand at the curbs, and delivery boys with teetering racks mounted on absurd little wheels carry thousands of dollars worth of fur coats and silk dresses from one place to another. Flanking the streets are countless buildings of various proportions, each one a hive of activity, the scene of varieties of human behavior, merely to catalog which would leave the brain dizzy and exhausted. To the east and the west are the two great waterways, with their own teeming life. Ferry-boats thread their way from shore to shore, small craft dash or creep perilously to and fro, giant ocean liners, throbbing with power, await the signal that for thousands of passengers will open the door to romance, or wealth, or doom. Still further to the east, if conditions are favorable, can be seen the great ocean itself, with its own peculiar burden of life and destiny. Suddenly the drone of motors emerges above the general roar of the city, and a fleet of airplanes passes overhead, or perhaps a gleaming dirigible.

Every one of these tiny atoms of activity is part of a great pattern, every one fits directly or remotely into the life of every other one, no one is behaving as he would if he were a detached unit. Who planned this mighty complex, who keeps it going, who directs the conduct of each infinitesimal individual so that it coordinates with the rest? There is only one answer—Society. The thing is its own explanation, if explanation there be. All this is so because society is society, and society is society because man is man. The full comprehension of it all probably lies beyond human capacity. But it is the task of social science somewhat prosaically to attempt to analyze it, and to resolve it into its constituent factors.

Aspects of Control

The phenomena of social control may logically be considered under three main categories, the purposes or objectives of control, the basis of control, and the agencies or means of control. With reference to the first of these, it has already been made clear that the goals of social control are the objects of the interests of society, and that these are primarily continuity and welfare. These naturally divide into many details, which can be examined more profitably after the mechanisms of control have been considered. For the present the broad objectives will suffice.

Basis of Control

The basis of control obviously resides in the dynamic characteristics of the units to be controlled. This is particularly true because, as will be shown more fully later, social control has the unique feature that the ultimate sources of control and the ultimate objects of control are identical—human individuals. It is control by the controlled. For the present, let us think of the basis of control in terms of the characteristics of the units to be controlled, which make them susceptible of control, and determine the means and methods of control.

Persuasive and Coercive Control

At the outset, it is helpful to recognize that social control manifests itself in two distinct forms, which may be called the persuasive and the coercive. This classification corresponds to the underlying concept of will and choice which has already been adopted. Persuasive control is the sort that gets its results through the voluntary conduct of the individuals concerned. It operates by causing them to wish or choose to behave in the ways that society is trying to secure. Coercive control is that which represents the application of force. It is called into requisition when persuasive measures prove inadequate. It operates through the application of the force which is always at society's command, which necessarily requires that certain individuals take the part of society in compelling other individuals to do things that they otherwise would not do. If the preliminary definition of the state is recalled, it will be understood that normally society exercises coercive control through the agency of the state.

It scarcely needs any evidence to demonstrate that, as between the two, persuasive control is immeasurably preferable to coercive control. It is positive and efficient, it arouses much less resentment, bitterness, and resistance, it operates to a great extent unconsciously, and it is much less expensive. As will appear later, many of the most important institutions of society have grown up out of the social need for persuasive control.

Control Through Interests

Since all voluntary social behavior is based on interests, it follows that society's program of persuasive control must also rest upon the prevailing interests of its members. To the extent that society can set the conditions under which interests can be achieved, it can control the behavior of its members. This is relatively simple with respect to those interests which are inherently social, that is, which cannot be attained except through the participation of a group. And since man is so definitely a gregarious or social animal, a very large proportion of his interests are of this type. It is probable, furthermore, that this proportion increases steadily with the growth of civilization, for complexity of organization appears to go inseparably with the advance of civilization, and the more complex a society is the more dependent is each individual upon others for the resolution of his desires. This is a point of the highest importance, as will be seen more fully later on. The specific modes and mechanisms by which society makes the realization of interests dependent upon conformity to its expectation will reveal themselves as we proceed.

Control Through Desire for Esteem

For the present, it is important to note that there is one interest which is inherently social, and over which society exercises its control immediately and directly. This has already been suggested—it is the interest in approbation and esteem. Unfortunately, this interest does not always focus itself upon the approbation of society as a whole, but satisfies itself with the recognition of certain subgroups. Where the standards of the subgroup are virtually identical with those of society, no serious difficulty arises. But where, as is often the case, the standards of the subgroup are different from or antagonistic to those of society, then difficulties occur. Society is then under the necessity of either winning the individual away from responsiveness to the subgroup, or else of molding the standards of the group into its own pattern. If society fails in both of these attempts, then it fails in its effort to exert persuasive control over the individual in question, and must either give him up as a lost sheep or resort to harsher methods. This situation prevails in the case of many of the subgroups in the United States, including gangs and many of the racial and foreign national groups. It is so prevalent, indeed, that it seems to threaten a serious breakdown of the whole system of control.

The great majority of individuals, however—all those who are reasonably normal in their attitudes—are responsive to the standards of society, and crave recognition and approbation, if not by society itself, at least by those subdivisions of society which are essentially representative of society itself.

On the whole, it is probably safe to say that a far greater volume of social control is exercised through this particular interest than through all other interests combined. It is the great, universal resource for securing conformity. This could not possibly be demonstrated, for the motivation of human conduct is seldom simple, and the craving for approbation has a way of entangling itself with most other urges. But you can easily test it out for yourself. Ask yourself why you are attending a certain college, or any college at all, why you are trying to ‘‘make’’ the football team, or the glee club, or a certain fraternity, why you are running for president of your class or editor of the college paper, why you wear the kind of clothes you do, or any clothes at all, why you use the slang that you do, sing the songs you do, dance as you do, why you are proud to have a certain person of the opposite sex as your partner at a dance, and so on through as long a list of your activities and interests as you care to string out. You may find yourself getting some rather incongruous and bizarre answers to some of these queries; but it is almost certain that you will be impressed by the frequency with which the real reason proves to be that you want admiration or recognition or position or power, or just "because it is done."

Folkways and Mores

Much of this persuasive control is unconscious on the part of the individual and unorganized on the part of society. We need not go the whole way with Sumner, to grant that a considerable portion of the activity of society is not formulated, or its immediate objectives recognized, in any concrete way. Society pursues many of its goals in much the same way as the human being promotes his own life interests. Every time we take a breath we do not stop to ask just why; we do not prepare a brief for each meal that we eat or each hour of sleep. Sumner himself, indeed, has provided much the best analysis and interpretation of this type of social procedure in his concepts of the folkways and the mores. The folkways are the customary, habitual methods of pursuing life interests that grow up in a group out of the common experiences of its members in their efforts to avoid pain and obtain pleasure. They are not planned or premeditated, nor are they formed by the action of any individual. They are strictly mass features.

After practising certain folkways for an extended time, people acquire the conviction that they are indispensable to the welfare of society. They come to believe that their own ways are the only right ones, and that departure from them will involve calamity. It is with the addition of this welfare-element that folkways become mores. To illustrate: the removal of the hat when a civilian meets a woman on the street is in our folkways, while the practice of monogamy belongs to our mores. We do not regard neglect of the former usage as dangerous to society, though it is discreditable to the individual; but we are so convinced as to the expediency of the latter that we will promptly and severely repress the polygamist, and that in the interests of society. There is a real distinction in analysis between a folkway and a mos, but it is a discrimination for the laboratory rather than for actual practice. Settled folkways surrounding a vital interest are always taking on the welfare-element and receiving religious sanction, thus becoming mores. It is out of the mores rather than the folkways that institutions develop, and in a study of institutions, such as we present, the former term is naturally more in evidence. Anyone who uses the two terms very much finds it in any case unprofitable if not impracticable to insist upon consistency in discriminating between them; as evolutionary categories, they shade imperceptibly into one another.

The welfare-element in the mores is powerfully reinforced by a conviction which is in the minds of all primitive peoples and appears in survivalistic form upon high stages of civilization. The dead are supposed to harbor an intense prejudice in favor of the mores which they found good while in life, and to guarantee them with the supernatural power which is now theirs. Religion comes to be the redoubtable sanction of the mores, and with its entrance upon the scene they become uniform, universal in a society, imperative, and, over long periods, invariable.

Putting the foregoing considerations together, we arrive at a definition of the mores: they are the popular habits and traditions, when they include a judgment that they are conducive to societal welfare, and when they exert a coercion on the individual to conform to them, although they are not coordinated by any authority. Human life, "in all ages and stages of culture, is primarily controlled by a vast mass of folkways handed down from the earliest existence of the race, having the nature of the ways of other animals, only the topmost layers of which are subject to control, and have been somewhat modified by human philosophy, ethics, and religion, or by other acts of intelligent reflection."[1]

PERVASIVENESS OF THE MORES

The mores, then, may be regarded as a sort of social habits. They are a type of interest-pursuits that have been so frequently repeated and so standardized that society and its members perform each successive repetition without either visualizing the objective or reasoning out the efficacy of the procedure. Just as personal habits are a more powerful determinant of behavior than separate estimates of probability, so the mores influence social conduct more powerfully than the specific precepts and exhortations of society. The mores form the groundwork of the total aggregate of expectation that society imposes on its members. To illustrate briefly, the mores of the United States include monogamy, monotheism, democracy, self-support of adult males, responsibility of the husband for the support of the family, obedience of children to parents, ability to speak the English language, good-nature and some consideration for others in crowds, the observance of precedence in "lines" or queues at box offices, privacy with respect to certain bodily functions, an interest in sports, professional or amateur, the payment of bills, the right-hand rule of the road, and so on indefinitely. Such a list as this suggests immediately the relationship between the mores and nationality. Indeed, one of the requirements of nationality might accurately be stated as a uniform set of mores.

Codes

But the mores alone, powerful as they are, are not an adequate basis for effective social control. Societies have learned the necessity of setting up certain codes, much more definite and specific than the mores. These codes are particularly appropriate with respect to those types of conduct where the will of society is relatively definite, standardized, and permanent.

The most important are the moral code, the legal code, and the religious code. Perhaps the ethical code should also be included. By all means the foremost of these is the moral code.

Mild crimes →

Moral Code

The items in society's expectation vary enormously with respect to their social significance, the importance that society attaches to them, and the gravity with which it regards any breach of them. As examples representing the two extremes we may take using a toothpick in public and committing a murder. Society does not expect its members to do either of these things. But the gravity of its condemnation and the severity of its treatment differ widely in the two cases.

Between the two extremes there is a minutely graduated series of social offenses, or violations of expectation. The various grades have their names, though the shading off from one to the other is so gradual, as is quite usual in sociological categories, that it is difficult or impossible to tell where one ends and the next begins. In a general way the series would run something like this:

Indifference
Unfashionableness
Unconventionality
Indecorum
Impropriety
Indecency
Immorality
Vice

Sin is a somewhat general term that includes several of the items at the bottom of the list; it is difficult to tell just where it begins. Crime is a special type that will be dealt with elsewhere.

The more serious of the above-mentioned types of nonconformity fall within the range of what is known in general as the moral code. This is a highly important sociological concept, an understanding of which is essential to an adequate interpretation of social relationships. Where and how does the moral code originate? What does it include? How is it expressed? What is its bearing on social welfare? Does it change, and if so, how?

The moral code is very distinctly a product of social evolution. It is so integral a part of the social structure that its origin is virtually identical with that of society itself. Like society, it probably antedates humanity. The moral code of any given society represents the slowly accumulating judgments of that society with respect to those types of individual conduct that bear most heavily on social interests. It is not made by any individual or class. Indeed, it is not made at all. Like Topsy, it "just grows." It is a composite of all the sentiments, attitudes, and judgments of the group. It is not necessarily logical or rational, nor does it necessarily represent the standards of the most intelligent and refined, the true *élite*, of the group. Moral codes differ widely as between groups, and are in a state of constant change within each respective group.)

Absoluteness of Moral Code

(But with reference to the members of the society to which it belongs, every moral code is absolute. Its authority is above question. The individual who conforms to it is moral; he who departs from it is immoral.)(Every human being who is normally associated with a society more or less consciously recognizes the code of that society as his own.) He cannot help it. He has been brought up within the influence of that code.(He has drawn in its spirit with his mother's milk, and its precepts have become thoroughly ingrained in his inner consciousness long before he reached the age of reflective judgment. In later life he may come to question some of its tenets. But even then, he is almost sure to find that its hold upon him is so great that he can break away from it only with a great wrench. Any sudden departure is likely to produce spiritual lesions that may leave permanent scars on his character.) The personal morality of any individual, therefore, is always to be judged by the faithfulness of his adherence to the code with which he is affiliated, and by that alone. A head-hunting, polygamous savage is just as moral in a head-hunting, polygamous society as a non-dancing, non-card-playing, non-smoking, non-petting débutante in a Methodist parish.

Social Morality

There can be no such thing as an immoral society, for by the time breaches of the moral code have become so general as to be characteristic of the society they will have become moral, no matter how much external lip-service may still be given to the old code.

It follows, therefore, that social morality is not always synonymous with social wisdom. A society may condone or approve types of conduct which are not conducive to its own best interests, but on the contrary destructive of the society's very life. The Roman people toward the close of the imperial period are often referred to as an "immoral society." It may be that there was a difference in codes between different elements of that society. But it is quite probable that the society had adopted and approved a moral code that was inherently suicidal.

Other Standards

It follows also that the moral code does not always furnish the only standard of conduct and guide to behavior for the individual members of society. There are also standards of wisdom and ethics. Individuals of exceptional intelligence and perception may detect serious weaknesses in the moral code. They may easily conceive it to be their duty to attempt to bring about changes in the moral code, and the best way to do so may be to violate the code in their own behavior. Morality and rightness, or righteousness, may therefore often be diametrically opposed. All this harmonizes with what was suggested above about the justification—indeed the necessity—of a certain amount of nonconformity. It is this necessity that creates a large part of the social and individual problems that confront societies. The more dynamic the society, the truer this is. Who are to be the nonconformists? How can society sanction or tolerate their activities without diminishing the authority of its own code? Shall it punish them for their individual temerity while it profits by their vision?

There can be no categorical answer to these questions. Societies have answered them differently in different times and places. Some nonconformists have been rewarded by the wild plaudits of their fellows; others have been exiled, tortured, or slain. Fortunately, it seems unlikely that there will ever be a dearth of brave and venturesome spirits, sufficient in number to guarantee the forward movement of society at whatever cost to themselves.

These questions can be considered more fully in connection with the discussion of progress.*

* See Chapters XVIII and XXVI.

MILD CODES

There are numerous mild codes operating in modern societies, which may be considered as aspects of the folkways or the mores, and have to do with types of conduct that are subject to a certain amount of social regulation, but about which the social sanctions are not very forcible or the penalties for violation very severe. These include fashion, propriety, decency, and manners. Some of the requirements under these heads are wholly capricious and without logic or reason. This is particularly true of fashion. There is no reason why women's skirts should drag the ground one year, barely reach the knees ten years later, and arrive at the ankles on their downward path at a certain subsequent date, or why the brims of men's hats should be wider and the crowns lower at one time than another, or why the outline of the feminine figure should alternately be accentuated and obscured, or why "everybody" should "wear blue" one year and brown the next. Propriety and decency usually have reference to more deep-seated standards and conventions, whereas manners operate as a sort of social lubricant to assist in the smooth functioning of various group forms.

The moral code itself is a sort of intermediary structure between these minor societal requirements and the more specific and definite codes.

LEGAL CODE

When we come to the legal code we leave the realm of persuasive control, and enter that of coercive control, for the legal code emanates from that particular aspect of society which has been identified as the seat of force. It has been emphasized that the major part of society's control is exercised through other agencies than force. But, extensive and potent as they are, these agencies are never adequate to secure the necessary degree of conformity. Without something more drastic every society would suffer such breaches of conformity as would involve enormous loss to the orderly members, and would seriously undermine the foundations of the social structure itself.* (The necessity of force arises from two sources. First, there are a number of individuals in every society whose response to the persuasive means of control is too feeble to guarantee the requisite degree of conformity. Second, between societal groups within the great society there are likely to be interests so conflicting that their resolution by any given society can be accomplished only by violent means. Force accordingly becomes essential for aggressive pursuit of societal interest on the one hand, or for resistance against aggression on the other hand.) In other words, a society needs to be able to exert force internally and externally. The former function is called the "police power," the latter the "war power."

The nature and function of the legal code can be understood only in the light of the nature and function of the state. Further consideration, therefore, of this code can profitably be postponed, and taken up later in connection with the examination of the state.

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* Exceptions to these statements must be made in favor of those rare but enlightening anarchic societies, mentioned above, p. 22, which have existed without a state.

Chapter XI

SOCIAL CONTROL (*Continued*)

RELIGIOUS CODE. MEANS AND AGENCIES

The religious code is another set of prescriptions and prohibitions, which has exercised a greater or less authority according to the place that religion itself has held in the structure of different societies. It is customarily closely intertwined with the moral and legal codes. To understand the essentials of its origin, nature, and influence it is necessary to examine briefly the origin and nature of religion itself.

Origin of Religion

Religion is one of the great human institutions, the origin of which probably lies within the appropriate field of sociological study. We have seen that the family, the state, and society itself probably antedate humanity, and that therefore their origins are taken for granted in sociological study. But it is doubtful if any creature lower in the evolutionary scale than was man when he made his first appearance ever developed a genuine religion, or was capable of doing so.

A vast amount of energy has been expended in research and speculation as to the origin of religion. The results are various and somewhat conflicting. They have been admirably reviewed and summarized by Professor Kirkpatrick.[1] If our principle is correct of regarding interests as the basis of all sociological phenomena, it follows that back of so important a social construct as religion there must be some powerful desire with its related interest. This is found in the desire to know, with its attendant interest in knowledge. More specifically, it may be identified as the desire to *know why*, and the interest in explanations. It is safe to assume that this is a primitive and virtually universal attribute of mankind. It is doubtless associated with the more generalized "instinct of curiosity" which is displayed in many of the higher animals, and which reaches a high pitch of development in the monkeys and apes, but is manifest also in cats and dogs, whose attention seems to be spontaneously attracted by anything new, and who exhibit an apparently definite interest in exploration.) If the law that "ontogeny repeats phylogeny" is true in its interpretation that the modern infant recapitulates in brief space the stages that the whole race has undergone during the span of its development, and that infants and young children display traits that were characteristic of adults in the early stages of evolution, there is abundant evidence that early man must have been much concerned with explanations, particularly explanations of the natural phenomena that he observed around him. One of the first definitely intellectual interests that the modern child displays is expressed in the question, "Why?" One particularly inquiring little miss, after a long bombardment of "whys," finally burst out, "Daddy, why do I ask why?" We are not obliged to ask why primitive man asked why. If he did, as it is reasonable to suppose, that is enough for our purposes.

It needs no argument to prove that the element of belief, which is present in all interests, is peculiarly conspicuous in religion, taking the form often of more or less unsupported faith. We have already seen that beliefs are derived either from experience or inculcation. When we are dealing with the origin of beliefs, particularly great common beliefs of the human race, it is obvious that the source cannot be in inculcation, for there could be no one to do the inculcating. What, then, were the experiences out of which the original speculators derived the pristine essentials of religion?

NATURE OF RELIGION

Before attempting to answer this question, perhaps we should ask an even more fundamental one—(What is religion? Various efforts have been made, as Kirkpatrick points out, to answer this question. Perhaps the best solution is found, not in a precise and explicit definition, but in a condensation of the common features that are found in all religions, and may therefore appear to be indispensable to the essence of religion. These seem to be reducible to three: first, a fairly well-formulated conception of a supernatural being or beings, power or powers, with general notions as to its character and attributes. Second, a conception of the relation of this being to the universe and the world, particularly the human beings who swarm upon the world. This invariably includes doctrines as to the will of god concerning human behavior. Third, an attitude on the part of the human being toward divinity, including not only the elements of belief, trust, faith, reverence, awe, etc., but also of conformable behavior, that is, obedience. Whether a person who possessed a fully developed set of beliefs and notions about divinity, but made no effort to act upon them and make his own conduct conform to them, could be said to have a religion, or to be religious, is a matter of definition, and not a very important one. We are told that "the devils also believe, and tremble." The question is mainly academic, as cases are practically non-existent where a human being has a well-established notion of god and belief in him and his will, but does not let this belief in any way affect his conduct.

It is important to recognize that the attitude of the worshiper toward divinity is one of emotion rather than intellect, just as the notion of divinity is characterized by mystery rather than by explicit understanding. Emotional reactions and displays are so conspicuous in religious phenomena that some students incline to lay the origin in emotion rather than intellect. Probably, however, in the psychic equipment of man at the time he first began to concern himself with the notion of religion, the distinction between emotion and intellect was much less sharp than it is now.

NOTION OF THE SOUL

Returning now to the question as to what were the experiences from which primitive man derived some notion of supernatural entities, and of his relation to them, we find the most logical and convincing answer given in the theories adopted and expounded by Spencer and Tylor. These identify the basic experiences as those of dreams and related visions, resulting first in a notion of the soul or other self, and from this developing into ideas of ghosts, spirits, and gods. The argument may be summarily stated as follows: Dreams may be regarded as practically universal experiences of human beings, at whatever physical or cultural stage of development. The higher animals appear to have them, and so they were probably not beyond the capacity of the earliest men. A dream, while it is transpiring, has the semblance of an actual experience. It is often so vivid that its memory cannot be distinguished from the memory of a waking activity. (You can probably verify this from your own experience. Most of us have had dreams so realistic that we were not sure for days afterwards whether they had really happened or not.) The savage, lacking any knowledge of psychology, had no means for distinguishing the sleeping activities from the waking. To him, they were all experiences. If they were of a peculiarly vivid and interesting character, he would be at least as likely to recount these experiences to his wife or neighbors as any others. For example, some fine morning he would give his wife a dramatic account of a successful tiger hunt that he had indulged in since last he talked with her, going into great detail as to the size and ferocity of the beast, and his skill and bravery in slaying it. But his wife, who, having had a wakeful night, had grounds for knowing what she was talking about, would reply, "What are you trying to tell me? You were lying right here beside me all night. To be sure you kicked and thrashed around a good deal, and made a lot of funny noises, but you didn't leave your bed." She might conclude by asking casually, "Oh, by the way, where is the tiger?" Being himself a little troubled by the absence of tangible evidence, the man would have nothing to say, and probably would go away and sulk all day; but his faith in the reality of his experience would remain. A few nights later he might have another dream in the course of which he burned his hand badly. Although a little less inclined to talk about it than before, he would at least examine his hand, and would be surprised to find no trace of any wound.

Experiences of this kind would accumulate until there would finally dawn on his simple consciousness the rudimentary idea of another self, a separate entity which was himself, but which could go about and take part in divers enterprises while his corporeal body lay fixed in a given spot.

Once initiated, this notion would receive confirmation from various other experiences and observations. It might happen that in the course of a slight altercation with one of his fellow tribesmen he hit the latter over the head with a club, and saw him fall motionless to the ground. After lying there awhile, the victim showed signs of life, and eventually got up and walked away. Again, he might stoop over a quiet pool to get a drink, and see there a man who seemed to do exactly what he did, coming close when he did, dipping his hand in the water when he did, and finally moving off just as he did. Your own imagination can supply a variety of other occurrences that would tend to intensify the notion of a self that was independent of the body—the phenomena of talking in one's sleep, delirious ravings, swoons and long unconsciousness, etc.

Inevitably, these experiences and interpretations would become inextricably bound up with the phenomenon of death. There would finally come a time when the wandering self did not come back to the motionless body. But to primitive man this was an occurrence of no different order from simple unconsciousness. He had no way of being sure whether the self was eventually coming back or not, and would wait in expectancy for a long time. Finally, the result of repeated experiences convinced him that the self never did come back after the body had begun to decay, and so putrefaction came to be recognized as a dependable evidence of death—not that the savage had any idea of what death was, but simply that he need not expect a recurrence of bodily activity. It is quite possible that in the New Testament account of the raising of Lazarus, Martha's reference to the odor of death may have been of importance not merely as indicating an objection to opening the tomb, but as assurance that her brother was undoubtedly dead.

Having become associated with death, it was natural that the soul should become identified with certain portions or functions of the body that were visibly affected by death, as the heart or the breath. Many words or expressions in our everyday language are "survivals" of these primitive notions. Perhaps the most familiar is the word "spirit" which in its derivation is linked with the breath, and which is now applied not only to disembodied beings but to anything that is ethereal or evanescent, such as a liquid that evaporates quickly. Other examples are furnished by our custom of saying of a person who is in a state of uncontrolled hysterical excitement, "He is beside himself," or of one who is recovering from a swoon, "He is coming to himself," or simply, "He is coming to." Ecstasy, by derivation, means standing out of oneself.

The Other World

Now one thing is quite characteristic of dream experiences —they are subject to fewer limitations and restraints than those of waking life. In dreams one can do all sorts of remarkable things, and perform incredible feats. One can fly, walk on water, jump amazing distances. Moreover, the other persons, animals, and objects that one meets in dreams also display amazing capacities. Men can transform themselves into beasts, or into other men. Things ordinarily inanimate can move about. Consequently, primitive man easily conceived the notion that this self of his was much freer and more powerful when away from the body than when in it. He also got the notion that not only other people, but things of all sorts, had selves. The idea of "self" eventually developed into the idea of "soul." Out of this set of notions grew the general philosophy known as daimonism, demonism, or animism, which endows every object of every sort with a spirit, and peoples the environment with an innumerable host of unseen, but more or less powerful, beings. From the same source, obviously, derived the notion of another world. These souls that were forever leaving their physical bodies and wandering about, often never to return, must have a realm of their own, peopled by others like themselves, spirits of other human beings, of animals, and things. This world was variously located, but was in all essentials similar to the present world, except for the absence of various physical limitations, restraints, and handicaps. The activities, appetites, passions, and pursuits of the denizens of that world were essentially the same as in this. Naturally, the savage had no dread of death when it meant simply entrance into such a world of expanded joys, opportunities, and experiences. As Professor Sumner used to say, to them, death was just like stepping into another room, the door of which was open but so placed that they could not see through it. Their deceased friends were there, moving about in a familiar round of activities, and at any time they (the living) might join them. This, of course, should not be interpreted to mean that the savage did not almost automatically cling to life, or resist the agencies of death. The "instinct of self-preservation" was probably just as strong in him as in his more civilized descendants. But he had no fear of death itself, nor trepidation about passing into the other world.

Formalism

(Space cannot be taken here to consider how simply and logically these ideas developed into various cultural forms, burial practices that involved supplying the corpse with food, weapons, etc., and killing his horse, dog, and favorite wife so that they might accompany him; how the dead came to be regarded as more powerful than the living, and it became immeasurably important to keep their good will; how various propitiatory rites were developed, realistic at first and symbolic later, such as throwing a pinch of salt over one's shoulder when sitting down to a meal; how it became "bad form" to speak ill of the dead (much too dangerous); and how ideas of the spiritual or ghostly world expanded, how the supernatural beings became divided into two groups, the friendly or "good" and the hostile or "bad,") and how preoccupation with means of coddling the former and placating the latter came to occupy a large portion of the savage's time and mental energy.(What concerns us is how all this linked up with his perpetual quest of the "why" of things, and eventually developed into definite religious institutions.)

AGENCY

Out of the total of his individual and racial experiences primitive man developed one simple and inclusive explanation of all observable phenomena—they were due to agents. When the agent was a living creature, man or beast, the explanation was direct and simple. But when the phenomenon seemed to arise out of an inanimate object, the problem was more difficult. If a savage was hit over the head by a club wielded by one of his rivals, the explanation of the bump on his cranium was simple enough—So-and-So had done it. But if he was walking through the woods and a dead branch happened to fall and hit him on the head, his query, "Who did it?" received no answer. The doctrine of animism afforded an adequate solution of all these problems. The principle of agency was not destroyed but simply amplified. If an event was not traceable to a human or animal agency, it could be attributed to a spiritual agency. Every object in nature was imbued with a spirit competent to give it some kind of power. The phenomena of nature thus became manifestations of the activities of great spirits. Lightning flashes were bolts hurled by Jove, thunder was the rumble of the chariot wheels of the gods, the creaking of two trees rubbing together was the complaint of the spirits confined within them, and a sudden gust of wind signified the passing of angels' wings.

TYPES OF RELIGION

As ideas of this kind became more formalized, and individual notions became consolidated and standardized, it is easy to see how certain great natural phenomena or agencies, like the sun or fire, would be singled out as objects of special devotion, and distinct cults would grow up around them. When men had reached the stage of the domestication of animals and agriculture, and thus gained some notion of the relation between the sex act and procreation, it was natural that they should single out for adoration certain reproductive processes or organs. Phallic worship, and various religious systems based on veneration of the principles of fertility and fecundity, have been wide-spread, the worship often being characterized by rites or periodic ceremonials of an orgiastic character.

Ancestor Worship

But perhaps the most important and wide-spread type of religion is that which has developed out of the identification of the leading divinity with the founder of the tribe or the progenitor of the family. This is ancestor worship, and is so important that Spencer was inclined to make it the inclusive original source of all religions. The evolutionary process involved in such a development is logical enough. It has already been suggested that the spirits of the deceased were at least as powerful as had been their corporeal representatives. This was because they were subject to fewer limitations, could go about unseen, and possessed unpredictable powers over the destiny and well-being of the living. Accordingly, anyone who had been especially revered, feared, and obeyed during life would have his authority augmented by death. Such a one would characteristically be the old man of the locality, the progenitor of the kin-group, the wise one who knew the sayings of the fathers, whose experience was wide and varied, whose memory of group history was long, whose judgment was ripe and seasoned. Having been the source of counsel and guidance during life, he would still be looked up to after death. In every crisis or perplexity his survivors would ask, "What would Old Man So-and-So have said about this? How would he have advised us? What saying in the lore of the ancients would he have applied to the case?" At first, this would have been a more or less simple form of questioning. But as time passed, and the authority of the old man grew, his reputation would increase, his sayings would acquire more and more authority, his human aspects would dwindle and his spiritual ones expand. Steadily he would take on the guise of divinity. His dwelling-place would become a shrine, his tomb a temple, and his hearth-stone an altar. As generation succeeded generation the recollection of the great being as a man would finally disappear, and he would be established as a true god. The actual extent to which such a process as this is responsible for the creation of the great religions of the world need not bother us. It was certainly a type of sequence of enormous importance. What concerns us particularly is the light that it throws on our immediate quest, the origin of religious codes, and their relation to other codes.

Relation between Religion and Moral Codes

Accepting the features of ancestor worship as representative of religious growth in general, it is plain that the body of religious precepts, as they grew, would be virtually identical with the established moral and legal precepts of the group. The maxims, commands, and interpretations enunciated by the old counselor would be primarily the conventional and traditional doctrines and precepts told to him by his fathers, and to them by theirs. In other words, they would be the accepted and customary requirements of the moral code, and of the legal code in so far as they were sufficiently definite to be regarded as law. When he died, and his sayings came to acquire more and more sanctity, they would take on a religious tinge, and by the time he had become a full-fledged divinity his precepts and admonitions, constantly reiterated and emphasized by one after another of his prominent descendants, would have come to be regarded as the will of a god, or divine law. As such, they would naturally have much greater sanction than as mere tenets of the moral, or even the legal, code. This, in summary form, seems to be the characteristic relation between the religious and moral codes. The former gets all its original content from the latter—there is no other source from which to get it, unless one is prepared to accept direct revelation—but having been taken over by divinity it thereupon acquires great additional weight and comes back to the people with heavily augmented authority. In practice, it undergoes modifications representing the evolutionary alterations in the moral code; these, in turn, are referred back to divinity and approved, and so the process goes on. In some respects, the religious code may embody that which is best in the moral standards of the people, but in other ways it is almost sure to be retarded and reactionary. Of necessity, the religious manual of conduct almost always lags behind the current moral standards of a people. The rôle of the prophet, in the true sense of the word, corresponds closely to that of the emancipated and independent protagonist of new ideas, the champion of moral reform, whose place in the scheme of things will be examined later. All of this, of course, is something apart from the strictly formalistic, or ritual, requirements of the cult itself.

ETHICAL CODE

With reference to the ethical code, it is doubtful whether that is a correct phrase in any sense. Ethics, as far as it can be defined, seems to be the philosophy of rightness. Its conclusions are too generalized and generic to correspond to the features of a code. Ethics does not prescribe minutiae of conduct, but enunciates general principles, the interpretation and application of which must be left to the individual. Ethics is sometimes called the "science of conduct," but this is also inaccurate, as ethics entirely lacks phenomena, and most of the other features of a true science. It might better be called the "logic of conduct." Its processes are a combination of the intuitive and the rational. Its primary function is to help you to decide what you would do in particular cases if you were truly altruistic, that is, if you were just as much concerned about the happiness and welfare of others as about your own. Its precepts, as already suggested, often run directly counter to those of morality, for it convinces the impartial and analytical thinker that in many respects the conduct prescribed by the current moral code is precisely the opposite of that indicated by the Golden Rule. Ethics is doubtless a decidedly useful factor in social movement, and the overt phenomena that result from it, so far as there are such, are legitimate data for sociological study. But ethics itself, not being truly phenomenal in character, lies outside the proper realm of social science.

MEANS, METHODS, AND AGENCIES

Surrounded as he is by mores, moral codes, legal codes, and religious codes, the individual finds his conduct subject to innumerable standards, and the pursuit of his interests restrained and conditioned by various sorts of pressure. The more penetratingly he appraises and analyzes his situation, the more he is impressed with the pervasiveness and power of social control. The means, methods, and agencies of this control are the next matters to demand our attention.

INSTITUTIONS

If control is the primary purpose of practically all social activities, to such an extent that social control is virtually the equivalent of *the* social process, it would be expected that most of the concrete products of social evolution, most of the instruments of the social organization, should have control as their central *raison d'être.* This we find to be the case. We have observed that the primary function of the state and one of the functions of religion is the securing of conformable behavior. The same is true of the family, though the family is such an inclusive and important agency in social dynamics that it needs to be considered in a much broader light than merely as an instrument of control. The family, the state, the church—all of these are included among the great institutions of society. The concept of "institution" is a very important one in sociological analysis, and one very difficult to define explicitly. By common practice, it may be understood to refer to the established instrumentalities and forms of society. But as it is used to include not only fairly organic realities such as the church and the state, but also such intangible modes or principles as democracy and language, the task of reducing it to a limited expression is baffling. Some of the definitions offered by leading American sociologists may be derived from the following paragraphs.

Gillin and Blackmar:

Social relationships express themselves in what we call social institutions. The terms "institutions" is but a name for certain ways in which social relationships bind men together.[2]

Hankins:

An institution may be defined as any means or agency set up by an association or consciously approved thereby.[3]

Edward Alsworth Ross:

In its broadest sense a social institution is, to use the words of Cooley, "a definite and established phase of the public mind, not different in its ultimate nature from public opinion, though often seeming, on account of its permanence and the visible customs and symbols in which it is clothed, to have a somewhat distinct and independent existence."[4]

Cooley, Angell and Carr:

An institution is a complex, integrated organization of collective behavior, established in the social heritage and meeting some persistent need or want.[5]

MacIver does not offer a concrete definition, but presents a careful analysis, taking pains to discriminate between institutions and associations.[6]

Expression of Expectation

As far as consistency can be found in these definitions, it seems to point quite clearly to the conception of an institution as a great, established social form, a fundamental pattern of social relationships. An institution, therefore, need not necessarily display any concrete organization, and certainly not any tangible, material embodiment. If society exercises its control through its great institutions, there must of necessity be some more immediate, intimate, and direct agencies, means, and instrumentalities of control. First of all, society must have some means of making its wishes known, of enunciating its precepts.

As far as the legal code is concerned, the matter is quite simple. As already pointed out, the legal code is by its very nature definite, explicit, and formal. It is recorded in the most permanent manner available. It is always more or less easily accessible in authoritative form. While the ordinary modern individual actually knows only a minute fraction of the laws he is supposed to obey, theoretically he might know them all. There are libraries full of codified statutes and court decisions. And in legal theory he is supposed to know them—"ignorance of the law is no excuse for the man."

Public Opinion and Public Sentiment

The problem is much more complicated in connection with the other codes, and with the mores themselves. How can you and I know what we are supposed to do, and not to do, in the society in which we live? This knowledge comes to us in the same two ways as our beliefs, by experience and by inculcation. This important educative process starts in infancy, and continues till death. A considerable part of our social experience consists in learning how our fellows will react to various types of behavior on our part and what will be the penalties and rewards for each. The two most important agencies used by society for our enlightenment are public opinion and public sentiment. Both of (these are condensations, or focussings, of societal interests.) They are often confused with each other, or both are subsumed under public opinion. But there is a significant distinction between them.

Public Opinion

(Public opinion represents the attitude of the determinative majority of society with reference to some fairly definite and formulated issue. It always contains a considerable element of reason, reflection, and judgment. It is deliberate. It can be affected by argument and evidence.) At the moment these words are being written there is a rising wave of public opinion in New York City against the rule of Tammany Hall. It is based on many grounds, but prominent among them are revelations made in connection with the investigations conducted by Judge Seabury, accumulated evidence of both stupidity and graft, with waste of the public's money in both directions, almost daily accounts in the newspapers of bickerings between city officials and bankers as to how the city's expenses are to be met, tangible evidence of maladministration in dirty streets, ill-kept parks, neglected playgrounds, and disreputable slums, the failure of relief funds, and the conspicuously futile character and personal appearance of the present Mayor. For months and years evidence on these matters has been piling up through the activity of commissions, committees, journalists, and various public-spirited citizens. Testimony has been put before the public in newspapers and magazines, in circulars and letters, in the movies, and in public addresses of many kinds. As a result, a definite *opinion* has been created which has crystallized in the formation of a Fusion movement, with a full slate of candidates, and an organized and determined effort to bring about a change.

Since the foregoing was written the election in question has been held, and public opinion has registered itself by electing the mayor nominated by the Fusionists, and a number of other Fusion candidates. The fact that real opinion was involved is shown by the extensive splitting of tickets that took place, and the election of numerous officials from other parties.

Other typical matters that are dealt with by public opinion are the tariff, disarmament, settlement of the war debts, the N.R.A. program, building codes and zoning laws, the arrangement of curriculums for public schools, and so on.

Public Sentiment

Quite different is public sentiment. It is primarily a matter of feeling, and represents an attitude toward affairs not determined by logic or evidence. If public opinion is mainly intellectual, public sentiment is mainly emotional. The attitudes held by any individual are not traceable to any demonstration or rational process. Prejudice, bias, unconscious self-interest, friendship, loyalty, group affiliations—these, and many similar elements, enter into the formation of public sentiment. Naturally, it is little influenced by argument. An excellent illustration is furnished by the practice of women's smoking. There may be arguments to support the view that the use of tobacco is less desirable among women than men, connected primarily with the effect upon unborn or nursing children. But they had little, if anything, to do with the rise and spread of the custom. At one time there was a prevailing sentiment that women should not smoke—it was not nice, or proper; it was even indecent or immoral; at any rate, it was not done. Then, some years later, smoking by women was entirely commonplace, and few thought anything about it. The *arguments* against women smoking are just as strong now as they were in 1910, and are at least as well known. But a complete change in sentiment has come about. How did it occur? Certainly, it was a gradual process. First women, perhaps of somewhat more than average recklessness or social indifference, were to be seen smoking in their homes or certain types of restaurants. Then women of a more conservative type appeared with cigarettes in more conservative places. Soon a woman was occasionally seen smoking in an automobile on a public street. The lobbies of theatres in time presented just as many women smokers as men. And so it went, until there are now no more restrictions for the female user of cigarettes than the male. But all this time, the feminine habit was confined to the cigarette; the cigar and pipe were taboo, whether out of respect to public sentiment or to the tastes of the smokers it might be difficult to say. But women's pipes have been on sale for three or four years, and just the other day an apparently perfectly respectable woman was observed lighting a pipe on Fifth Avenue in broad daylight.

The advertisers, always sensitive to both the dangers and the possibilities of public sentiment, recorded the change in attitude very subtly. On the whole, their public recognition of the feminine practice, and their overt appeal to it, lagged far behind the facts. For a long time, no public poster or printed advertisement revealed any connection between women and tobacco. Then, with consummate delicacy, the suggestion that women were not wholly averse to smoke began to appear. First, "Love At First Light," a girl holding a match for her boy friend, so beautiful of feature and coloring, so alluring in expression, as almost to defeat the purpose of the poster by diverting attention completely from the name of the cigarette. Then, "Blow Some My Way," a man and a girl on a mountain top, with the fragrant fumes drifting from his cigarette. Soon women began to appear in the illustrations, holding lighted cigarettes in their fingers, but never—oh never—putting them to their lips. There followed the subtle suggestion that possibly they did occasionally take a puff or two in the privacy of their boudoirs. From this on the completion of the process, like the legendary descent into Avernus, was easy. Throughout the whole procedure it would be difficult to find a single argument, or piece of logical evidence, advanced by anybody.

Other similar examples might be taken from bobbed hair, the use of lipsticks, profanity, etc.—for some reason, women seem to furnish more examples in this field than men. But the episodes of the Prohibition Era furnished plenty of examples in both sexes.

Illogicality of Sentiment

It has already been suggested that attitudes that are based on feeling and emotion are much more difficult to dislodge or alter than those based on reason and evidence. And since a great many more people feel than think it is probable that public sentiment is a much more potent force, by and large, even in the most advanced communities, than public opinion. This is, indeed, one of the most discouraging convictions that eventually forces itself upon any one who undertakes to engage actively in movements for social improvement. He may build up a most convincing case for his pet program, buttressed by an impressive mass of fact, logic, and authoritative judgment. The argument for his position may be uncontrovertible. But suddenly he finds that he has run counter to some ancient and pervasive prejudice or attitude of the people, and his whole structure is knocked into a cocked hat. There is a wealth of mordant philosophy in that elegant little ditty that begins,

Tobacco is a filthy weed—I like it!

A living personification of these principles was furnished by a former mayor of New York. He was, as far as journalistic evidence goes, lazy and incompetent. He spent a considerable portion of his time on vacations in California, Florida, Bermuda, or Europe. His mornings were very frequently occupied recovering from the potations of the night before. His (supposedly) private life was notoriously contrary to the prevailing mores. His conduct of his administration was marked by flagrant inefficiency, venality, and favoritism. But he had a definite charm of personality, was handsome and dashing in a way, a slick dresser, a good companion, and an expert wise-cracker. For years he was the darling of his constituents, and was kept in office because they liked him, regardless of the cost in blundering and corrupt government.

Means of Control

Successful manipulators of mass behavior are well aware of these truths, though they may never have studied sociology out of books. They know that (the dividing line between opinion and sentiment is blurred.) They do not scorn an appeal to sentiment, of even the most mawkish kind, in support of a measure that is really quite defensible by logic and reason. They flavor their rather insipid appeals to the intellect with abundant dashes of bias, prejudice, sentimentality. Sob-stuff has abundant uses besides getting a story into the newspapers.

In the present connection, we are not concerned with the means and methods by which public sentiment and public opinion are formed, but rather with the concrete means by which they are made effective in individual behavior; in other words, with the direct instrumentalities of social control. Professor Lumley has made a uniquely comprehensive study of the subject.[7] He lists the main means of control as follows: Rewards, Praise, Flattery, Persuasion, Advertising, Slogans, Propaganda, Gossip, Satire, Laughter, Calling Names, Commands, Threats, Punishment. It is interesting to note that only the last of these, and to a partial extent the next to the last, are characteristic devices of the state, applied in connection with the legal code. The others are essentially the media of persuasive control. And it is enlightening to observe to what a large extent this type operates through appeal to the interest in social approbation, emphasizing once more the importance of that interest. Rewards may be material, but Praise, Flattery, Gossip, Satire, Laughter, and Calling Names are devices that play directly upon the desire for esteem and recognition.

PUBLICITY

Several of the items in Lumley's list might be regarded as subdivisions of the single category "Publicity." The importance and influence of publicity is a striking, and somewhat sinister, aspect of modern American life. It takes myriad forms. Obviously, it, too, operates directly through the desire for approbation and recognition. Its possibilities in this day of rapid and extensive communication are almost unlimited. It uses every medium of bringing matters to public attention, newspapers and all sorts of periodicals and journals, books, posters, public speeches, songs, sky-writing of various kinds, the radio, and the movies. Its basic operating principle is that the main consideration is to get the name of a person, an object, or a project before the people as frequently as possible and in whatever guise. This was tersely expressed in a card designed to hang on an office wall:

> If you hear that somebody is knocking you,
> Put him on your payroll.
> It doesn't make any difference what they say,
> As long as they talk.

Mere prominence, in the minds of the unthinking mass, very readily passes for endorsement and a guarantee of worth, and they decide that

> Such popularity must be deserved.

A sharp distinction should be made between publicity and advertising. As one professional publicity agent put it, "Advertising is the attention that you pay for; publicity is what you get for nothing." Genuine and successful publicity is presented in such a manner as to disguise its origin, and the fact that it is "inspired" or supplied by interested sources. To the casual observer it appears to be just an ordinary news item of more than usual human interest, or a particularly intimate movie scene, or a spicy anecdote of some important personage. Not long ago the New York newspapers carried a story of a picturesque occurrence at one of the steamship docks. It seems that an incoming passenger brought in with his luggage a large number of bottles, apparently, to judge by their labels, containing a wide variety of French wines and liqueurs. He was naturally stopped by the customs inspectors, who raised quite a disturbance until they were finally convinced that the bottles were empty, and were being brought in to serve as "properties" in a play that was just about to open up on Broadway, the first scene of which was laid in a café in a small French seaport. Naturally the reader not only noticed the name of the play, but made the mental observation that a performance that took so much pains about the details of its setting must be pretty well staged. It was a clever and effective piece of publicity.

Practically all large business concerns have their publicity agents, now more euphemistically known as "public relations counsels," as do also individuals in artistic or professional lines who need to keep their personalities before the public. It is no secret that one prominent publicity man, whose name is a household word in business circles, made his way to fame (?) and fortune by successful efforts in publicizing and making "respectable" a certain financier and his family, whose *modus operandi* brought him much more worldly wealth than public esteem. (We will not add even a slight item to their success by naming either the publicity man or the plutocrat.) Even great universities now have their publicity departments, the staffs of which, unfortunately, are often much more interested in their success in getting a "good story" into the papers than in the veracity of the impression conveyed by the story.

The menace of publicity is manifold. It distorts true values, and encourages the notion that merely to get attention is a worth-while objective, thus stimulating the impulses of many criminals, racketeers, and other shady characters. It confuses the public mind, which is not equipped to distinguish the impartial from the inspired in the news items, to discover what stories regarding certain businesses or prominent characters were prepared by their own agents or secretaries, or to read between the lines of such statements, which are literally true on their face, to detect hidden meanings of a different character and to guess at the things that are not told. Time was when public meetings were attended by reporters who listened to the speakers and turned in an account that was at least original and might be intelligently critical. Nowadays, the experienced public speaker prepares his own digest of his remarks which is handed to the reporter before the meeting. This saves the reporter many an hour of boredom, and usually results in a more accurate transcript of what the speaker wishes to say than even the best reporter is likely to produce, but it eliminates all element of criticism or comment. The public misses parts of the speech which might have given them a different impression, and the lecturer is deprived of a knowledge of the actual reaction of his audience.

Eventually the experienced and disillusioned newspaper reader learns to discount practically all items that have a personal flavor of any kind, and to distrust the ostensible meaning of most of what he reads.

PROPAGANDA

But probably the worst feature of publicity is the ease with which it can be made the instrument of propaganda. (Propaganda is) a device of mass control that sprang into the foreground during the World War, and has maintained a high degree of prominence ever since. It has been widely discussed, and its merits and faults vigorously exploited. Like so many other sociological concepts it is difficult to define. It is evidently (a form of public persuasion, but it differs from advertising, preaching, promotion, or straight-out advocacy.) Some persons deny its sinister implications; others regard it as one of the serious dangers of modern life. To most people, the word undoubtedly conveys, and correctly, a suggestion of dishonesty, insincerity, or concealment. This does not usually extend to actual lying, or factual misrepresentation. The deception is connected with its origin, its purposes, and its agencies. Genuine propaganda consists in trying to get people to do certain things without taking two preliminary steps: first, making clear what is the final objective aimed at by the behavior that is advocated; and second, proving that the behavior is calculated to achieve the objective. The sins of propaganda are usually sins of omission rather than commission. It may be employed by well-meaning persons for the promotion of really useful projects. But the persons whom it is sought to influence are not wholly taken into the confidence of the propagandists. Propaganda always implies lack of trust either in the program or the public. It indicates the fear that if the public knew the whole truth they would disavow either the objective or the means employed to attain it. Propaganda is frequently used to create good will or ill will toward certain groups or enterprises. During the War, of course, it was employed to arouse the greatest possible hate and suspicion of the enemy. But just as frequently it may be used to promote a favorable attitude toward some object. Here the danger is that the object is something of direct benefit to the promoters of the movement, who realize that it would be difficult or impossible to get popular support if it was generally known who were the promoters and what was their relation to the objective. In other words, propaganda is an effort to achieve personal interests while concealing the true nature of the interests. This usually involves creating the impression that some other interests are being aimed at.

"Probably a sample will be a valuable aid at this point. Some months after the war much was said in the press and elsewhere in favor of returning the bodies of American soldiers from France. The matter having been mentioned and all favorable arguments presented, and no criticism arising because a sentiment was involved, it was quite generally agreed that we ought to have our heroic sons sleeping in native, not foreign, soil. Much was written and much more was said. Steps were taken to find the necessary money and the campaign was on. All went well until someone discovered that this 'campaign' was largely organized and fostered by the undertakers and casket-makers. Then it seemed clear to many that the campaign was a bubble blown about by the propagandists.''[8]

THE SLOGAN

Closely allied to publicity and propaganda is the device known as a slogan. This is a concise phrase or sentence, using terse, picturesque language, frequently alliterative, preferably with an inherent appeal to the emotions, which makes such an appeal, or conveys such an impression, that when it is attached to a program, a policy, or an object it will at least focus attention sharply upon it, and preferably also tend to create a favorable attitude toward it. The slogan has achieved great popularity in recent years and has been used in connection with advertising, propaganda, and promotion of various sorts. But the device is much older than its modern vogue and name. It has been used in more than one political campaign in this country, as for example ''Tippecanoe and Tyler too.'' It was enlisted in our border discussion with England in ''Fifty-four Forty or Fight.'' It is evidently related to war-cries and mottoes of various sorts, such as the famous French expression, ''Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité.''

The chief objection to the slogan, which it shares with various other devices for molding public attitudes, is that it takes the place of evidence, reason, and thought. A program that is lucky enough to get a snappy slogan may easily win over a rival measure that has much more claim to public support but lacks the picturesque catchword. That its dangers were recognized long ago is shown by the fact that Dante records this observation:[9]

> Ye . . . of the fluent phraseman make your king;
> Therefore your steps have wandered from the path.

One trouble with the slogan as an instrument of social control is that it is both vague and unstable as to meaning. In the first flush of its popularity it may convey very different impressions, and evoke quite inconsistent responses, from different people, and if its life is at all prolonged it may take on a connotation quite different from its original and intended one.)

"A Bigger, Busier, Better Boston" sounds stirring, but there is no precise indication of the values back of "Better," nor hint as to just what Boston is to be "Busier" about. In point of fact it was not long after this slogan was introduced that Boston was busy settling a police strike in a manner that did not make very favorable publicity.

"THE FORGOTTEN MAN"

Perhaps no slogan has had a more curious career than the famous one introduced by Professor William Graham Sumner, "The Forgotten Man." In the year 1884 Sumner published an essay entitled, "On the Case of a Man Who Is Never Thought Of." It started as follows: "The type and formula of most schemes of philanthropy or humanitarianism is this: A and B put their heads together to decide what C shall be made to do for D. The radical vice of all these schemes, from a sociological point of view, is that C is not allowed a voice in the matter, and his position, character, and interests, as well as the ultimate effects on society through C's interests, are entirely overlooked. I call C the Forgotten Man."[10] In Sumner's treatment, the Forgotten Man was the orderly, law-abiding, self-respecting citizen, who earned his own living, paid his bills and his taxes, asked no favors of any one, and in general attended to his own business, and was relied on to provide the wherewithal for the carrying out of the various philanthropic schemes referred to in the quotation. As such, he received wide recognition among sociologists and other readers of Sumner's works. Thirteen years later, according to an account given by Burton Hendrick in his biography of Walter H. Page, Mr. Page, in the course of an address, "gave the cause of Southern education that one thing which is worth armies to any struggling reform—a phrase; and it was a phrase that lived in the popular mind and heart and summed up, in a way that a thousand speeches could never have done, the great purpose for which the best people in the state were striving.'"[11] It was the Forgotten Man. Mr. Hendrick does not inform us whether Mr. Page was familiar with Sumner's use of the phrase or whether, as is quite possible, he independently hit upon an effective slogan. But considering that he was a man of culture and wide reading it seems altogether probable that he had read, or at least heard of, Sumner's famous essay. But he evidently used the term in a sense quite different from that of Sumner. For Mr. Hendrick goes on, "'The Forgotten Man' . . . immediately passed into the common speech of the South and even to this day inevitably appears in all discussions of social progress. It was again Page's familiar message of democracy, of improving the condition of every man, woman, and child. . . . Page had first of all to inform his fellow Southerners that it was only in the South that 'The Forgotten Man' was really an outstanding feature. He did not exist in New England, in the Middle States, in the Mississippi Valley, or in the West, or existed in these regions to so slight an extent that he was not a grave menace to society.'"[12] Plainly, he was a man *for* whom something was to be done. Fancy Sumner's Forgotten Man being a "menace to society!"

The next appearance of this hardy but somewhat shop-worn slogan was in a radio speech made in April, 1932, by Franklin D. Roosevelt while he was Governor of New York. It played a prominent part in his subsequent presidential campaign.

Within the following year the familiar phrase made an actual stage appearance on Broadway as the subject of the theme-song of a popular moving-picture musical comedy, "Gold Diggers of 1933." (Shades of William Graham Sumner!) In this portrayal, the Forgotten Man was the down-and-outer, particularly the veteran, neglected by society, and the emotional appeal of the performance was that something should certainly be done for him. Finally, in far away Manchukuo, the Forgotten Man, in his altered guise, received a promise of attention from the new Emperor, Kang Teh, on his enthronement day.[13]

Thus at the end of a half-century's checkered career, the

Forgotten Man is now not C, but D, and the real hero of Sumner's famous essay has once more been forgotten.

Is it any wonder, in view of the multitudinous agencies and instruments of control by which he is continuously bombarded, that the average individual often becomes completely bewildered as to what he ought to do, begins to wonder if he actually knows his own mind, and cleaves pathetically to such figments of self-determination and self-direction as he still seems to possess?

CHAPTER XII

INSTITUTIONS. THE FAMILY

SOCIAL INTERACTION

Emphasis has already been laid on the importance in human affairs of what may be called the principles of reciprocalness and circularity. Human relations are practically never unidirectional. Indeed, the very notion of relation implies a two-way movement. The nexus between two things of sociological interest is frequently such that each is the cause, and each the effect, of the other. Several examples have already been encountered, and others will readily suggest themselves. Men get drunk because they are poor, and are poor because they get drunk. Sex freedom gets talked about because it is common, and becomes common because it is talked about. Men become unemployed because of lack of ambition, and lose ambition because they are unemployed. In other cases the movement is a rotatory one, passing around through successive points, no one of which can be considered the actual starting point. The typical business cycle is a familiar example. Optimism—business stimulation—expanded credit—increased production—inflation—underconsumption—shrinkage of credit—collapse—depression—slow recovery—optimism—business stimulation, and so on. An even more fundamental example will be considered in detail later.* These facts account in part for the great difficulty in making an orderly and consistent scheme or diagram of social relations in general. They do not present a single continuous sequence, but a vast number of related sequences. They cannot be arranged in one-two-three order. The relations of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, whole and part are inextricably tangled. Hence the widely differing treatment in equally scholarly texts.

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* See Chapter XVI.

Accordingly, we discover that it is not possible to devise an orderly pattern of the relation of society to its forms and its institutions. Society creates its forms, and its forms mold society. Society builds up its institutions, and the institutions determine the nature of society. We have already seen how the development of society was accompanied by progressive mastery of the physical globe, and how the forms of mastery influenced the entire structure of society. This prepares us, in a measure, to understand the nature and significance of the family. Here is a great cultural form or pattern that affects all other forms and patterns, an institution that not only is the root stock of all other institutions—almost of society itself—but also conditions and qualifies all other institutions at all times and is in turn conditioned by them. It is both cause and effect, means and end, instrument and object, form and substance. There is no point in the study of sociology at which a knowledge of it is not important, and yet a complete understanding of it cannot be even approached until the essentials of sociology have been thoroughly mastered. The only solution is to take some of its essentials for granted on the basis of common knowledge, and begin to study it intensively when a sufficient grasp of sociological method has been attained to make such study profitable. That point has now been reached, and the family will occupy the center of the stage for the immediate future in our study.

It is not necessary to attempt to set up an explicit definition of the family. The every-day, matter-of-fact conception will serve admirably for the present.

The Pristine Family

The opinion has already been advanced that the study of the origin of the family probably lies outside the proper sphere of sociology, for the reason that the family antedated humanity, and that man came gradually into existence bringing the family with him. Our immediate concern is with the probable form and functions of that primitive family institution as it existed among the first group of animals that could properly be called men. On this point there is practically no factual evidence, and consequently there has been a vast amount of speculation. The primary issue is whether among the earliest hordes there was any organized family system of even the most rudimentary sort, or whether men and women lived together in a state of complete promiscuity. The theory of promiscuity was vigorously championed by Bachofen in 1861, and later endorsed by McLennan, Morgan, and Frazer. The evidence relied upon was necessarily of a circumstantial or inferential sort, and not wholly convincing. One of the most profound students of the question, Westermarck, arrived at a diametrically opposite conclusion. Miss Goodsell, one of the foremost American students of the field, tends to agree with Westermarck, and observes, "The more the matter is investigated, the more questionable it becomes that primitive groups generally lived in a condition of absolute promiscuity, although great laxity in marital relations undoubtedly prevailed among them."[1] The term "laxity" in this quotation should obviously be interpreted to mean laxity according to the standards of an outside observer. There is no reason to suppose that primitive men were any more lax in conforming to whatever codes they had than are the most civilized men of today. The probabilities are all the other way, for primitive mores have a tremendous hold on those subject to them. Herein lies one explanation of prevailing notions about promiscuity, and general sexual immorality, among nature peoples. Travelers, explorers, and most of all missionaries are likely to judge the conduct of natives according to their own standards. Most such observers never acquire sufficient insight into the cultural life of these groups to understand just what their systems of regulation may be. Consequently, in such a tribe a great deal of rigid regulation may be going on that is not detected by the foreign visitor. In point of fact, apparently no tribe has ever been discovered, no matter how low in the scale of culture, in which adequate study did not reveal some social control over sex relations, and some regulations or restrictions governing intercourse.

Evidence of this sort, coupled with evidence from studies of living anthropoids tending to support the view that man's immediate precursor had some sort of family organization, tends to throw the balance of probability strongly against the doctrine of promiscuity. We may therefore devote our attention to the question of what this pristine family was probably like.

Ignorance of Procreation

One consideration will be of great help in forming a preliminary idea. It is virtually certain that these remote progenitors of ours had not the faintest notion of any connection between sex intercourse and pregnancy or the birth of children. We know that numerous primitive tribes that have actually been studied display complete ignorance on this point. All sorts of bizarre explanations of pregnancy may be found in the lore of primitive peoples—the mother has eaten a particular kind of food, or a baby soul has climbed into the loose top of one of her husband's boots which she was wearing, or the spirit of a recently killed animal has been sent into her, or she has been sitting over a fire on which she was roasting a particular kind of fish, or she has gone hunting and caught a particular kind of bull-frog, or she has been visited by a stork.[2] Indeed, there is an almost incredible lack of knowledge among some individuals even in modern civilized societies.(Probably man's first general enlightenment came to him in connection with his experience and observation in the domestication and breeding of animals, that is, relatively late in his cultural development.) Under such conditions, obviously, there could be no idea of fatherhood as we know it.

The first family, therefore, must have been of the matrilinear type. The relation between a child and its mother is a conspicuous, observable, irrefutable fact. There was never any doubt who was a given infant's mother—there might be considerable uncertainty as to who was its father. Consequently, all descent or kinship had to be traced through the mother. As far as family names existed, they were transmitted through the females. Any prestige or prerogatives that were derived from family connections would revolve around the women, not the men. The woman was the recognized nucleus of the family. This type of arrangement has been called the "mother family," and is supposed to have prevailed among the basic human groups the world over. There is also good reason to believe that in some cases actual authority and direction of the affairs of the family rested also with mothers, rather than fathers. A societal system where this was true is designated a "matriarchate."

One may wonder where, in such a system, there was any ground for the family whatever, in its usual meaning which includes a husband and father. If paternity played no part in establishing family groups, what did? The answer is, economic assistance, physical protection, and mutual aid. Sumner laid great stress on the economic character of the primitive family; indeed, he traced its origin to economic interests. In his conception, it was a case of what he called "antagonistic cooperation," an arrangement entered into at some sacrifice on both sides for the sake of greater benefits that can be derived from it.

Care and Protection

It is a safe assumption that any way of life as firmly established in the order of nature as is the family must have some definite utility in the preservation of the species. And if the family antedates humanity it is logical to expect that its primary utility is biological rather than social. Common sense and observation would suggest that its utility is in connection with reproduction, or the self-perpetuation of the species. This is doubtless correct. But it is easy to get a wrong idea as to the particular phase of self-perpetuation that is most closely bound up with the family. Taken in its broadest sense, the reproduction or self-perpetuation of the species depends not only on the securing of pregnancies and the birth of offspring, but also upon the protection of the offspring and keeping them alive until they are able to fend for themselves. As we ascend the scale of organic evolution, the more important relatively does this latter requirement become. Among the higher mammals and the birds there is a prolonged period of infancy, during which the young would promptly perish if the parental care was relaxed even for a brief time. Among the mammals, in particular, this burden is very unevenly distributed between the male and the female. Furthermore, in the same groups the period of pregnancy, the period between conception and birth, imposes special handicaps and limitations on the female. For the sake of the offspring—which is what nature is particularly interested in—it is therefore important that there should be some special care and protection extended to the female during pregnancy, and to both her and the offspring after birth, and also that the mother should have some assistance in the care of the offspring until they are able to look after themselves. In the case of some species of birds the male not only bears his full share in the feeding of the young, but also takes turns with the female in sitting on the eggs during the period of incubation. Among mammals, including the human species until it had reached a stage of culture that made the artificial feeding of infants possible, the father cannot participate directly in the feeding of the young children, and must therefore do his part by helping the mother as much as possible in her own food quest. These ends can best be served by some more or less stable and exclusive relation between representatives, one or more of each, of the two sexes.

Economic Aspects of Family

In thinking of the human family we have habitually concentrated so heavily on the primary sex aspects, and the phase of reproduction that has to do with procreation, that we are inclined to regard these as the basic ground for the justification, not to say the genesis, of the family, and to consider the other aspects as secondary, or even to ignore them altogether. But this idea probably has less of truth in it when applied to human beings than to any other species. If the securing of pregnancies were all that had to be considered, nature could have provided for that abundantly without any family at all. But the care and protection of mother and infants that are necessary to guarantee the survival of the species are more pronounced in the case of man than of any other creature. All this, we are assuming, had been worked out before man appeared as a separate species, and was being elaborated during the long stretch of time during which he was developing from a definitely prehuman, to a definitely human, animal.

Sumner's analysis of this problem suggested an arrangement or agreement worked out and entered into by a man and a woman. He pointed out that the terms of every agreement represent the balance of power and need of the parties concerned. The one who needs the arrangement more, and has more to gain from it, will be ready to give more, and will be forced to accept the more onerous terms. In the case of the family, the female was obviously in the inferior position; a woman with a child in her arms or in her womb is a poor bargainer. As a consequence, the marital arrangement from the earliest times down close, at least, to the present has been distinctly one-sided, and quite contrary to abstract ideas of justice. Woman has had the heavy end of the log to carry, but it was better than having to carry the whole log alone. Man, on his part, gave up relatively little, and gained much in comfort and convenience. But, taken as a whole, the arrangement was mutually advantageous, and in accordance with nature's plan for the efficient perpetuation of the species.

Discarding the implication of deliberate planning and arrangement, and considering it rather as simply the way things worked out, the foregoing appears to be a reasonable and acceptable interpretation of the nature of the relationships, and explanation of the distribution of benefits, in the pristine human family. Such a family could come into existence and persist without any consciousness of the connection between the sexual relations which would naturally take place and procreation. If these relations were recognized as part of the advantages of the union they would be valued for their own sake, not at all for their bearing upon pregnancy and the birth of children. In fact, if this causal connection had been recognized it would probably have been considered a liability rather than an asset.

Division of Labor

The recognition that the family was originally fully as much an economic as a reproductive institution helps us to understand its paramount importance during the subsequent development of the race. In it were combined the two basic interests of the human species, and in its forms and functions is to be found the explanation of many diverse and conspicuous features of human culture. Here, for instance, was probably first developed that notable device known as the "division of labor." During the first long stretch of man's growth in civilization, while he was living on the collection stage, there could have been very little diversity in economic activity. The major part of the time of all individuals was devoted to the food quest, which was very much of a routine matter. You cannot, for instance, imagine any division of labor among a herd of cattle grazing in a pasture. Consequently, there must have been very little that the female could offer in return for male protection except her company, and, as already pointed out, company of any kind, male or female, is not greatly prized during "business hours" on the collection stage. As a result, the family relation was presumably one of pretty abject subjection and dependence on the part of the woman. But even on this low level, there may have been some types of food getting, such as climbing trees or scaling rocks for birds' eggs, that required special agility and daring, and others that required protracted and arduous journeys away from the "home," such as it was. A pregnant woman is ill fitted for the former and a nursing woman for the latter. On the other hand, there might be other activities, such as digging for roots or probing rotten tree trunks for grubs, that required particularly perseverance and diligence. The mother would gladly assume an extra burden of this latter type in return for exemption from the former. With the development of hunting, this cleavage became much more marked. Hunting is arduous, dangerous, and exhausting, but it is also interesting and exciting. Naturally, then, the division between the sexes would become more definite, the men devoting themselves to the hunting, while the women carried on the more primitive activities of collecting. When hunting was combined with elementary agriculture, as was the case among some of the North American Indian tribes, it was natural that the more static and localized pursuits of agriculture fell to the women, while wide ranging in the search for game was monopolized by the men. In the meantime there was developing a new type of group activity that called especially for male prowess. This was war. As soon as human evolution had reached the point where there were self-conscious groups living in juxtaposition with one another, it was virtually inevitable that relations of hostility and conflict should arise among them. Fighting became a more or less constant occupation, and while there may have been cases where Amazonian warriors habitually bore the brunt of the attack or defence, for the most part this activity fell to the men, who thereupon acquired another claim over their females. The woman of the family had now to please not only her provider but also her hero.

Furthermore, when technical arts of industrial and artistic sorts began to develop, they, too, were mainly assigned to the women. Activities of this type are essentially sedentary. Basketry, pottery-making, preparing hides, spinning and weaving, even the manufacture of stone and wooden implements, can best be done in a fixed location. They require no great physical strength, nor any venturesomeness or intrepidity. They are excellent woman's work. One interesting consequence of this situation is that among primitive peoples women became the chief repositories of industrial skill and technical lore of all kinds. They were not only the preservers of culture, but, being often captured in war or raids and carried away, and often also sold into slavery, they were likewise the disseminators of culture. Evidently, the transition from this situation to that which characterizes modern industrial society is a matter of no small significance.*

THE FAMILY A UNIT OF CONSUMPTION

The economic character of the family also brought it about that the family should function as a unit not only of production, but also of consumption. Common meals, a family budget, pooling of income, social and legal regulations about support are all aspects of the modern family which bear evidence to the long-established economic significance of this group.

FAMILY AND STATE

It has been stated that the family can be considered as the starting point of several of the great institutions of society. In addition to furnishing the groundwork of the economic organization, it was almost certainly the progenitor of the state; that is to say, in the original human hordes the family and the state had not yet become differentiated, and were practically indistinguishable. The horde was a kin-group, because in the nature of the case its members were more or less closely related to each other. And a kin-group is essentially an expanded family. Such a group must necessarily have some rudiments of leadership, and this leadership would naturally reside in the head of the family. As the horde grew in numbers, and several more immediately related family groups, each with its head, were recognized, there would inevitably arise a clash among these heads as to the leadership of the horde. The resulting competition would push to the top the individual of greatest strength, cleverness, intelligence, and force of personality. He would become the political head of the group, and the prototype of all subsequent forms of rulers and government, in accordance with MacLeod's theory of the origin of the state. A large element in his success in winning and retaining his position would be his ability to use force effectively and judicially, which accords with the concept of the state already set forth. In any case, the development of the family and the state are closely tied up together.

* See p. 352.

FORMS OF FAMILY

With its early instinctive origin, the form of family characteristic of the earliest human hordes was hardly a social product, that is, it was not the outcome of definite social processes nor was it governed by genuinely social regulations. But as time passed and man developed the rudiments of a set of mores and a regulatory system, the form of the family must have been one of the first subjects to come under social recognition and control. Relatively early, there developed in each group a fixed pattern of the relation between the sexes, and between parents and offspring, which was regarded as "right." This constituted the great institution of marriage. It is worth observing carefully that the family is the objective, tangible, physical group, whereas marriage is the set of traditions, standards, and regulations that governs the form and function of the group. Both are institutions. Marriage concerns itself in particular with the terms upon which each new family group can be set up in order to be accepted or "legitimate."

MARRIAGE: ENDOGAMY

The types of marriage that have appeared during the span of human existence can be classified in several ways on the basis of their broad essentials. The first classification is based upon the group limitations within which mates must be selected. The two dominant forms are "endogamy" and "exogamy." The former of these terms is applied to the system where husbands and wives must be selected from the members of one's own group. Exogamy refers to the standard selection from outside the group. From the necessities of the case, endogamy must almost certainly have come first. If there was ever a time when there was only one human horde, matings must have taken place within it. Or if, as is more likely, by the time a genuine marriage institution began to develop there were a number of human hordes, they were probably rather widely scattered, and the relations between them were not friendly enough to encourage an inter-group system of mating. In any case, mere propinquity would have determined that the standard matings should have been within the group.

EXOGAMY

But as the number of hordes grew, and the relations between them became more frequent, though fundamentally hostile, a new type of marriage arose. The genesis of this may reasonably be looked for in the prevailing discontent of the men of the group with a system of complete endogamy. Coupled with the matrilinear type of family, the system of endogamy tended to concentrate family authority in the women. Since women were the stable element in society, and the home-makers, it was natural that when a man married he should come to live with his wife, instead of her coming to live with him. The new wife would naturally be domiciled in the immediate neighborhood, if not in the actual "home," of her mother. In the course of time, therefore, there developed a type of family composed of an old woman and her female descendants of two or three generations, with their various husbands. In such a group, family solidarity would be reinforced by sex solidarity. The husbands would be outsiders, without even the moderate comfort of close relationship with each other. To such a husband, the "mother-in-law joke" would have much too personal and bitter a flavor to be funny, amplified as it was by an indefinite number of sisters-in-law. The assumption is reasonable that in the course of time an unusually independent and daring young man here and there, exceptionally indifferent to the conventional requirements and formal endorsement of his group, would conceive the idea that a much happier arrangement could be made if he could get a woman from outside, who would be all his own, and would not be surrounded and supported in every way by a lot of female relatives. His thoughts would turn longingly toward some comely maiden of a neighboring group. By just what exertion of physical prowess or subtlety, and with just how much connivance on the part of the bride-to-be, the marauding enterprise was successfully carried out, we can only surmise. But eventually the intrepid youth found himself in physical possession of a woman who would be more pestered and tormented than coddled by the other women of the group, and who would therefore turn to him with grateful spontaneity for protection and comfort. And so, oblivious of the grumblings of his kinsmen, he would settle down in a home of his own with peculiar satisfaction. If the penalties meted out by the group for such breach of custom were not too severe, other young men would be encouraged to follow the example, and in time the practice of getting wives from outside would become quite general. With the growth of the practice, the prevailing ideas and conventions would gradually adapt themselves, and eventually the custom of out-marriage would be not only tolerated, but recognized, and finally endorsed as the only right method, and then the system of exogamy would be firmly established. It need hardly be remarked that the actual transition was probably not as immediate and simple as the foregoing summary account would suggest. But the basic incentives that brought it about must have been much as indicated.

The actual procedure by which wives have been, and are, secured from outside the group shows many variations. Instead of getting a woman by an exploit of individual theft, the end might be accomplished by a raid, participated in by a number of young braves, which resulted in the capture of not only one prize but several. Or, as a result of war, a number of women might be taken captive, and carried home, there to be apportioned as rewards to the soldiers, or transferred gratuitously to the ruler's favorites. As the more peaceful relations of trade developed, wife-purchase was frequently substituted for wife-capture. Often, there were interesting customs or ceremonies, marking the transition stage, wherein all the semblance of attack, defence, and pursuit was displayed even though the arrangement had been peaceably made in advance, and all parties were pleased with it. In fact, some of these customs have survived down into the civilization of our own day. The practices of harassing the bride and groom, decorating their equipage with annoying objects, and throwing old shoes, rice, and confetti after them are merely symbolic reminiscences of the time when the carrying away of a wife represented an actual theft of valuable property from her father, and there was a determined effort to prevent it or to capture the marauder.

The marriage systems actually worked out in different societies show a wide range of variations. As a general rule, the progress of civilization has been accompanied by a tendency toward a limited exogamy. Marriage within the first degree of kinship, the parent-and-child, brother-and-sister, relationship is customarily definitely prohibited, and the union of first cousins is looked upon with some social misgivings. There is doubtless sound biological justification for this custom based on the probability of the accentuation of specific weaknesses or defects in the family stock.

Plural Marriage: Polygamy

Another classification of marriage systems is based upon the numerical pattern that is recognized by custom and law as legitimate. There are two main forms—monogamy, which indicates the marriage of one man and one woman; and polygamy, which indicates plural marriage. This, in turn, is divided into polygyny, or the marriage of one man to two or more women, and polyandry, the marriage of one woman to two or more men. In this connection, it is important to recognize the distinction between the established form of the marriage institution in a given society, and the actual practice prevailing in that society. Polygyny may be the recognized system, and yet it may be practiced by relatively few for the simple reason that there are not enough women to provide a plurality of wives for all the men, or that it is too expensive. Anything that tends to reduce the proportion of men, such as the prevalence of warfare or of dangerous masculine occupations, will obviously be favorable to polygyny. So will a particularly favorable and productive physical environment. For polygyny tends to produce a rapid growth of population, and sometimes also to lay a heavy burden of support upon the head of the family. Whether this latter condition exists depends partly upon the type of polygyny that prevails. There are two main possibilities. In some societies polygyny is practiced as a form of luxury. Wives are not only instruments of pleasure, but visible evidences of wealth and prominence. Under such a system, wives are an expense and only the rich can afford a large number of them. This is particularly true if, as was the case in Turkey until recent years, social regulations require that all the wives be treated on a basis of equality. The Mohammedan system of polygyny in Turkey limited a man to four legitimate wives, each of whom must be treated exactly alike. The houses of the well-to-do were built in rectangular form with a court in the middle, each corner containing quarters for one wife. If the husband bought a silk dress for one, he must forthwith get a similar one for the other three. It needs only the imagination to convince one that such a system might run up to considerable expense.

The other type of polygyny exists where women are looked upon primarily as workers, and a man acquires additional wives just as an American farmer buys another team of horses. Here, too, a number of wives is an evidence of wealth, but not in the same sense as in the other form. It is both the actual wealth, and the means to more wealth.

POLYANDRY

Polyandry is much less frequent than polygyny. It tends to develop in regions where the conditions of existence are particularly hard, and where it is important to keep population as near the stationary point as possible, particularly if the characteristic occupation is one that falls primarily on the men but involves no great risk of life, such as stock raising. Tibet is the most familiar example of a polyandrous society. One cannot help wondering what is done about the surplus females in such a society. The Tibetans, according to the testimony of a competent observer, have a simple solution of the problem. When a second, or subsequent, daughter is born, a little opium is rubbed on the mother's nipple at the time of the first nursing, and the little girl passes into a sleep from which she never awakens. In this country the standard practice is for the husbands of a given woman to be brothers.

Among primitive tribes, curious forms of group marriage are sometimes developed, the regulations of which may be so complicated as to baffle complete comprehension by a civilized outsider. The natives themselves may not be able to explain them, but they can obey them.

MONOGAMY

The tendency of civilization has doubtless been toward the general establishment of monogamy. Recognized polygamy has practically died out of the Western world. The reasons for this are probably diversified. Economic considerations in advanced civilizations doubtless support monogamy as providing more efficiently and more equitably for the material wants of the majority of the population. Notions of abstract justice, and a growing sense of independence and self-assertiveness on the part of women, may have had something to do with it. Also the refinement and sublimation of sex love into something more than a biological urge, reaching a point where it can find its highest satisfaction in the establishment of mutuality with only one other person, certainly tended in this direction. From the point of view of social utility, possibly the greatest influence was society's discovery that the monogamic family provided the best possible environment for the care and protection of children, and their training and development along lines that would make them useful, particularly to communities growing into the democratic pattern. For just as nature's great consideration is the perpetuation of species, so society's chief specific concern is for the welfare and development of its children. The only important instance of a modern, Western, civilized group attempting to reestablish a system of polygyny, that represented by the Mormons, has not proved successful. While the group itself has maintained its integrity and achieved a high degree of prosperity, it has abandoned its characteristic marriage customs,

FAMILY AND STATE

The development of the family and of the state must, for a long time, have proceeded together, and the branching off into separate lines of development must have been very gradual. The primitive forms of the state must have been harmonious with the primitive forms of the family, the two being so nearly identical. This has led many writers to assume that, since the matrilinear type of family was almost certainly the characteristic one for a long time before the separation took place, there must have been an early type of state in which the central authority was vested in women. Such a state has been styled a gynaecocracy, which means rule by women, or more specifically a matriarchate, which implies that the head of government is the oldest maternal ancestor in the kin-group. The evidence for the actual existence of such a state, however, is far from convincing; in fact, it is so inadequate as to lead Frazer, whose authority is of the highest, to observe, "The ancient and widespread custom of tracing descent and inheriting property through the mother alone does not by any means imply that the government of the tribes which observe the custom is in the hands of women; in short, it should be always borne in mind that mother-kin does not mean mother-rule. . . . The theory of a gynaecocracy is in truth a dream of visionaries and pedants."[3] The prevalence of this conception may perhaps be traced, in part at least, to an over-emphasis on the sex, or reproductive, aspect of the family relative to its economic and organizational aspects. The practice of tracing descent through the mother, and even the woman-centered endogamic family described above, are not necessarily inconsistent with a domineering position of the male in other affairs of the group.

THE CLAN

On the other hand, the notion of the kin-group, the nature of its uniting bond, and the form of its organization, quite apart from the personal domination within the organization, would naturally have been affected by the system of tracing zation, therefore, that superseded the horde was quite generally one based upon kinship through the females. This kind of a group is called a clan. Its existence at one time or another can be traced pretty much all over the world, and it was still in existence in definite form among the American Indians at the time of their first observation by white men. The clan form of group organization is characteristically associated with the institution known as totemism. A totem is a certain object, or symbol, which has been adopted by a given clan as its mark or badge of relationship. It is very frequently an animal or bird, but may be a plant or even an inanimate object such as a ball. The tie between a clan and its totem is a very intimate and mystical one. Sometimes the clan is thought of as being originally descended from the bear or deer which is its totem. In any case, there is a sense of actual kinship. Ordinarily members of the clan are forbidden to kill or eat their totem animal. The totem served a useful purpose in keeping track of group affiliation, just as do surnames today, or the tokens or symbols worn by members of lodges like the Elks or the Moose. Accurate information in this particular was often essential in enforcing the regulations imposed by the marriage system, especially under endogamy.

The Tribe

As the size of the societal unit increased, and the practice of tracing descent through the father became established, accompanying, as it doubtless did, the spread of exogamy, a new form of organization appeared, known as the tribe. This is a societal group in which descent, transmission of property, and group affiliation in general, are traced through the father. It might be more accurate to say, through the male partner in the family, because the tribal form of organization might exist, and presumably did exist, before the biological relation of father to child was understood. As long as there was an established family unit the male member might claim as his own all the offspring who appeared within it, without being in the least aware in just what sense they were his own. Indeed, the tribe was not thought of necessarily as a kinship group, but as a political or administrative group. Young men were customarily accepted into the tribe of their father by a formal ceremony of initiation. Consequently, both the clan and the tribal forms of organization could exist simultaneously in the same societal group, as was frequently the case among the North American Indians. For instance, it may be noted that in the foregoing quotation from Frazer the word "tribes" is used in referring to groups that trace descent through the mother.

The various features of familial organization at this general stage of development are excellently illustrated by the well-known "long-house" of the Iroquois Indians in North America.

Separation of Family and State

In the gradual development of the clan and the tribe can be discerned the first stages of the branching off of the state as a separate institution from the family. This was necessitated in part by the increased size of the societal unit. When the numbers of a group exceed a certain maximum it becomes no longer possible to identify physical ancestry with governmental authority. The kin-group is now too large. There is no one man of advanced age who is recognized as the ancestor of them all. Instead, there is a large number of kin-groups, each with its leader and its own sense of close relationship. If the prevailing economic system, and the nature of the physical environment, are such that these groups can separate, and maintain a somewhat independent existence, as is the case with many nomadic or pastoral peoples, then the patriarchal form of family and of government may persist for long stretches of time. This was the case with the Hebrews during the early years of their existence, though naturally in time the patriarchal groups grew into large tribes, still designated by the name of their respective legendary founders.

From this stage on, the state becomes more and more completely differentiated from the family, and can therefore be considered as a separate institution.

Chapter XIII

INSTITUTIONS. THE STATE. RELIGION

A vast amount of study, research, and argument has been devoted to the question of the origin of the state. One of the most popular explanations is based on the "conquest theory," championed by Oppenheimer, Gumplowicz, and others. According to this doctrine, the state came into being as the result of a successful military attack, in consequence of which the conquered group was reduced to a position of subjection, while the conquerors assumed the position of superiority and domination. This argument has been ably challenged, and seemingly refuted, by MacLeod, who shows, among other things, that no single authentic historical case of such an occurrence is adduced by any of the supporters of the theory. Equally conclusive would seem to be the consideration that before any group could carry out a successful military campaign it must already possess a degree of organization and leadership which implies the existence of at least a rudimentary state. Much more convincing is MacLeod's own theory that the state arose out of the natural variations in physical and mental strength, initiative, and capacity for leadership which occur spontaneously among the individuals in any group, and the consequent almost automatic assumption of power and authority by the abler individuals.[1] If this is the true explanation, it is probable that the origin of the state antedates humanity, and that therefore the study of its origin does not fall within the scope of sociology. For evidences of individual leadership are found abundantly among animals much lower on the scale of organic evolution than the probable immediate precursors of the human species. Man probably brought with him the state, along with society, out of the mists of prehuman existence. In brief, the state is inherent in human nature.

UTILITY OF FORCE

It has already been suggested that as helpful a way as any to think of the state is as that department, or aspect, of society that is authorized and equipped to use force. From the individual point of view, as noted, the state may be thought of as arising out of the innate desire of the human (or prehuman) being to dominate, to assert authority, to impose his "will" on others. But if there had been no social utility in such exercise of authority no mere individual impulse of this kind could have become thoroughly established and exalted into a great institution. The nature of this social utility has already been briefly indicated. The attainment of society's interests, particularly those of continuity and welfare, can be achieved only through the conformity of individuals to the expectation of the group as expressed in the mores, and in the various codes that have been described. Most individuals, most of the time, can be kept in the necessary degree of conformity by the various forms of persuasive pressure exercised in connection with public sentiment and public opinion. But a few individuals all of the time and most individuals part of the time, are liable to temptations which they are unable to resist through the support of persuasive measures alone. As these cases are likely to represent the most dangerous kinds of nonconformity, it is necessary that society have some powerful resource to fall back on. In the last analysis this must be force. Force may be used either to physically restrain the individual so that he is incapable of performing the forbidden act, or to impose on him such serious penalties that he will presumably never want to do it again. The validity of this assumption will be considered later under the topic of crime.

The exercise of force by society involves several distinct requirements. First, there must be an instrument for determining that force is to be applied, where it is applied and how it is to be applied. Second, there must be an objective instrument for the actual application of force. Third, there must be a recognized and effectively authorized agency to make the connection between the deciding instrument and the applying instrument.

Sovereignty

The functions of making decisions that involve force and constraining obedience to these decisions are included in the general concept of "sovereignty," the favorite word of the political scientist. It would not be profitable in this connection to enter into a detailed consideration of its various definitions and interpretations. For our purposes it is sufficient to think of it as that power inherent in society whereby the societal will is made effective against whatever resistance there may be. Sovereignty must be located somewhere in society, but is differently lodged in different types of societies. Wherever is found the ultimate seat of authorized force, there is found the location of sovereignty. In one sense it is so completely diffused throughout society that its precise seat cannot be identified. But its objective and operative location may usually be discerned with a sufficient degree of clarity. On the basis of its location, states may be classified into certain well-defined categories. The most important are the autocracy, where the practical sovereignty is located in a single individual; the oligarchy, where it resides in a small group; and the democracy, or republic, where it is distributed evenly throughout the general population, with specified limitations as to sex, age, or other qualifications. In the last case, the actual participation in the affairs of state may be either direct or through representatives, depending primarily on the size and geographical setting of the people. There is an abundance of good literature on the state, and we need not linger on further details.

Government

As no social function can be carried out except through individuals, so the exertion of force requires a set of individuals, usually specially designated for the purpose. These individuals, together with the system by which they are selected and under which they operate, constitute the "government."

The government, in turn, has at its command two groups of individuals specially assigned and authorized to put the will of society into forcible effect. For internal purposes there is the police force; for external, the army and navy. Thus society has the state as its instrument for exerting force, the state has government for administering the will of the state, and government has the police and military forces as its direct tools of operation.

All this, of course, is a very highly condensed and schematized account of a very complex subject, on which whole libraries have been written. But it will serve as a starting point, as a trellis about which all the amplifications, variations, and combinations that social evolution has produced may be intertwined into the indescribably intricate pattern which represents the actual state of today.

Law

Since the state exists primarily to exert force, and since force can be exerted only through individuals, it follows that some individuals at least in society must know in what ways and for what ends force is to be exerted. The state must make its will known. The expressed will of the state is what is called "law." The particular instrument of the state that formulates and enunciates the law is called the "legislative branch" of government. We will not stop at this point to ask how legislatures ascertain what the will of the state is, or what guarantees there are that their enactments will actually express that will. These matters are handled in an almost infinite variety of ways. In theory, legislatures have the power to, and do, formulate and enunciate the will of society as embodied in the state. The law has a high degree of sanctity and stability in every society. It is usually recorded in as permanent a manner as the cultural development of a given society makes possible. Before the development of writing this record had to be oral. The statutes were handed down by word of mouth from generation to generation, usually through the agency of the elders of the people. As soon as the art of writing was invented, it is probable that its primary use was to perpetuate the laws. If they could be written on tablets of stone, like the Ten Commandments, so much the better.

The basic law of all societies doubtless grew up by slow and minute processes. It was never "passed." No individual or group of individuals was directly responsible for its origin. It became part of the social heritage, and in accordance with the slow tempo of social movement in primitive times it remained virtually unchanged generation after generation, century after century. With the passage of time it acquired more and more sanction and authority, and also became increasingly stereotyped and rigid. To know the law, therefore, and to be able to expound it with authority, conferred great prestige on an individual. But even primitive societies did change, and as social conditions changed the practical meaning and application of the law might often be in doubt. Thus there arose the need for interpretation. In general the interpretation consisted in a pronouncement as to what the law always had meant. Primitive law was excessively conservative. Yet in spite of the intention of the elders to state the law exactly as it had been transmitted to them by their predecessors, their dicta must inevitably have been colored by the conditions and needs of the day in which they spoke.

As civilization progressed, and society became more complex, and the necessity of social control grew more urgent, the scope and content of the law steadily widened until it reached the point where modern legislation stretches out into almost every phase of individual life and interest. It has been estimated that if a voter in New York City read at the rate of three hundred words a minute, seven hours a day, it would take him about forty-five days to read all the general laws, city, state, and national, that were in force on January 1, 1930, in the jurisdiction to which he was subject, though the laws that might by any probability apply to him could be read in six or seven days.[2] The urgency of new demands for social control brings forth a perpetual flood of new legislation each year. The Seventieth Congress of the United States (1927-1929) passed 1183 public laws, and the separate states average nearly 450 every two years.[3] This new law has also to be interpreted. For although legislators exert every effort to make their enactments absolutely explicit and definite in meaning, yet the vagaries of language are many, and the variety of contingencies and cases almost infinite, and even the lawyers hardly profess to know the precise meaning of a new statute until it has received several interpretations. So whether because it is old, or because it is new, the law must be interpreted, and the state has to have a special body of individuals whose duty and right it is to expound the meaning of the law. These constitute the "judicial branch" of government, composed of judges, courts, and all their attendant paraphernalia.

The Executive

Finally, when the will of society has been made quite clear, the state needs another group of agents who will see that the law is put into effect. This group is the "executive branch" of government. It has direct control and command over the police and military forces, which are, in the last analysis, the agencies through which force is exerted.

Modern Types of Law

As we have seen, the beginning of law was almost certainly in the necessity of protecting society from the more flagrant kinds of misdeeds, those that were particularly dangerous either because of their inherent seriousness or because of the urgency of the temptation and the frequency of their commitment. Murder and theft are universally regarded as the basic crimes. But as the moral sense of the community developed, and as societies learned the efficacy of the legal method of control, the tendency grew to slip more and more types of conduct under the aegis of the law, and to diminish steadily the degree of inherent turpitude that was regarded as necessary for inclusion in the legal code. This process has gone on until modern legal codes include such trivial misdemeanors as spitting on the sidewalk, scattering litter in a park, or shaking a rug out of an up-stairs window.

Along with this development, perhaps as an extension of it, has come the practice of including in the legal code a great many kinds of conduct that have no moral or ethical content at all, but need to be controlled simply in the interests of the security, efficiency or stability of society. Modern traffic regulations are an extreme example of this sort of legislation. There is nothing inherently immoral, unethical, or in any way sinful about driving your automobile forty-one miles an hour instead of thirty-nine, of turning to the left at a certain corner instead of to the right, or of not turning at all, or of driving west on a given street instead of east. These restraints represent simply society's judgment of what is necessary to secure the smooth and safe functioning of its transportation system under complex modern conditions. Between this extreme and the upper limits of the definitely sinful group, there are many gradations of mild wrongfulness, as illustrated by housing regulations, factory legislation, compulsory school laws, child labor laws, divorce and marriage laws, etc., etc.

These matters will be considered more fully in the section dealing with crime. For the present, three observations are pertinent. First, since obedience to law is an essential part of the mores or the moral code of every society, as soon as a particular act, whatever its inherent nature, is prohibited by law it becomes a sin to perform it, just because it is against the law. It is therefore often difficult to determine in particular cases how the guilt is to be apportioned. This was abundantly illustrated during the Prohibition Era in the United States while it lasted.

Rule by Minority

Second, a very large portion of the law, in both its primary and secondary aspects, is necessitated by the weakness or anti-social disposition of a small proportion of the population. The great majority would be adequately restrained without the law. But the law can be no respecter of persons, and once a statute is passed it must be applied to all who fall within its jurisdiction. At least, that is the spirit of Western jurisprudence. Consequently, many individuals of the highest reputability, responsibility, and goodwill are constrained within limits quite superfluous in their own cases. Hundreds of thousands of persons who could be trusted to drive considerately and carefully at fifty or sixty miles an hour are, because of the frailty of a few of their fellows, forced to choose between a forty-mile limit and the risk of a ticket along with a guilty conscience. This is one of numerous cases where, whatever our political philosophy may be, we are really governed by the minority, not the majority.

Uniformity of Procedure

Third, whatever the type of conduct that society seeks to regulate through the state by means of the law, the legal and judicial machinery is virtually the same in all cases. True, there has been a tendency in late years to develop certain special kinds of courts—juvenile courts, family courts, traffic courts, night courts, poor debtors' courts, etc.—but these are minor and relatively unimportant variations of the traditional procedure. Whatever you may have done that is forbidden by law—whether it be killing your father, burning your rival's store, stealing your neighbor's wife, lifting an imitation ruby ring from the counter of a ten-cent store, letting your twelve-year-old child go to work, paying your office boy less than agreed in the N.R.A. code, covering too much of the ground space with a tenement building, carrying a bottle of Scotch from your steamer stateroom to your office, forgetting to mention that bargain in kid gloves that you got in Paris, or passing a traffic light—you find yourself arrested by a policeman, taken to essentially the same kind of a court, confronted by the same kind of a judge, put through the same routine judicial procedure, sentenced by judge or jury, and if guilty, condemned to fine, imprisonment, or death. Without being fully conscious of what it was doing, society has superimposed upon a functional system that was originally designed to deal with degenerate, depraved, rebellious, and anti-social persons the task of dealing with self-respecting, intelligent, responsible, and socially minded individuals with respect to matters that have little if any taint of moral or ethical turpitude. The approximate breakdown of our American judicial system can certainly be traced, in part at least, to its overloading not only with a volume of legitimate work, but with a vast and varied mass of responsibilities for which it was never designed and with which it is wholly unfitted to cope.

Limits of Force

Now it doubtless appears that the analysis thus far has greatly exaggerated the function of the police and army. These agencies of force, in modern societies, seem to play a much more subordinate rôle than that indicated in the foregoing paragraphs. Their part in carrying out the will of society seems to be relatively insignificant. Most of society's wishes seem to get done without calling in the police or the militia. The explanation of this seeming discrepancy is threefold. In the first place, as the state has developed over the long stretch of social evolution it has immensely enlarged its scope, and has taken unto itself a host of concerns far removed from the pristine occasions for the application of force—this has already been explained.

Limits of the State

In the second place, the major part of social control is exercised by means quite apart from any state activity. While it is true that most of us are likely to underestimate the significance of force in the origin and intrinsic nature of the state, it is also true that most of us tend to exaggerate the practical importance of the state in controlling the individual conduct of ourselves and others. We are inclined to think of the state as a great coercive agency, standing ever above and around us, and of the law as a rigid, imperious mass of prohibitions and regulations hampering and restricting our freedom of behavior on every side. The reason for this misplaced emphasis is found in the unconscious nature of our yielding to persuasive control. Not only do the incidents of behavior on the part of the normal individual which are controlled persuasively vastly outweigh those that are governed by law, multitudinous as these are, but even those that are governed by law are to a very large extent also enjoined by the agencies of persuasive control. This is true of all the more fundamental and serious acts included under the law. In fact, it is probable that social condemnation, and control by non-legal means, antedated their inclusion in the law. This is the way in which law originally grew. Certain types of behavior, such as murder, theft, some sorts of sex conduct, came to be condemned in the mores of slowly evolving societies. All the existing rudimentary sanctions of the primitive group were brought to bear to restrain such acts. But it was discovered that these forms of restraint were not always adequate, and so more explicit prohibitions, backed up by force, were invoked. Accordingly, down to the present day, most of the inherently base, cruel, and injurious acts that are prohibited by law are also prohibited by other instruments of social constraint. Not only the government, but the family, the church, the neighborhood, and society itself look with horror on the wanton taking of human life. Each of these agencies has its own form of pressure which it exerts to prevent such conduct. Now the important thing is that the ordinary normal individual is affected primarily by these agencies, and *would be prevented from committing such acts as murder by these forms of pressure if there were no law at all.* With respect to deeds of such inherent sinfulness, the average citizen is not restrained in any degree by the law. It is probable that not a single reader of this book was ever prevented from committing a murder, or rape, or arson, or a burglary *just because there was a law against it.* Persons of the sort that study sociology textbooks are, almost to one hundred per cent, restrained from gross misdeeds by the non-legal forms of pressure. When, in extreme cases, these means prove inadequate it usually happens that the incentive to action is so powerful that the individual will go ahead with his crime anyway, regardless of the existence of a law. Laws of this kind are necessitated by the characteristics of a very small proportion of the population.

Fear of Force

Thirdly—and this is perhaps the most important point in understanding the function of the state—control by force does not necessarily involve the actual application of force. If the right and the ability to use force are there, and are known to be there, the *fear of force* will often secure the desired types of conformity. In the ideal (what is the ultimate value back of this word?) state there would probably be no actual application of force at all. The perfect law is the one that produces results without any imposition of the specified penalty. It is the mailed hand in the velvet glove. A very large part of the activities of a modern state is carried on on the basis of the tacit understanding on the part of both the state and the individual that the fine, the prison, and the electric chair loom forever in the background. The whole system of taxation furnishes an excellent illustration. Only an infinitesimal portion of the total tax bill is collected by the actual exertion of force, yet if the assurance that the strong arm of the law is back of the tax demand suddenly disappeared, the aggregate receipts from this source would dwindle amazingly. So it is with compulsory school attendance, speed of automobiles, declaration of imported articles, and securing of marriage licenses. The police and army have about the same relation to the total display of conformity that a Yale lock has to a ponderous steel door.

Just as the persuasive methods of control are far preferable to the coercive, and for much the same reasons, the fear of force, in so far as it can be made to operate, is far preferable to the application of force. The machinery of force is cumbersome, and its use expensive. It is likely to create very undesirable reactions on the part of the individual to whom it is applied. Consequently, states try to enunciate their requirements, and to stipulate their intentions, in such dire and emphatic terms as to frighten persons away from any breach of expectation. In other words, the law aims to prevent crime rather than to punish it, and to prevent it by the fear of force rather than by actual physical constraint.

Use of Force Externally

So far we have been discussing society's use of force and fear through the agency of the state in the control of its own members. There is also, as has already been suggested, the necessity of exerting force on other societies, for purposes of either protection or aggression. This use of force is likewise entrusted to the state, and here also the state attempts to use fear to preclude the necessity of using force. The whole phenomenon of ''armament racing'' is based on this principle. It is the practice of modern nations—with how much sincerity we need not stop to inquire—to protest vehemently that they have no intention or desire of infringing on the territory or rights of other nations. But most of them admit a fear that some other nation may take the aggressive against them, and to prevent it they seek to build up a military and naval establishment sufficient to instill a salutary fear in the heart of the other nation. This, of course, the other nation interprets as a threat against itself, and proceeds to increase its own forces to a point that will guarantee a restraining fear on the part of its potential enemy. And so the vicious circle goes on—though really it is a spiral, rather than a circle, since its scope gets steadily wider. Nothing could better illustrate the sinister character of fear, and the difficulty of dealing with it. For as long as fear exists in one nation, it justifies fear in other nations. One of the outstanding and imminent problems of modern life is how to cut into this particular vicious circle.

Religion and Science

Other great institutions which are more or less closely linked up with the family are education and religion. Religion, in turn, is intimately related, strange as it may seem, to that great modern institution, science. The primal roots of religion, as we have seen, may be traced to man's desire to know, particularly to understand the phenomena of nature. Some notion of causality seems to have been one of the earliest manifestations of human intelligence. The idea that one thing is caused by another, and an eagerness to know what is the cause of each observed phenomenon, appear as traits of very primitive men. We have observed how the idea of causation through agency was satisfying to the primitive mind, and simple for it to grasp, and how, as soon as the idea of a soul became established, this served to provide an explanation for the kinds of events that had not hitherto been assignable to any known agency. A physical universe, peopled in all its details with animate beings, is obviously capable of performing all sorts of feats.

In other words, man's original religion grew out of his desire to understand, interpret, and if possible control, nature, and it became the formulation of the results of his inquiry. But this is also precisely the nature of science. It follows that in the beginning there was no distinction between religion and science. Primitive man's religion was his science, and his science was his religion. Of course, it is not our custom to call these early efforts at understanding "science," while we do call them "religion." This is because, in the modern view, science has departed more radically than religion from these early animistic concepts. There is nothing in these primitive practices that corresponds to the definition of science already given. But the fact of this common origin should serve as a deterrent to those who are apt to scoff at religion because of its humble origin, and its unbroken development from ideas which we now recognize as erroneous and infantile. For if origin and antecedents are to be accepted as a basis for judging modern institutions, science must go the same way as religion, for its genesis is precisely identical. In point of fact, it is neither logical nor scientific to judge a modern form merely by its antecedents, and neither religion nor science can be discredited by its humble origin, or either exalted or debased by its ancestral kinship with the other.

What has happened is just what has occurred over and over again in the evolution of human culture—what is, in fact, characteristic of the entire evolutionary process—the branching of a common stem into two or more subdivisions, each of which from that time on proceeds to develop along independent lines, and to become more and more separate and diverse from the other. This is precisely what occurred in the case of the family and the state. Progression toward an increased number of specialized and differentiated forms is the very essence of the evolutionary concept, as Herbert Spencer pointed out emphatically long ago.

The actual separation of science from religion, however, is a relatively recent matter. For ages the pursuit and accumulation of knowledge were closely associated with the church and its representatives. In societies the world over, religious leaders of diverse sects have been the repositories not only of philosophic and esoteric doctrines, but of knowledge of the physical world and the forces that govern it. Very frequently, too, the possession of such lore is combined with the effort to put it to practical use in controlling the forces of nature. This combination is strikingly embodied in the person of the medicine man or shaman, who is a familiar figure in religions of many different sorts, as well as in the great practical services rendered by the medieval Christian monks.

Magic

This linkage of science with religion is also manifested in the multitudinous practices of magic, necromancy, and witchcraft. The concept underlying them all is the identification of nating interests. It is hard for the modern mind to grasp the that all objects in nature are imbued with spirits, or the more refined idea that a single all-powerful god operates through the phenomena of nature and uses material objects to accomplish his purposes, and there inevitably develops an overpowering desire to get at divinity and to influence it to use its powers for one's own benefit, and along with the desire an elaborate and complex ritual and instrumentation for satisfying it. Practical theology has for ages been one of man's dominating interests. It is hard for the modern mind to grasp the sincerity and gravity with which the medieval mind approached these subjects, though, truth to tell, there are abundant illustrations of the survival of the ancient attitude to be observed among one's contemporary friends, not to say in oneself. These survivals we now call superstitions, and recognize them as being culturally childish, and incapable of demonstrable support. Yet very few of us are entirely free from them. They take multitudinous forms, having to do with black cats, ladders, new moons, four-leaved clovers, broken mirrors, white horses and red-haired girls, the day Friday and the number thirteen. There are numerous intelligent bridge-players who actually believe that they are "poor holders" or "good holders,"—usually poor—as if there were some mystical quality in their personalities that could influence the fall of the cards. But there are also somewhat more sublimated forms that have to do with the will of god, and rewards and penalties for its observation or violation.

Superstition

The essence of superstition is a belief in causal sequences for which there is no scientific justification, that is, for which there is no adequate accumulated evidence of their constant and unvarying repetitiousness. For the most part, we hold our superstitions not on the basis of any evidence or argument whatever, but merely of some ill-defined authority which we could not now possibly identify. They usually trace back to notions planted in our impressionable minds long before we had reached the age of critical analysis, or had any idea of science or its methods. As far as there is any evidence whatever for them it is of the crudest *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* kind. It does not take many instances to establish a superstition firmly in a mind already hospitably disposed to it. Let a single death in the family follow quickly after a broken mirror, and the next crash of glass will be heard with intensified horror. The disastrous termination of one trip started on Friday the thirteenth may easily prove an effective deterrent against similar defiances of fate. An amusing story illustrating this point is told of one of the foremost scientists in this country. He is a biologist, and is likely to have various kinds of animals about him. At one time he had a cat which was about to become a mother, and which had a habit of playing around with some rabbits. A workman on the place warned the scientist that he would better keep the cat away, or otherwise when the kittens were born they would have little short fuzzy tails and would hop like rabbits. Of course the scientist laughed at the idea, but the workman was so positive that he offered a five dollar bet, and the wager was made. Imagine the scientist's consternation when the kittens were born, all with fuzzy tails and all hopping like a rabbit! He paid the bet, and it was not till later that he learned that this peculiar type of kitten is an abnormal variation which occurs at rare intervals, whether or not the mother has been within a hundred miles of a rabbit. The case was one of pure luck.

Luck

The element of luck or chance plays a large part in the creation and perpetuation of superstitions, and has, indeed, exercised a profound influence on human destiny, diminishing somewhat since the inauguration of true science. Luck is our generalized term for the pseudo-force, or imaginary power, that causes events to happen for which there is no comprehensible scientific explanation. Almost always the events are of interest to ourselves. This means that there is a second event involved, or rather, that what we call a case of luck is an inexplicable combination of two events, both of which separately are quite explainable. Indeed, luck might very accurately be defined as the meeting of two or more unrelated, or seemingly unrelated, sequences. For example: the fact that Mr. Jones took a walk through the woods on a certain autumn day might be easily explained. Also, the fact that a certain dead branch on a certain tree reached a stage of decay that caused it to fall is perfectly capable of explanation if we know enough about the history of the tree. But for the fact that Mr. Jones walked under the tree at just the moment that the branch was falling, and in consequence got a bad bump on his cranium, there is no explanation. There is no conceivable relation between these two sequences, though in theory there might be if we had infinite knowledge of all the chains of consequence that had been operating since the creation of the universe. But we simply call it a case of bad luck.

It is obvious that the importance attached to luck by a given individual or group is in inverse ratio to the knowledge of natural forces and physical causation possessed and used by the person or group. An event for which we have no explanation, and of which no explanation seems possible, we assign to luck or divine intervention, according to the degree of our religious disposition. Consequently, luck, or the aleatory element as Sumner called it, has always played a tremendous rôle in the affairs of primitive and low-cultured peoples. Naturally it becomes inextricably intertwined with ideas of ghosts, spirits, and gods, and good-luck rites and charms are often indistinguishable from religious tokens and observances. The amulet may very easily develop into the idol. It is merely an extension of these notions that accounts for the still existing faith in holy relics to influence human destiny. This is wide-spread among contemporary religions, including some of those practiced among the most highly civilized peoples of today. The life of the Middle Ages was thoroughly permeated by this type of belief. The Crusades were largely activated and supported by belief in the military efficacy of sacred relics. Indeed, the whole professed objective of the Crusades, the rescue of the Holy City and the Holy Sepulchre from the infidels, was essentially a manifestation of the same notions. Once let an idea of this kind become established, and every case of favorable luck increases its hold greatly. It is a notable feature of the superstitiously minded, that a single confirmatory incident impresses them more than a thousand inconsistencies. Some explanation for the latter is always found, or else they are simply ignored. We human beings have a strange eagerness to believe what we do believe. Our beliefs are precious possessions, and we resent having them taken away just as we do the theft of some tangible property. This makes us a fertile field for the operations of charlatans and conjurers of every stamp. And so great is the power of belief over human life that it doubtless often produces the very effect it is fixed on.

SCIENCE AND RELIGION

The dawn of true science was characterized by the supplanting of this mass of belief, tradition, superstition, and dogma by a concept of natural forces, and the regularity and constancy of natural processes. The notion of causation was shifted from whimsical and capricious spirits, or a divinity with a fixed will who could nevertheless be influenced by human supplications, to the material constituents of the universe themselves. Back of these materials, and operating through them, were conceived to be natural forces manifesting themselves in the laws of nature. Of the character of these laws and forces no explicit and uniform notion was established, nor has it yet been established. Some scientists still continued to think of them as a divine fiat, but established once and for all at the foundation of the universe, and fixed and unchangeable, perhaps even by god himself. But the majority preferred to detach them entirely from all notions of god or a supernatural power, and simply to regard them as the "established" order of the universe—how or by whom established, they did not consider it their function to inquire. Hence arose that notorious "conflict" between science and religion which has raged with greater or less intensity down to the present day. To the devout, science seemed to have dispensed with god, or at least to have reduced him to a subordinate and impotent position in the scheme of things. A god who has no power to influence human destiny has forfeited a major part of his claim to reverence and devotion. And to the scientist, religion appeared as a mass of unprovable dogmas, which served only to mislead the minds of men.

The details of this controversy need not delay us here. It is worthy of note that after centuries of developing science religion still persists, and although it has undergone numerous modifications (just as science has), many of them made in response to the unquestionable revelations of science, it is an open question whether mankind as a whole is any less religious than it ever was. There is a marked tendency away from authoritarianism, ritual, dogma, creed, and institutionalization. Religion is becoming more of a personal and less of a group-standardized affair. An increasing number of individuals today realize that they can be religious without being members of any body, subscribing to any formulation of doctrine, or performing any routine of ceremonial observance. Furthermore, the limitations of science are beginning to be understood as they could not possibly have been in the first flush of its popularity and success. Once grasp the truth, already set forth,* that science, by its very nature, can never really explain anything, and can never establish ultimate values, and there immediately opens up a vast field for speculation, reverie, and belief in which each individual is free to wander as deeply and as discursively as he chooses. Certain minds will find these excursions pleasant, and both stimulating and soothing; other minds will recoil from them with all the primitive horror of the unknown. Some will call this the field of philosophy rather than of religion. But names are not important. The significant truth is that when science shall have done its perfect work, and revealed all that it is capable of revealing, there will still remain vast realms of reality and of mystery, the exploration of which must always be done, if at all, in what is essentially the religious spirit.

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* See pp. 88-90, 103-109.

CHAPTER XIV

ECONOMIC CULTURE

In pursuit of its interests, and in conjunction with the various agencies of control and fundamental institutions that have been discussed, society has built up various instruments and processes which are designed to accomplish concrete results. These may, in a way, be thought of as the practical, and relatively ephemeral, manifestations of the institutions.

The primary and dominant interest of society is continuity. However developed or explained, this objective is integral to the very nature of society, and is consciously or implicitly recognized and admitted by every particular society. In the last extremity, every other interest will be sacrificed to this.

SELF-MAINTENANCE: WEALTH

The continuity of society is dependent upon two essentials, the preservation of life and the reproduction of life. The basic purposeful, or telic, activities of society may therefore be grouped under the heads of self-maintenance and self-perpetuation. This division obviously corresponds closely to the hunger interests and love interests of the individual. Taking up first the preservation of life, we see that it is dependent upon securing from the earth certain necessaries which can be obtained nowhere else, and without which life is impossible. In their simplest aspects these may be summarized as standing room and food. Of course, these terms are merely symbolic or representative of much wider requirements of the human animal. Man needs superficial area for much more than merely to place his feet upon; he requires it for the establishment of a genuine home, for recreation, etc. Likewise, the material supplies demanded by the human body are something beyond food, or even food and drink. Men need shelter, clothing, warmth, light, and material supplies of countless sorts for their various elaborate activities. What are customarily called the hunger, or food, interests may better be thought of as a complex of interests that revolve around the securing of material supplies from the earth's surface, and making them adaptable and available to satisfy a wide range of desires. To include all such useful material supplies there has been adopted the technical term "wealth," which, with certain refinements or limitations of definition, plays the title rôle in the highly developed science of economics. Society's primary activities for the preservation of life may therefore, with sufficient accuracy, be called its economic activities. These may be divided into the production of wealth, the ownership of wealth, the exchange and distribution of wealth, and the consumption of wealth. Around each of these interests society has built up, through countless ages of evolutionary experience, a vast structure of mores, customs, traditions, instruments and devices, regulations (legal and other), and institutions.

ECONOMIC DETERMINISM

It has already been suggested that fundamental changes in the characteristic type of wealth and mode of producing it have been instrumental in dividing cultural evolution into certain great stages. Each of these changes has had a profound influence on other, non-economic, aspects of society, sending out ramifications which may eventually alter the whole character of society. The realization of each successive change absolutely requires appropriate modifications in the social structure and functioning. Thus, the pastoral or nomadic form of life which grows out of the introduction of stock-raising necessitates light and portable dwellings, facilities for relatively extensive seasonal movements, and an absence of too strong an attachment to a given spot of land, and tends to foster the patriarchal form of family, the communal ownership of land, and the ancestor-worship type of religion, with possibly a special trend toward monotheism. The agricultural system, on the other hand, tends to foster a settled mode of life, more pretentious dwellings, private property in land,

and probably a more rapid accumulation of capital. It needs no argument to show that the whole face of modern society is profoundly affected by the prevalence of a highly mechanized, capitalized, concentrated system of industrial production, associated with highly developed commercial and financial systems. Some of the concrete problems arising out of this situation will be considered later.

PROPERTY

The economic system that prevails in any society is a combination of physical instruments or appliances, technical knowledge, techniques, and dexterities, and philosophical or conventional ideas and doctrines that govern the operation and management of the whole. Foremost in this latter group is the great institution of property.

Property is the socially recognized and sanctioned claim to a specific item of wealth. It is to be distinguished from the wealth itself, and from the physical possession of the wealth. Cynics may aver that "Might makes right," and that "Possession is nine points of the law," and perhaps in practice it works out that way all too often. But it cannot be ignored that some of the very earliest of the specific sanctions of society were those dealing with the right to wealth, and that a large part of society's activities, in all stages of its development, has been concerned with precising and enforcing these sanctions. In this respect, as in others, the origin of the institution probably antedates humanity. Man probably came into existence with some rudimentary notions of property rights, of the sort which can be observed among some of the lower animals. But these rights were not much more than a recognition of the fact of possession.

FOOD

It would be interesting to know to what extent food was regarded as a matter of private property among the earliest hordes. Perhaps the question seldom arose practically as long as man was on the collection stage. The items in the dietary were necessarily for the most part small in size, and were probably consumed as soon as found. The food quest on this stage, as already indicated, would naturally lead persons apart from one another, and there would seldom be competition or a conflict of claims for a given morsel. But as men moved up to the hunting stage, and it became possible to capture large game animals, the question of ownership would become very important. It is probable that the growth of this stage tended to develop participation and a sense of communality among the group, not only through cooperation in the hunt, as suggested above, but also through the sharing of the result. Descriptions of the food habits of primitive peoples seem to indicate that expectation of sharing a large acquisition was quite general.

Ornaments and Amulets

Aside from food, among the early hordes there was probably not very much else to be owned, except women and children, and possibly some customary dwelling spot. It seems likely that one of the earliest types of wealth to be looked upon in terms of private property was the ornament, charm, or amulet. The notion of bodily decoration is a very primitive one, and early man was much disposed to collect small objects that caught his fancy, and hang them upon his person. Ornaments may easily have preceded clothes. As soon as the notion of daimonism developed, and objects of all sorts were peopled with spirits, it was natural and logical for primitive man to conceive the idea that a peculiarly shaped piece of stick or stone—one that bore some resemblance to a human being, for instance—was the abiding place of a peculiarly powerful spirit, and that the possession of the trinket would give the owner control over the powers of the spirit, or at least would induce the spirit to use them in his behalf. In brief, it would bring him good luck. Such was the origin of the amulet, or charm. The natural procedure would be to hang such an object on the body, just as the ornament had been hung, and in fact the same sort of objects that were chosen as ornaments were regarded as likely abodes of useful spirits. Consequently, the ornament and the amulet were closely related and frequently identified with each other. The survival of these notions and practices down to the present day is easily observable. Not only are charms and amulets frequently worn on the person, but the charm and ornament are often combined in the same object, such as a gold cross worn round the neck, or a brooch in the shape of a swastika—the latter perhaps less popular now than before the days of Hitlerism. It is said of one of the most prominent and select college fraternities in the United States that until recently its members were forbidden to let the emblem leave their person, even when they went in swimming or took a shower.

Capital

From such humble beginnings developed the institution of private property. The next objects to receive the social sanction of ownership, aside from personal clothing as soon as it began to be used, may well have been the early instruments to which reference has already been made, stone hammers, flint scrapers, bows and arrows, etc. It is important to note in this connection that these implements were not intended or adapted for the immediate satisfaction of human wants, but were used to facilitate the acquirement of other objects of practical use. That is, they were instruments of production, or true capital. Thus the custom of sanctioning the private ownership of capital developed very early, sowing the seeds of incalculable confusion and turmoil which are coming to their full fruition in our own day.

Land

All these things, however, were relatively trivial and secondary in the great task of supplying necessary wealth to society and its members. The one, inclusive, ultimate source of all wealth is the land, using the term in a broad sense to include everything on the crust of the earth, soil, rocks, water, and atmosphere. This was true at the dawn of human existence, and it is no less true today. Every object of wealth, whether it be a simple natural product, such as a piece of real chalk or an uncut diamond, or a highly elaborated and refined device such as a watch or a radio, traces back ultimately to the land. It could not have come into existence except for materials supplied by the land, and it could take only such forms, however intricate, as were made possible by these materials. It is one of the great marvels of mundane existence that the ninety-odd elements in the earth's surface can be elaborated into so nearly infinite varieties of wealth. The recognition of these truths is the very bedrock foundation of an adequate understanding of the processes and problems of the whole economic system.

The ownership of land is therefore the starting point for all ownership of wealth, and the sanctioned system of ownership has an immeasurable influence on the whole economic structure and functioning. It might seem, accordingly, that the struggle for the ownership of land would have been one of the first types of conflict indulged in by individual humans. For not only is the total land upon this earth a positively limited quantity, but the land available to any given horde was very closely restricted. Not only a man's comfort and well-being, but his very life, was dependent, and has always been dependent, upon his having access, direct or indirect, to enough land to provide him support. The fundamental inducements to monopoly have always been inherent in land. This is instinctively realized by some of the subhuman species. Julian Huxley tells us in a fascinating essay that among many birds a practice exists whereby each male every spring selects a certain section as his own, known as his "territory," his claim to which is recognized by the other birds of his species. Until he has secured such a territory he cannot get a mate and set up housekeeping for the year. Any male who arrives too late, or for any other reason fails to secure a territory, is seriously out of luck for the season.[1] But among humans private property in land seems to have developed very late. Perhaps it was because direct access to land was so vital that the claim of any individual to the exclusive use of a given area could not be tolerated, or perhaps no individual could enforce his claim to so wide an area as he wandered over in his food quest, or perhaps the social organization was not sufficiently compact and powerful to enforce the necessary sanctions. Or possibly they never thought of it. At any rate, the communal ownership of land was undoubtedly the prevailing system until society had passed through the nomadic or pastoral stage of culture.

In the typical pastoral group the patriarchal family is so prominent that we can discern an approach to a system of family ownership. But it was not until a settled mode of life was introduced by the discovery of the arts of agriculture, and the planting of crops tended to center the interests of an individual or a family upon a certain restricted parcel of ground, that the foundations were laid for an established system of private ownership of productive land. And even here, it is probable that the ownership took the form of a conventional right to the use of land, rather than an absolute title. This was certainly the case in Europe down as late as the Middle Ages. The absolute title to the land was vested in the king, or the highest noble, by whatever title he was called. This was a natural survival of an earlier, and less concentrated, group ownership. From the king the great nobles received traditional rights to specified areas, and from them in turn the land was parcelled out on similar terms through the lesser nobles to the serfs who were the actual tillers of the soil. The rights and uses of the land were rigidly prescribed by custom and status, and yet no one could lay claim to absolute title except the overlord.

Pastoral Capital

It is clear that the systems of ownership and of production have always been closely bound up together. This is true not only of land, but also of the other instruments of production. We have already indulged in the surmise that the earliest tools and weapons were privately owned. But it is probable that the ownership of the first really important mass capital, that represented by the flocks and herds of the pastoral stage, was centered in a group at least as large as the expanded patriarchal family. The familiar story of Abraham and Lot, agreeing to separate because the land was too narrow to support their vast herds together, is a picture of two great pastoral chieftains negotiating about what was really the capital of their respective kin-groups.[2] Likewise the account of Jacob's clever scheme of building up a herd of streaked and spotted cattle is merely a recital of an early foreign capitalist enriching himself at the expense of his employer by means which would receive the applause of a modern business man, if not the scientific endorsement of a modern geneticist.[3]

SLAVERY

But there was another form of capital of a peculiar sort which came into existence also at an early stage of culture. This consisted of human beings. It has been observed above that the waging of a successful war or raid often resulted in the capture of women who thereupon became wives of the victors. But not all female captives were so disposed of. Nor were the captives all females. Frequently a marauding band found itself in possession of a number of persons of both sexes. In the days before there was any high development of industrial arts and therefore no way of making such captives economically useful—for an additional individual can be of very little service on the collection stage—there was only one logical thing to do with those that were not wanted as wives—that was to eat them. Cannibalism has been the established accompaniment of war among many savage peoples. In time, however, as the arts of life developed, the idea gradually dawned on some progressive group that a greater net return of satisfaction and profit could be derived from a captive by keeping him alive and making him work for them than by eating him. In other words, the victim was more valuable as capital than as consumption goods. Thus was born the institution of slavery, which has played such a conspicuous and tragic rôle in all subsequent human history.

TYPES OF SLAVES

The forms of slavery that have prevailed over the earth's surface have been various, and have been determined by the form and structure of the societies involved, and particularly by their general economic system. In general there are two main types of slaves, the house slave and the field slave. The former is the earlier, since, at the time slavery originated, the arts of agriculture, or even of stock-raising, were not sufficiently developed to make a demand for menial labor. A hunting band is not likely to take slaves with it, on account of the danger of attack or escape. Among such peoples the slaves worked about the dwellings, sharing in the characteristic feminine tasks. Thus they became skilled in the technical processes, and, being often of equal intelligence with their captors, they might become persons of considerable importance. Among more advanced peoples, such as the ancient Greeks and Romans, house slaves were frequently of a very superior type. Certain of the women slaves, also, instead of being assigned to laborious occupations, would be taken as companions by their male captors, sometimes being placed in those secondary and inferior grades of wifehood that are socially recognized and sanctioned among many peoples.

Origin of Wage Labor

The inauguration of slavery was of double significance. In the first place it initiated an institution of tremendous subsequent importance, and in the second place it originated the still more influential practice of having one person work for another in productive activities. The complete history of labor is yet to be written, and we do not know the precise steps by which the earlier forms of chattel slavery became softened into the qualified servitude of serfdom. But we do know that the subjection of one person to another in productive enterprises, in all its manifold forms, has been fraught with incalculable consequences down to the present moment.

Labor

To understand this adequately it is necessary to comprehend the general relation of labor to the production of wealth. It has been pointed out that the starting point of all productive activities is land. But land itself is inert, and incapable of providing man with the materials to satisfy his interests without some exertion on his part. Even the fruits and nuts that grow wild without any attention from man have to be picked. We read idyllic accounts of bounteous tropical lands where all that the native has to do to get his living is to lie in a receptive attitude under a breadfruit tree. But at least he has to make the effort of getting under the tree and opening his mouth. The sort of production that consists in gathering the edible products of wild plants represents the very minimum application of labor, and the maximum relative contribution of land. But it is exceedingly important for all subsequent analysis to realize that picking blueberries or gathering hickory nuts requires some labor, and that it is a genuine process of production. For production includes every form of activity, however simple, that results in making the materials of nature available for the satisfaction of human wants.

Essentials of Production

Land and labor, therefore, are the two indispensable factors in production, invariably present in every productive activity, however complex it may be, and however much they may be subordinated or obscured. A constant remembrance of this principle helps immeasurably in the interpretation and analysis of all sorts of economic phenomena and problems. A changing emphasis in the relation of labor to the entire productive instrumentation and process has had a profound effect in creating many of the most perplexing problems and menacing situations of modern life.

Units of Production

As repeatedly suggested, the form of the typical productive unit has always had a profound bearing on all other forms and functions of society. The original unit of this type was exceedingly simple—a single individual on an area of wild land. Next came the individual armed with a stone hammer or a bow and arrows, and after that the loosely organized hunting group, similarly equipped, and using also such devices as traps and pitfalls. Such units are now composed of three distinct factors of production—land, capital and labor—and in the last there is also the first rudimentary expression of a fourth factor—organization or management. Following these came the typical unit embodied in a stock-breeder skilled in the arts of animal husbandry, with his extensive capital in the form of flocks and herds, and utilizing a wide stretch of land. Here the factor of organization is clearly discernible, since there might be several subordinate workers managing the stock and in any case the successful management of the enterprise required considerable foresight, planning, and direction. Next came the elementary agricultural unit, with nothing more elaborate, perhaps, than a patch of forest land where the trees had been killed by girdling, and the underbrush destroyed by fire, while the seeds of some undeveloped grass plant were scratched into the native soil with a pointed stick. The capital in such a case consisted in whatever tools or implements were used, but especially in the seed, the importance of which as a factor in cultural development, as of domesticated animals, has already been stressed.

Central Position of Labor

Thus by the time the agricultural stage was well established there were united in the typical productive unit four distinct factors—land, labor, capital, and organization. Two of these, land and capital, are inanimate and inert. The other two are embodied in sentient human beings. And up to the point of cultural evolution that has just been described, both the human factors were combined in the same individual, who was primarily the laborer. Furthermore, in so far as the other factors, the land and the capital, were privately owned at all, he, the laborer, was the owner. This is a fact the fundamental significance of which will become clearer as we go on. The whole productive unit was centered on the laborer. He owned whatever was individually owned, he supplied the labor, and he provided such elementary skill and management as were necessary to combine the factors into a functioning unit.

Energy

There is another factor in production which has been seriously overlooked or misinterpreted even by professional students of economics. This is power or energy. The reason for this neglect is that energy has been distributed throughout the various recognized factors, and it has not seemed to be important to differentiate it. Thus land, with the aid of the sun, provides a vast amount of energy, utilized mainly in the growing of plants. The outlay of energy, for instance, of a single apple tree in raising water from the ground to its branches, leaves, and fruit in the form of sap is tremendous. Another portion of the energy used by a productive unit is exerted through certain capital instruments, and so comes to be confused with capital. Thus the power plant of a factory, whether it be a steam boiler and engine, a water wheel, or an electric motor, is included as a part of the capital. Finally, a certain part of the energy is supplied by the human participants, including both those classified as labor and as management. The significance of energy in the productive process, and in the whole future of the economic system, has suddenly sprung into recognition and prominence in recent years, particularly in connection with the spectacular exploitation of Technocracy. So important is it now considered that many engineers and economists assert that the perplexities of the present era may best be thought of as due to the transition from a machine age to a power age.

Labor Ownership

The significant point for our present analysis is that during the early development of production all the energy, aside from that exerted by the land in growing plants, was supplied by the laborer. Thus the laborer combined in his own person the labor, the management, and most of the energy. These factors he also "owned," since they were inherent in his individual personality. He also owned the capital, and came as near to owning the land as anybody else. In strict accuracy, then, he could be said to own his own business, such as it was.

The change from this primitive situation was of the same order as that which we have observed in various other departments of life—a process of branching off and specialization into separate, though related, structures and functions. The first step was the development of more important and extensive capital instruments in the form of flocks and herds on the one hand, and seeds and growing plants on the other. These, in turn, required other instruments of capital—stables and folds to shelter the domesticated animals; skins and other vessels to keep the milk, cheese, and butter in; barns and bins to store the grain in, and rude mills to grind it with. Thus the relative importance of the human element, particularly labor, in a given productive process diminished. But still the laborer was in control of the situation, and either owned the capital and the land, or was one of a small group that owned them.

Power Plants

But in time, a new type of capital instrument began to be developed, that designed to appropriate energy from nature and make it available for productive purposes. There were two main sorts, the animal and the mechanical. The first draught animals or beasts of burden were probably the same species as had already been developed for their meat or their milk, such as horned cattle or goats, or for their companionship, the dog. But in time, species came to be bred especially for their tractive capacities, like the horse, ass, and camel, though these too provided a milk supply which, subordinate though it was, was not ignored. Among the mechanical power plants the water wheel occupies an early and eminent place. From these beginnings, the development of power instruments proceeded through such devices as the windmill, the treadmill (powered by either human beings or lower animals), and the sailing vessel.

Growth of Standard of Living

All these developments, whether in the way of increased and diversified capital or of extra-human power plants, had one central consequence of the highest importance—a tremendous alleviation of the burden of physical existence, and a great increase in the amount and variety of material supplies that man could make available for his uses. First and foremost was the enormous increase in the amount of food that could be produced from a given area of land. But along with this went a more ample provision for the other needs of man in the way of clothing, shelter, and implements of art and recreation. Accompanying this enlargement of economic possibilities came an expansion of human wants. Desires and interests grew along with the facilities for satisfying them. Each new comfort or simple luxury, each novel experience of sensory pleasure, called for something more. There became manifest that seemingly unlimited capacity of the human animal to develop new tastes and appetites, which has created the much-exaggerated and misapplied doctrine of the insatiability of human wants. Thus the advance in economic culture was both the basis and the stimulus of expansion in the other aspects of civilization.

These great enlargements of economic capacities and resources offered two different means of utilization. They could be devoted to either the support of a larger number of people on a given area of land, or the improvement of the level of comfort and material well-being of the number that already existed. The nature of the antithesis that exists between these two possibilities will be discussed more fully under the head of the reproductive interests of society. For the present, it is sufficient to observe that in point of fact the growing advantages were distributed between the two objectives; the populations of societies increased, but not as rapidly as might have been possible if all had been content to live on the former low level of existence; the level of comfort rose, but not as high as it might have if the increase in numbers had been less.

Differential Evolution

When generalizing about human evolution it is customary to speak as if all societies everywhere had gone through the same typical stages, and had displayed the same characteristic forms. This is convenient, and need not be misleading if due caution is used. The progressive sequence ordinarily referred to is that which has been experienced by the most civilized societies that have been known, particularly those of classical antiquity in the Mediterranean basin and the modern nations of the Western Hemisphere. In point of fact, innumerable societies, as every school-child knows, have never completed this progression, but have been permanently retarded at one or another of the earlier stages. Even within the recent observation of civilized peoples, some groups, such as the Digger Indians in North America, have been found living practically on the collection stage, while numerous people today have not advanced beyond the hunting, or primitive pastoral and agricultural stages. Furthermore, not all peoples have made an orderly progression through each of the stages antecedent to the one they now occupy. For example, many of the American Indian tribes at the time they were first observed by white men were in the process of passing from the hunting stage to the agricultural stage without passing through the pastoral stage at all.

Accordingly, there are many contemporary peoples among whom the typical unit of production is much the same as one or another of those already described. The individual laborer largely controls his own economic activities, and has an undisputed claim to the products of his efforts. In such societies "the labor problem," as it is visualized in modern Western civilization, is unknown. But for most of these latter countries there has been a characteristic development by similar steps to the present complex and baffling situation.

SERFDOM

The next distinctive stage in this progression is that displayed by the feudal societies of Medieval Europe. By this time slavery, as the typical method of appropriating the labor of one person to the advantage of another, had disappeared, and in its place had sprung up the great institution of serfdom. This represented a distinct mitigation in the lot of the common worker, though on the other hand, probably a larger proportion of the population lived in a state of subjection than had ever so lived under slavery. The typical features of the land factor in this system have already been described. The ultimate title to the land rested in the king. The various successive grades of society received their land "in fief," each being accountable to the one above it. The size of the separate parcels of land naturally diminished with each subdivision, until the level of the serf was reached. His holdings, on the average, were just large enough to enable him to make a comfortable living according to the standards of the time, and to pay to his overlord fees amounting roughly to the product of half his land and half his time. Under the feudal system all social relations, rights, duties, privileges, and obligations, were rigidly prescribed by immemorial custom. The representatives of each class of society knew precisely what services they had to render to those above them and what they might expect from those below. This applied not only to economic services, but also to military contributions, attendance at ceremonies, marriage arrangements, choice of an occupation, etc. The dominating principle of the societal organization was status. The presumption of the free exercise of individual initiative did not exist. Societal expectation was of the most explicit and inclusive sort. Personal ambition was not encouraged beyond the point of fulfilling well your tasks in the station to which you were born. The hope of advancement in life among the common people was not an important force. All that the average individual desired was that he should maintain the level of comfort traditional among his parents and grandparents, or, at the extreme, that he should be regarded as an outstanding and successful member of his class. The contrast between such a social environment and that of a modern Western society, dominated by the universal principle of "free contract," is striking at first glance. Its full significance will become evident as we go on.

The societal organization of medieval Europe was still essentially agricultural. The typical productive unit was the small farm, often divided into separate parcels of land, operated according to traditional methods by a single individual and his immediate family. Human labor was the dominating factor, and this was supplied by the tenant himself. Domesticated animals were raised in accordance with the cumulative principle of cultural evolution* and were used for milk, meat, and draught purposes. At the same time, a different type of activity had reached a point of considerable importance. The freeing of a portion of man's energies from the primary task of making a living had led to the development of a number of arts and handicrafts, each with its specialized group of workers. Many of these, such as wood-working, glass-making, spinning and weaving, and metal-working had reached a high degree of excellence. There existed, accordingly, distinct groups of craftsmen who had a highly developed sense of group solidarity, and traditions, standards, and codes of their own. One important capital plant, the grist mill, was owned by the lord. To it all the serfs were required to bring their grain, and a certain percentage of the meal was taken by the lord in payment. But there were no large business enterprises, no concentrations of the various productive factors under a single management and ownership. About the only business that was organized on an extensive scale was war.

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* See p. 347.

Trade

The transition from this situation to the modern one has taken place within recent historical time, and its salient features are fairly well known. One of the first innovations in the way of large-scale enterprise appeared in the field of commerce or trade, rather than of manufacture, or primary production. This was the ambitious maritime venture, characteristic of what is known as the Discoveries Period.

The part occupied by trade in the production of wealth has not enlisted our attention as yet. There are various ways of getting wealth—to find it, to make it, to steal it, to have it given to you, and to trade for it. The first of these, though the characteristic method during the whole long stretch of the collection stage, and though still employed, has now become so insignificant and inconsequential that it receives small place, if any, in conventional economic analysis. The third, not being sanctioned by society, is more appropriately treated as an abnormality rather than as one of the normal features of society, and the fourth is so spasmodic and whimsical as to defy all efforts to reduce it to a standardized pattern of behavior. Consequently, economic science confines itself to the two orthodox methods of getting wealth, manufacturing it (in the broadest sense), and trading for it.

The significance of trade in the economic life of society has been somewhat underrated in the conventional treatment of economic history. We have, as has been repeatedly observed, several formal and widely accepted classifications of the stages of culture based on the characteristic productive agencies. But no comparable standard classifications based on the forms of exchange exist. Yet in modern life almost as much wealth is got by exchange as by manufacture. Except for that portion of the wealth created by ourselves that we retain for our own use, all our wealth (with the exemptions above indicated) comes to us through trade. Even the farmer under modern conditions consumes only a minute portion of the crops that he raises. Of course, this was not always so. As we proceed backward in social evolution we observe a steady diminution in the relative importance of trade, until we come to the primeval hordes, among whom there can have been very little trading at all. This, in itself, should serve to indicate how influential has been the development of the institution of trade upon the social life of man through his whole existence.

Division of Labor

The development of trade as an important institution was a concomitant of the division of labor. True, there may have been frequent instances of swapping that were more or less fortuitous. A savage who had been lucky enough to find several powerful amulets might be willing to trade one of them for a handful of arrows that he was quite able to make himself. Or another who had struck a particularly large group of birds' nests might be glad to exchange some of the eggs for part of the honey plundered from a bee-tree by one of his fellows. But all such cases were essentially casual and isolated before some stable form of division of labor was established.

There are three main types of division of labor, the sexual, the territorial, and the occupational. The first of these, which was also the earliest, has already been noticed. It, however, can hardly have operated to occasion real trade, for the division of labor was within the family unit, and the products of both parties were pooled in the common supplies of the family, in keeping with its function as a unit of consumption. It was not until there arose some settled differentiation among the productive units themselves that any formal and standardized trade could arise. Whether this took place first on a territorial or on an occupational basis it would be difficult to say. Fortunately it is not important. At some time or other, and in some place or other, both types originated, and proceeded to develop in ever-increasing varieties and ever-augmenting importance down to the present time.

TERRITORIAL DIVISION

The origin of intergroup trade on the basis of territorial division of labor is easy to understand. The land, from which all wealth is derived, is highly diversified. The elements of which it is composed, and their various natural compounds and mixtures, are very unevenly distributed. Materials highly desirable to many groups of primitive men may be supplied by the territory of only one or a few. Consequently, as soon as the group distribution of man over the earth's surface had proceeded to a measurable degree, and to the extent that relations were maintained between these groups, it was inevitable that the impulse should arise to exchange the products of one group for those of another. Typical materials that have thus served as the basis of early trade are flint, salt, pipe-clay, gold, silver, and on a somewhat higher level, iron, copper, tin, perfumes, spices, amber, dyestuffs. The bulk of world trade has always been of this territorial type until recent centuries. Trade and occupational division of labor become inseparably intertwined as the technique of industry advances. In a land where the silkworm grows indigenously it is inevitable that the weaving of silk should develop, and that silk cloth should become an article of export. A stock-raising people will naturally develop the art of tanning, and will at first offer hides, and later leather and elaborate articles of leather work, in exchange.

TRADE ROUTES

So the great world trade routes have been built up primarily on the basis of the varying distribution of natural supplies, and the diverse products made possible by local conditions of soil, temperature, topography, and general climate. From time immemorial the most important of these routes have taken a general east and west direction. This is accounted for not merely by the difference in the physical environments of the Orient and the Occident, but also by the earlier development of civilization in the East, so that from that direction articles of luxury and refinement have been offered in return for the cruder products and raw materials of the West. One of the great difficulties in this trade has always been for the Western peoples to find enough articles that the Easterners wanted which could bear the heavy costs of transportation, for crude products and raw materials are usually heavy and bulky in proportion to their value. Silver has been an invaluable means of solving this problem, for the Eastern countries, especially India, have a seemingly insatiable appetite for silver.

INFLUENCE OF TRADE

The influence of the territorial division of labor, and intergroup trade, particularly the east-west trade, upon the whole course of human development has been incalculable. Brooks Adams has written a brilliantly ingenious world history based upon the discovery, exploitation, and exhaustion of mines of metals.[4] Keller and his associates at Yale have laid great stress on the influence of trade and trade routes in shaping human destiny.[5] It is significant that the interests of trade are so insistent that they sometimes surmount hostile attitudes, and trade is carried on between two groups whose normal attitude is one of animosity. Not only is this true of primitive peoples, but even among the most advanced nations, trade, even in munitions, goes on between enemies in the midst of war.[6]

The technical details of trade, and the shift from barter to money exchange, will occupy our attention later.

Large-Scale Trade

It is not surprising, then, that the first ventures in the organization of production on a large scale should have been in the field of interterritorial trade. The conduct of commerce up to the Middle Ages had been difficult, expensive, and dangerous. The great routes were largely overland, though water transportation was utilized whenever possible. Goods had to be transshipped and repacked frequently. Much of the intervening territory traversed was in the hands of not too friendly peoples, and the caravans were in constant danger of attack by bandits, and the fleets of plunder by pirates. Imposts, taxes, and duties of many kinds were levied at every possible point along the way. Some of the main routes reached a land terminal at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, and many of the great cities in that region owed their wealth and power to their strategic positions at the juncture of land and water routes. One entire people, the Phoenicians, took advantage of their unique situation to develop commerce to an extent never before known, and devoted themselves so unreservedly to it that they finally traded themselves off the face of the earth. During the early Middle Ages several of the Italian cities, Genoa, Pisa, Florence, Naples, and Venice, capitalized their situations at the western end of the Mediterranean routes, and waxed prosperous and insolent upon the proceeds of their maritime and financial transactions. The Crusades, viewed as an economic phenomenon, are one episode in this great commercial drama.

The nations of western Europe had for generations looked with envy on this lucrative activity, and had particularly begrudged the Italians the large share of the proceeds that they were able to exact. There arose, consequently, a powerful urge to find some way to the sources of Oriental products which would not traverse so many dangerous areas, encounter so many physical and political obstacles, or be subject to so many heavy charges by intermediaries, but would lie almost wholly within the control of the nations for whom the goods were destined, and whose demand made the entire system possible. In the nature of the case, such routes must be largely by water, and so arose the romantic, glamorous, soul-trying search for routes to the East. The expenses of these ventures, compared with the existing wealth and accumulations of capital, was enormous. In fact, it was so great that no individual except the king could command sufficient resources to fit out one of the expeditions and finance it to its conclusion. Consequently, all of these early undertakings were royal ventures. The most familiar to the average American is the one which fortuitously resulted in the discovery of the continent wherein he resides. But others were more successful in attaining their primary goal. The Portuguese navigator, DaGama, following the lead of Prince Henry the Navigator, was the first to make a successful voyage around the Cape of Good Hope and back again. The enormous potential profits of these enterprises are indicated by the fact that although DaGama's voyage took two years and two months the proceeds of the cargoes were sufficient to pay the entire expenses of the expedition sixty times over. The articles involved in this trade were silks, precious stones, fine metalwork, jewelry and fine articles of luxury, but most of all spices. It may seem strange that spices should have occupied such a prominent place in the life of Medieval Europe that they could bear the burden of these vast ventures until one recollects that the diet in those days consisted largely of meat and was otherwise monotonous and tasteless, that they had no means of refrigeration, and that a variety of pungent spices was invaluable in making palatable a joint or a steak that was, as you might say, a little overdue.

The point worthy of especial notice in the present analysis is that these ventures were government enterprises, even though the government was vested in a single despot. The day of huge private economic ventures, in either the commercial or the industrial field, had not yet dawned. But a premonitory glow was to be seen on the social horizon, and it was not long before the sun of a new era broke upon the landscape.

Chapter XV

ECONOMIC CULTURE *(Continued)*. STANDARD OF LIVING

Joint-Stock Company

The distinctive feature of this new epoch was the joint-stock company, the progenitor of the modern corporation. This was essentially a novel system of the ownership of businesses. Under it, the ownership of a vast enterprise was distributed among a large number of individuals, many of them relatively small holders. The main advantages were threefold. It made possible the collection of larger sums for such undertakings than any single individual, aside from royalty, was able to provide in those days. It divided the risks of the undertaking—which were heavy enough, indeed—among a number of contributors. And it enabled the common man to participate in what had previously been the prerogatives of royalty. These great adventuring companies operated on the basis of charters from the sovereign, which usually included concessions of a monopolistic sort for trade or exploitation in some outlying possession of the crown.

The enthusiasm with which this new economic device was hailed, as soon as its features and possibilities became familiar, was tremendous. As already indicated, the opportunities for profit were almost incalculable. But there were also abundant chances of loss, amounting in the extreme to the total investment. Thus there was a powerful appeal to the speculative impulse which seems to be deeply rooted in human nature. Some of the companies that rested on a stable and permanent basis, such as the Dutch and English East India Companies, had long and prosperous careers. Others, of which the Mississippi Bubble is the most notorious example, were of the most speculative and insubstantial character. The eagerness of the populace for each new issue of shares furnished a vivid forecast of the attitude of modern stock-buyers in a boom time. There is an account of a certain company that offered shares in an enterprise, "the purpose of which would be revealed in due time." There was a mad rush for the shares that would be almost incredible were it not for all too similar occurrences in connection with our modern financial activities.

For the purposes of our present analysis, the important point is that these companies introduced the expedient of business ownership divided among an indefinite number of individual holders. This practice did not reach its full fruition until the Industrial Revolution paved the way for its application to large-scale industrial, instead of commercial, ventures.

Thus was introduced a cultural device that was to have an incalculable influence for good and evil on the entire social life of succeeding centuries. The corporate form of organization was extended from the field of commercial and maritime adventure to the closely related field of colonization. Several of the colonial establishments along the North American Atlantic coast were chartered companies. But the full efflorescence of this potent institution had to wait upon the emergence of some new ideas in the technical branches of production. These were soon forthcoming, as time is reckoned in human history. They expressed themselves in certain epochal discoveries and inventions which are now familiar to every school-boy, the steam engine, the spinning jenny, the power loom, and the use of coal as fuel. These were merely the vanguard of a host of subsequent innovations, piling up in almost geometrical ratios, and in their aggregate introducing the profound economic and social upheaval known as the Industrial Revolution. It is not necessary for us to rehearse all the hackneyed details of mass production, factory organization, child labor, mechanization, high specialization of production and occupation, concentration of management and ownership, and the rise of the modern captain of industry. Let us concentrate our attention on the change that was involved in the typical unit of production, and the bearing that this had on the life of the average member of society, particularly as he represented the labor factor in production.

TRANSITION TO MODERN ECONOMY

As a starting point, let us recall once more that up to this time the typical unit of production was dominated by the laborer. His bodily energy, his skill and dexterity, his accumulated experience, his native intelligence and shrewdness were the essential factors. Greatly as they might be amplified by material devices of one sort or another, they were indispensable. In such a unit the tools or simple machines were appendages of the human worker, extensions of his personal equipment. It could accurately be said that such a man *worked with* certain tools and implements. And however this unit might be owned, whether individually, communally, or by conventional status, it was small enough in compass so that it was available to every normal individual of the appropriate social rank.

DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL CRAFTS

Between the period of feudalism and the inauguration of the modern era several important developments had taken place which are indispensable links in our analysis. The first was the development of the industrial crafts to a position of large importance. These were concerned with the application of the highly developed techniques of manufacture, and were conducted characteristically by skilled master workmen aided by their children and a small body of apprentices. They were, accordingly, individual businesses. There was a strong group feeling among the members of the same craft, who were organized into very powerful guilds. Through these guilds, and through various legal regulations, the conduct of these crafts was strictly prescribed and limited, but they were, nevertheless, essentially individual enterprises. Along with these were similar trade guilds, devoted to different branches of commerce, each unit being also conducted as an individual business.

Domestic System

Another important development was what is known as the "domestic system" of industry, which was a minor foreshadowing of the modern era, on account of its introduction of the entrepreneurial middle man.

Free Labor Class

A third change was the growth of a class of free laborers who were not attached to any piece of land, but were ready to sell their efforts to anyone who would buy. The origin of this class can be traced to certain epochal events, the full force of which was felt most heavily in the British Isles. The first of these was the Black Death, an exceptionally virulent and devastating epidemic of a contagious disease, probably the bubonic plague, which swept westward across Europe, carrying destruction wherever it went, and reaching England in 1348. Estimates of the total loss of life in this disaster differ widely. It is a conservative judgment that one-third of the population of English perished by the Black Death. The effect of this heavy reduction in the population was to create a keen demand for labor, in the face of which it proved impossible to hold workers to their traditional obligations. England was soon full of roving laborers, offering themselves to the highest bidder. This process was accelerated by changes that were taking place in the villages and countryside. The growth of the textile industries had created a great demand for wool, and many of the large landholders were giving up the cultivation of diversified crops in order to turn the land over to sheep grazing. At the same time, the common lands, which according to immemorial custom had provided the common man with the means of supporting an animal or two, were now arbitrarily enclosed by the powerful landlords and devoted to pasturing sheep. This large-scale reversion from agriculture to stock-raising is an interesting instance of a retrogressive evolutionary movement, which would naturally be expected to produce wide disturbance. By these measures many formerly established tillers of the soil were cast adrift to join the ranks of detached laborers. Thus there developed a new relationship between the ordinary laborer and the directors of industrial activity—new, not in the sense that it had never been known before, for scattered instances had doubtless occurred in much earlier times,* but new in the characteristic and dominating position that it assumed in the general economic system. Just as cannibalism had gradually been transformed into slavery, and slavery into serfdom, so serfdom was supplanted by the wage system, or, as some of its harsher critics call it, "wage slavery." This change was consistent with, was in fact a part of, the transition from the prevailing principle of status which characterized the feudal period to the principle of contract that dominates modern life. The laborer, like every other participator in economic life, was "free" to make the best arrangement he could with his employer.

Egalitarianism and Individualism

The fourth, and perhaps the most important, change that took place in the economic landscape between feudalism and capitalism was of an entirely different sort. Among the features of the wealth-producing system, mentioned above,† was the set of philosophic assumptions and abstract dogmas that underlie and direct economic relations. During the last half of the eighteenth century there was developing in Western Europe, particularly in France, a powerful group of such doctrines, the influence of which was felt in every department of life, but particularly in the political and economic. These may be summarized as Egalitarianism and Individualism. They had to do largely with rights. They proclaimed the universal principles of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, asserted that all men are born free and equal, endowed with certain natural and inalienable rights, such as freedom and the pursuit of happiness, and entitled to complete self-direction and the management of their own affairs. These slogans were eagerly hailed by the common people of the time as a sort of emancipation proclamation, or ''declaration of independence,'' and in fact they served a very useful purpose in helping to break down the privilege, favoritism, injustice, and oppression that were characteristic of the aristocratic societies of the period. Today, we recognize that most of them are inherently false, or at best inconsistent and contradictory. They are one of the outstanding illustrations of a sociological paradox, not at all in keeping with the Sunday-school books, that that which is not true may sometimes be very useful, and that bad means occasionally produce good ends.

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* Thus Jacob, as recorded in the passage already quoted (see p. 268), speaks to Laban about his wages.

† See p. 262.

It is apparent at a glance that these doctrines, too, were consistent with the shift from status to contract. For every individual, being free, is entitled to make such terms with his fellows in the affairs of life as he sees fit, so long as he does not directly infringe on the rights of others, and being equal, he can be relied upon to look after his own interests and see that the arrangement is equitable. In the economic field, the application of this philosophy took the specific form of the famous doctrine of *laissez-faire, laissez-passer,* usually abbreviated to laissez-faire, which has ever since operated as the Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta, of the individualist. The gist of this doctrine may be summed up briefly: Every individual has a right to get the most possible happiness out of life; as far as his economic relations are concerned, he can get this by offering to society that for which society will pay the highest reward; but society will pay each man most for the thing that he can do best, the greatest service that he can render; consequently, if all individuals are left free to find their own level and place in the scheme of things, eventually each one will be found doing the thing he is best fitted for, and receiving from society the maximum return that it can be induced to give him; so both the individual and society will be reaping the greatest advantage, and everything will be lovely. So stated, the doctrine sounds logical and convincing, and it made a profound appeal to the thinking classes of the early nineteenth century. It must be reiterated that it really served a useful purpose in helping to free the weak elements of society from many forms of arbitrary interference and tyrannical compulsion. But it was seized upon by the rapidly emerging class of business promoters, organizers, and managers as a justification for demanding a "hands-off" policy with respect to their operations on the part of society. In the form of "less (or no) government in business" it permeated the economic and legislative development of the nineteenth century, and exerts a powerful influence in the halls of Congress, and around the tables in directors' rooms, down to the present moment.

Dawn of the Industrial Era

The effects of all these changes on the industrial and family life of England, and to a less extent of other countries, were immediate and appalling. Factories sprang up everywhere, the volume of production rose by leaps and bounds, export trade swelled portentously. But wages sank to impossible levels, while the poor rates rose to meet the increasing destitution, and in the dwellings of the working class was seen the ironical spectacle of expert, self-respecting, and formerly prosperous craftsmen and hand-workers staying home and keeping house for their ten- and eight-year-old children who toiled twelve and sixteen hours in the mills under incredible conditions, while in the coal mines far below the earth's surface naked women on their hands and knees hauled the cars to and from the foot of the shaft.

All this is familiar to every student of industrial history. The central significance of it is that at the dawn of the nineteenth century the average member of Western society found himself suddenly plunged into the midst of a human environment as alien and uncongenial to him as if it were another world. Three changes of fundamental importance in his relations with this environment had occurred. First, a complete reversal had taken place in the relative importance of labor and capital in the economic structure and the economic process. The machine now dominated. Previously, the laborer had worked with his tools and simple mechanisms; now the machine operated with so many "hands." The speed of the process, and the nature of the human operations, were determined by the character of the machine. The qualities of intelligence, resourcefulness, and physical strength that had previously given him success and standing were no longer of importance. What was needed now was endurance, application, and docility, and these could be furnished by a mere child—until he wore out, and there were always more to take his place. In the second place, the typical unit of production had now become so large that the average worker could not possibly provide the land and capital necessary to make it function, even if he had had the special kind of mental ability required to operate it. On the other hand, the economy and efficiency of these large plants were so great that the individual could not possibly hope to compete with them on the basis of the old-fashioned individual unit. The large plant now dominated the situation. The only way that the average worker could make a living was to associate himself with one of these plants, but the terms of his association were the complete antithesis of what he had been used to. Thirdly, as a result of the foregoing conditions, the worker had completely lost the ownership of his own business. Each of the typical units in the past had been a compact business entity, and as far as it was owned by any individual, it was owned by the worker. But ownership of one of these vast new plants was as remote from his possibilities as the appropriation of the moon. From now on he was destined to be a hireling, a cog in a machine, the seller of a commodity—his own labor—in the industrial markets of the world.

Expansion of Industry

For a time this new economic system swept upward on its own initial impetus, supported by the genuine economies and efficiencies that it inaugurated in the production of goods. Its success was furthered by the fact that the western hemisphere, discovered three centuries before, was just being opened up to thorough exploitation. Its vast stores of natural resources furnished the raw materials for the expanding industries of the Old World, while its prosperous and rapidly growing populations afforded a seemingly inexhaustible market for manufactured products. Furthermore, the very expansion of the industrial system created temporarily the conditions of its own success. The period of plant building is marked by a prosperity that may not survive after the plant is completed and in operation. At the same time there was taking place a commercial revolution, scarcely second in importance to the industrial one, each dependent on the other, and each contributing to the other's effects. The commercial revolution was characterized primarily by the development of a world market. This was made possible partly by the improvements in land and water transportation which were a feature of the general mechanization of the economic structure. Both the speed and the carrying capacity of the transportation units were largely increased. The cost of conveyance was lowered so that many commodities became objects of world trade which previously had not been able to bear the cost of carriage more than a few miles from the place of their origin. Tending in the same direction were improvements in communication by mail, telegraph, cable, and telephone, increased knowledge of geography, improved access to raw materials the world over, the enlargement of diplomatic and consular services, and innumerable other features of the modern era which have contributed to contract time and space to a fraction of their former dimensions.

Today, we are beginning to visualize the full significance of these titanic changes. We have seen the productive capacity of the individual man increased a thousandfold, we have seen the output of material goods magnified and diversified until it would seem that there should be abundance for every human creature. We have seen the forces and resources of nature brought under our control to an extent that would really seem to justify us in calling ourselves lords of creation. And yet we have been forced to recognize not only how futile, but how positively devastating, all these achievements may be unless accompanied by a correspondingly elaborated and ingenious social organization and instrumentation for their control and direction. One aspect of the human environment has been developed to a phenomenal degree while another, and even more important one, has been allowed to lag far behind. The individual, whose success, happiness, and very life depend upon his adjustment to his human environment, finds himself faced with the necessity of adaptation to conditions that are mutually incongruous, and is bruised and lacerated in the vain struggle.

Continuity and Reproduction

Society's interest in continuity could be served if its present members bore enough children so that those who survived the perils of youth and grew up to become parents would equal the present number, and they in turn bore a similar number of children, and this continued generation after generation. This would provide for at least a stationary population, and guarantee society against extinction. This would be true regardless of the degree of happiness and comfort enjoyed by the individuals of each successive generation. The whole population could live on the margin of starvation, but as long as a sufficient number did not starve, continuity would be achieved. There is little doubt that practically all societies would pay this extreme price for continuity if it were necessary. Fortunately for humanity, however, this has very seldom been necessary in the later stages of cultural development. This is because the improvements in the wealth-producing equipment of society have progressed fast enough to provide not only for a constant population, but a growing one, and also leave a considerable margin for the creation and use of material goods not essential to mere survival. This margin of well-being above the irreducible requirements of existence constitutes the "standard of living" of a society.

Standard of Living

The standard of living is an essentially human attribute. It is true that some of the higher species of animals enjoy a certain amount of "leisure time," that is, they do not have to spend their entire energies in the food quest and the rearing of the young. Some of them spend part of their time in actual play. But this is simply part of their instinctive and biological organization; it is practically the same for all members of the species, and does not improve generation after generation. Particularly, the animals have no accumulations of material supplies to make life more pleasant or interesting. Man's unique achievement in this respect is due to a combination of wealth-producing resources which for want of a better term we may call "economic culture." Any particular development of economic culture is commonly referred to as a "stage of the arts." Economic culture consists of four main elements. First, there is an accumulation of knowledge which can be applied to the production of wealth. This knowledge includes both scientific and technical lore, and the practical, rule-of-thumb information and "tricks of the trade" acquired by experience in actually doing things, and passed on from generation to generation of craftsmen. Second, there are acquired skills and dexterities, physical and mental adaptations to the task in hand, that are learned after birth. Third, there are certain qualities of the human participants that are hereditary in character and transmitted in the germ plasm from generation to generation, such things as native inventive ability, resourcefulness in solving problems, perseverance, "industriousness," conformability to routine, etc. These traits are evidently elusive, and difficult to isolate or define, and there is much discussion among geneticists as to how far they are actually a matter of physical inheritance. But to the extent that they are inherent in the genetic stock of a people, it is evident that they contribute directly to its economic success. And fourth, there is the actual accumulation of material instruments of production—factories, machines, tools, railroads, steamships, telephone and telegraph systems, scientific libraries and laboratories, in short, everything of a material sort that contributes in any way, directly or indirectly, to the success of the society in its economic pursuits. Thus economic culture is obviously a very comprehensive concept, merely to catalog the items of which would be an exhausting and impossible task. But it needs no argument to show that it is on the basis of this factor that man has been able to build up a steadily widening margin between himself and the elemental struggle for existence that characterizes the subhuman animals, and was his own lot in the first stages of his existence.

DEFINITIONS OF STANDARD

There have been many and various efforts to define the standard of living. A few typical ones may be selected almost at random.

By the standard of living is meant the mode of activity and scale of comfort which a person has come to regard as indispensable to his happiness and to secure and retain which he is willing to make any reasonable sacrifice, such as working longer, or postponing marriage.[1]

The number and character of the wants which a man considers more important than marriage and family constitute his standard of life.[2]

A proper standard of living means the amount of economic goods which is required to maintain the highest industrial efficiency of the individual or family under consideration.[3]

The amount of comfort or luxuries customarily enjoyed by any class of men forms the "standard of living" of that class.[4]

One of the purest of all the products of current mores is the standard of living. . . . The standard of living is the measure of decency and suitability in material comfort (diet, dress, dwelling, etc.) which is traditional and habitual in a subgroup.[5]

TWO MEANINGS OF "STANDARD"

In these definitions may be discerned two contradictory ideas struggling for expression, which, upon examination, are found to correspond to the two different meanings of the word "standard" in every-day conversation. (Herein, incidentally, we find an excellent illustration of the difficulty of precise terminology in sociology.) One use of the word indicates a goal, objective, or ideal. Thus we are adjured to "keep our standards high." Of two men it may be said that one has "high standards" and the other "low standards." It may be admitted that the former habitually fails to live up to his standards, and may, in fact, display a lower level of actual conduct than the latter. The other use of the word indicates that which is customary or usual. Thus we speak of a standard typewriter, a standard gauge railway, a standard gear shift, or a standard dictionary. The former usage implies something which probably is not so, but which somebody would like to have so; the latter, something which is so, whether anybody likes it or not. Is it surprising that confusion arises when such opposite ideas are included in the same phrase used by equally scientific writers? The notion of an ideal is plainly implicit in the first two of the definitions given above, the notion of an existing condition in the last two, while the middle one is indeterminate. It is also worthy of note in passing that the first two definitions set the standard of living in opposition to marriage and a family, suggesting very pertinently that the standard of living may be an overt expression of the basic antagonism between hunger and love which has already been stressed.

It must be granted that either of these two concepts is tenable. The standard may be that toward which a group is striving, an imaginary stimulus such as we have recognized to be common in human motivation. Or it may be the measure of that which actually exists. The majority of writers seem to lean toward the former concept; yet it seems indubitable that the latter is much better adapted to scientific discussion, at least to begin with. It seems much more illuminating to start with reality, and consider things as they are, and then upon that basis to move on to the discussion of things that may be, than to start immediately with the visionary and the unreal. That is the procedure that will be adopted for the remainder of this discussion, and it may be understood that hereafter, unless otherwise specified, the standard of living refers to that which is usual or customary; it corresponds very closely to an average.

Family the Unit

There is another feature of some of the foregoing definitions that is open to criticism. They refer to the standard of living as an attribute of an individual, or of a "family or individual." This would be accurate enough if the members of society characteristically "lived" as individuals. But they do not. The typical unit of "living," in the sense used in this phrase, is not an individual, but a family. This is in accordance with the principle already pointed out* that the family is not only a unit of production, but also of consumption. For the typical member of society, all those desiderata of dress, dwelling, diet, material comfort, etc., referred to in the definitions, are expressions, not of an individual income and a separate establishment, but of a family income and budget, and a family residence. The standard of living is really a function of a group, and the representative unit of the group is the family. This demonstrates the confusion that results from defining the standard as antithetical to marriage and a family. Of course, there are many individuals who have independent existences. But they are not representative of society as a whole. Most of them are in that situation for only a portion of their lives, and society, with its primary interest in continuity, must assume the family association to be normal and expected of its members, and to set up its forms and sanctions on the presumption of family ties.

Final Definition

For the purposes of our discussion, then, we may set up the following definition: The standard of living of a group is the amount of comfort or well-being habitually enjoyed by the average, or typical, family within the group. This is obviously a broad definition, including within its scope not only material goods, but such intangibles as sunshine, fresh air, pleasant neighbors, freedom from worry, and so on. This is a legitimate, and in many ways useful, conception of the term. But unfortunately, these immaterial and intangible desiderata are not measurable or comparable by any method yet discovered, and to include them in the definition gives an impression of vagueness to a concept that it is desirable to pin down to reality. For practical purposes, therefore, it is desirable to limit the definition to material things. Henceforth, therefore, unless otherwise specified, the standard of living will be defined as "the amount of material necessaries, comforts, and luxuries habitually enjoyed by the average, or typical, family within a group." This is something observable, measurable, and comparable, and therefore adapted to scientific treatment.

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* See p. 232.

So defined, the standard of living is a function of a group, and is expressed or represented by the typical family within the group. Any group of sufficient size to give the average any significance can be considered as having its standard. Theoretically, these groups may be united by any sort of a bond, and may be of any type, involuntary, semi-voluntary, or voluntary. Any group that includes a number of families has its standard, though it may be very difficult to determine it concretely. Thus it is perfectly legitimate, and practically suggestive, to speak of the standards of the white race and the Mongolian race. The reality of the concept is indicated by the fact that almost anybody, without any immediate evidence, would be ready to assert that on the whole the white race has a higher standard than the Mongolian race. The assertion would doubtless be correct. Obviously, groups based upon sex could not be so treated, for they would cut through the family unit and so contravene the meaning of the term. But religions, political parties, and the alumni of specified colleges, appropriately classified, may be thought of as having their standards. Also, the concept of the standard may be applied to territorial groups. The standard of Chicago may be compared with that of New York, or the standard of Florida with that of California.

Bases of Standard

But since the standard of living is an economic concept, the groups to which it applies most appropriately and helpfully are economic groups. These are of two main types, occupational groups, either within a single society or in different societies, and societies themselves. Thus we may compare the standard of trolley-car conductors (understanding, of course, the families whose heads are trolley-car conductors) with the standard of shoe clerks, or of bankers with lawyers, of engineers with bootblacks, of artists with garbage collectors. Or we may compare the standard of American mine workers with that of German and English mine workers. Or, for that matter, we may compare the standard of American bootblacks with that of Portuguese college professors, and possibly find that the former is higher. The measurement of the standard of an entire society is very difficult, particularly in a country like the United States, where there are very wide extremes of luxury and destitution. Furthermore, the standard, even if it could be determined, would not give a comprehensive picture of the living conditions within the society. The standard, being an average, shares many of the defects and limitations of all averages. The standard itself does not reveal how well-being is distributed among the families included in the group. A group with family conditions distributed all the way from the acme of luxury to abject destitution might show the same standard as one where family status was as homogeneous as was said to be the case a century ago in New Haven, where "no man was too poor to own a carriage, and no man was rich enough to own two." To really understand the living conditions in a society it is necessary to determine the standards of many of the societal subgroups. Nevertheless, with all its shortcomings, the concept of the standard of living of a society is very useful, indeed indispensable, in analyzing and interpreting many sociological phenomena. For instance, as we shall see, it would be impossible to understand modern immigration without it. The societal standard is, obviously, a matter of welfare rather than of continuity. But it is intimately tied up with the question of continuity, and neither can be fully understood without the other, as will be made clear later.

Measurement of Standard

As intimated above, the standard of a given group can be represented by the living conditions of a typical, or "standard," family in that group. But how is the typical family to be found? To go through the group and pick out a family as typical would obviously be to beg the question, for it would imply that the conditions that made a certain family typical were already known. No, the typical family is an artificial and abstract creation, a synthetic product. It is built up just as many other types are built up. For instance, if you were sent to a remote land, commissioned to describe the racial type of its inhabitants, you could not pick out a certain individual whom you had decided was typical, and describe his traits, for every scientist would immediately ask, "How do you know he is typical?" What you would have to do would be to make an anthropological examination of the largest possible number of members of the tribe—ideally all of them—taking separate measurements of all the important race characters, such as stature, hair and eye and skin color, shape of head, proportions of the body and of the features, form of the hair, etc., and then average the measurements of each separate trait, and by a combination of these averages, build up an artificial creature who would be the true race type. Very few of the actual members of the tribe would come very close to this synthetic individual; it would be remarkable indeed if a single individual was identical with him. Yet he would be a more accurate type of the race than any living individual who could be selected. Similarly, in depicting a family which will represent the standard of a group, the correct procedure is to take measurements of as many as possible of the items that constitute the necessaries, comforts, and luxuries of the group, based on the actual situation of the largest possible number of families, average these measurements, and combine them into a consolidated family budget. Among other things, of course, you would have to take measurements of the composition of the families, as to sex, age, and relationship, so as to make sure that your standard family was itself typical. This is a complicated and onerous task, but by no means impossible. It has been performed with an adequate degree of accuracy and completeness for a great many occupational and other groups in the United States.

Suggestions for the standardization of the procedure were made years ago by a German investigator, by the name of Engel, who divided the expenditures of a family in the following general manner:

Necessaries or Essentials	Food
	Shelter
	Clothing
	Heat and light
Culture Wants or Non-essentials	Recreation
	Medical and dental attendance
	Religion
	Music and art
	Charity
	Saving
	Miscellaneous

It may seem strange to find medical attendance, religion, and recreation classed as non-essentials, but their inclusion under that head simply shows how far short of a satisfactory living status the typical family may still fall. It has been suggested that the dividing line between necessaries and comforts corresponds closely to that between pleasure and pain. When all the necessaries have been supplied, but nothing more, the body is in a neutral state. There is no pain, but neither is there any positive pleasure. One of the definitions stipulated that a "proper" standard required a sufficient amount of supplies to keep the individual or family up to the highest industrial efficiency. This would obviously include more than mere necessaries, since efficiency depends on more than mere physical adequacy. But then, this definition includes the notion of an ideal.

Practically, then, the establishment of the standard of a group would involve measurements among its families of such items as number, size, and location of rooms in the apartment, number and location of windows, toilet facilities, specific food consumption during a year, such as pounds of beef, pork, mutton, and fowl, dozens of eggs, quarts of milk, pounds of butter and sugar, pecks of potatoes and other vegetables, loaves of bread, tons of coal, feet of gas, kilowatts of electricity, quarts of kerosene, suits of clothes and overcoats for the husband, dresses, coats, etc., for the wife, clothes for the children, shoes and underclothes for all—these and many other items under the head of necessaries. The classification of the culture wants is much more complex and difficult. Many of the items must be indicated in terms of money, so many dollars for medical care, dentistry, church, charity, saving, etc. Other of the items may be more specifically described—so many trips to the movies, so many attendances at theatres or ball-games, so many days' vacation at the shore or in the country, and so on. By such means a very graphic and accurate picture can be drawn of the yearly mode of life of such a family, and the basis laid for the comparison of different groups with one another.[6]

To aid in such comparison Engel made an important discovery, the general validity of which, with modifications, has been verified by other students. Extensive observations of actual families has revealed that there is a progressive and consistent shift in the proportions of the total expenditure that go for specific items as the family income—that is, the income of families within the group, and presumably also of the particular family—increases or diminishes. These alterations, which are commonly expressed in what are known as "Engel's Laws" may be summarized as follows: With an increase in family income, there is a tendency for a smaller percentage of the entire income to be spent for food. The percentage for clothing remains approximately the same, as does also the percentage for rent, fuel and light. The percentage remaining, and spent, for the non-essentials, or cultural wants, increases constantly. In particular societies there may be special variations, as in the case of New York City, where the percentage spent for housing tends to decline rather rapidly as the family income increases.

MATERIAL BASIS OF STANDARD

It is clear that the standard of living is the concrete material objective of both the single family and society in their struggles to achieve the interests of economic well-being. The height of the standard attained and kept by any group is the tangible measure of its success in adapting itself to both its physical and human environment, and making the best use of its various resources. An improving standard may be accepted as a mark of economic progress; a declining standard may well be recognized as a warning signal of some defects or failure in the societal structure or organization. It must not be forgotten, it is true, that there are other elements in well-being than material supplies, and that many of them may be of greater intrinsic worth to the human personality than the purely material. It is sometimes claimed that these items should be included in the concept of the standard of living, and that to omit them gives a distorted and misleading view. All this may be granted for purposes of abstract argument. But it must be conceded, as already indicated, that these elements are not measurable by any known means, and furthermore that even these intangible and sublimated interests almost without exception must have some material support. The artist must have his canvas and his pigments, the sculptor his marble and his chisels, the musician his piano or violin or perhaps a hall to sing in, and the religious worshiper his holy book, his altar, and his sanctuary. At any rate, the economic standard may very well be given a primary place, not only because it is measurable itself, but because it serves as an approximate measure of other phases of cultural advancement.

But it must also be recognized, as intimated above, that generalizations about the standard of an entire society do not by any means tell the whole story. Not only do they fail to reveal how well-being is distributed among the different subgroups, but they do not tell whether the groups are maintaining their relative positions, and all moving up or down consistently, or whether there may be a wide differential in their rate, or even their direction, of movement. It is quite possible, for instance, that the standard of a whole society may be going up while the standard of some group within it, possibly even a majority group, may be going down. This may be illustrated by the following chart:

Chart II.—Rising Societal Standard Composed of Two Sub-Standards.



Standard of Class A Is Rising Fast Enough to More Than Offset Declining Standard of Class B.

Movement of the Standard

No economic question is of greater immediate importance to a society than whether its standard of living, and the standards of its constituent classes, are going up or down. Unfortunately, the understanding of the standard of living has been so imperfect, and the study of its features so inadequate, that we have no explicit and reliable information about many of the subgroups, to say nothing of societies themselves. However, some partial studies have been made, with particular reference to the working classes in the United States, that are reliable as far as they go, and of no little contributory significance. One of these concerned itself with the standard of the unskilled laborer in this country. The method used was as follows: A typical year's budget for *necessaries* for a standard family was worked out from numerous reliable studies of actual family expenditures. The prices of these various supplies at two different dates were then estimated by the use of government indexes and other data. Similarly, the average income of an unskilled worker's family was estimated for the same dates. The total cost of the necessaries was then subtracted from the total income at each of the dates respectively, leaving a certain balance to be spent for culture wants. A proportion was then struck between this balance and the total income at each date, and it was assumed that, in accordance with Engel's laws, a smaller percentage left for culture wants would indicate a lower general standard, while a larger surplus would indicate a higher standard. The result showed that between the years 1890 and 1908 there was a slight but positive decline in the standard of living of the American unskilled working class, and that this decline probably continued up to the time of the World War.[8] There is a considerable amount of contributory evidence in support of the conclusion that previous to 1890 the standard of this class had been rising since the time when unskilled wage labor became an important element in American society. In other words, the pinnacle of well-being of the common worker in the United States appears to have been reached about the years 1890 to 1892.[9]

Causes

The causes of this phenomenon are complex, but the most important can be briefly summarized. The nineteenth century was a period of enormous industrial and commercial expansion. The innovations introduced in connection with the Industrial Revolution led to a tremendous increase in the physical plant used in production, including the construction of factories, machines, railways, steamships, telephone, telegraph, and cable systems, etc. The building of this plant required vast amounts of labor, and also huge quantities of raw materials, which, in turn, required labor for their production. This total expansion was so extensive and speedy that even the rapid growth of population in the United States and other Western countries did not provide a sufficient amount of common labor to keep real wages from rising. At the same time, the increased efficiency in production turned out greatly augmented quantities of consumer goods, and so helped to raise the standard of living, even while money prices were mounting. But the period of building a plant is one thing, and the period of utilizing a plant that is measurably complete, and is growing only moderately, is another thing. When the productive plant of a great mechanized society is fairly well rounded out, the tendency is to produce more and more goods by mechanical means, and to reduce the amount of human labor to the lowest possible minimum. If, in the meantime, the population continues to increase, there will inevitably result such a surplus of common laborers that their competition with one another for jobs will tend to beat down wages to ever lower and lower levels. In the United States, this process was undoubtedly accelerated by the vast influx of unskilled immigrant laborers which characterized the first decade and a half of the present century. The post-War period has been marked by extreme fluctuations, which reflect the unstable and perplexing character of contemporary social conditions, some aspects of which will be considered later.

Long-range Movement

Looking back over the whole stretch of human existence, there is evidence of a general improvement in the standard of mankind as a whole. At one extreme is the primitive savage family, with material supplies scarcely adequate to keep soul and body together; at the other, the typical family of a modern civilized society, not only provided with all possible requirements for a comfortable livelihood, but also equipped with the supplies and implements for the most elaborate and even fantastic forms of recreation, enjoyment, and self-expression. But there is also evidence of tremendous ups and downs, not only in given geographical areas, but likewise in the experience of societies whose communal existence has been continuous. Unfortunately, the picture cannot be complete, for ancient peoples were even less competent than ourselves to measure and record their standards of living, and we have not the materials to reconstruct them in retrospect. But there is every reason to believe that although, on the whole, man has used his enlarging economic culture progressively to improve his mode of material existence, yet, on the other hand, there have been periods when for some reason or other, the non-economic phases of his civilization broke down, or were so ill adjusted to the economic aspects, or the economic to them, that no amount of productive efficiency could by itself support a high standard, and the actual conditions suffered a more or less prolonged decline. At present writing it appears that the third decade of the twentieth century might prove to be such a period, and that our general social structure and organization were not competent to utilize constructively our unquestionably high productive capacity, so that we may as a consequence suffer a decline in our standard of living until we learn how to reconstruct our whole societal edifice into a harmoniously functioning whole, in other words, until we establish thorough normality throughout every department of our common life.

Thus new emphasis is laid on the fact, already noted, that while the productive system of society is designed primarily to secure continuity it also contributes to welfare, and so, in their higher reaches, these two great interests become closely intertwined.

CHAPTER XVI

POPULATION

As has been stated, the interest of continuity requires both the preservation of life and the reproduction of life. We have seen how, in nature, the reproduction of life is characteristically secured by methods that conflict sweepingly with the preservation of life, particularly of new-born offspring. Nature does, indeed, equip all her creatures with an impulse for self-preservation, but her primary interest in doing so seems to be that they may live long enough to reach maturity, mate, and bring into existence a succeeding generation. Her method of reproduction is to bring into the world such redundant numbers of young of each species that, no matter how arduous or perilous the conditions of life, there will be enough who survive to take their parents' place. The appalling toll that this process involves does not concern her. Man's linkage to the natural world is so close that his inherent impulses and urges would lead him into a very similar situation.

EQUIPMENT FOR REPRODUCTION

The equipment for reproduction possessed by any species consists of two main factors, first, the physiological capacity to produce offspring, and second, the urge or impulse actually to produce offspring in numbers approximating the physiological capacity. In the bisexual species, to which we may confine our observations on account of their closer kinship with man, this capacity is divided into the capacity of the females to produce ova or eggs, and the capacity of the males to produce spermatozoa or sperm. Practically, the matter narrows down to the egg-producing capacity of the females, for as a rule the males are equipped to produce a superabundant quantity of sperm, much more than sufficient to fertilize all the ova produced by the females, so that the limits to the rate of reproduction are set by the characteristics of the females. The prodigality of nature in providing this capacity is startling when first encountered. A familiar example is furnished by the oyster, a creature neither at the top nor the bottom of the evolutionary scale. The average yield of the American female oyster is 16,000,000 eggs a year. Breeding at this rate a single pair would in the fifth generation produce a mass of great-great-grandchildren eight times the size of the earth.

As we ascend the scale of evolution we find the capacity for reproduction steadily diminishing until in the highest forms of animal life only a dozen or a score of young can be produced during a lifetime. But always the possible rate exceeds the number of parents, so that an unchecked process of reproduction would go on in the form of a geometrical progression, and almost without exception at a rapid rate. There is not a species in existence that could not cover the entire earth in a very short time if there were nothing to stop it.

LAW OF STATIONARY POPULATION

Backing up this tremendous fertility is the great sex urge, one of the two basic impulses of organic life. On the other hand, checking the potential increase is the absolute limitation of food supplies provided by a finite globe. There is only one possible outcome. Every species multiplies up to the supporting power of its habitat, as conditioned by other species struggling for existence in the same area, and thereafter is prevented from any further increase whatever. The law of nature is the law of stationary population. The birth-rate and the death-rate are always equal in nature. There may be temporary fluctuations, or a new species may come into existence which will increase for a limited time. But for organisms in general, and over long stretches of time, the inflexible regulation holds. On the average, only so many of one generation can survive as have places made for them by the death of their elders. This means that no matter how numerous the progeny of a bisexual species may be, only two of the total can survive to maturity and become parents in their turn.

The entire surplus is eliminated by death, which takes two forms, corresponding closely to the two great human methods of slaughter—violent destruction for the sake of food or a free field, which has its parallel in war, and starvation by exclusion from the limited supplies, which is the analog of economic competition. Most of this toll of death falls upon the new-born. Among the great mass of creatures in nature, infant mortality falls short of totality by an infinitesimal fraction of one per cent.

Man alone of all species on earth has been able thus far to escape the law of stationary population. The means by which he has accomplished this feat, as we shall see, are movement and the development of an economic culture.

Definition of Population

The term population, as used in scientific discussions, may be defined as the total number of men, women, and children included within a society. The term population is therefore just as elastic as the term society. Whenever a group may appropriately be spoken of as a society, the human beings who compose it may be referred to as a population. It is true that in every-day speech we often use the word in a much more restricted sense, speaking of the population of a certain city block, or even of a certain house. But as a concept in sociological analysis it is much preferable to treat population as an attribute of a society.

There are two aspects of population to be considered, both of which are of profound importance to society. These are the quantity and the quality. It is a striking commentary on the slow development of social science that these two considerations, which are of primary importance to society, are only just beginning to be studied intensively. Society has devoted much attention to various of its problems, such as crime, destitution, vice, divorce, labor relations, etc., all of which are secondary, and has neglected the study of population which surpasses them all in importance, and in fact underlies and conditions them all. The scientific study of the quantitative aspects of population is called "larithmics," a word derived from two Greek roots denoting "people" and "number." The more familiar term "eugenics," covering the field of qualitative study, is also derived from two Greek roots meaning "good" and "origin." These two subsciences are supplementary and interdependent, but the forces and principles governing them are best considered separately in the beginning.

LARITHMICS

Larithmics may be taken up first, partly because number is, in a sense, a simpler and more elementary concept than quality, and second because numerical data, being primarily a matter of counting, can be handled more precisely and objectively than qualitative data, which, by their very nature, imply, or at least ultimately involve, value judgments.

The custom of giving definite thought to the quantitative aspects of a society's structure is, as already suggested, of relatively recent origin. The practice of taking regular censuses is practically a matter of less than a century and a half. The unbroken series of decennial censuses started by the United States in 1790 is the oldest in the world with the exception of Sweden. Occasional counts were taken in certain ancient societies, but they were spasmodic and not thoroughly established in the mores. An early and interesting case in point is recorded in the Old Testament. It appears that King David, for military reasons, conceived the idea of counting the people of Israel. That such a procedure was not sanctioned in a theocratic society such as this is evidenced by the vigorous objections of the leading General, Joab, who protested: "The Lord make his people an hundred times so many more as they be; but, my lord the king, are they not all my lord's servants? why then doth my lord require this thing? why will he be a cause of trespass to Israel?"[1] But David persisted, and the count was taken. The Lord, however, as Joab had anticipated, was highly displeased, and forced David to submit to a choice between three very unpleasant penalties. That notions of this sort were somewhat wide-spread is evidenced by a similar instance, dated only three centuries later, in the far-away land of China. According to the historical account: "King Hsuan, having lost his army in the southern states, proceeded to take a census of the people at T'ai Yuan. Chung Shan-fu remonstrated, saying: 'The people should not be censused.' King Hsuan did not heed, and did carry out the census of the people.'"[2]

This notion of the sinfulness, or dangerousness, of census taking persisted down close to modern times even in civilized societies. It was quite prevalent among the American Colonies before the Revolution. The people of New Jersey, for example, opposed the taking of a census on the ground that a wave of sickness had followed a similar procedure in New York, and they feared that the wrath of God might be visited upon them as it had been upon David thousands of years earlier.

As a consequence, we know very little positively about the size of ancient populations. But careful estimates have been made from the best available sources of various kinds. Some of the more important conclusions are as follows:

Population of Roman Empire, 14 b.c.

Italy	6,000,000
Spain	6,000,000
Greece	3,000,000
Gaul	3,400,000
Other countries	4,000,000
	22,400,000
Continents	
Europe	23,000,000
Asia	19,500,000
Africa	11,500,000
	54,000,000

It is estimated that the population of Europe hardly exceeded 50,000,000 before the fifteenth century.[3]

Sources of Larithmic Change

There are two ways to add to the population of a society—births and increments from outside. And there are two ways to detract from a population—deaths and decrements to the outside. In the case of "the great society," the whole of humanity, only the former of each of these possibilities is available. Only by births and deaths is the population of the globe affected. If the mania for rocket exploration continues there may in the future be some cases of decrement by departure into space. But they will doubtless remain negligible for a long time to come. And there is no present prospect of any increments from the stellar regions. For these reasons, and for clarity of analysis, it is preferable to disregard intersocietal movements for the present, and to examine the principles that govern the growth of population in a self-contained, isolated society. In such a society, all additions to population must come by birth, all deductions by death. If the number of births exceeds the number of deaths in a given period of time, then during that period the population increases. If the number of deaths exceeds the number of births, the population diminishes. If births and deaths are equal, population is stationary.

Larithmic Rates

As soon as the importance of the size of population began to be explicitly recognized, efforts were made to devise means of computing and recording changes in concise and comparable terms. The result was the various "rates" which are in common use today in dealing with vital phenomena. A rate is a proportion with a time element included. Some constant is taken as a base, and the variable is represented as a proportion of that, for a specified time period. The most important larithmic rates are the birth-rate, the death-rate, and the rate of population growth.* In each of these rates the customary procedure is to take an average thousand of the total population as the base, and a calendar year as the time period. The rate is then the expression of the number of births or deaths per thousand per year. The crude rates are based upon the total number of births or deaths compared to the total number of the population. There are various ''refinements'' of these rates but they can be dispensed with in a general analysis. To establish any of these rates, the gross figures must of course be known. We must know the total population, and we must know the aggregate numbers of births and deaths. Given these figures, the method of computing the rates is simple: To get the birth-rate, divide the number of births during the year by the number of thousands in the population (computed at about the middle of the year), and the result is the number of births per thousand. Similarly, to get the death-rate divide the number of deaths by the number of thousands in the total population. There are two ways of deriving the rate of growth. First, subtract the number of the total population at the beginning of the year from the number at the end of the year; this gives the actual numerical increase. Then divide this number by the number of thousands in the total population and it gives the rate. A simpler way, provided the other two rates are known, is to subtract the death-rate from the birth-rate. The two methods, of course, give the same result.

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* It is a further evidence of the immaturity of this branch of science that no satisfactory term has come into general usage for this third rate. The use of the words "growth" or "increase" is unfortunate, for the numerical change may be down instead of up, while the word "change" is unsatisfactory because it might apply to quality. The phrase "rate of numerical change" is cumbrous and pedantic. The best solution at present appears to be to use the term "rate of growth," and to understand that the growth may be a minus quantity.

Causes of Births

These rates, obviously, are only convenient symbolic representations of the facts. They are not to be regarded as causative factors in any sense. They are not phenomena, but simply methods of visualizing phenomena. For the causation of the phenomena it is necessary to inquire into the whole complex of factors and forces that occasion births and deaths. As for births, the physical factors are now well understood, thanks to the contributions of biology and genetics. A birth is caused by the sexual union of a man and a woman under such conditions that the sperm succeeds in reaching and fertilizing the ovum, and the subsequent absence of any unfavorable factors which would prevent the fetus from going through its natural stages of development and coming into the world as a living infant.* Back of this overt event, as we have seen, is the physiological equipment of the man and the woman. But back of this there is an intricate combination of human desires, hopes, passions, fears, ambitions, affections, opportunities, etc., all linked up with the institutions of betrothal, marriage, home, family support, taboos, emotional conditioning, personal inclinations and aversions, and a thousand and one considerations that defy apprehension or enumeration. Very few women actually bear children up to, or anywhere near up to, their maximum physiological capacity in the primary biological sense. To understand the causation of the birth performance of a society it is not only necessary to know why women bear the children that they do, but also why they do not bear more. This explanation, in its completeness, is far beyond the reach of social science at its best. But it must never be forgotten that the actual causation lies in these human, personal factors, many of them intimate in the highest degree, not in figures, enumerations, or tables of rates. As has been said, it is the besetting sin of the professional statistician to treat his rates as if they were themselves causes, or at least as if they derived from forces that were so immutable and standardized that they could be treated as constants in his analyses.

In view of these facts, it may at first seem surprising that birth-rates show as much consistency and order as they do. There is, indeed, a high degree of regularity in the birth-rates of a sufficiently large population. But this is merely a case of the regularity of mass phenomena, and it is, indeed, a regularity that holds only over relatively short periods of time. Looked at with due perspective, as we shall see, there is a wide variation in this fundamental rate.

Causes of Deaths

In a similar way, the causes of deaths are to be looked for first in the viability of the human animal, that is, his capacity to live, set off against the innumerable contingencies of disease, accident, old age, and forcible destruction by himself or another. And back of these immediate factors lie all the vicissitudes of personal experience, types of human environment, and purposeful preventive activities on the part of society. The explanation of deaths involves not only an explanation of why men are physiologically incapable of living beyond a certain upper limit of age, but also why so many of them fail to reach this limit. The only explanation that is as yet possible is that which rests upon knowledge of the self-maintenance equipment of society, its provisions for health protection and medical care, its control of the homicidal impulse, its military activities, etc. In brief, the explanation of deaths, like that of births, involves a survey of the entire social structure and functioning.

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* Or as a dead infant, in the case of what is known as a stillbirth. According to the best statistical procedure a stillbirth is counted as both a birth and a death.

The actual results, or phenomena, are much more easy to observe and record than the causes. Unfortunately, the actual records do not go far enough back to give us a very long perspective. This is particularly unfortunate because the end of the vista usually lies somewhere in the nineteenth century, which, as we have observed, was a unique period in human existence. Very few continuous tables of birth-rates and death-rates go back of the middle of that century, and many are much briefer. Consequently, it is impossible to know definitely what were the trends of population growth before very recent times. All authentic charts and curves, therefore, dealing with births and deaths must have their beginning at some point in a very exceptional and atypical period in human affairs, and accordingly cannot be relied upon to reveal the course of events in earlier years and centuries. No statistical procedure is more indefensible than to extrapolate any population curve backward, for even though we do not know what the causative sequences actually were in earlier centuries, we are absolutely positive that they were very different from those of the last century, or the present. Students of population all too frequently forget or ignore this principle, and as a result arrive at some very astonishing, not to say fantastic, conclusions.

The two basic larithmic tables for the United States are as follows:

DEATH-RATES AND BIRTH-RATES PER 1000
TOTAL POPULATION IN THE REGISTRATION AREA OF
THE UNITED STATES

Year	Birth-rate
1915	25.1
1916	25.0
1917	24.7
1918	24.6
1919	22.3
1920	23.7
1921	24.3
1922	22.5
1923	22.4
1924	22.6
1925	21.4
1926	20.6
1927	20.6
1928	19.7
1929	18.8
1930	18.9
1931	18.0
1932	17.3

Year	Death-rate
1880	19.8
1890	19.6
1900	17.8
1900	17.6*
1901	16.5
1902	15.9
1903	16.0
1904	16.5
1905	16.0
1906	15.7
1907	16.0
1908	14.8
1909	14.4
1910	15.0
1911	14.2
1912	13.9
1913	14.1
1914	13.6
1915	13.6
1916	14.0
1917	14.3
1918	18.1
1919	12.9
1920	13.1
1921	11.6
1922	11.8
1923	12.3
1924	11.8
1925	11.8
1926	12.2
1927	11.4
1928	12.0
1929	11.9
1930	11.3
1931	11.3
1932	10.9

* A different basis.

Throughout these tables two important trends are distinctly observable. These are declines in both the birth-rate and the death-rate. These constitute one of the outstanding sociological phenomena of modern times, the significance of which cannot yet be fully determined, but must be of profound importance. In general, the death-rate has not declined as fast as the birth-rate, so that there has been a net decline in the rate of growth, but not nearly so extreme as it would have been if the birth-rate alone had been involved.

Decline in Death-rate

The basic, or underlying, cause of the decline in the death-rate can easily be comprehended. As already pointed out, society's interest in continuity, coupled with the individual's interest in survival, leads to the spontaneous utilization of every means for postponing or escaping death, and prolonging life. This is so completely a societal axiom that it is never necessary to convince the mass of humanity that life ought to be preserved, though it is often necessary to urge upon them the need of more care and the utilization of means that have been made available. The course of the death-rate, therefore, becomes an almost automatic index of society's success in grappling with its major life problems. A decline in the rate is a necessary concomitant of an advance in economic culture, provided it is associated with a harmonious movement in general civilization, so that normality is preserved throughout. We have already seen that such an advance was characteristic of the nineteenth century. Consequently, the declining death-rate calls for no searching inquiry, though the details of its accomplishment are of great intrinsic interest.

Decline in Birth-rate

The decline in the birth-rate is not to be explained so simply. There is no general and compelling urge toward a low birth-rate, as there is toward a low death-rate, on the part of either society or the individual. Indeed, the predominant inclination of society, as we have seen, has always been in the opposite direction. As for individuals, their inclinations have varied; some have wanted many children, some few or none. But as a matter of fact, the birth-rate, except in the most advanced countries, is an expression of the desire for children to only a very limited extent. Until recent decades the reproduction of the human species has been closely analogous to that of the lower animals; the motivating impulse has not been the desire for offspring, but the mating urge, and children have followed as a natural biological consequence. The whole matter of the causative forces back of births is so complicated that its further consideration may profitably be delayed until the general factors in population change have been examined.

LARITHMIC THEORY

Like practically every other science, larithmics divides itself into two sections, the pure, or theoretic, science, and the applied, or practical, science.* Theoretic larithmics seeks to answer the question why the population of any given society is what it is at any given time, or, in more general terms, to discover what are the broad factors and forces that govern the growth of population. First of all, it is helpful to think of population as an elastic entity, actuated by a powerful expansive force which tends always to enlarge it to indefinite proportions. This is entirely in keeping with the basic principles of reproduction which have already been set forth. This being the case, the factors that actually govern population growth may be thought of as limiting or restraining conditions which hold this ebullient factor within bounds, and prevent it from even approaching that infinity toward which it always tends. The qualifications of this interpretation which have been necessitated by relatively recent developments can be taken account of after the primary relations have been discussed. We are now prepared to understand in some detail what these limiting factors are, and how they operate. Let it be remembered that we are thinking of population in societal terms.

LAND

The one basic necessity for the maintenance and growth of population is land. Both as a corporeal resting place for human individuals, and as the source of all food and other material supplies, land is indispensable. Every society, therefore, must have an area of land from which it derives its support through either actual ownership, or use, or command of its products. All true societies occupy land, for on no other basis could they carry on the pursuit of the major interests which are inherent in the nature of society. The economic success and prosperity, and therefore to some extent the achievement in every other field of endeavor, of every society depend primarily on the character of its land. This may be divided into two aspects, the extent or area of the land and its productivity. Sheer area is important directly for the purposes of standing room, but the total significance of area depends of course partly upon the other element of productivity. This, in turn, may be divided into two aspects, corresponding to the two chief types of elemental production, which may be designated as agriculture and mining. Agriculture includes those forms of production which do not involve permanent withdrawals from the land, at least not in proportion to the amount of product, but are of a rotatory nature so that the substances taken from the land are constantly restored, and in the course of time are ready for use again. This replenishment is so nearly complete in primitive forms of cultivation that the idea became established that agriculture does not occasion any depletion of the land, and the older textbooks used to speak of the "indestructible qualities of the soil." We know now that the qualities of the soil are highly destructible, and we have learned to our cost how thoroughly land may be ruined even by agricultural processes. Nevertheless, land will survive long treatment by agriculture, and modern science has shown us methods of preserving soil quality with little deterioration. From this point of view, therefore, the land of a society is to be judged by its typical fertility taken in consideration with its area, and an abstract formula, fertility times area, would give an accurate representation of the agricultural resources of a society.

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* See p. 102.

Mining includes all those forms of production that rest upon fixed and inflexible supplies of certain material substances stored in the land controlled by a society, and ready to be withdrawn whenever the stage of the technical arts makes it possible. These supplies are not self-restoring, nor is there any way of replacing them. Once they are gone, they are gone forever. Whether they cease to exist in their primitive form depends upon the uses made of them. Some of them are at least partially recoverable after their first use; others are virtually dissipated forever. But in either case, each withdrawal from the land represents a net deduction in the future productivity of the land, and consequently a corresponding diminution in the basic resources of society. In this category obviously fall all the metals, as well as coal, gas, and oil, and such substances as rocks of various kinds, brick clay, and asphalt. In the United States, unfortunately, timber has been treated mainly as a mining product. The standing trees have been regarded as fixed supplies, and they have been withdrawn ruthlessly with no thought of their replacement. Of course, lumbering should be regarded as an agricultural pursuit, as it has been for centuries in older and less prodigal countries. Stock-raising may be regarded as a form of agriculture in this connection, or as a closely allied pursuit. The mining resources of a society may be calculated in fixed terms, and with sufficient technical ability may theoretically be computed at any given time for an indefinite future. It is clear, then, that the economic achievements of a society that rest on agriculture are of a very different order from those that rest on mining. A society that at one epoch is very rich because of its mining resources may later find itself reduced to penury, whereas another society, seemingly much less affluent at first, may continue to maintain a modest but stable prosperity. This is a principle that has been too little recognized by economists and political analysts, although, as already pointed out, it has served as the basis for one very illuminating treatment of world history.

MATERIAL ENDOWMENT OF SOCIETY

We can now take a broad and comprehensive view of the total material set-up of any typical society. We find it to be composed of four great factors which are associated with each other in one of those interesting and characteristic rotatory relationships which are of such a nature that the causative sequence runs through them all in a circular manner in both directions. In other words, any one of the four members of the quartet may be thought of as the result of the other three, or any three as the cause of the fourth. These factors are Land, Economic Culture, Population, and Standard of Living. The reality and nature of this rotatory causation may be difficult to grasp at first; it will become clearer by considering first some of its simpler manifestations. For purposes of discussion these four factors may be represented as the sectors of a circle, thus:

Chart III.



The Factors in the Material Development of Society.

Sources of Material Supplies

Although the causative principle is, indeed, continuous, and there is no point in the circle at which one might break in and say, "The causative sequence begins here," yet there is a special relationship of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, that justifies putting land and economic culture in the lower half of the circle, and population and standard of living in the upper. From the point of view of the material achievement of a society it is clear that land and economic culture are the sources of all its supplies. It is by the application of its total economic culture, as already defined, to its total land equipment, that society produces all the wealth that it has at its command, remembering that the industrial *qualities* of its people are included in the complex of its economic culture. In fact, it should be explained at this point that the factor of population, as used in this chart, is purely a quantitative, or larithmic, concept. The significance of population within its own sector is determined strictly by counting. Quality is omitted from the chart entirely except in its economic aspects, for this is exclusively an analysis of material relationships, and a picture of the material organization of a society.

USES OF MATERIAL SUPPLIES

By the application of its economic culture to its land, then, a society, within a given period produces a certain amount of wealth. What does it do with it? Two things. It supports a population and it maintains a standard of living. The two factors below the horizontal diameter, therefore, may be thought of as the cause, or the support, of the two factors above. This is in keeping with our central emphasis on society's interests. For obviously, population and standard of living are the primary objects of society's two great interests, continuity and welfare, in their material aspects.

This diagram, also, serves to illustrate the persistent antagonism between these two fundamental interests, corresponding to the great natural antithesis between hunger and love, for population and standard of living are keen rivals for the supplies produced by the combination of the two lower factors. Stated in its simplest terms, a society which as a result of a year's efforts is capable of producing a certain aggregate of goods may use these goods in two ways, and may adjust its productive efforts accordingly: it may use them to support a large population very close to the margin of starvation, or to support a much smaller population on a much higher standard. Remembering that we are now discussing the question in its most elemental and schematized form, this relationship may be expressed as an arithmetical division. If L stands for land, EC for economic culture, P for population, and SL for standard of living, then

$$\frac{L \times EC}{P} = SL \text{ or } \frac{L \times EC}{SL} = P$$

This is the great equation of the material existence of society, and many of the most pressing and momentous problems of life in all stages of cultural evolution have their genesis in the relationship thus expressed. Its analog in the case of a single family is easily understood. Given a certain family income, the general level of family welfare is the quotient of income divided by the size of family.

Reciprocal Influence

The analysis up to this point rests on the assumption that the year's product of society is a predetermined quantity, given L and EC, that is, that it is not influenced by either or both of the factors above the line. If this were true, the solution of practical social problems would be vastly easier than it is. In point of fact, both P and SL have an effect upon EC. That is, they enter into the causation of the very sequence of which they are the result. This is simply a manifestation of the rotatory relationship already emphasized. This may be made quite clear by considering the effect of the size of population on the total product of a society. It needs no demonstration to show that a larger number of people will ordinarily produce a larger output from a given combination of L and EC than a smaller number. Two workers on a 640-acre farm will produce a larger crop than one, using the same farm equipment, and three will produce more than two. So an increase in the product of society provides for an increase in the population, and this in turn contributes to a still larger output. If this could go on forever in undiminished force the problem of material existence could be easily disposed of. We shall see in a moment why it cannot.

The same dual influence of the standard of living is also easily grasped. Workers living on a high standard are more efficient than those on a low standard. Consequently, an increase in the standard tends to promote production, which in turn helps to raise the standard. So here, too, things would be admirable if only the process could go on undiminished forever.

Law of Diminishing Returns

The impediment to this realization is found in the familiar "law of diminishing returns." In its primary form this may be stated as follows: An increase in the amount of labor applied in production to a given area of land will produce an increase in the output, but not necessarily a proportional or per capita increase. Sooner or later there will come a time when an additional application of labor will produce a product which, divided by the number of units of labor now at work, will give a smaller amount per unit. This may be illustrated simply by the case of a young man who has homesteaded a 160-acre farm. At first he cultivates it alone, while his wife devotes herself to the household cares. Naturally, the entire crop belongs to him. But after a year or two he becomes convinced that it would "pay" to take on a hired man. Suppose, for purposes of illustration, he agrees to divide the crop equally with the hired man. Experience may prove that the two men working together can produce more than twice as much as the farmer working alone. Thus the farmer's family has more to live on than before. After a few years on this basis, the farmer decides to take on another hired man. This experiment, also, proves successful, for the three men produce more than a fifty per cent increase in the crop, and so both the farmer and the first assistant are benefited. But if, encouraged by this experience, a fourth man is added, the new crop proves to be less than one-third larger than the last one, that is, the present crop divided by four gives less *per capita* than the previous crop divided by three. If a fifth man is added, the situation becomes still worse. The point of diminishing returns lies somewhere between the third and fourth man.

The secondary aspect of this law has to do with the application of additional units of capital, instead of labor. The young farmer starts cultivating with only hand tools, and his own physical powers. Soon he adds a team of horses, a plow, a harrow, and a mowing machine. He finds at the end of the year that the crop has been increased sufficiently to more than pay for the investment, including interest and depreciation. So next year he adds a drill, a couple of wagons, a cultivator, and a reaper and binder. Once more the investment proves profitable. The new capital more than pays for itself. After two or three years more, he decides to buy a complete threshing outfit, steam engine and all. This is very expensive, and although it enables him to increase his total crop, he discovers that when his income has been apportioned among interest and depreciation charges, he has less left for himself than before. His application of capital has passed the line of diminishing returns.

In economic analysis the distinction is sometimes drawn between businesses that operate on a basis of diminishing returns, and those that enjoy increasing returns. But if a sufficient degree of expansion is allowed for, it is discovered that all businesses must eventually begin to operate on a basis of diminishing returns, for they all depend on natural resources, and these resources are limited. Thus the law of diminishing returns is seen to be one of the inclusive, established features of life on this planet, tracing back eventually to the finite character of the earth.

Looked at from the societal point of view, this law means that when a society occupies a large area of land, an increase in population may not only produce a larger total output, but an output so much greater that divided among the whole population it provides a larger per capita amount than formerly. But sooner or later, if the amount of land and the stage of the arts remain unchanged, there will come a time when, no matter how hard the people work, they can no longer increase the amount of the product at a rate proportional to their own increase. So the per capita product will diminish, and the standard of living will be reduced. When this point is reached, it can be said that population is now pressing on the standard of living, or, in other words, that the basic antagonism between hunger and love is expressing itself on the societal level.

CHAPTER XVII

APPLIED LARITHMICS

UNDERPOPULATION

Out of these principles arise two of the most important relationships with which societies have to deal—underpopulation and overpopulation. In the foregoing chapter it was intimated that conditions may be such that a deficiency in population is the determinative factor in preventing a society from attaining its maximum standard of living. The reason for this is that certain developments of economic culture *require* a rather large population to operate them efficiently. Thus a society may have abundant knowledge about factory construction and mass production, but it cannot afford to build and operate factories if the population is very scanty. Neither is it profitable to build railroads in a sparsely settled country. High specialization of industry requires a large population.

Actual examples of high specialization in New York City are an "expert repairer of piano keys" and a "maker of fancy frostings for wedding cakes." Now it is obviously desirable to have an expert repair your piano keys when they need it, but no man, however expert, could have made his living that way in old New Amsterdam. In fact, we are told that in that simple community even the first schoolmaster had to take in washing to supplement his meager salary. Also, it is gratifying to have the frosting of your wedding cake made by a specialist, but most of us need that service not more than once or twice in our lifetime, and only a large population can support a man in such a minute field. It has been seriously stated that there is one man in New York who makes his living by breeding wood-worms to sell to the manufacturers of antique furniture.

Underpopulation may therefore be defined as that condition wherein the population of a society is not large enough to achieve its maximum possible standard of living on the basis of its land and the existing stage of the arts.

OVERPOPULATION

It has already been shown how population may increase to the point where no amount of industry can keep the per capita production from falling off. This evidently constitutes overpopulation, which may be defined as that condition wherein the size of the population is too large to permit a society to maintain its maximum standard of living on a given amount of land and a given stage of the arts.

ILLUSTRATION OF UNDERPOPULATION

The very nature of the principles of population growth makes it inevitable that overpopulation should be a much more prevalent and persistent state than underpopulation. Indeed, the latter condition must be recognized as relatively rare and limited in human experience. There have, however, been some conspicuous cases, the most notable of which is the society founded by white men on the Atlantic coast of North America early in the seventeenth century. The founders of the English colonial settlements in the New World were familiar with the most advanced economic culture that had been developed in the Occident up to that time. Some of the material instruments, and most of the intellectual and manual elements—which, as we have seen, are the most important—of this culture they brought with them. Contrasted with the native inhabitants of the region, the Indians, they represented a very high stage of the arts. The amount of land, on the other hand, including both area and productivity, available to them once the Indians had been disposed of, was almost unlimited. It was natural, therefore, that population should grow very rapidly. The density of population made possible by the cultural development of the Redmen was very low; a careful estimate of the total Indian population in North America north of Mexico at the time of the arrival of the white men places the figure at only about half a million.[1] The much higher culture of the white men not only permitted, but demanded, a much larger population to operate it efficiently. Consequently, during the Colonial period, there was a well-defined sentiment among the settlers in favor of rapid increase. This was undoubtedly well founded. For under such conditions the inherent antagonism between population and standard of living is suspended, and the growth of each contributes to the advance of the other.

Such a situation may be illustrated as follows:

CHART IV.—UNDERPOPULATION



STANDARD OF LIVING IS KEPT DOWN BY LACK OF POPULATION

The result in America was an increase of population so rapid that Malthus took it as the outstanding example of the reproductive capacities of the human species, and at the same time a marked and continuous improvement in the standard of living. This development persisted well into the nineteenth century, and helped to create an impression in some quarters that perhaps Malthus had been more gloomy in his prognostications than the facts of life warranted.

EQUALIZATION OF PRESSURE

But such a situation, obviously, cannot last forever. As the population and standard of living enlarge, their boundaries inevitably tend to approach each other. Sooner or later they must meet. When they do, the end of that particular Golden Age has come. From that time on, the established conflict reasserts itself; further increases in population must infringe on the standard of living, and further improvements in the standard can be won only at the expense of population. What actually happens when this stage is reached is of the most profound importance to society. Both factors can no longer expand. Will population or the standard of living continue to advance, or will both come to a standstill, and an equilibrium be established?

There can be no categorical answer. The outcome will differ in different societies, and our knowledge of larithmics and of history is far too limited to enable us to decide what has actually happened in concrete cases. But reason and logic furnish a general conclusion which is probably not far from the facts. We are dealing with two expansive entities, both starting from zero, and each enlarging toward the other. What will happen when they meet must depend on the relative momentum of the two entities, and the force of the dynamic principle that drives them on. Is hunger or love the stronger? We have already discovered the answer in nature. From the point of view of the species, love is immeasurably the more powerful force. It drives to the production of innumerable multitudes of offspring for which no sustenance exists, and which must forthwith perish. But in nature we are dealing with creatures who have no standard of living. The very existence of a standard among men proves that by one means or another they have been able to subdue the impulses of reproduction sufficiently to enable them to build up a margin between their level of existence and starvation. In fully civilized societies, even the lowest economic classes are seldom kept down by actual starvation.* The question really hinges on the vigor and elasticity of the force that drives men to seek an ever higher standard of living.

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* This fact has frequently caused the question to be raised whether food is really the limiting factor in population growth. How can it be said that there is population pressure, that the growth of population is restrained by the amount of subsistence, when there seems to be food enough for everybody? The answer is that an active entity may be confined within definite barriers without ever touching the barriers. A man shut up in a room with the door and windows locked is effectively confined within that room, even though he does not dash himself against the walls. Indeed, if he insists upon hurling himself against the barriers he is considered to be out of his mind, and is shut up in a padded cell. The standard of living is the padding on the walls of the great cosmic cell in which mankind, inclined at times to run amuck, is forever incarcerated. The padding prevents the inmate from perpetually injuring itself in the course of its rebel-

STANDARD OF LIVING PART OF THE MORES

A key to the answer is found in the fact, so effectively stressed by Sumner, that the standard of living is a phase of the mores of a society. Remembering that the mores are essentially a matter of custom, convention, and social habit it seems clear that the dynamic element in the standard is more of a resistant force than an expansive one—it is negative, rather than positive. Accordingly, a social group will exert itself more energetically to prevent a lowering of its standard than it will to achieve its improvement by the same amount. This is illustrated in modern industrial life by the greater frequency and stubbornness of strikes to prevent a lowering of wages and working conditions than to secure an advance in wages and conditions—especially as sometimes the latter is really a camouflage for the former. Likewise, in a period of depression, laborers will often suffer unemployment and destitution rather than submit to a reduction of their wage scale, for they know that this is the badge and symbol of their customary standard of living, and that it will be very hard to restore it, once it is impaired. Of course, there must be some positive elasticity in the standard, otherwise it would never rise at all. But it appears that when an actual pressure arises of population upon the standard, the force of population is ordinarily sufficient to force the standard below its possible maximum before an equilibrium is reached. Like most resilient substances, the resistance of the standard increases the more it is depressed, and so eventually the encroachment of population is checked. But it would be hard to find any cases where the positively expan-

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lious struggles to escape, but it does not remove or extend the walls themselves. On the contrary, it makes the inner space somewhat smaller. If the human species insisted on using all its resources for food, and were willing to pay the cost in suffering, it could doubtless maintain a larger population. If it wants a resilient cushion to protect itself from its own mad impulses, it must submit to a slight reduction in the scope of its movement, but the actual confining walls are the same in either case.

sive power of the standard has forced a numerical reduction in population.

PREVAILING OVERPOPULATION

It is for these reasons that overpopulation has been the prevailing state the world over within the period of recorded history, and probably the characteristic situation in all old societies since the dawn of humanity. Of course, we have no specific and reliable technique for determining whether a given society is overpopulated at a given time or not. This will be touched on later. We should like very much to know, for instance, whether the United States is overpopulated or underpopulated today. But the United States is a very new society. The merest rule-of-thumb measures will convince one that India, China, Japan, and most of the regions of Asia are overpopulated, and there is abundant opinion, privately expressed, on the part of government officials of most European countries that they, too, would be much better off if their populations could be measurably reduced. There can be no doubt that overpopulation has been the chronic state of most of mankind most of the time until recent centuries. Whether the present situation is different, if so why, and how long it will continue so, are matters that now demand attention.

An overpopulated society may be represented as follows. Population has definitely encroached on the standard of living.

CHART V.—OVERPOPULATION



STANDARD OF LIVING IS KEPT DOWN BY EXCESS OF POPULATION

Change in Factors

Hitherto, our discussion of larithmic principles has assumed that the two factors below the horizontal diameter, land and economic culture, remained stationary. Of course, they never do remain stationary. As far as land is concerned, there has been, and can be, no appreciable increase in the total amount of land potentially at the command of "the great society." The finite limitations of the globe take care of that. But there has been a tremendous and prolonged increase in the amount of land actually *available* to the members of the great society, as well as in the land occupied or controlled by smaller societal groups. The progressive acquisition of new land has been the outstanding means whereby the population of the human species has been increased. Similarly, the stage of the arts has steadily risen, with this essential difference, that whereas the acquisition of land is a movement toward a fixed limit, and therefore tends to proceed at a diminishing ratio, the development of economic culture is a cumulative process, and hitherto has moved toward an unpredictable maximum at an accelerating ratio. Each new invention and discovery make possible an increasing number of new advances.

Distribution of Improvements

The combination of these two expedients, movement onto new land and the expansion of economic culture, has provided the basis for man's unique feat in escaping nature's great law of stationary population, and not only increasing his population continuously, but also raising his standard of living at the same time. The fact that this process has continued, doubtless with ups and downs, for a million or more years has very naturally tended to inculcate the idea in the human mind that it can keep on forever. It is a very difficult task for the average individual to realize that great human phenomena, established features of mundane existence, may eventually come to an end, even in our own day. Incredulity on this point in the particular matter of population growth is encouraged by the experience of the past century and a third. According to the best estimates the population of the world in 1800 was about 700,000,000. In 1900 it was about 1,700,000,000. That is, world population increased a great deal more in a single century than it had in all the previous existence of the species. It took mankind a million or more years to build up a total population of seven hundred millions, and then in the next one hundred years it added a billion more! To any one whose study of arithmetic included geometrical progression, these facts should be a sufficient indication that what has happened in the past cannot possibly continue to happen indefinitely. But, curiously enough, many intelligent people are inclined to say, "Well, mankind always has increased, and apparently is increasing faster now than ever before, and I guess it can keep on increasing."

To understand the real meaning of these facts, it is necessary to consider what the forces of enlargement are, and how they operate. For this purpose, let us return to the case of a single society, as illustrated in our chart. The only possibility of enlarging the population or improving the standard of living—to say nothing of increasing them both together—lies in an expansion of either land or economic culture. Let us imagine such an expansion taking place in the quadrant of land. This, we will assume, does not affect the economic culture. But it does make possible an enlargement in one or the other, or a distributed enlargement in both, of the quadrants above the line. And since the nature of the reciprocal influence running through the four factors is such as to tend to establish an equilibrium, the eventual effect will be to enlarge the whole circle. After the force of the enlargement in land has spent itself, then, the new situation will be represented by a larger circle, with a sector representing economic culture the same size before, and a larger sector for land. The following chart represents the possibilities of distribution of the advantages made possible by a bulge in the land sector. The situation would be equivalent, of course, if the improvement were in economic culture. The whole circle is enlarged. The gain may go to population, or to standard of living, or it may be distributed between them. But never can both population and standard of living get the maximum gain at the same time.

Just what will happen above the line depends upon the principles already discussed. The result seems to be governed largely by the rapidity with which the expansion in land

CHART VI

A



NEW RESOURCES COME FROM AN INCREASE IN LAND

B



THE GAIN ALL GOES TO POPULATION

C



The Gain All Goes to Standard of Living

D



The Gain Is Divided Between Population and Standard of Living

takes place. It must be remembered that while the expansive force of population is powerful and unlimited, its operation takes time. New members of the species have to be born, grow to maturity, and become parents in their turn. Consequently, if an improvement below the line takes place very rapidly, population cannot at once appropriate the whole advantage, and a margin is left which will be seized upon by the more sluggish, but yet positive and quickly responsive, dynamic element in the standard. Before population can reach the maximum made possible by the new situation, the standard will have advanced, and will have become sufficiently entrenched so that it can resist the further pressure of population. This appears to be the basic explanation of the enormous rise in the standard of humanity from its origin to the present. As already pointed out, the upward course of civilization has been marked by certain epochal discoveries or achievements—hunting, agriculture, stock-raising, fire, bronze, iron, electricity—each of which probably came with a certain relative degree of suddenness. Each in turn would open up new vistas for the species as a whole, too extensive to be monopolized at once by population. The standard would therefore have a chance to rise, especially in view of the principle, already explained, that for a time an increase in population might contribute to the utilization of the new discovery. It seems, therefore, that the improvement of the standard of mankind as a whole has not been by a smooth and uniform incline, but has been marked by a succession of steps and plateaus, with possibly an occasional decline. Some of the golden ages of civilization have marked these upward steps, such as that in classic Greece, the older civilizations in Mesopotamia and Egypt, the Renaissance in Europe following the Middle Ages, and the Norman occupation of England. A study of the climatic history of the world, particularly as exhibited in Asia, shows definitely how alternating periods of favorable and unfavorable land conditions have affected the course of civilization and the level of well-being in various lands.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

But never, in all recorded history, has there been such a striking illustration of these principles as that afforded by the nineteenth century. The momentous character of the technical inventions and discoveries that clustered about the beginning of this period is already familiar. Superimposed upon the relatively recent discovery, and contemporary exploitation, of the Western Hemisphere, this meant a simultaneous expansion of unprecedented degree in both the factors below the line. The addition of the land of half the world, virtually unsettled, coupled with an unparalleled development of the great institutions of science and technology, gave mankind such a chance as it had never had before. This impulse was felt most keenly by the peoples actually established in the newly opened lands, but only less forcibly in the countries of Western Europe. Eventually it was disseminated over the entire globe, with diminishing intensity as more remote and less-developed areas were touched. It opened possibilities of expansion far too vast to be occupied exclusively by population, no matter how vigorously it responded. Enormous spaces were left to be filled up by improvements in the standard of living, which inevitably took advantage of them. Thus there occurred the amazing phenomenon of an unheard-of increase in population, not only in the Americas, but the world over, coincident with an advancement in the standard to heights of extravagant luxury.

Nineteenth Century Optimism

Every phase of human life was necessarily affected, economic, religious, esthetic, intellectual, philosophical. A whole new set of ideals, axioms, and standards arose, centering largely on such concepts as Liberty, Equality, Freedom, Opportunity, Democracy, Prosperity, and Progress. "There's always room at the top" was a characteristic motto. Energy, industry, and thrift were exalted as major virtues. The limits to material achievement seemed to be set only by the industry, ability, and perseverance of the individual. A philosophy of Success pervaded every department of life. And since all these blessings seemed to be associated with increases in size there arose a cult of bigness, and megalomania became the characteristic psychosis.

But it is now plainly understandable that this could not last, and why. The opportunities for enlargement, great as they were, were not infinite. Eventually population and standard of living had to come into conflict once more. The heyday was over, and the world was faced with stern realities again. The second decade of the twentieth century may be regarded as marking the definite culmination of one era, and the inception of another. The evidence, once more, is found in every department of life. The philosophy of optimism gave way to that of pessimism, the doctrine of success to that of frustration, the high flavor of achievement to the boredom of futility. The World War was the overt expression of a momentum of the period of expansion carried far beyond the safe margin of adjustment. The post-war period is an era of bewilderment, of groping, of efforts at readjustment, of a struggle to appropriate the new while still clinging to the tattered and bedraggled remnants of the old.

There is an old conundrum, ''When an irresistible force meets an immovable obstacle, what is the result?'' The answer is, ''Infinite heat.'' That is an excellent summary of the character and natural consequences of the great ironic jest that placed the two fundamental impulses of life, hunger and love, in implacable opposition to each other.

Human Aspects: Abortion

In the discussion thus far we have treated the reproductive complex of equipment and urge as if it were virtually the same among men as among the lower animals, involving the fundamental assumption that the gratification of the mating impulses sets in motion certain natural processes which eventuate in the production of offspring in numbers approximating the physiological capacity of the females. This was undoubtedly true among the earliest representatives of the species. Though sex relations were not entirely free from control, yet matings must have been in close accordance with the biological organization, and intercourse must have resulted in pregnancy regularly enough to occasion about as many births as the women were capable of. The virtually stationary population of these early ages must have been maintained in much the same way as in nature, by a high mortality, particularly of infants. But the burden of excessive reproduction, upon individuals if not upon the group, must have forced itself upon the attention of primitive man at a very elementary stage in civilization. The part of the father in reproduction escaped detection for long ages, but that of the mother was obvious. The knowledge became familiar that the pregnant woman was carrying something that would eventually emerge as a superfluous and unwelcome addition to the group. It was natural enough that means should have been sought to prevent this untoward event, and so the ancient practice of abortion originated. The strength of the desire to escape childbirth among primitive women is evidenced by the lengths to which they were willing to go, and the painful and brutal character of the methods adopted.[2]

INFANTICIDE

Even more widespread than abortion as a means of getting rid of unwanted additions to the group is infanticide. This has been practiced among widely scattered peoples on various levels of civilization, and still persists in some relatively civilized countries such as China. There is also evidence of very early efforts at contraception, that is, the prevention of pregnancy in spite of intercourse, which were probably, however, not very successful. At the other extreme, as a means of artificially limiting population growth, is the ceremonial killing of the old, which has also been widely practiced. This practice has also persisted down to relatively recent times in advanced countries. There are still preserved in Sweden some of the clubs which were used for this purpose. They were called "family clubs," and were kept in the churches. In a society where this custom is established there is of course no sense of wrong-doing on the part of those charged with the duty of the execution, usually younger kinsmen, nor any resentment on the part of the old. Indeed, we are told that sometimes when the young people show reluctance, perhaps from affection or because of advancing cultural ideas, the old people taunt them with their "softness" and urge them on to do their duty. Attitudes in this matter would obviously be colored by the prevalent ideas about death and the other world. On the whole, the killing of the old has been a much less important means of limiting population than infanticide, largely because the older generation was on the ground first and had command of the situation when the emergency arose.

MALTHUSIAN THEORY

The meaning of all this is that reproduction among human beings has not, for countless ages, been a strictly "natural" phenomenon. The human intelligence has entered in to affect it more or less gravely from very early times. Nevertheless, the automatic character of fertilization, and the habitual practices of bringing the embryo to birth, have prevailingly been such as to lead thinkers in even the most advanced countries to regard reproduction as a process that took place spontaneously at a rate determined by nature, or in a more theological interpretation, by God. The various preliminary ventures on population theory indulged in by certain advanced intellects[3] have accordingly looked upon population growth as something which tended to occur at a more or less fixed rate established in the nature of things. This idea was supported by the doctrines developed in some higher religions that it was sinful to interfere in any way with the realization of this process. Such were undoubtedly the ideas of Thomas R. Malthus, whose epoch-making work, appearing in England in 1798, established the firm foundations of scientific population theory. His interest in the subject was developed in connection with arguments that he had with his father concerning the possible perfectibility of human society, an idea that had been popularized by certain English and French philosophers. They believed that practically all the ills of human life were due to defects in the social or political system, and that it was entirely possible so to organize a society that everybody would be prosperous and happy. Malthus Senior was inclined to agree with them. But Thomas R. denied any such possibility. Somewhere or other he had caught a vision of the devastating power of population, and he insisted that no matter how perfect a political system a society might have, the resistless pressure of population would always overcrowd it with such a superfluity of members that a large proportion of the people would be in destitution, and the entire group always in a state of greater or less misery. He expressed his interpretation in the form of a mathematical comparison, which has since become famous, and is continually misquoted to the unmerited discredit of its author. Almost universally, Malthus is alleged to have said that population tends to increase in a geometrical proportion, while food tends to increase in an arithmetical proportion, and then the criticism is brought forward that there is no evidence that food tends to increase in an arithmetical progression. What he did say is that, without any pretension to accuracy, we may safely assert that there is no hope of causing food to increase at *more* than an arithmetical ratio, and that consequently we may accept this as the outside limit of the increase of subsistence. Subsequent history has shown no reason to regard this as other than a conservative statement. Malthus's argument then proceeds to show that on this basis population will always tend to outstrip subsistence, and hence mankind will always be condemned to misery, the only choice being between the greater misery of the "positive checks" which work through increasing the death-rate, and the lesser misery of the "preventive checks" that work through diminishing the birth-rate.

But though Malthus recognized the existence of checks on the birth-rate, the only ones that he took account of in his system are those that work through delayed or postponed marriage, and an ill-defined factor that he called "prudential restraint." He made no allowance for any interference with the natural course of procreation in the married state. He was a clergyman, and like most orthodox people of his day he considered that children were "sent from the Lord," and that it was immoral and impious to interpose any human interference in the matter. Hence the distinct element of fatalism in his system.

NEO-MALTHUSIANISM

But it was not long before other students of the field began to carry the analysis a step further than Malthus had. They began to inquire whether there was not some way of escaping this doom of perpetual misery. One of the leaders was an English workingman by the name of Francis Place who had been redeemed from an unpromising and degraded existence by a young and happy marriage, but who had fifteen children. He became convinced that the solution of the problem lay in the voluntary restriction of procreation within the family, which would permit the normal enjoyments and comforts of married life without the penalties of superabundant offspring. Supported by a number of influential countrymen, including Robert Owen, he launched a campaign which became known as the neo-Malthusian, and later the birth control movement.

Dual Aspect of Sex Impulse in Man

The history of this movement is varied and dramatic, affording, among other things, numerous demonstrations of the futility of trying to curb ideas by legislative action and criminal procedure. The best publicity and the greatest impetus that birth control has ever had has come as a result of efforts to suppress it forcibly. For the purposes of sociological analysis, the important facts are that the movement has steadily won its way, and has introduced an entirely distinct, and definitely human, element into the population problems of modern societies. No longer can it be taken for granted that reproduction must necessarily follow the gratification of the mating urge, or that sex desire is the basic motive that leads to the birth of children. In point of fact, these recent developments have thrown into sharp relief a subdivision in the general love motive that is distinctively human. The subhuman animals desire only to mate; reproduction is an unanticipated and unappreciated sequel. Modern man desires sex pleasure and he also desires children. There are therefore two distinct impulses and sets of interests involved in the sex relations of today. Sometimes they work harmoniously and sometimes in direct opposition to each other. If a couple desires sex pleasure and desires children at the same time, no problem arises. But if they desire pleasure but do not desire children then complications arise, which may result in various forms of maladjustment and distress, even to the extent of breaking up the family. It is to resolve this clash of interests that birth control was devised. It should be clearly recognized that birth control deals with the prevention of conception, and is directly opposed to abortion, not only in theory but also in the intentions and policies of its champions.

Birth Control

So important is birth control as an influential factor in contemporary and future social developments that at least one eminent natural scientist has put it on a par with such great discoveries as fire or the art of writing. Certainly its ultimate effect upon the whole aspect of world society can hardly be overestimated. At the present time its progress is being impeded by many persistent taboos and dogmas, and by legal restrictions. But it is obviously making its way into the mores of modern peoples, and is unquestionably destined to be one of the dominating factors in social change in the next few decades. It is certainly responsible in large measure for the striking decline in the birth-rate of Western lands which has already been noticed.

Future of Population Growth

The larithmic future of the world is a matter of paramount importance, and one which is receiving a vast amount of intensive scientific study at present. There is no evidence of any impending cessation in the decline of the birth-rate. The death-rate, on the other hand, cannot be forced down indefinitely. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that in the United States and the countries of Western Europe the death-rate will turn definitely upward within the next decade or two.[4] If these trends continue the two rates will eventually meet, which will mean that the population has reached a static point. This is frequently referred to as the point of "stabilization." But whether population is actually stabilized depends on what happens next. If the birth-rate continues to go down or the death-rate continues to go up we will enter a period of declining population. No one can foretell the outcome. Here the predictive resources of sociology are blocked, for there are no repetitive data to serve as the ground for a generalization. Nothing like this has happened before within the period of accurate recording of vital statistics. There is a tendency in some quarters to forecast the future on the basis of the projection of present trends, and the extrapolation of curves based on the best available statistics. This is a hazardous procedure for two reasons. First, as already pointed out, none of the reliable statistics carry us much further back than the middle of that very unusual epoch of the nineteenth century; hence they cannot be relied upon to forecast the future. Second, all these formal methods of representation, rates, tables, diagrams, charts, and curves, are merely outward expressions of factual phenomena. They are not causative factors, nor do they record causative factors. The real causes, as already explained, lie in an intricate complex of psychological, biological, emotional, social, and cosmic factors, the future aspects of which cannot possibly be foretold by any methods now available to science. There are excellent grounds for the belief that most of the nations of Western Europe have already entered a period of intrinsic decline in population, although their gross numbers are still increasing.[5] The full significance of these changes on world affairs will be discussed later.

Basis of Controlled Growth

From the point of view of the Great Society the possibility of land expansion is virtually at an end. What the future expansion of economic culture may be no one can foretell. There is every reason to anticipate that it will go on sufficiently to make some continuing increase in population possible for a long time to come, if it is desired. Whether such increase shall be desired and how the advantages of new technological improvements and achievements are to be distributed are problems of applied larithmics.

Chapter XVIII

SOCIAL CHANGE. PROGRESS

Our study thus far has been replete with instances of social change. So numerous are they that they suggest the conclusion, fully in accord with all the facts, that change is a characteristic feature of society, as has already been suggested in connection with the examination of the nature of sociology. It is therefore quite impossible to gain an adequate understanding of society without some grasp of the nature of social change. To this end, it is helpful to divide the factors that play upon society into factors of stability and factors of change.

Factors of Stability. The Geographical Constant

Some of the basic factors of stability have already been observed. Foremost among them is the finite character of the earth and its constituents, and of the forces that inhere in them. Man, being primarily an animal adapted to his physical environment, can by no possibility undergo any changes that are not allowed by his cosmic setting. Here is one great constant that limits and conditions every form of change. Conversely, when changes take place in the physical environment itself, as they have in the past and doubtless will in the future, they inevitably produce changes in human society. The anthropo-geographers have rendered great service in helping us to interpret the shifting drama of mundane experience. This may be called the geographical constant.

The Biological Constant

Next there is the biological constant. All man's activities are necessarily conditioned by his physiological make-up. This, in turn, is determined by an unbroken stream of germ plasm that flows through the bodies of parents, generation after generation, theoretically incapable of any alteration through the bodily experiences of its carriers. There are at the present moment a certain number of genes, of certain potentialities, existing in the bodies of the present human denizens of the earth. The characteristics of the members of the next generation, and of all future generations, are latent in those genes. All individual ambitions and social enterprises, for all time to come, must rest upon the materials supplied by that self-producing current of sub-microscopic particles. Here, certainly is an effective limitation upon individual, and therefore social, change. Race is one aspect of the biological constant.

Sociological Stabilizing Factors

Then there are the sociological elements of stability. These are enduring constructs of man's past activities, residues of the social change of other ages. They are traditions, conventions, institutions, dogmas, which possess varying degrees of inertia, but which, taken in the aggregate, constitute a tremendous conservative force, constantly impeding and retarding change. The potency of this set of constants can hardly be exaggerated. The great French philosopher and sociologist, Le Bon, was deeply conscious of their significance, which he expressed in the following striking passage:[1]

> The dead, besides being infinitely more numerous than the living, are infinitely more powerful. They reign over the vast domain of the unconscious, that invisible domain which exerts its sway over all the manifestations of the intelligence and of character. A people is guided far more by its dead than by its living members. It is by its dead, and by its dead alone, that a race is founded. Century after century our departed ancestors have fashioned our ideas and sentiments, and in consequence all the motives of our conduct. The generations that have passed away do not bequeath us their physical constitution merely; they also bequeath us their thoughts. The dead are the only undisputed masters of the living. We bear the burden of their mistakes, we reap the reward of their virtues.

The influence of this kind of social mortmain becomes more and more obvious the more one studies sociological phenomena.

FACTORS OF CHANGE. VARIATION

Turning to the elements of change, the first to be noted is the varying innate character of humanity itself, and the almost infinite deviations of human individuals. In spite of the fixity of the total germinal endowment of the species, innumerable variations from the ancestral pattern are continually taking place, explicable on the basis of new combinations of genes, or perhaps of elusive modifications in the qualities of genes themselves, concerning which biologists are beginning to make some tentative speculations. At any rate, as already pointed out, the ultimate particles of social science cannot be regarded as uniform either with respect to a single individual in time, or to all individuals synchronously.

COSMIC CHANGE

Another factor in change, already suggested, is furnished by modifications in the earth itself, such as the great climatic cycles. These are mostly very gradual in their operation, but over long periods of time doubtless have profound effects.

SOCIAL ACCUMULATION

Very important, also, is the cumulative effect of societal modification itself. Change begets change. The process is carried out largely through its effect on individuals. A change in society necessarily induces changes in its individual constituents. These individuals, in turn, being the dynamic elements in society, transmit their alterations in the form of further social changes, and so the process continues indefinitely, illustrating once more the rotatory principle already noted.

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Another fertile source of change is the contact of cultures with one another. Much stress is laid on this factor by many writers; indeed, it is frequently claimed that all great civilizations have arisen out of the cross-blending of cultures. The various forms of population movement, to be discussed later, are obviously instruments of change in this respect.

IDEAS

But probably the greatest factor of all in social change is ideas. The immediate motivating agencies in all social phenomena are beliefs about interests. Ideas have the effect of modifying beliefs through the creation of new imaginative stimuli and through the modification of the objects of interests. An illuminating history of social change could be written in terms of the appearance and adoption of new ideas. Some of these ideas are materialized in inventions, some express themselves in philosophical concepts, some in religious inspirations, some in intellectual refinements. Some ideas develop gradually; some burst forth suddenly. All the great advances in economic culture, already dealt with, are the embodiments of new ideas. The idea of the fatherhood of a god of love has had an incalculable influence on the social changes of the past two thousand years. The ideas of democracy, liberty, and equality have already been appraised. Think of the profound alterations in the face of modern society that have resulted from the single idea of a "horseless carriage," brought to perfection through the other idea of an internal-combustion engine.

Ideas, like social forms themselves, are cumulative. Samuel Butler, in the "Way of All Flesh," makes the pertinent observation, "Ideas, no less than the living beings in whose minds they arise, must be begotten by parents not very unlike themselves, the most original differing but slightly from the parents that have given rise to them." But just as new combinations of genes in the physical germ plasm may produce quite unprecedented types, so novel associations of ideas may give rise to a new idea distinctly different from anything ever known before. The more ideas there are afloat in the sea of human thought, the greater is the probability that something unique, possibly epoch-making, may be produced. The genesis of new ideas is a fascinating field of study, but one that belongs to psychology or philosophy rather than to sociology. The important thing for sociology is that they do occur, and with increasing frequency.

Increasing Scope and Tempo of Social Change

In view of the cumulative character of inventions, of social forms, and of ideas in general, it is not surprising that social change itself is cumulative. This feature manifests itself in both the widening scope, and the accelerated tempo, of social change. Not only is there a tendency toward an increased magnitude of change, but the time within which a change of a given magnitude (we are assuming a rough and ready appraisal of the magnitude of change) takes place is becoming progressively shorter. Consider, for example, the sweeping alterations that have taken place in the United States alone in a brief third of a century—the coming of woman suffrage, the adoption and repeal of the Prohibition Amendment, the full social sanction of the use of cigarettes by women, a profound modification of the moral code, particularly with reference to sex, the decline of chaperonage, a more lenient attitude toward divorce, the spread of birth control, the enlargement of economic opportunity for women, etc. This list makes no mention of physical discoveries and material inventions which sometimes become hard to distinguish from social change itself. This is illustrated by the extreme rapidity of modern acculturation, or the spread of a given cultural form from one society to another. Take for example the swastika. This is an ancient symbol which has been used from time immemorial among widely separated and diverse peoples. There is some doubt whether its appearance in these primitive centers was due to independent development or to acculturation. If the latter, the spread must have been exceedingly slow. But today the swastika, as the symbol of a certain concept of social organization, can spread over the globe in a few months, while various "shirt organizations"—black, brown, blue, khaki, silver—have suddenly sprung up in countries as remote as Italy, Germany, Ireland, the United States, and China.

Such vast changes, coming with such vertiginous rapidity, are powerful factors in social disintegration. They tend to put an unsupportable burden on the agencies of control, and undermine the props of stability. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that *the* social problem of the modern day is how to adjust and accommodate the slowly changing human animal to the super-dynamic societal environment that he himself constructs.

ORIGIN OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The direction of social change and the control of social change are so linked up with social values that consideration of them reaches over into the field of applied sociology. Indeed, the whole question of social problems is so intimately bound up with social change that neither can be considered without the other. Walter Lippmann, in his highly stimulating book "The Phantom Public" discusses the nature of a problem. He arrives at the conclusion that problems arise from the combination of several variables changing at differential rates and hence needing constant readjustments. "In an absolutely static society there would be no problems. A problem is the result of change. But not of the change in any self-contained element. Change would be unnoticeable unless we could measure it against some other element which did not change at the same pace. . . . The change which constitutes a problem is an altered relationship between two dependent variables."[2] This is a penetrating and stimulating suggestion. But it does not cover the whole ground. It has already been pointed out that social relations are conditioned by certain great constants, from which there is no escape. Many of the most crucial social problems result from the relations between changing variables and these ultimate constants. The larithmic problem is, obviously, an outstanding illustration of this principle. But Lippmann is essentially correct in his assertion that in a completely static society there would be no social problems in the ordinary sense—though in that case change itself would become a paramount question. In such a society a workable adjustment of factors to one another would have been reached, and as long as there was no change there would be no problem.

However, as we know, in modern society change is the invariable rule, and there is a marked differential in the rate of change of different variables. Ogburn has brought this out clearly in his study of social change, and has introduced the happy phrase "cultural lag" to describe the divergencies that arise.[3]

NATURE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

It is important to have a clear notion of the nature of social problems in general. A social problem is an unsatisfied interest that involves group relations. Social problems in general fall into two main categories. The problems in the first category are those in which the interest is an interest of society itself. This may be contrary to the interests of many, or even all, individuals in the society. For example, at the present time the declining birth-rate in many Western societies constitutes a problem, because if it should continue in the same direction much longer it would threaten the major interest of society, its continuity. Yet every particular family might wish to have no more children than it is having now. A similar situation was presented during the great depression when it was to the interest of society that people should spend freely, while discretion prompted the single individual or family to conserve its purchasing power. Many laws are of this nature. They represent the type of group relations where every individual desires that other individuals be restrained, but wishes that he himself might be free. Speed regulations are an excellent example. Every automobilist recognizes the necessity of control over drivers in general, and yet would himself like to drive as fast as he pleased.

The other category includes problems where the interest is individual but where either the cause inheres in social conditions over which the individual has no direct control, or else the resolution of the interest depends on social action —which comes very near to two ways of saying the same thing. As an example of the first type may be cited a large part of the unemployment that characterized the depression of 1929-1933. Millions of individuals found themselves interested in finding jobs, through no fault or act of their own, but solely because of social conditions. Representative of the second type is the problem of public parks. Almost every individual in a modern city has an interest in parks; but they can be provided only by social action.

Of course, as in most other social affairs, these classifications frequently merge into each other, and it is often just a question of the predominance of one form or another. Particularly is there a tendency for problems of the second class to take on something of the character of the first, for there is seldom an individual interest that is general enough to become a social problem at all that does not become an interest of society to some extent. Obviously it must become an interest of society before it can be resolved, because only then will society take the necessary steps to remove the causes or to provide the solution. The society of the United States is interested in the elimination of unemployment. At present, surprising as the statement may seem, the interest is not really very vital. When it becomes keen enough, some solution of the problem of unemployment will be found. Problems that arise out of social change are obviously social problems in the fullest sense of the term.

MALADJUSTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND FAMILY MORES

Illuminating illustrations can be found in the group of problems that arise out of the difference of the rate of change in the economic mores and the family mores. The former have been changing much more rapidly than the latter. In the economic world, women today are free to participate in almost every activity on about the same terms as men. But in the family the married woman is still economically subordinate to, and dependent on, her husband. Thus we have the strange anomaly that an unmarried girl can enter an occupation and compete freely with the young men in the occupation, supporting herself while they support themselves. But if in time she chances to marry one of these young men, immediately he becomes legally responsible for her support, and for the support of any children who may come, and she is entitled to sue him if he fails in this obligation. The chaotic results of this situation are obvious. The average man must normally expect to earn enough to enable him to support a wife and children in a reasonable degree of comfort. But the woman who competes with him has usually no legal responsibility for the support of any one but herself—not always even that—and that ceases on marriage. Since wages are determined in part at least, by the competition of all those bidding for jobs, it follows that the wages of men tend to be beaten down far below the level necessary for the support of a family. Thereupon it becomes necessary for the married woman, and the older children, to try to increase the family income by working themselves, thereby creating a situation in itself contrary to the prevailing assumption that the husband should be the chief or only breadwinner. In brief, our family mores require the man to support the family, while the economic mores make it impossible. And yet there are ardent advocates of equality of women who insist that women should have identical pay with men in the same occupations. The whole thing is a terrible tangle, simply because our economic and family mores are completely out of adjustment with each other.

The extreme rate of change in the economic system has created a number of other maladjustments. In fact, a very large part of our present social disorganization and futility is traceable to the fact that the technique of production has so far outrun the technique of consumption, the industrial arts so completely outdistanced the art of living. These phenomena will be more fully discussed in other connections.

The type of problem just discussed arises from the fact that the interest of the individual is not being achieved because of some fault in the societal organization, or cannot be achieved by societal action. The other type of problem arises because the interests of society are being blocked by the actions, or failure to act, of individuals. In the former case, society sanctions the individual interest but does not provide for its realization; in the latter case, society's own interests are hampered by the unsanctioned or non-conformable behavior of individuals. Problems of this latter type are detailed manifestations of society's difficulty in achieving its second major interest, welfare.

Objectives of Applied Sociology

The question of societal welfare lies at the core of the whole field of applied sociology. For applied sociology, as already explained* concerns itself with referring the generalizations of pure sociology to specific and concrete interests. But before any such application of the general to the particular can be carried out scientifically, there must be an explicit understanding as to goals or objectives. The practical scientist must have a pattern to work by. This pattern may be a norm or an ideal. That is, it may be concerned with bringing some detail of the societal organization into harmony with the whole, without passing judgment upon the satisfactoriness of the whole, or it may be concerned with the improvement of the whole, the advancement of the entire complex to a higher level. In a wholly normalized society, where every detail was in perfect adjustment to the others and to the whole, every ideal would necessarily involve a modification of the whole, for a change in any of the details would immediately produce a maladjustment. Activities designed to promote or restore normality fall within the field of social reform; efforts to raise the whole level of normality, or for the attainment of an ideal, may be designated social engineering.

Social Values

But both social reform and social engineering must rest ultimately upon some accepted social values. The nature of these values has already been discussed. They lie outside the field of science as far as their creation or determination is concerned. The function of science is first to discover or ascertain them, and then to show the relation to them of various forms of social change. The scientific method cannot be applied to telling a society what it ought to want, but it can be used, and is indispensable, in discovering what a society actually does want. This discovery is one of the greatest tasks that applied sociology has to face. This is partly because the methods of expressing the interests of society are inadequate and unreliable, and partly because the interests of different groups in society are frequently so divergent or conflicting that it is difficult to determine whether society itself has any well-defined interests in the given field. Situations of this kind are obviously of a centrifugal, or disintegrating, nature. When they become too numerous or too violent, they may result in the serious disruption of the societal structure. That is, to the extent that a society ceases to have clean-cut and positive interests of its own, it loses its capacity to function smoothly, and therefore loses the very characteristics of a society.

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* See Chapter VI.

General Values

Philosophers—whose business it really is—have sought for ages to discover some formula that would epitomize the ultimate values of society. The problem is complicated by the fact that since society is not organic, and has no sensory apparatus of its own, its values must be represented in the experiences of individuals. Societal welfare is achieved through individual welfare, but not always the precise forms of welfare that each individual would choose for himself. The old utilitarian phrase, "the greatest good of the greatest number," or the more concise term, "happiness," probably come as near as anything yet offered to a generally acceptable answer. But they are far too vague and unspecific to meet the needs of the applied sociologist. Before he can go to work, and recommend concrete plans and programs, he must know what is "good," what constitutes "happiness." Happiness is obviously a complex concept, composed of many particular values. Anyone could make a long list of the items included in various concepts of happiness: material wealth, physical health, absence of pain, leisure, opportunity to work, freedom from work, opportunity to serve, opportunity to be served, friendship, public esteem, the exercise of power, recreation, freedom of sex expression, knowledge, peace, security, adventure, and so on interminably. The concept of societal welfare is obviously a composite of all such values held by individuals harmonized as completely as may be in view of the conflicting nature of many of them. It is the clash not only of interests, but of the values that underlie interests, that makes ameliorative social effort so puzzling and so disheartening. Fortunately, there can almost always be found general agreement upon a few fundamental values, and upon such agreement the applied sociologist may construct a really defensible program. Indeed, if achievement could be reached with respect to only those values upon which there is practical unanimity, society would be raised to a level of satisfactoriness probably never hitherto attained. Almost everybody will subscribe to the values of health, mental soundness, reasonable longevity as long as the faculties are not impaired, the absence of starvation or actual hunger, opportunities for such wholesome (but what is wholesome?) recreations as individuals may choose, the maximum freedom of action and self-determination that is consistent with the same values for others, the absence of such extremes of welfare as would arouse the sense of injustice and resentment, and non-interference with devotional expression. Certainly this enumeration affords a wide enough range for all the ameliorative enthusiasm and activity that almost any society is likely to be able to muster at the present time. If there must be a concrete epitome of it all perhaps "realization of personality" is as good as any. Every individual can read into that phrase anything he chooses.

SOCIAL REFORM

Of the two types of ameliorative effort, social reform is obviously much the easier. This is not merely because it is simpler, in the sense that it concerns itself with the restoration of particular items to harmony with the general, but also because the interest of society is much more definitely expressed and easier to determine. The requirements of normality are expressed in the expectation of society, and this is relatively easy to ascertain. As already observed, society has developed numerous and varied means of letting its expectations be known, in the form of codes and other patterns of behavior that are impressed upon the consciousness of the individual. Quite generally, the individual himself knows whether or not he is performing his social obligation of conformity, and recognizes the validity of the efforts to bring him into line, however much he may resist them. Social reform requires relatively little imagination, except as to methods. Its aim is primarily to prevent deterioration within a given social framework. When it has done its perfect work it leaves society in a static situation. There are no longer problems, but neither is there positive improvement.

Social Progress

Social engineering, on the other hand, concerns itself with definite advancement; in other words, it involves the concept of progress. This is a notion which has occupied the attention of philosophers for ages past. Todd, in a valuable treatise,[4] has summed up the various theories of progress from classical times down to the present. Obviously, any concrete interpretation of progress must assume some ultimate values of the sort already discussed. Granted such a basis, the concept of progress is composed of two elements, movement and direction. The element of movement causes no serious difficulty. It is a matter of course that progress must involve movement. But it must be remembered that it is not the mere shifting of the items of the social structure within the framework, but movement of the framework itself. It is the question of direction that is complicated. A society can be said to be in a state of progress if its total structure is modifying in a way calculated to promote the fuller attainment of those accepted values which have been suggested. But this is often difficult to determine, because the readjustments among the structural items necessary to secure an improvement of the whole may often involve a loss of desirability in one or more of the details. This is an outcome of the principle of antithesis which has already been discussed. This being by no means a perfect world, the attainment of one good can often be realized only through the sacrifice of some other good. Whether there is genuine progress depends upon the balance of gain and loss in the total process. A pertinent and deeply important illustration is furnished at the present time in the obvious strain toward readjustment of modern industrial societies to the new technical and organizational facilities that they have built up. There are obviously materials here for definite progress. But before this can be achieved there must be drastic realignments of the constituent features. The broad pattern that is indicated clearly demands a more highly socialized form of industrial cooperation. But this can be secured only at the cost of some degree of personal liberty and individual self-determination. Society today is in the throes of the struggle to secure the individual self-renunciation that is necessary to permit the technological organization to work constructively. At the present writing it is impossible to prevision the outcome with any certainty. Western societies, particularly the American, cling with extreme tenacity to the values represented by personal liberty, freedom, and "rugged individualism." They also want security, efficiency, peace and prosperity. Some few of the more enlightened are beginning to see that these two sets of values, under modern conditions, are inherently incompatible. But they have not yet brought themselves to the requisite pitch of resignation, while the remainder of the populace is still groping in blind confusion. There is room for hope that in the long run some progress will be achieved. But it is by no means impossible that before it comes there will intervene a catastrophic period when the movement will be distinctly retrogressive. It should be repeated that progress can be judged only by the direction of movement of the whole, not by the seeming aspect of the social structure itself. There is a hill in New Hampshire so steep that the only way a Model T Ford could get up was to turn around and proceed rear end first. The car was going backwards, and yet it was making progress.

Continuous Evolution Not Identical With Progress

This point is of particular importance in helping us to realize that the continuation of social evolution along the lines of the past does not necessarily mean progress. Mere perfection of social organization is not synonymous with progress. Maeterlinck has issued a word of warning as to the possible future of mankind when the individual is completely merged in the community.[5] Whether or not this constitutes progress depends upon whether or not the values that are acknowledged by the individuals of that day—not of this—are better subserved by that form of organization than they would be by a simpler one. It would be a tragic thing indeed if it should prove that the forces of social evolution had such tremendous inherent momentum that they dragged man along with them toward certain predetermined eventualities regardless of whether or not they subserved the lasting interests of the individuals concerned. The assumption of applied social science is that this need not inevitably be so. Man is conceived to be capable of sufficient control over social forces, just as he is over physical forces, so that he can manipulate them, and interpose one against another, in such ways as to progressively and permanently secure his own protection and the steady promotion of his interests. But the need of action of this sort appears to be urgent, and the utilization of the best available mastery of social laws and principles to be imperative.

Mumford on Progress

Lewis Mumford has given us a brief but brilliant critique of the concept of progress which is so illuminating that it deserves to be quoted in full:[6]

> The eighteenth century brought forth the idea of Progress. Man, according to the philosophers and rationalists, was climbing steadily out of the mire of superstition, ignorance, savagery, into a world that was to become ever more

polished, human and rational—the world of the Paris salons before the hailstorm of revolution broke the windowpanes and drove the talkers to the cellar.

In the nineteenth century the idea of Progress became the leading principle of action: it rationalized and seemed to make more potent and purposeful that demonic concern with inventions, material improvements, power-driven machinery and mass production which swept everything before it in the more "progressive" regions of the world. At the end of this century, the exponents of Progress surveyed their work and, like God, felt that it was good: but unlike the six days' labor of Creation, there was happily no end to it. In the nature of Progress, the world would go on forever and forever in the same Victorian direction, becoming more humane, more comfortable, more peaceful, more smooth to travel in and, above all, much more rich.

Thanks to inertia, the notion of Progress lingered on into the twentieth century; but even before this century had brought its bitter corrections and qualifications, there was plenty of evidence to show that Progress did not describe actual events; it was a mythological interpretation of certain portions of them: that is, it awakened emotions and fed the energies of men, while it distorted and concealed the nature of the historical processes more certainly than it revealed it. For the reality of Progress was established only by disregarding with a bright Pecksniffian eye all those departments of life and work which indicated retreats, atavisms, regressions. Machine industry, which clothed so cheaply the bodies of the poor, also produced cities whose disorder and squalor had been equaled in Western Europe only in the worst days of Rome: the conquests of iron and coal, which created the great bridges and marvelous ocean steamships, likewise gave to warfare a murderousness which the implacable Assyrian would have envied. At the same time, the great institution of democracy abolished the hired bands of obvious roughnecks who had originally constituted the soldiery, and transformed whole nations into vastly more powerful armies of roughnecks. Result: an increase in fear, anxiety and destructiveness, and a diversion of energy into preparation for war and into payment through successive generations for indulgence in past wars and annihilations. One could multiply such examples.

Progress, in short, was Janus-headed: each great advance in technology and in social organization had a sinister face as well as a smiling one. The exponents of Progress, imitating the sun dial, counted only the smiling hours; only an exceptionally courageous spirit, like Herbert Spencer, would admit the steady increase of servility and militarism—attributes which should, on his own theory, have diminished to the point of extinction.

Plainly, by taking some low point of human development in the past, one might over a limited period of time point to a real advance. But if one began with a high point—for example, the fact that German miners in the sixteenth century frequently worked in three shifts of only eight hours each—the facts of progress, when one surveyed the mines of the nineteenth century, were nonexistent. Or if one began with the constant feudal strife of the fourteenth century, the peace that prevailed over great areas of Western Europe between 1870 and 1914 was a great gain: but if one compared the amount of destruction caused by a hundred years of the most murderous warfare in the Middle Ages with what took place in four short years during the World War, thanks precisely to such great instruments of technological progress as modern artillery, steel tanks, poison gas, bombs and flame throwers, the result was obviously a step backward.

What remained valid in the notion of progress were two things which had no essential connection with human improvement. First: the fact of life, with its birth, development, renewal, decay, which one might generalize, in such a fashion as to include the whole universe, as the fact of change, motion, transformation of energy. Second: the social fact of accumulation: that is, the tendency to augment and conserve those parts of the social heritage which lend themselves to transmission through time. No society can escape the fact of change or evade the duty of accumulation. Unfortunately change and accumulation work in both directions: energies may be dissipated, institutions may decay and societies may pile up evils and burdens as well as goods and benefits. To assume that a later point in development necessarily brings a higher kind of society is merely to confuse the neutral quality of complexity or maturity with improvement. To assume that a later point in time *necessarily* carries a greater accumulation of values is to forget the recurrent facts of barbarism and degradation. (The segregation of classes and the initial feeling of security caused by the success of the professional police force of the nineteenth-century metropolis perhaps abetted this forgetfulness.)

By now, however, it should be apparent that the one notion that has been thoroughly blasted by the facts of twentieth-



ARCHBISHOP ASSASSINATED
IN PROCESSION TO ALTAR;
LAID TO OLD-WORLD FEUD

GLAD YULE SPIRIT
REIGNS OVER CITY

GIRL, 15, MURDERED;
BODY TIED IN SACK

'Dance Crazed' Frequenter of
East Side Social Clubs
Found Slain in Street.

4 IN SEDAN DROWN
IN PLUNGE OFF PIER

KILLED BY FRIEND
IN PISTOL MISHAP

Youth Shot Dead With Weapon
Thought Unloaded as
Another Looks On.

Dogs Rob Almshouse
Of Its Turkey Dinner

4 MEN SHOT DEAD
IN JERSEY MURDERS

Three Killings in Hoboken and
One in Secaucus Said by
Police to Be Unrelated.

WEST COAST SLIDE
'BURIES 2 WOMEN

BEATEN AT CHURCH PICNIC.

Archbishop Was Attacked by Gang
in Westboro, Mass.

OFFICER AVERTS ROBBERY.

PRODUCER'S WIDOW
FOUND DEAD ON BEACH

Letter Telling of Foreboding
Dreams Lies Near Body of Mrs.

ALL FRANCE MOURNS
RAIL-CRASH VICTIMS

National Tribute Is Decreed
—Bodies of 189 Found and
Injured Total Twice That.

GIRL, SHOT IN HOME, DIES.

Vineland Police Refuse to Reveal
Who Fired Shotgun.

AUTOS KILL FOUR,
HURT THREE HERE

In Four Accidents Drivers
Speed Away Without Aiding Victims.

BOY, 5, DIES NEAR HOME

One Autoist Held on Charges of
Homicide and Driving While
Intoxicated.

Struck by Auto, Caroler Dies.

Retired Merchant Fatally Hurt.
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

NEPHEW OF GORDON
SLAIN IN RACKET ROW

GIRL, 8, FOUND SLAIN
IN WESTCHESTER

Battered Body Is Discovered
Under Hastings Building
After All-Night Search.

KILLING LAID TO MANIAC

Father, Former Inmate of Insane
Hospital, Under Investigation
in Town's First Murder.

2 POLICEMEN SLAIN
AT PROVIDENCE BOX

4 DIE AS TRAIN HITS AUTO.

Two Others Injured in Crossing
Accident Near Greensboro, N. C.

HELD FOR BRODIX DEATH.

West Virginian Is Arrested for
Auto Killing of Vanderbilt Friend.

KILLED TO LEAVE FARM.

Tenant Says He Would Not Do So
While Kind Owner Lived.

Two Held in Jersey Death.
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Woman Dies of Injuries.
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Long Island Man Killed.
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

HOSPITAL FUND ASKS
INCREASE IN GIFTS

AFTER 1933 YEARS OF "PROGRESS"

Headlines from the first four pages (which do not include the regular obituary section) of the Christmas issue of the New York *Times*, December 25, 1933.

century experience is the idea of Progress. We who have seen the recurrent poverty, misery and starvations that punctuate the advances of technology, we who have seen the immense irrationality and destruction of the World War, we who have seen barbarous, atavistic modes of feeling and expression rise again in Germany, technically the most advanced country in the world—we cannot comfort ourselves with the naïve belief in Progress. "The individual withers and the world is more and more," sang the great poet of Victorian progress: unfortunately, we now realize that it may be more and more of worse and worse.

Past Achievements

Perhaps a more optimistic way to appraise the realty of past progress than comparing whole eras with each other is to select certain outstanding cases of undeniably evil social forms that have been definitely disposed of in civilized societies. Several such can be easily recalled—cannibalism, chattel slavery, infanticide. Others are in process of elimination, such as despotic tyranny, legal torture, and religious persecution. Of course, in all honesty, we must set off against these, certain achievements of modern culture about which the barbarian knew nothing, some of which would probably have stricken him with horror. One need only mention poison gas warfare, the labor of miners far below the earth's surface, and city slums where two or three families crowd into a couple of dark, airless, insanitary rooms. The city itself, with all its violations of natural impulses and ancient needs, is a heavy price to pay for a few physical comforts.

But in any case, the past is finished, and there is nothing that can be done about it. The vital question is whether the resources of applied sociology are sufficient, or can be made so, to set the stage for a drama of genuine progress in the future.

Confusion with Movement

The unprecedented developments of the nineteenth century inevitably tended to confuse progress with mere movement in the minds of Western peoples in general. The extraordinary conjuncture of advantages which has been mentioned opened up broad avenues of advance, and almost automatically indicated the direction that advance should take. It seemed self-evident that to do the immediate and obvious things would result in advantage to those who did them. A new hemisphere had been opened up to exploitation—exploit it. Marvelous machines had been invented—build them and operate them. The highways of world trade were being extended and smoothed, and transportation over them greatly speeded up—buy and sell goods in every land, always taking care to sell more than you buy. Facilities had been developed for the support of much larger populations—encourage propagation at a rapid rate. New modes of acquiring and accumulating wealth had come into existence—lay wreaths of laurel on the brows of the opulent.

These naïve reactions were supported by the fact that behavior of the kinds indicated did indeed result in the piling up of the material instruments of comfort and enjoyment. The standard of living visibly advanced. There seemed to be no occasion to question the final outcome, or to inquire analytically what ultimate values were being served, and what, perchance, were being jeopardized. These developments were naturally most intensified in the United States, which was the very vortex of the forces that occasioned them. This society was the possessor of the best of the new lands, its people were richly endowed with the kinds of ability and temperament that harmonized with the new opportunities, its political system was relatively free from the trammels of ancient tradition, and it started its existence without the handicap of overpopulation. No wonder that its people acquired an axiomatic concept of progress, failing to perceive the necessity of defining it, or of deliberately charting the route that would lead to it, but instead took it for granted that any obvious movement, particularly movement toward bigness, was a means to progress. This was a comfortable mental state. It raised no abstruse philosophical questions, it afforded justification for doing what one wanted to do, and it seemed to provide a direct and logical reward for effort. The rude shattering of this ephemeral structure during the past two or three decades, as has been observed, is largely accountable for the disorganization and confusion of contemporary American intellectual life. As someone has put it, the early settlers of this country had a definite objective before them. They had no doubt what life was for, or what constituted progress. It consisted in subduing a wilderness, developing the resources of a continent, creating an economic organization in a new land, building a nation. Now that this great task is accomplished, modern Americans are at a loss for any concrete and well-defined goal comparable to their energies and capacities. To a large extent they have kept on doing the same sort of thing their fathers did, simply because they have not known what else to do. They are now learning painfully but rapidly that the terms of progress have altered.

Means of Progress

But granted that a nucleus of ultimate values, of sufficiently wide acceptance to make them truly social, has been discerned in a given society, how can this be transmuted into a pattern of progress? And when the pattern has been sketched, the goal set, and the direction of movement determined, how can progress actually be attained? How can movement be initiated, directed, and sustained?

Social Engineering

The former of these queries posits the central problem of social engineering, a problem far more intricate and delicate than any which confronts the most skillful civil or mechanical engineer. If society is in a state of relative normality, then any change in any of its features is likely to set up disturbances and strains. If there are serious abnormalities, their correction is a matter of reform, not of engineering. Unless all parts of the structure move simultaneously, and at the same rate of speed, there will occur "cultural lags," or differentials, which are the immediate source of problems. A constructive project in social engineering requires a clear comprehension of how a seeming improvement in any aspect of the structure will affect other aspects, and how those other aspects may be altered suitably, without necessitating still further modifications in still more remote aspects. To move the whole of society forward, in accordance with a definite set of plans and specifications, without causing serious cracks and fractures, appears a task of almost superhuman complexity.

"REFORM"

It is these facts that have occasioned the wide-spread distrust and scorn of the social thinker, the visionary, the crank, the hare-brained "reformer" (as he is called), the man who thinks things out in bed. Most of the individuals who come forward with schemes of social regeneration do indeed justify a skeptical scrutiny, and most of their plans are of a distinctly "half-baked" character. The current depression has called forth an unusual flood of plans for economic improvement. The great majority of them are based upon some real vision of the underlying causes of the difficulty, and some grasp of fundamental changes that are essential to improvement. But when it comes to a practical program for action, they lay all stress on some single remedial measure which is logical in itself, but which would involve such sweeping changes in various interrelated aspects of society that putting it into operation would create much more serious problems than those it is aimed to cure. For example, one ingenious plan[7] that has received considerable endorsement proposes to regiment all young people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six into governmentally regulated units to produce necessaries, regardless of the upheaval that this would create in the educational and family institutions.

IDEALIZATION

The trouble with such plans is that they are not based on sound social engineering principles. The first essential step in setting up a program of progress is the preparation of a working model. This model takes the form of an ideal. The word "ideal" has been the object of a vast amount of contempt and derision. Ideals are customarily looked upon as visionary, impractical, ethereal, unworthy the attention of the practical man of affairs. Nothing could be more erroneous. The ideal is an indispensable requisite to all improvement that is not purely fortuitous or haphazard. All planned and rational improvement must rest upon a predetermined concept. An ideal is merely somebody's mental picture of something better than that which is. It is therefore subject to all the deficiencies and frailties of the one who constructs it. This means that there are all varieties of ideals. Some may be fantastic, absurd, impractical, and chimerical. Others may be sensible, realistic, practical, even scientific. It all depends upon whether or not they are constructed on the basis of an adequate comprehension of the ends to be achieved, the materials to be worked with, and the laws and principles that must be observed. Every artist must have an ideal definitely constructed in his imagination before he lays brush on canvas or sets chisel against marble. The glorious Hermes of Olympia was an ideal in the mind of Praxiteles long before it emerged as an immortal work of art. Leonardo da Vinci, one of the most practical men of his day, was one of the great idealists of all time. The same is true of the engineer. The Brooklyn Bridge was an ideal, and a very novel one, before it became a practical means of connecting Long Island with Manhattan. The Panama Canal was an ideal for decades before it became a reality. There had to be definitely formulated ideals before there could be a Parthenon or an Empire State Building. So it is with every great achievement in any department of life that is the result of deliberate vision, foresight, and planning. Idealization, therefore, is one of the most practical and indispensable of all social processes.

The Idealization of Wilson

The most skillful kind of idealization, that which would mark a social engineer as an eminent practitioner in his profession, consists in envisioning a change in some important aspect of the social structure or functioning which would bring a definite improvement, with a minimum of alteration in related aspects. Some incidental changes are practically always involved. An expert job of idealization foresees all the modifications that are required to preserve normality in the revised social structure, and maps out a definite program for carrying them out. One of the most momentous projects of idealization ever undertaken was that which resulted in the formation of the League of Nations. Many minds had contributed to it, among which that of Woodrow Wilson was probably the most influential. President Wilson had had large experience in practical idealization, and during the first years of his administration had put a number of important ideals into effect, prominent among them the Federal Reserve System. He went to Europe with high enthusiasm for this favorite project of his. The conditions for its realization were far from perfect, and many of his other cherished ideals had to be sacrificed for its attainment. And when he returned to his own country he learned the tragic truth that it was not prepared to support him in the venture. The League has not been an unqualified success. It has met and surmounted several severe crises. At the present moment of writing it is facing one of the most serious phases of its existence. How different the situation would be today if the United States had become a member, and what the future developments may be, it is impossible to say. The League was an unprecedented attempt to remodel world society on the basis of a voluntary acceptance of a preconceived plan. Its survival during fourteen turbulent years of what was expected to be a "Reconstruction Period," and its long list of accomplishments in non-political fields, in the face of tremendous obstacles and much positive opposition, bear eloquent testimony to the possibility of practical idealization, on even the most ambitious scale.

THE IDEALIZATION OF ROOSEVELT

Fifteen years later, another Democratic president, Mr. Roosevelt, launched another vast program of idealization, though limited to a national scale. There was this difference, however; the N.R.A., A.A.A., P.W.A., C.W.A., and related alphabetical ventures represented rather the application of empirical expedients to emergent problems than a comprehensive program of readjustment worked out by experts on the basis of clearly envisioned principles, and a careful analysis of structural relationships. The fundamental requisite of a better distribution of consumer purchasing power was recognized, but its full importance was not appreciated, and the steps taken to accomplish it were not only inadequate, but inconsistent.

Successful Idealization

Instances of more successful, though perhaps less ambitious, idealization are afforded by the elimination of wage labor on the part of very young children and other results of "social legislation," the introduction of woman suffrage in the United States and other Western countries, the establishment of a quota system for the regulation of immigration to the United States, the establishment of an International Postal Union, etc. The ideal of a warless world is one of the grandest conceptions of the human mind. Its attainment would involve far-reaching modifications in the structure and functioning of all of the great nations. The formulation of a practical working model is a task of titanic magnitude, and the perfecting of plans for its adoption and operation would tax the best intellects of the day. Yet, happily, many of the best intellects are working earnestly on it, and the success, even though partial, of less epochal ventures is the best guarantee of the possibility of its achievement.

Utopias

The creation of comprehensive ideals for the reorganization of society has been a favorite diversion of philosophers for ages. Plato, Campanella, More, Butler, Bellamy, and many others have constructed Utopias according to their own conceptions of what constitutes a satisfactory social organization. Most of these ideal communities have been envisioned fancifully or whimsically. They were designed rather to reveal the futilities and absurdities of the existing order than to offer a practical project with any expectation of its adoption. Many of them presuppose a group of inhabitants of such a high moral, physical, and intellectual type that they would constitute a happy society on almost any system. But there is no doubt that these imaginary social paradises have served as an inspiration and a stimulus to practical planners of less comprehensive improvements.[9]

Social Manipulation

When an ideal has been constructed, and a program for its realization has been mapped out, the next problem is to induce society to bring it into realization. How can this be done? The answer is obviously to be found in the whole analysis of social change, social forces, social causation, and social control. The only way to produce conscious social change is by affecting the desires and beliefs of individuals, and the interests in which they express themselves. The various means by which this can be done have already been suggested. The question of the efficacy of any single individual in producing this result has been widely debated by students of social affairs. Some, like Sumner, incline to deny the significance of individual effort almost absolutely. Others go to the opposite extreme of assuming that most of what happens is the result of deliberate individual activity. The antithesis is virtually that of the Great Man Theory of history as contrasted with the doctrine that social events take place as a result of impersonal forces inherent in society itself, which produce results little influenced by the doings or personality of any individual. The dominant figures of history, who seem to direct and control events, are merely puppets responding to the impulsion of forces outside themselves. They are merely the personifications of the spirit of the age. They are inconsequential particles selected by the current of change, almost fortuitously, to be borne along on the crest of the wave. If they had not been there, someone else would have served just as well. According to this theory the time makes the man, not the man the time.

The truth, as usual, probably lies somewhere in the middle ground between these extremes. There are doubtless tides in the affairs of men that surge onward regardless of any particular individual or minor group. They represent social forces, that is convergent interests of many individuals, in which no personality seems to be notably more influential than another. But there are many other social movements which would not, by any stretch of the imagination, have been the same if it had not been for some dominant personality. Can any one believe that the League of Nations would have been formed in just the same way, or that the subsequent history of the world would have been the same, if there had not been a Woodrow Wilson to sponsor it and a Henry Cabot Lodge to oppose it? Or that the birth control movement in the United States would have had the same vigorous growth without Margaret Sanger? Or that the development of low-priced automobiles would have been the same without Henry Ford? Indeed, any one who has participated at all intimately in social movements must be vividly aware of how great is the influence of personalities, not only in promoting causes in which they are interested, but sometimes also in impeding them. "The heaviest calamity in English history, the breach with America, might never have occurred if George the Third had not been an honest dullard."[10] And the World War might never have occurred, at least not as it did, if Wilhelm Hohenzollern had not been born with a withered arm.[11]

SOCIAL POTENTIAL

The underlying principle is that while every human individual who has reached the age of even partial self-determination contains a minute particle of the dynamic element of social change, yet there is a vast difference in the social potential of different individuals. A belief held by one individual, and an interest pursued by him, will have more effect on social change than a similar belief and interest held by thousands or tens of thousands of other individuals. The difference lies in qualities of intellect, emotion, energy, enthusiasm, force, charm, knowledge, experience, and all the other attributes that combine to make that elusive but influential complex called personality. Such an individual will energize a movement, crystallize it into concrete, rugged form, give it an explicit appeal, and draw myriads along with him. One of the steps, therefore, in the realization of an ideal is the enlistment of as many as possible of persons of this type, who are frequently called the "élite." Through them, and along with them, must be enrolled a sufficiently large number of persons of lesser and varying potential so that in the aggregate they will form a consolidated social force sufficient to offset the effective opposition, which may be a considerable majority, and may be either inert or active, but is not sufficiently unified or consolidated to dominate the situation. The Prohibition Amendment has been frequently criticized on the ground that it was "put through by an organized minority." Doubtless it was. Practically all deliberate social movements are put through by organized minorities. A portion of the majority may not be opposed, or may even be favorably inclined, but they are not mobilized into the body that actually gets results. The truth of this is exemplified by the fact that the Prohibition Amendment was enacted in full accordance with the provisions established in the Constitution itself for its own modification, which are popularly supposed to be exceptionally efficient safeguards of democratic action.

POTENCY OF SMALL UNITS

The efficacy of small groups, or even of individuals, in affecting social change under the conditions of modern social organization is striking, and at times alarming. This is due to the pyramiding of influence in a complex society where the authority and initiative of large groups must of necessity be delegated to smaller groups or to individuals. A small group of tired men, gathered in a smoke-beclouded hotel bedroom at three o'clock in the morning, selects a man to be nominated as the candidate of their party for the presidency of the United States. This man is accepted by the convention, placed at the head of the ticket, elected by the voters, and a lurid chapter is written in the history of the nation. The importance of committees in the management of modern social action is enormous. There are definite techniques of committee control well known to experienced practitioners by the use of which a very small number of persons may determine policies which eventually have the appearance of being the mature judgment or opinion of thousands or millions of people. The committee system of handling bills in legislative bodies is a case in point. The technique of the internal control of interest groups thus takes on great social significance.

Social Determinism

To the extent that social change does take place as a result of what may be called "social determinism," it simply means that through the operation of antecedent causal sequences a large number of people have come to hold similar desires, and to regard certain objectives as capable of satisfying those desires, without any process of organization or any conspicuous leadership, certainly without the impact of any dominating personality or the creation of anything resembling a crusade. The continuous drift of population, in the United States and other western countries, from the country to the city may be cited as a case in point. There have been innumerable groups which have been interested in drawing the rural population into the city, and various forms of purposeful stimuli have been devised to accomplish the purpose, but there has been no nation-wide campaign to foster urbanism led by a single dynamic and dramatic figure. On the contrary, the overt propaganda has been mainly of a contrary purpose, designed to get the people back onto the land or to keep them there. What has caused the percentage of urban population, in the United States for example, to shift from 3.3 per cent to 49.1 per cent in a period of 140 years* has been a consensus of belief on the part of increasing millions of individuals that the city offered greater opportunities for employment, wealth, enjoyment, eminence, and the "realization of personality" in general than the country. It has been a phenomenon of hosts of relatively self-determining organisms making the same type of adjustment to a changing human environment.

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* Taking a population of 8000 as the dividing line. Abstract of the Fifteenth Census of the U. S. A., p. 20.

Efficacy of the Individual

This may offer some comfort to those who believe that they have a concrete and practical vision of a happier organization of society, but who recognize their own lack of the masterful qualities of high leadership, or who are at a loss to know just how leadership is to be exercised in a modern complex society. They may rest assured that if their ideal is really scientific and sufficiently simple probably a number of other people have already caught some comparable vision, and that myriads of the common population will see the validity of the proposal once it is explained to them, and if the change is really in accordance with the principles of progress the acceptance of the ideal will steadily grow until finally, without anybody's quite knowing how, it becomes a reality. This is the chief hope in such a state of economic disorganization as the present. As already stated, the world today is flooded with economic ''plans.'' Most of them contain a germ of understanding if not of inspiration. If a sufficient number of them are candidly discussed among the more intelligent and better-informed elements of the population, out of them will eventually emerge a concentrate or precipitate, which will represent the most convincing ideals that are common to many or all of them, and which will operate as a nucleus to bind innumerable individual concepts into a consistent desire for a specific accomplishment, which will inevitably thereafter become an accomplished fact. Then the social determinists will sagely observe that the time was ripe for such-and-such a change, and that the internal forces of societal evolution had duly brought it about. This kind of explanation sometimes takes the form of referring events to ''the historical process,'' as if a process could be a causative factor.[12] Of course, results of this kind can be achieved only if those who are ardently convinced of the merits of their own ideas are active in promoting them to the best of such abilities as they possess. This is the merit and the promise of the countless ''discussion groups'' that exist in every center of modern population. Taken individually, they may seem to accomplish nothing tangible. The discussers, as Omar Khayyam would say, evermore come out by the same door where in they went. Personal views seem to have been altered but little. No one rushes forth to wave a banner and lead a charge. But by the cumulative effect of multitudes of such contributions there is gradually built up a body of opinion or sentiment which in the end must have its way. To be sure, if fate is kind enough to send some glowing and magnetic personality who can put his hand on the heart of the matter and galvanize it into a vital and colorful ‘‘movement,’’ results will come so much the quicker. But ideas are the concrete dynamic factors in purposeful social movement, and no idea, however humble and obscure, is wholly negligible.

CHAPTER XIX

SOCIAL CHANGE (*Continued*). SOCIAL PROCESS

The manner in which social change takes place is designated as "the social process," or, in its diversified aspects, as "social processes." This concept is regarded by many sociologists as of paramount importance.[1] An impressive and comprehensive study of separate social processes has been made by Ross, whose sociological system consists largely in a classification and analysis of social processes. His list of identifiable processes includes: Socialization, Association, Domination, Exploitation, Opposition, Stimulation, Antagonistic Effort, Personal Competition, Sex Antagonism, Class Struggle, Institutional Competition, Adaptation, Cooperation, The Organization of Effort, The Organization of Will, The Organization of Thought, The Deterioration of Social Structure, Stratification, The Rise of Gross Inequalities, Gradation, Segregation and Subordination, Equalization, Selection, Estrangement, Social Control, Super-social Control, Individuation, Liberation, Commercialization, Professionalization, Institutionalization, Expansion, Ossification, Decadence, Transformation, Re-shaping.[2]

The primary significance and importance of many of these concepts is clear at a glance. Whole volumes might be written about many of them. In fact, Ross himself has written a classic book about one of them, Social Control. Von Wiese also gives social processes a dominant position in his system, and furnishes an even more minutely detailed classification of processes in a well-known table. Other social scientists have stressed one or another of these concepts. Thus Sumner laid much stress on what he called "antagonistic cooperation." Gumplowicz regarded race conflict as the central factor in social development, and Marx stressed exploitation, while numerous sociologists have built their entire systems around the concepts of association or socialization.

Action Pattern

For the purposes of a general understanding of social phenomena the important thing is to get an adequate idea of what is meant by a social process. It is what von Wiese calls an "action pattern," a mode of behavior by which an individual, several individuals, or a group participate in a social relationship. Obviously, every reaction to the social environment, every active contact of a person with another person or a group, is a social process. A catalog of processes so minutely subdivided would exhaust a considerable part of a dictionary. But an action or a process is not important for scientific purposes unless it is repetitious, that is, unless it occurs in nearly identical form often enough to serve as a legitimate basis for a generalization. Otherwise it would not conform to the idea of a true "pattern." No social action, therefore, however great its immediate significance to the individual or the group, can properly be listed among the social processes unless it has classificatory value and represents a type of phenomenon that the sociologist is likely to encounter somewhat frequently. How minutely, on this basis, any systematist may wish to subdivide the primary concept of social process is essentially a matter of judgment or convenience.

Importance of Repetition

The processes or actions that are repetitious are the ones that society must count on in attempting either to prevision or to control social change. The fact that the relationship of domination and subordination appears over and over again in all societies indicates that it is a factor that can be relied upon; we may have a justifiable scientific belief that it will happen again. The fact that competition is an invariable concomitant of liberty helps us to understand that we may frequently be forced to a choice between the two. The fact that commercialization has spread its influence over an ever-widening circle of interests during the modern economic era justifies us in expecting that it will continue to increase as long as the present economic framework persists.

In a very real sense, therefore, a condensed statement of an established and verified social process is closely akin to a generalization, or law, of social science, provided it is something more than a mere description of a momentary aspect, but also includes an adequate segment of a causative sequence.

Types of Control

We are now prepared to consider in some detail some of the more important specific types of control which society seeks to exert, and its reasons for exerting them. We have examined the bases of control, the means of control, the standards which signalize the objectives of control, the types of change that necessitate control, and the major interests that society seeks to serve through its processes of control. It is now in order to look into the types or departments of control that society displays.

Control of Beliefs

First and foremost, perhaps, comes the control of beliefs, since they are the activating elements in all social action. Nowhere is the cumulative character of the social process more manifest than in the genesis of beliefs. A large portion of our beliefs we hold just because they have always been held. This is of course much less true today than it was before the dawn of the scientific era. One of the characteristics of magic is the acceptance of doctrines on the basis of mere authority, without any attempt to check them against the facts. The thought of the Middle Ages abounded with the most fantastic and bizarre notions, particularly concerning sickness and the remedies therefor, and the properties and behavior of the lower animals. To us it seems a simple method of determining whether a spider will cross a ring of powder supposed to be made of unicorn's horn to put a spider inside such a ring and watch him. But the men who first actually did so were innovators and iconoclasts—but precursors of the scientific era. It is still the case that a large part of society's control over beliefs is, if not actually unconscious, at least unreasoned, undeliberate, and semi-automatic, corresponding to Sumner's analogy of a mass of drifting clouds, formless, undirectional, self-activating. Beliefs of this kind become imbedded in tradition, myth, and convention. No authorized agency of society has the responsibility of demonstrating them, of justifying them, or of examining their origin, though many may be charged with enunciating them or inculcating them. As far as the individual is concerned, he often has difficulty in tracing the precise origin of beliefs of this kind in his own mind. How did we come to believe that it is wrong to lie, that there is a God, that sexual promiscuity is bad taste, that certain types of behavior constitute good sportsmanship and fair play, or the reverse, that a man should carry a lady's packages for her, etc.?

With reference to some of these beliefs we may have fairly definite recollections of indoctrination at the hands of our parents, teachers (day school or Sunday school), clergymen, or other authoritative elders. But many of them we seem to have just absorbed from the social environment about us. As has been observed, some of the colonial settlers of North America opposed the taking of a census because they believed that it would bring down the wrath of God as it was alleged to have done upon David three thousand years earlier; they also resisted the introduction of iron plows in the belief that they would poison the soil. The origin of the former of these beliefs may easily be traced to the Old Testament tradition, but where did the latter come from?

EXPERIENCE

This kind of regulation, being so little conscious or deliberate, should be distinguished from the forms of control which imply a purposeful outlook. There is also another form of control of beliefs which can hardly be called social, because of its automatic character. This is the control exercised by the hard school of experience. It was emphasized in an earlier section that the immediate activating force in social phenomena is belief, not knowledge and not fact. A false belief is just as powerful a spring to action as a true one, a traditional belief just as strong as a scientific one. But, fortunately for man, beliefs are always getting checked up against facts. This is nature's provision for the limitation of error. Sometimes it seems to require a vast amount of fact to eradicate a cherished belief, but sooner or later everyone who has sufficient intelligence to participate in genuine social action at all finds most of his important beliefs projected against the cold background of experience, and begins to appraise their validity. One's equipment of beliefs at any moment is a complex of externally acquired notions progressively modified and corrected by one's own reflections upon them, influenced by subsequent notions, and particularly by personal experiences and contact with facts. It is out of such a complex of beliefs that we construct the imaginative subjective situations which serve as stimuli to action.

Limits of Knowledge

The intricacy, variety, and richness of these pre-visualized sequences depend largely upon the imagination and experience of the individual; their accuracy and verity depend upon his intelligence, training, and also experience. About none of them, it must be remembered, does any individual ever have positive knowledge. Even the most erudite and rigid scientist knows nothing about events that are to come. All forecasts of the future are at best merely estimates as to relative probabilities. The factual grounds for making estimates vary between the widest extremes. Every day we are virtually certain that the sun will rise on the morrow. What wouldn't we give for equal assurance that General Motors would go up three points, or down a point and a half, within five hours after that sunrise!

If one is fortunate he may enlist the aid of science in making these forecasts. The major part of the work of science consists in accumulating, arranging, and interpreting knowledge as to the events of the past. Such of these interpretations as are practical take the form of statements as to the probabilities of future events, given a certain existing situation that can be described in concrete terms. In the case of certain of these situations the accumulated knowledge bearing on them is so extensive, and the probabilities based on this knowledge are so high, that it is easy for the scientist to slip into the habit of saying, with reference to a future event, "I know." But every time he does so he is unscientific, even though he be dealing with such routine matters as the most familiar chemical reactions or the acceleration of a falling body. In other cases the negative chances, or improbabilities, are so great that they have been compared to the likelihood that if one hundred monkeys were put in a room with one hundred typewriters they would reproduce all the books in the Library of Congress.

There are almost infinite variations and shadings of belief. Belief is not mere guesswork, nor blind faith. Belief, as we are using the word, is an appraisal of a pre-visioned sequence of events. It may be impulsive, unconsidered, and ignorant, or it may be based upon a thorough knowledge of the facts that must actually govern the sequence in question, and an intimate familiarity with the events that have actually come to pass in similar situations in the past. Scientific belief bears the same relation to the future that scientific knowledge does to the past. It is the best guide to conduct that exists in all the ordinary affairs of life.

But right or wrong, scientific or capricious, once a belief is formed in an individual's consciousness it becomes absolutely determinative of conduct. This is one of the great sources of tragedy in human existence. To be sure, beliefs vary in intensity, and accordingly conduct may be assured or hesitant. They are followed in accordance with their intensity, not their validity.

Correct Beliefs

It thus comes about that nothing in human life is more important than the acquisition and cultivation of correct beliefs. Knowledge in itself can do us no good. It is barren. It deals exclusively with past events which cannot be altered. The sole practical value of knowledge is to help us formulate accurate beliefs about the future. And for this purpose knowledge is indispensable. Knowledge is the record of past sequences of events, and we believe that there is no better guide to future sequences. We *believe* that there is an order, a constancy, a reliability in the universe on which we can count. From the events of the past, we derive our ideas as to the probabilities of the future. The higher the degree of uniformity in past sequences under given conditions, the greater is our assurance that the same sequences will display themselves in the future under identical conditions. If a given set of factors has *always* produced the same result in multitudinous past instances, the probabilities for the future become so high that our belief takes on the guise of practical certainty. It becomes the wise thing to act as if we did know, as if we were sure.

Necessity of Choice

For events are bound to transpire, and to transpire in sequences. There is no way of stopping them. Whether or not we human beings are free to choose, we are certainly not free *not* to choose. We have to select between alternatives. There is no escape. To refuse to choose, to hold one's self inert, is to choose. This is a form of predestination about which there can be no two opinions. Whether we believe that we exercise some power over our selection, or that we are the impotent media through which eternal cosmic forces make their selections—in either case we go on selecting just the same. For sequences of events have transpired since the beginning of creation and will go on until the end of existence. The whole record of man, of life, of nature is just a vast series of unbroken sequences. We puny human individuals are gathered up in them and made a part of them. In some way we have acquired the capacity to visualize multitudes of them in advance. Out of a given situation, however, only one sequence is actually going to develop. To the extent that we believe in self-determination we believe that we can in some measure decree which of the supposedly possible sequences becomes the actual one. Our peril is that we may misinterpret the probabilities that past sequences have set up among these figments of our imagination, and that we may misjudge our capacity to turn the pointer in this direction or that. There may be a greater certainty about a particular one of them than we conceive, or the really predestined sequence may be one that we have not even thought of at all. A certain tourist in Italy, after days of careful planning, may determine to climb Vesuvius on a given morning, and to "do" Pompeii the next day. But, all unknown to him, certain cosmic sequences may have predetermined that on the day in question his plans may be carried out up to the point of his ascent of Vesuvius, but that thereupon a violent eruption of the volcano is to take place, which puts a period to his plans for Pompeii, and all his other plans.

Education

Herein lie the origin and the justification of the great institution of education. The primary function of education is to assist the individual in acquiring valid beliefs, and in correcting those that he already holds. This may be accomplished in several ways, by sharpening his powers of observation, by training his faculties of reason and logic, by improving his capacity for the interpretation of experience, and by giving him access to the accumulated experiences and interpretations of other individuals, of his own and previous generations. But in the exercise of this function a difficulty arises. The test of the validity of a belief is found in its relation to an interest. Without entering into the much-debated question as to whether there is any such thing as absolute truth, or whether all truth is in some sense relative, it may be granted that with reference to the beliefs that lead to social action truth is relative to the object of the action. A belief is true if the action that it indicates will actually resolve the interest that is at stake; it is false, if it leads to action that will not satisfy the desire that is back of the interest. But frequently two sets of interests are involved in a social action, the interest of the individual and the interest of society. These are not always identical, or even harmonious. This is partly because, as has been shown, it is frequently profitable for the individual to violate the expectation that represents society's interest, and which he approves of in its social, but not its personal, application. But there are also cases of another type, which arise from the fact that there are numerous relations where the behavior of the individual is not only conducive to his own benefit, but is also legitimate, and may be even sanctioned and encouraged in a society which is not sufficiently informed about its own interests, but is nevertheless actually prejudicial to the interests of society itself. This is another instance of the great antithesis of life, which is of sufficient importance to merit careful consideration.

Immigration as Example

Out of many examples that might be cited, a single one will suffice to make the principle clear. The immigration from Europe to the United States during the years from about 1880 to the outbreak of the World War was motivated primarily by the search for a higher standard of living on the part of the working classes of various countries, particularly those in the southern and eastern parts of that continent. For reasons that are familiar by now, the United States enjoyed a much higher standard than these countries. A laborer coming from one of them to America, during the great period of industrial expansion and demand for cheap labor, could find a job without much difficulty that paid him far more than he was receiving, or could hope to receive, in his native land. Although prices were also higher in this country, yet the differential was enough greater in wages than in prices so that he could establish a much higher standard of living than he was accustomed to. This was true if he brought his family with him, and even more true if he left his family at home and supported them by money sent from here which was expended at the low prices of his home village. The motive was therefore a natural one, and the energy and ambition that animated the immigrant were admirable and commendable from the individual point of view. Such an immigrant was doing just what an industrious and conscientious head of a household might be expected to do. But from the point of view of American society the process was disastrous. The competition of standards set up between the foreigner and the native worker was destructive to the latter, the increased competition for jobs tended to lower wages, and in many other ways the rivalry between alien and native was prejudicial to the welfare of the latter. The standard of living of the whole American society was being dragged down, or at least kept from rising as high as it otherwise might have. Evidence on this matter has already been cited.* As far as the European countries were concerned, they too were suffering from the loss of many of their most industrious and energetic and constructively minded citizens, without getting any compensation through the alleviation of the evils of overpopulation.† The American people were finally aroused to the menace of the process, and also convinced that no obligation of international ethics stood in the way of their protecting themselves, and a drastic policy of restriction was put in force.[8]

Dilemma of Education

Other dilemmas of a similar sort will be encountered in our study of specific social problems. The nature of the problem that they create in the educational activities of society is obvious. Shall society encourage, and help to inculcate, beliefs that are true from the individual point of view, and that will stimulate him to do the things that are immediately beneficial to himself, or shall it concentrate on the effort to instill into individuals beliefs that are true from the societal point of view, that is, that will stimulate them to socially constructive action, even though this involves the suppression or distortion of beliefs directly advantageous to them? Or is it better to foster abstract truth at all hazards, and to rely upon persuasive or coercive means to restrain individuals from doing the very things that they have been encouraged to believe will be to their benefit? Different societies have answered this question in different ways. Instances could probably be found of societies that have actually tried to inculcate in their members false beliefs about their own interests. But it is much commoner for societies dominated by a despotic agency to attempt to suppress those aspects of truth that it regards as disruptive. This is why popular education has never been favored by tyrannies.* At the same time, this type of control is by no means confined to despotisms, but may be observed in countries of the most democratic structure. During the early years of the depression, the Hoover administration issued, or allowed to go uncorrected, many statements and counsels to action that were prejudicial to the interests of individuals, if not at actual variance with the truth. The central theme was "prosperity is just around the corner." It may be assumed that the officials responsible for them were sincerely convinced that their announcements would encourage beliefs beneficial to the American people as a whole.

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* See pp. 303-306.

† See pp. 536-539.

The Right to Know

This brings up a very interesting and delicate question, the question of the right to know. There is a rather widespread doctrine that in a democratic society no information of any sort ought to be denied to any one seeking it, certainly no information concerning social or public affairs. Recognizing that all rights are socially conferred, the problem becomes whether or not it is expedient, and in accordance with the highest concepts of justice, that all knowledge should be available to all men. It is a commonplace that in war time suppression is the rule, and even in peace time there are many items of knowledge that authorities do not regard as safe to be freely released to the public. On the very day that these words were written the newspapers bore an account of a session of the Senate that was held behind closed doors in the fear that certain facts that were being revealed concerning dealings between one of the great New York banks and the former administration of Cuba might be injurious to society, perhaps that of Cuba, perhaps of the United States.

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* If it appears that this should be considered as governmental control rather than social control, it should be remembered that government is the agency of the state, and the state is an aspect of society. Action on the part of government that is permitted, tolerated, and submitted to by the members of society, no matter how passively or resentfully, is social action. The explanation is found in the difference of potential of certain individuals and classes. Furthermore, social control is not necessarily and always synonymous with societal control. The control of a group over its members, or over another group, is genuine social control.

A very good case can be made out for suppression. If knowledge is power, it is unsafe to spread it around indiscriminately. Various kinds of power are carefully guarded by society, and are entrusted to individuals only under strict limitations. An automobile is an instrument of power, and society allows nobody to operate one who has not received a license, issued on the presumption of his ability to use this power safely. Pistols are a source of power, and society seeks (rather ineffectually, it must be admitted) to restrict their ownership to those who will use them both intelligently and conscientiously. Membership in the profession of law or medicine is a source of power, and is sanctioned only to those who have convinced the agents of society that they are competent to exercise it. Numerous other illustrations could be cited. Accordingly, since knowledge is one of the most effective forms of power, it might seem reasonable that those to whom it is committed should be required to demonstrate their fitness, and that the possessors of different kinds of knowledge should be required to secure a license. To take an extreme example, suppose it should be reported that some great physicist had discovered a new death ray, which was noiseless, invisible, and so powerful that it would act at a distance of five hundred feet from a little instrument that could be aimed like a rifle. Would every citizen in the community have a right to demand that the formula be given to him forthwith? Probably you will answer, "No, the patent right would protect the inventor from such claims." But suppose that the inventor had his patent, would he have a right to sell the use of the instrument to whomsoever he chose? Has society any right superior to the rights of individuals with respect to so potent a device as this? Is it possible that the right to know, like every other right, is a limited one?

The trouble is, who shall set the limits? Who shall give the examinations? Who shall issue the licenses? What shall be the principle of suppression? It is just because knowledge is so powerful that society is reluctant to authorize any agents to regulate or suppress it. The sentiment of most of the Western world has been outraged by the action of the Nazis in Germany in putting a strict curb on the dissemination of knowledge through the public press. All muzzling of the press is condemned by champions of democracy. Yet the press itself exercises a tremendous selective influence in the news that it publishes, not only with respect to what is omitted, but also through the medium of emphasis, position, headlining, etc. The motto of the *New York Times* is "All the news that's fit to print." Should editors have the right to decide what is fit?

Plainly, we have here another insoluble dilemma, another case of the great antithesis. There is no satisfactory answer. The most promising procedure is to follow the counsel of moderation and good sense, not to set up any inflexible mandates, but to let each concrete case suggest its own treatment, and to try to see to it that the agents who exercise discretion are of the highest possible type.

Volume of Knowledge

Another outstanding problem is presented by the sheer volume of knowledge that has accumulated out of the past experience and research of the race. There is more to be known in these days than any individual, even the most brilliant, can possibly absorb, assimilate, and retain. And it is increasing at a prodigious rate. Yet a very considerable proportion of this knowledge is supposed to be at the command of every mature citizen of a democratic state. The essence of democracy in social and economic affairs is that the individual shall be able to look out for himself, and in political matters that he shall be competent, and shall have the opportunity, to deal directly with the details of the affairs of state.

But in a world of technical complications, the average citizen cannot possibly look after himself economically, but is constantly at the mercy of those who are better informed than he in one direction or another, and in political affairs he cannot achieve a sufficient grasp of the manifold minutiæ involved in governmental issues to enable him to perform the duties of citizenship wisely or efficiently. Some relief must be found, some short cut that will enable him to arrive, or at least to enjoy the semblance of arriving, at the heart of a matter without threading his way through all the maze of preliminary details.

The Symbol

One of the means of partial escape bears a close resemblance to that favorite instrument of propaganda, the slogan. It is the symbol. One of the most spectacular symbols ever injected into an American public issue was the figure of "The Melting Pot," introduced by Israel Zangwill in a little drama that appeared in 1909. It had all the qualifications for immediate success, and spread over the country like wild-fire. Its influence in the immigration controversy outweighed volumes of printed argument, and days of carefully reasoned exhortation, and contributed powerfully to the postponement of much-needed restrictive legislation.

Overburdened Schools

Thus the educational function of society, like most other social relationships, has become perplexingly complicated. Not only must it be decided what portions of all available knowledge are adapted to the capacities of a not-too-intelligent citizenry, but also how the knowledge that is deemed innocuous is to be apportioned in doses that can be swallowed and assimilated by the average individual during the years of his formal tutelage. The American people has always placed a pathetically naïve trust in education, particularly the education of the public school. The tendency has been to believe in the unlimited efficacy of education to solve all problems, and to unload upon the public schools all problems that have proved too much for other agencies. Is there evidence of a national danger from unassimilated immigrants? Let the public schools become Americanization agencies. Is the misuse of alcoholic liquors threatening our national stamina? Teach Prohibition in the public schools. Is municipal government sinking to intolerable depths of corruption and inefficiency? What are the public schools for but to train the youth in practical citizenship? No wonder the school system has very nearly broken down under the strain. In the colleges and universities the curricula are swamped by the demands of new realms of knowledge and expanded vistas in the old. It has been said that a general or cultural education means knowing something about everything and everything about something. Neither of these goals is even approachable in the modern day. The specialist has to know more and more about so much less and less that the field in which he may be considered competent declines to a mere dot on the map of knowledge, while the one who (as a certain captious critic once said of the sociologist) seeks to know less and less about more and more finally becomes mentally unbuttoned. The only possible solution seems to lie in a complete reorganization of the entire educational system, involving not only the curriculum and the methods of teaching and administration, but the whole concept, outlook, and objective of the educational process. But education, like most institutions, is highly conservative, so that the very agency that is relied upon for advance operates to drag back. It is baffling.[4]

OVEREMPHASIS ON INTELLECT

The prevailing tendency in Western nations appears to be to put a minimum of restriction on the types of knowledge offered to the citizens, and to rely on the forces of social control to prevent them from using their knowledge to the detriment of society. The fallacy of such reliance is becoming clearer with each day that passes. The rich stores of accumulated knowledge are used by the most anti-social in the pursuit of their nefarious ends, and each new achievement of science is seized upon by the predatory to increase the efficiency of their methods.[5] What is to be done about it? Shall society reverse the hard-won trends of democracy, and resort to the defences of ignorance and stupidity? It is probably all too late for that. The course of evolutionary change is not so easily turned back. The only hope appears to be in developing some new forms of appeal, in creating a modern set of beliefs. And it appears that these must be based much more upon the feelings and emotions than upon the intellect and the reason. If this seems like a retrogressive procedure, we must recall that progress is to be judged, not by the structural aspect of society, but by the direction of movement. If we have to turn around to go forwards, let us do so. For the past century and a half we have relied almost exclusively upon the reasoning powers and the acquisition of scientific knowledge to produce socially beneficial conduct. We have failed to realize that neither science nor reason can create values, and we have neglected other means to cultivate the values necessary for societal stability and progress. During the ages of the sway of authoritarian religion, an emotional devotion to a higher power, a fear of everlasting punishment, and a hope of eternal reward afforded what Benjamin Kidd called ''ultra-rational sanctions'' for disinterested, altruistic conduct.[6] The codes governing this conduct, as already explained, are derived from the general sanctions and mores which society, out of its protracted experience, has conceived to be conducive to its welfare. But the unsophisticated faith in divinity serves to build around these codes a set of subjective stimuli which no exertion of factually supported reason could supply. This type of religion has largely disappeared from modern societies, and we have found nothing to take its place.

Need of New Emotional Appeal

The modern individualist, freed from the shackles of traditional faith and encouraged to seek his own interests as indicated by his own logical and reasoning faculties, finds little incentive toward altruistic conduct. Here is a young man, born and brought up in the slums of a modern city, deprived of the normal outlets for his energies and love of adventure, surrounded with living examples of the profitableness of a predatory existence in high places as well as low, denied the opportunity of finding a satisfactory opening for himself in an overcrowded and de-humanized economic system—what rational arguments can be presented to him to persuade him that a life of racketeering is not the most promising career open to him, and that the maximum use of the scientific instruments of warfare, the automatic pistol, the machine gun, the armored car, and the airplane is not the sensible and intelligent course for him to take? Society's attempts to fill the gap by the use of force and fear have proved unavailing. Some new appeals, some modern incentives, must be devised, and they will have to be of an emotional rather than an intellectual kind. They must take the form of new loyalties, of revivified standards of good sportsmanship and taste, of more elevated conceptions of recreation and enjoyment. And of course the opportunities for the fulfilment of these new attitudes must be furnished. How all this is to be done it is difficult to say. But we must realize that we have fatally overestimated the value of sheer intellect and reason. After all, the feelings and the emotions are at least as ancient as the intellect, they have not died out or been superseded in the human constitution with the growth of the intellect, and it is a fair assumption that in many of the relations of life they are at least as reliable a guide to conduct as the intellect. But they must be cultivated, trained, and socially directed just as the intellect has been. And this, obviously, requires a brand new type of education. Experience with the facts of life has proved the belief in the unlimited virtues of science to be itself unscientific. We must now set out to develop a more realistic belief to take its place.

Control of Ideas

Closely related to the control of beliefs is the control of ideas, for ideas are, after all, a specialized form of belief. Ideas, as the outstanding elements in social change, are highly potent for good or evil. They are watched closely by those who have a perceptive interest in social change, either positive or negative. It is the attitude toward new ideas that really separates mankind into conservatives and radicals. Mr. Albert E. Wiggam often quotes the definition of the conservative as the man who believes that nothing ought ever to happen for the first time, while the radical believes that nothing ought ever to happen except for the first time. It is natural that all elements in society who are prospering under the *status quo* should deplore change and condemn innovators, while those whose existing lot is hard, and who therefore have all to gain and nothing to lose, should be eager for change. Conservatism and prosperity, radicalism and frustration tend therefore to go together. Yet there is also probably a difference in the innate temperamental equipment of different individuals which predisposes them toward one outlook or the other. All favored classes, whether they be privileged by heredity or elevated by ability and opportunity, whether they be despots, an aristocratic nobility, or financially entrenched captains of industry, tend to look upon new ideas as inherently dangerous, particularly ideas that concern the form of society, or the relations of classes within it. Innovations that may be made to contribute to their own enrichment are not to be despised, if they can get their hand on them first and secure a monopoly. But ideas that may shake the institutional foundations upon which their own eminence rests are most certainly to be "viewed with alarm."

Resistance to Change

The history of attempts at the repression of ideas is a long one. Its pages are dotted with the figures of martyrs, inquisitors, torturers, fanatics, bigots, spies, and bearers of false witness. In no field of interest, probably, has the expression of new ideas been considered more dangerous, and been more ruthlessly suppressed, than in that of religion. The strength of established religion is in authority, and every new idea is a challenge to authority. Religion, being by its very nature conservative, based upon dogma and tradition rather than upon evidence, cannot tolerate the impact of novelty. It seems to be a principle of human behavior, that the more a belief or an attitude is a matter of pure faith or emotional conviction, the more tenaciously do we cling to it, and the more bitterly do we resent any attempts to uproot or modify it. Any well-established belief is hard to change. But those that are based upon argument and evidence are plasticity itself compared to those that have no foundation but tradition or emotional preference. Following closely after religion as strongholds of conservatism come morality, government, and economics. In all these fields, the established order must necessarily have proved itself to some extent—otherwise it could not have survived. Society has at least been able to persist under it. Therefore there are always those who have prospered under it, and even the submerged masses for the most part prefer to "bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of." The burden of proof is always on the new. The old has stood the test of evolutionary survival. All change is therefore looked upon with misgiving. There is a deep-seated tendency in human nature to regard the existing order as the perfect flower of social evolution. Change, even beneficial change, can be conceded in the past. But future change must necessarily be pernicious. You may convince the typical American business man, on historical grounds, that cannibalism gave way to slavery, slavery to serfdom, and serfdom to the wage system, and he may even grant that each change was for the better. But suggest to him that in the near future the modern wage system may give way to something as different from it as it is from serfdom and he will begin to look into the possibility of having you deported to Communist Russia; hint that such a change might be an improvement, and he will change your destination to a madhouse.

No Progress Without Ideas

And yet without ideas no purposeful change, no really intelligent change, can take place—there can be no progress. Fortunately, an irrepressible urge to beget new ideas is widely disseminated throughout humanity. Ideas pregnant with the possibilities of change, progressive or retrogressive, emerge most frequently from two classes of society—the disinherited, oppressed, and wretched elements near the bottom, and the true idealists at the top. Those from the former source are likely to be amorphous, unscientific, impractical, representing a semi-instinctive rebellion against the hardships and seeming injustices of life rather than a thought-out pattern of improvement. They are relatively innocuous to the established order, partly because of the low social potential of those who sponsor them and partly because of their own illogicality and inconsistency, their failure to take account of the requirements of normality. Conservatives largely waste their time and energies in attempting to suppress this type of innovation. The ideas that really involve a threat to things-as-they-are come from the other source. Their nature and potency have already been discussed. Their repression constitutes a serious problem for the reactionaries. For the practical idealist is usually at least as intelligent as his opponent, and has the inspiration of devotion to what he regards as a noble cause, so that opposition takes on the aspect of persecution, and spurs him on to greater efforts. In point of fact, history has shown pretty conclusively that efforts to suppress an idea that contains a germ of real social improvement, especially if force and pain are resorted to, usually operate to give it a new impulse. ''The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church,'' is a generalization that applies to other than religious idealists. The history of the birth control movement furnishes some striking, and rather amusing, examples. The famous Bradlaugh-Besant trial in England in 1877 which represented an attempt to use legal methods to suppress a book which had been selling for forty-three years at the rate of about 700 a year had the immediate result of increasing the sales to 125,000 in three months and the wider effect of spreading the knowledge and practice of contraception throughout the Kingdom, and contributing to the marked decline in the birth-rate which started at about that time. A similar sequence took place in Australia, while in the United

States every effort to suppress the movement forcibly has simply given it a new impetus.[7]

RADICALISM

In the United States, the ideas which have been the most conspicuous object of recent repressive efforts have been those of a "Red" tinge, aiming at a more highly socialized or communalized form of economic organization. Attempts to curb such ideas reached their high point in the work of the Lusk Committee, which scoured the country for documents of a "subversive" character, gathered them together and printed them in two large volumes, and circulated them at public expense, thus giving them much wider accessibility than they otherwise could possibly have had. The launching of the Soviet government in Russia fed new fuel to the fires of repression in this country. The coming of the great depression, and the irrefutable demonstration of the futility and autocatalytic character of the old economic system, spiked the guns of this campaign to a considerable extent. The novel and venturesome experiments of the Roosevelt administration made extreme conservatism out of vogue for the time being. But there is no reason to suppose that it has permanently crippled it. In new forms, adapted to the exigencies of a new era, it is bound to crop up again.

SUPPRESSION IMPOSSIBLE

It is fortunate for society that the suppression of ideas is difficult or impossible, for ideas are the only means of providing that social change shall be constructive and progressive. We know that social change is bound to come. If society succeeds in suppressing the ideas that could guide change along beneficial channels, the inevitable result must be change of an unbalanced sort, bringing with it all the lags, maladjustments, and abnormalities that we have discussed.

Opposition to innovation can easily be made to masquerade under the cloak of patriotism. "The preservation of our great national institutions," "the support of our ancient traditions," are symbols that can be made to cover vast amounts of individual and class self-seeking. "The protection of the American standard of living" serves as an admirable camouflage for efforts to protect entrenched privilege. "The maintenance of confidence" may be appealed to in the hope of preventing too close social scrutiny into unsavory financial and business practices. Only constant vigilance and alert intelligence can suffice to reveal what menacing realities are lurking behind such screens.

NONCONFORMITY OF THOUGHT

The conclusion appears to be that whereas conformity of action is essential to social stability, nonconformity of thought is indispensable to social progress. But thought is inert until it is transmuted into action, and the true idealist may be counted on to attempt to transform his thought into action. To encourage free and independent thought, therefore, is to pave the way for non-conformable action. Society, accordingly, is forced into a hypocritical and inconsistent attitude, repressing, penalizing, even persecuting those who are seeking to inaugurate movements from which society will eventually benefit. This is unavoidable. For no revolutionary movement can be helpful until the people are prepared for it—the "Noble Experiment" of Prohibition was a shining example of that truth—and the only way to prepare the people is to agitate for it in an era that does not yet accept it. It is one of the ironies of fate that pioneers and prophets must be made to suffer for the blessings that later generations enjoy as a matter of course. The conservative has once more been defined as the man who worships dead radicals, and the D.A.R. has been described as an organization that is opposed to all revolutions except the American Revolution. "For ye build the sepulchres of the prophets, and your fathers killed them."[8] One of the few compensations for the accelerated tempo of social change in modern times is that the prophet, if he is able to survive the early stages of his mission—and prophets are not disposed of quite so summarily nowadays as formerly—may live to have the laurel wreath draped upon his brow, or, in more modern figures, to see his name in the headlines of the newspaper he defied or blazing in a Neon sign on the Main Street of the city he tried to clean up, or to receive a medal of honor from a foundation created by the great financier whose economic methods he has helped to eradicate from the face of the earth.

CHAPTER XX

CONTROL OF POPULATION

Another prominent object of social control has been population. As suggested above, this offers two forms of control, the control of quantity and the control of quality. Taking up first the question of larithmic control, it is obvious that nothing positive or deliberate in this direction can be done at the source by any society that does not understand the rudimentary facts about the processes of reproduction; this limits the question to relatively highly cultured societies. In order that there should be a definite population policy it is also necessary that society should recognize some relation between the size of population and its two major interests. The relation with continuity is so obvious that any society that has advanced far enough to understand reproduction and to attempt to do anything about it will recognize that the way to guarantee continuity is to encourage increase. As a matter of fact, the sentiment in favor of increase and of large populations has been the prevailing one the world over down to very recent times; if separate families had reasons for desiring a limited increase their interests were likely to be in conflict with those of the group.

The grounds for this societal attitude are not difficult to comprehend. They represent certain well-established and wide-spread values, objectives, and criteria of human society which seemed to be promoted by the numerical increase of population. Foremost among these may be placed the militaristic incentive. Suspicion, competition, rivalry, and hostility have ever been the characteristic attitudes of groups toward each other, and these have inevitably resulted in periodic conflicts among most of the peoples of the earth. Warfare has been the universal expedient for both societal growth and aggrandizement, protection and the sheer avoidance of extermination. To be able to wage war successfully has been a social desideratum second only to the necessity of producing the essentials of life. It is a truism that in primitive warfare man-power is the determinative factor, and the basic element in man-power is numbers. Consequently, a large and increasing number of members, especially of the male persuasion, came to be regarded as synonymous with societal security and prestige. It needs no special evidence to demonstrate that this assumption has prevailed down to the present. The extent to which it is still valid obviously depends upon two considerations, the inevitability of future warfare and the degree to which military success in the future will depend upon numerical man-power.

Dynastic Incentive

Closely related to the foregoing is the dynastic incentive for population increase. As government became more definitely despotic, and single individuals or families came to dominate and hold power, the significance of mass population came to be regarded not merely as a means to simple societal survival or expansion, but as an agency for the glorification and enrichment of the ruling group, not solely through military prowess, but also through economic and cultural aggrandizement. The body of the people came to be regarded as the breeding herd of the tyrant. Never was this conception more tersely expressed than in the epigram of Louis XIV, "*L'état, c'est moi.*" With the spread of democratic government, this incentive, in its crude personal aspect, has tended to die out; but something of its spirit still survives in various of the aspects of "patriotism."

Religious Incentive

Next in importance, perhaps, comes the religious incentive. Encouragement of increase seems to be quite a general feature of the religious complex the world over. In some cases it is connected with the idea of ancestor worship, and in more primitive religions with the veneration of procreative powers. But in modern religions it finds a more refined and quite adequate support in the natural desire of every religion to increase. Naturally, the principal source of increment in the membership of every religion is found in the children of its adherents. A childless church is almost certainly doomed to speedy extinction. And since every religion naturally regards itself as the only true faith, it looks upon the increase of its members as an augmentation of the number of the blessed. In the case of the Christian religion, this general motive is fortified by the specific injunction, twice enunciated in its holy book, to "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth." It may seem strange that this command, issued thousands of years ago, especially as in the first instance there was only one man and one woman in the world, and in the second, only one family, should be accepted today as a literal guide to social policy and individual behavior, and should be authoritatively advanced in refutation of any arguments in favor of the voluntary limitation of population, but such is the fact as anyone can testify who is at all familiar with the literature in the birth control controversy.

Economic Incentive

So closely related to the dynastic incentive as possibly to be considered its modern manifestation is the economic incentive. Here it is the industrial barons and overlords who desire a large population in order that the supply of wage labor may be superabundant and correspondingly cheap. Like other molders of public sentiment, they do not broadcast their doctrine recklessly, nor necessarily even formulate it definitely in their inner consciousness. Frequently it too is camouflaged in the guise of patriotism, labeled by such grandiloquent slogans as "The needs of industry," "National economic expansion," "The commercial supremacy of the flag," and so on. But in essence it is the simple craving of the privileged classes for their own enrichment and prestige.

Ethnic Egotism

Another motive that sails with peculiar complacency under the banner of patriotism is what may be called "Ethnic egotism.'' This is the conviction, quite general among peoples of every grade of civilization, that their own particular culture is the finest and most desirable on earth. Among primitive tribes this notion sometimes takes the form of identifying the name of the tribe with the word for men. ''What tribe is this?'' ''We are the men.'' The implication as to other tribes is obvious. Modern societies do not go at it quite so crudely, but it is not necessary to wait till next Fourth of July, or to pay a visit to the halls of Congress, to recognize the attitude as not entirely foreign to our own national psychology. Probably the most conspicuous exponent of this motive in modern times was the Germany of the World War, with its prodigious and insolent emphasis on ''Kultur.'' To the degree that it cherishes this doctrine, every nation naturally regards its own expansion as a real blessing to mankind, however little the fact may be recognized by its contemporaries.[1]

MEGALOMANIA

This list of incentives may be closed, without any pretension to completeness, by reference to sheer megalomania, the admiration of bigness, the craving for size for its own sake. Though developed to an exceptional degree among the American people, this sentiment is not unknown in other areas of Western civilization. The ease with which it may be applied to population, and the magnitude of its consequences there, need no demonstration.

Wherever this type of sentiment prevails, the control of population, in so far as it is societal control, will naturally take the form of encouragement to procreation. This may express itself in rewards of one kind or another for large families, or; if there is evidence that couples are trying to interfere artificially with the natural course of reproduction, in efforts to suppress such practices. The latter form has probably been relatively infrequent until modern times.

ENCOURAGEMENT EASY

The ''revision upward'' of population is one of the easiest forms of control that society has to undertake, for it is in essential harmony with one of the basic interests of individual life. To be sure, the results in the single family may, and frequently do, run counter to the other great interest of material well-being and the maintenance of a high standard of living. But in a communally organized society where the support of the children falls on the group rather than on the parents, or in a society well endowed with the natural means of subsistence, or in a sophisticated society where public provision is made for the maintenance of the needy, and no one need fear actual starvation, incitements to rapid reproduction will not meet with serious opposition. For such a social attitude leaves the way open for the free indulgence of one of the basic urges, and for the enjoyment of one of the few pleasures that are not limited by material well-being. If the consequence is a heightened degree of economic stringency, and an actual shortage of the means of support, the family can always find consolation in the self-approval that comes from a consciousness of a duty to society amply performed, and in the envious or congratulatory reactions of their acquaintances. This attitude was piously expressed by the Vicar of Wakefield when he said, "I was ever of opinion that the honest man who married and brought up a large family did more service than he who continued single and only talked of population. From this motive, I had scarce taken orders a year before I began to think seriously of matrimony, and chose my wife. . . . My children . . . though I had but six, I considered them as a very valuable present made to my country, and consequently looked upon it as my debtor."[2] The result of this conjuncture of societal and individual interests has been the prevalent overpopulation the world over, which we have observed.

SIGNIFICANCE OF BIRTH CONTROL

As has been pointed out, the introduction of birth control contributed an entirely new aspect to the larithmic realm, in theory as well as in practice. Birth control represents an addition to the "preventive checks" of Malthus of the greatest importance. To the extent that it is sanctioned and practiced, the voluntary limitation of increase need no longer be by the misery-producing expedients of celibacy and deferred marriage, but by a means which harmonizes the desire for mating with the desire for offspring. It offers at least a partial escape from the "lesser misery" of Malthus, and largely eradicates the world-old antagonism between hunger and love. At least, it transfers the antithesis from the conflict between two elemental urges to the secondary and much less painful necessity of choosing between children and standard of living. The product of intelligence, foresight, self-control, and science, it raises the procreative interest onto a distinctly human level.

Opposition to Birth Control

But in spite of its evident advantages, the advance of birth control has met with the bitterest opposition, criticism, and attack. There are two main reasons. First, the social sentiment in favor of increase is still strong in most countries, and birth control offers a direct and positive means, available to the individual, of countervening this sentiment, and defeating the purposes of society. Second, there is a powerful complex of sentiments, traditions, taboos, and dogmas that condemn birth control on moral, religious, or philosophical grounds. The whole process of reproduction, being of such profound interest, and yet being shrouded so long in mystery, has become incrusted with an enormous mass of emotional and sentimental excrescences.

Argument on Morality

As far as these objections can be formulated concretely, they may be classified according to the grounds on which they rest. Two of these grounds are rather closely related. They are the "moral" and the "natural." Whether contraceptive practices are immoral or not in a given society is a matter of objective fact. If the moral code condemns them, they are immoral; if it does not condemn them, they are not. Of course, it may be difficult to determine which of these suppositions holds true in a given society, particularly if its mores are in a transitional stage in this respect, as items of the moral code so often are. But one who has grasped the real character of the moral code will recognize that the assertion that a certain thing is immoral, or even the fact that it is immoral, is not necessarily an argument against it, or a condemnation of it. Certain aspects of the moral code may be seriously at variance with the real welfare of society. Granted that a certain immoral innovation is in line with progress, the constructive procedure is not to abandon the innovation but to change the canons of morality. Consequently, attacks upon the birth control movement on the grounds that it is immoral may logically be met with the answer, "Of course it is immoral. But it is socially useful. Therefore we propose to make it moral." Of course this answer does not obviate the necessity of demonstrating that it is socially useful. But it disposes of the objection on the grounds of immorality.

Argument on Unnaturalness

The objection that birth control is unnatural can be disposed of even more summarily. As we have seen, the definition of natural excludes the application of the human intelligence. This means that if everything that is unnatural is wrong or sinful, then all the distinctively human achievements upon which the species prides itself are sinful—cutting one's hair and fingernails, shaving, wearing glasses, taking medicine, brushing one's teeth, and so on, not to mention the great material achievements of bridges, steamships, airplanes, skyscrapers, and radio. It is precisely on the basis of his unnatural or artificial achievements that man has raised himself above the level of the beasts. But if one still believes that the reproduction of the species is so unique as compared with all other interests that it must be treated in accordance with an entirely different set of principles, then he must not simply condemn it by asserting that it is unnatural, but must seek to demonstrate by evidence or logic why this single interest, out of the whole complex of human affairs, must be left to the control of primeval impulses and biological processes, instead of being subjected to the human faculties of reason, foresight, and self-control.

OTHER OBJECTIONS

Other common objections to birth control are that it is unhygienic, and irreligious, and that it will increase overt immoral conduct. The customary answers may be stated briefly. Birth control is not unhygienic, if practiced under competent medical advice, as its scientific supporters insist that it should be. A line of reasoning similar to that used above in connection with immorality applies to the argument of irreligion. If a given religious body condemns birth control, it is irreligious for the adherents of that faith. There can be no argument about it. An individual member who believes that birth control is ethically justifiable and wishes to remain religious has only two alternatives, either to seek a new religious connection, or to make a mental reservation in his allegiance to the existing one.

EFFECTS ON ILLEGITIMACY

Whether or not the free dissemination of birth control information would increase sexual immorality, and how much, depends on the extent to which sexual conformity is motivated by fear of the consequences. It is doubtful if fear is a much more potent deterrent in this interest than in the field of crime. Certainly there can be no great claim to righteousness on the part of those who are prevented from sin only by fear. Society, however, is interested in behavior more than in abstract righteousness, and if, as is quite possible, the free availability of birth control did increase to some extent the frequency of illicit relations, society would be more than compensated for this loss by the diminution in illegitimate births.

POPULATION POLICIES

The placing of reproduction under the immediate control of the individuals directly concerned, enabling them to place a limit upon the number of offspring without seriously interfering with the interest of sex gratification, has laid the foundations for the formulation and prosecution of population policies on the part of society in a way never possible before. The relation of larithmic factors to welfare becomes an intensely practical matter. It is now possible for society to ask what size of population it wishes to have, with some hope of not only finding a reasonably concrete answer but also of acting upon that answer.

Optimum Population

What are the criteria upon which society may base a judgment as to the desirable size of population? If, as we have seen, there is such a thing as overpopulation, and such a thing as underpopulation, it follows that between the two there must be such a thing as just the right population. This is a rather modern idea. The evils of too large or too small a population are so conspicuous that they inevitably attract attention. But it required a rather high development of social science to create the concept of "optimum population." Within recent years, however, a large amount of thought and study has been devoted to this idea, and it is now widely recognized that hardly any question is of greater concern to society than the number of its people, since this conditions practically all of the secondary problems such as poverty, crime, health, marriage, vice, and war. If the size of population affects so many of the interests of society, it follows that there are many tests by which the best size may be judged. There are considerations of military efficiency, of esthetic satisfaction, of world status, etc. All of these are somewhat vague and difficult of measurement. There is one criterion, however, that is objective, tangible, and measurable, and which stands in a contributory relation to practically all other criteria. This is the standard of living, conceived of in the material aspect that we have already adopted. This has the advantage of being non-controversial to a maximum extent. Almost everyone will agree that a high standard of living is desirable, and the higher the better as long as no other values are sacrificed. For our purposes, therefore, we will define optimum population as the number of persons in a given society that will enable it to achieve and maintain the maximum standard of living made possible by the amount of land and the stage of the arts that are at its command.

UNDERPOPULATION

That there is a close relation between population and standard of living has already been demonstrated. To understand the nature of the optimum we may begin by considering an underpopulated society. By definition, in such a society there are too few people to enable it to achieve its maximum standard, because it cannot make the full utilization of either its land equipment or its economic culture, or both.* Under these conditions, there is no material barrier to population growth. As population increases, the standard rises, thereby both stimulating and supporting further increase. In other words, the Malthusian checks, both the positive and the preventive, are non-operative. Almost automatically such a society will develop a population policy favorable to increase. But as population grows, *granting that the land and economic culture factors remain constant,* the advantage will begin to disappear, and the time will approach when further increments can add nothing to the standard. This can be illustrated on the familiar diagram as follows:

CHART VII.—OPTIMUM POPULATION



FOUR FACTORS ARE BALANCED TO MAINTAIN HIGHEST POSSIBLE STANDARD OF LIVING

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* See p. 327.

The point at which population and standard of living come together may be regarded as the point of optimum population. Of course, in actual life it is not a point or a line, but an area, for in this case, as in most sociological categories, the boundary is diffuse. The birth of one more child does not suddenly plunge a whole society from underpopulation into overpopulation. But it is plain that after this general demarcation is reached any further increase of population must infringe upon the standard of living, and therefore crowd the society over into overpopulation.

DETERMINATION OF THE OPTIMUM

The concept of optimum population, therefore, is a perfectly clear-cut one. The determination of the actual population, even in very round numbers, that constitutes the optimum for any given society at a given time is a very different matter. This is partly because of the difficulty of measuring the standard of a whole society, especially a complex modern one, partly because of the difficulty of demonstrating the precise relationship between numbers and standard, and partly because the optimum is not a fixed number but a constantly shifting one. Our discussion thus far has been predicated upon the assumption that land and economic culture remained static. Of course, they never do. Land may show relatively small changes, but economic culture is always in flux, particularly because of the fact that size of population enters into economic culture, as already explained. The formulation of a practical larithmic policy, therefore, conforms precisely to the principle enunciated early in our study that sociology must be a dynamic science. Yet there is hardly a more vital question that an intelligent and practically minded society could ask of its social scientists than, "What is the optimum population at the present time, and what will it be ten, fifty, or one hundred years from now?" Obviously, the longer the period contemplated, the more complex are the variables that enter into the determination. It will be a long time, if ever, before social science reaches the degree of development that will enable it to answer these questions with any high degree of precision. Yet even in its present modest stage it should be able to go much beyond the rough rule-of-thumb appraisal that enables any observant traveler to conclude that China and India are overpopulated, and that, from the white man's point of view, Australia is probably underpopulated. It ought, for instance, to be able to determine roughly whether the United States today is underpopulated or overpopulated, or possibly somewhere in the area of optimum population. The fact that during the great depression there seemed to be a surplus of many millions of people would not beguile the scientist into a hasty decision. He would recognize that the social system, in so far as it affects economic well-being, is an element in economic culture, and that a society with a well-balanced social structure can support a larger population on a higher standard than can one the structure of which is distorted by various lags, maladjustments, and differential rates of change. He might conceivably decide that the United States is definitely overpopulated in consideration of its anomalous and top-heavy economic system, but that it need not be if it could devise some means of reorganizing that system in accordance with the principles of normal social functioning.

QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT

Of no less importance, perhaps of even greater, than the larithmic aspects of population are the eugenic aspects. Certainly it would be hard to think of anything that more vitally affects all the interests of society than the quality of the people themselves. The objective study of human quality, however, like that of quantity, is a very recent development. As already indicated, the naïve attitude of practically all societies is to think of themselves as representing the best type of people in existence, and to judge others by comparison with themselves. Within each society differences in quality are recognized, but until recently it did not occur to anyone that there was anything to be done about it, at least beyond the destruction of the obviously unfit as was done by the ancient Spartans. Of course, as in so many other departments of human thought, there has appeared an occasional advanced thinker who caught a vision of the deliberate control of quality by social action. Thus Campanella, in his account of the ideal community which he called "The City of the Sun," written about three hundred years ago, speaks as follows: "Love (one of the rulers of the city) is foremost in attending to the charge of the race. He sees that men and women are so joined together, that they bring forth the best offspring. Indeed, they laugh at us who exhibit a studious care for our breed of horses and dogs, but neglect the breeding of human beings."[3] It would be difficult to find a more concise statement of the eugenic ideal in the modern literature of the field.

EUGENICS

It remained, however, for an Englishman, Sir Francis Galton, to perform for the understanding of population in its qualitative aspects a service closely comparable to that rendered by Malthus with respect to the quantitative aspects. The absurdity that Campanella pointed out was the lack of any attention to those human qualities that are governed by breeding, that is, the hereditary or biological qualities. Galton perceived this lack, and proceeded to found a science which he named "eugenics," or the science of human breeding. The name itself, beginning with the prefix "eu," and Galton's whole treatment of the subject, indicate clearly the acceptance of certain standards of quality or goodness, which are assumed to be generally acknowledged and cherished by society. Such a procedure need not be unscientific provided it is based upon adequate scientific study of the values held in any particular society. In point of fact, however, the science of eugenics as actually developed has been very deficient in this particular. Eugenicists for the most part simply take their criteria for granted, which means that they assume that society in general must prize the same qualities that they do. Their tests of "good eugenic stock" are based upon certain stereotyped desiderata such as health, intelligence, longevity, etc. This is obviously not enough for scientific purposes; no comprehensive eugenics program could be based upon such vague generalities as these. Galton himself stressed mental excellence. Relatively little was known in his day about the biology of inheritance, and he based his conclusions upon results derived from tracing the ancestry and family relationships of various individuals who by common consent were recognized as outstanding in ability and achievement. He demonstrated that a very large proportion of the eminent men and women of England are furnished by a very small number of families. Galton rather begged the question in assuming that this close kinship was proof of the hereditary character of high mental ability. He did not furnish an answer to the argument frequently advanced by the critics of eugenics that the children of superior parents are also usually brought up in a superior social environment, and have exceptional advantages, and that it is impossible to tell to what extent the excellent traits that they may develop are actually traceable to their physical descent.

HEREDITY *vs.* ENVIRONMENT

Of course, this is the old question of heredity versus environment, which has occupied the thought and the emotion of countless students, and has elicited much acrimonious controversy. We need not enter into it further here than to observe that both are indispensable. Heredity and environment among humans are closely analogous to the seed and the soil among plants. No matter how good the seed, it cannot bring fruit to perfection except in a favorable soil, and no matter how fertile the soil a poor seed can never produce an excellent plant. For the development of a fine type of human beings both good stock and a good environment are essential. It is a waste of time to discuss which is more important.[4]

Eugenics, in its strict sense, confines itself to those traits that are directly traceable to heredity, that is, are carried by the germ plasm through the medium of the genes, recognizing that no trait can actually develop in a human organism except in an environment favorable, or at least not wholly prejudicial, to it. The influence of the eugenic factors in human personality, therefore, is determined at the moment of conception. As soon as the two tiny germ cells have united to form a new human being the work of eugenics is done. All the hereditary potentialities of that new personality are already latent in the first single cell of the embryo. What happens to them subsequently, and how they develop, are matters of environment.

Divisions of Eugenics

The resemblance of a eugenics program to the activities of plant and animal breeders has already been indicated, and is obvious. It involves certain well-defined steps. First there must be a complete study of the traits of the human personality—physical, intellectual, and emotional—and a classification of them according to whether they are distinctly hereditary in origin, or whether they are the product of environment and experience, operating, of course, necessarily upon some biologically transmitted materials. An example has already been furnished by the case of the boy Mbwanga in our study of race and nationality. Some of his traits are biological, some are cultural. His skin at the time he was discovered may have been almost as dark as that of his adoptive brothers. But it was the result of a special environment acting upon certain inherited qualities. Having performed this analysis, eugenics then proceeds to sub-classify the hereditary traits according to their "goodness" or "badness," socially considered. The good traits are those that it is to the interest of society to perpetuate and intensify; the bad traits are those that should be eliminated. On this basis, eugenics then divides itself into two branches: "positive eugenics," which devotes itself to the cultivation of the good traits; and "negative eugenics," which applies its energies to the elimination of the bad traits. It needs no argument to show that the latter of these programs is much simpler and easier of accomplishment than the former. This is for two reasons. In the first place, it is much easier to get society, and its individual constituents, to agree upon certain traits as undesirable than upon others as desirable. There will be little opposition to the assertion that idiocy, epilepsy, and constitutional weakness are undesirable traits and that it would be to the interest of society to eradicate them. It is quite another matter to get agreement as to whether acquisitiveness, promotional ability, venturesomeness, industriousness, thrift, docility, and endurance—all traits that are variously prized in contemporary society—ought to be fostered and intensified. In the second place, it is much easier to formulate and introduce a practical program for the realization of negative eugenics than positive. This is because negative eugenics works primarily by the prevention of matings, whereas positive eugenics works by the arrangement of matings. It is easier to decide, and to get society to prescribe, which people ought not to mate than which people ought to mate. No serious objection will arise in a modern society to an effectual prohibition of the marriage of idiots, imbeciles, and morons—legislation aimed at this result already is common among the states of the Union. But let any legislative body attempt to usurp the rôle of Cupid and prescribe just what man should marry what maid, or even divide the youth into groups among which marriages might be arranged according to a rigid set of rules, and what a storm of protest would break forth!

Positive and Negative Eugenics

It is natural, therefore, that the greatest achievements of eugenics up to date have been in the negative field, and particularly in the way of limiting the reproduction of mental defectives. The task of positive eugenics involves the formulation of a definite breeding program. This would be a case of idealization of an extreme sort. What should a society breed for? Mental excellence or physical excellence? "Obviously," one would say, "both." But to attempt to secure both would necessarily restrict the possibility of developing either, for there would not be enough stock of such combined excellence to breed from. Is it better to seek to develop the highest pitch of all-round capacity, or to develop separate strains which would reach a higher pitch of excellence in various directions than could be possible without complete specialization—breed one group of families to be violinists, another to be bankers, another to be steamship captains, another bootblacks, and another (perhaps on the basis of heredity dullness of the olfactory sense) to be garbage collectors? These are not merely whimsical or flippant questions. For the establishment of an inclusive positive eugenics program involves the determination of the perfect man. And who is authorized to set up that ideal, or by what method of research is it to be determined? Shall it be the typical American go-getter—five years ago the answer of a large portion of the American populace would doubtless have been in the affirmative. Shall there be several types, such as would contribute to the smoothest possible functioning of the sort of economic organization that prevailed before 1929, separate groups of skilled promoters, executives, technicians, financiers, scholars, and literati, with much larger groups of stolid, unimaginative, sturdy workers to perform the hard and menial tasks of industry? There are those who would have endorsed this picture.

REALIZATION OF EUGENIC IDEAL

Granting that such an ideal could be delineated and socially sponsored, there would remain the task of setting up social sanctions and regulations calculated to bring it to realization. This is perhaps the most difficult undertaking of all. It has been common among eugenicists to make a rather literal application of the analogy expressed by Campanella, and to assume that it is possible to transfer the methods of the animal breeder almost unmodified into the human field. But a moment's thought shows the absurdity of this notion. In the first place, the animal's breeder can arrange his matings in whatever ways are conducive to the fulfilment of his breeding program. No conventions or taboos hinder him. He can mate mother and son, father and daughter, brother and sister. Furthermore, he deals with creatures whose length of generation is so short and whose fertility is so great that he has many variants to choose from in a relatively short time. Finally, he can eliminate from the breeding stream all individuals who do not conform to his standards. Out of a litter of a half dozen puppies or a dozen pigs the breeder may select just one to carry on the strain. The others may be killed, or prevented from breeding. Plainly, none of these things can be done among human beings. Society is certainly not ready, nor is it likely to be in the near future, to consent to a program which debars from all reproduction nine-tenths, three-quarters, or even one-half of its members. If it did, with the present rate of fertility, it would soon die out. Any practical eugenics program that has any chance of adoption in the immediate future must make allowance for the reproduction of the great majority of its people.

Eugenic Dilemma

This raises another baffling problem. If procreation is to be so nearly general, how is improvement to be secured. The basic assumption of eugenics is that there is a very limited amount of superior germ plasm carried by a small minority of the families. Improvement of the stock is to be accomplished by exclusive combinations of these superior strains. But in that case, what happens to the remainder? If the best always mates with the best, the level of the best will steadily mount higher. But that will leave the worst to mate with the worst, so that the masses will sink to lower and lower levels. The result of this process would clearly be the development of a distinct caste system, with a small élite at the top who would possess high ability and would therefore assert power, and a large group of inferiors who would inevitably be reduced to the state of helots. There may be some who would regard this as the best possible arrangement of society, but it is certainly hardly compatible with the principles of democracy which are still proclaimed in Western societies. The only other alternative is to allow the superior stock to be disseminated throughout society in the hope of raising the whole to the highest possible level of slightly differentiated mediocrity, which is about what happens without any eugenics program at all. This is a dilemma for which no adequate solution has yet been offered.

The urgency and complexity of these problems should not be interpreted as a condemnation of the eugenics program in its entirety, nor as a justification for relegating it to the limbo of impractical phantasmagoria. They merely emphasize the vast amount of research and study that must be devoted to the subject before society can hope to have at its command a workable and scientific program. But the goal is worth the effort.

A Practical Possibility

Fortunately, there is one limited step that can be taken which is easy to justify and to understand, and for which social sanction can be won without great difficulty. This is the encouragement of larger families on the part of the more socially useful elements of society. The arrangement of matings according to a eugenic breeding program seems at present almost impossible. But it is not difficult to get a rule-of-thumb agreement as to what families represent stock distinctly above the average, which will be accepted even by the families concerned. It is a matter of common knowledge that at the present time "society breeds from the bottom," that is, that the so-called lower classes have a considerably larger number of children per family than the upper classes. To be sure, the standards commonly used in determining these classes are those of financial success, which does not necessarily represent eugenic excellence. But probably if other more discriminating tests were used the result would be similar. Thus Havelock Ellis observes, "Wherever are gathered together an exceedingly fine race of people, the flower of the race, individuals of the highest mental and moral distinction, there the birth-rate falls steadily. Vice or virtue alike avails nothing in this field; with high civilization fertility inevitably diminishes."[5] Such data as are available agree in indicating that the wealthier and better-educated classes of the United States have not for some time been producing enough children to maintain their numbers if there were no recruits from below. This situation has been frequently illustrated by studies which show that probably every one of the leading Eastern universities and colleges, either for men or women, would relatively soon find itself without any students if it relied solely on the children of its own graduates, even though every one (of the appropriate sex) enrolled.[6] To the extent that this is true, a society which does not wish to face a definitely declining population must improve its quality by increasing the fertility of its upper classes above that of the lower, rather than by attempting to reduce the fertility of the lower below that of the upper. Of course, the extent to which the reproduction rate of the lower classes can be brought down will depend on the extent to which that of the upper can be raised. The differential is now heavily on the side of the lower classes. If it can be reversed, that will mean a gradual improvement in the stock. The rapidity of improvement will depend on the spread in the new differential.

Need of Improvement

All of the foregoing is predicated upon the assumption that "good" eugenic stock is more prevalent among the upper than the lower classes. Ward challenged this assumption, at least as far as intelligence is concerned, and in fact built his whole system of applied sociology on the postulate that ability is about evenly distributed in all classes of society, and needs only opportunity and education to bring it out.[7] But recent psychological developments hardly justify this assumption. Although reliance on casual evaluations of social desirability is not a very scientific procedure, and although the rate of improvement by the means under discussion must necessarily be slow, yet there does seem to be here a really practical expedient that society can use to improve the human average while waiting for science to devise more efficacious methods. And some improvement is certainly urgently needed. If it be true that there has been little if any advance in average intellectual ability since the days of the Cro-Magnon, this suggests one of the major causes of our present social disturbances. The little cave-baby of twenty thousand years ago looked out on an immeasurably simpler world than that faced by a newly arrived increment to a vast city population. The requirements of adaptation to the human environment in twentieth century civilization are incomparably more exacting than ever before. If each new generation starts with virtually the same equipment of abilities and faculties as the last, it places an insupportable burden on the institutions of education and control. If mankind is not eventually to be engulfed in the ruins of its own devices it must speedily find some methods of building up a progressively superior mental and emotional equipment for dealing with its cumulative material and technological structures. For although the immediate operation of machines tends to minimize the importance of human intelligence, the management and coordination of machines for social welfare require a degree, or at least a type, of mental excellence previously uncalled for. Eugenics is the only agency that even attempts to deal with this problem.

Methods of Eugenics

A practical eugenics program operates either by arranging matings, or by regulating procreation within matings made in accordance with the existing conventions. The latter method requires some means of controlling reproduction. Before the days of modern biology, there was no other recourse than to forbid marriage to those who were presumptively unfit to bring children into the world, and so we have the various limitations to the marriage laws that have been mentioned. But this is an unsatisfactory method, first because reproduction may take place outside of marriage, and too severe restrictions upon the marriage license may result in an increase of illegitimacy, and second because there are frequent cases where marriage is desirable except for the possibility of offspring. To meet these needs society now has two expedients available. One, birth control, has already been discussed. It is particularly suited to those cases where the parents are of at least normal intelligence, and can be relied upon to conform voluntarily to the requirements of social utility; it is also indispensable in promoting that reversal in the reproductive differential which has just been discussed. Sterilization is particularly adapted for use in those cases where the intelligence and self-control of the individuals, either within or without marriage, cannot be relied upon to prevent them from bringing socially unwanted children into the world. In its broad aspects, sterilization is no new thing; it has been practiced for ages in various societies. But until recently it involved a serious type of operation which destroyed not only the power of procreation, but also, in the males, the capacity for mating. Recent biological and medical advances have provided sterilization processes which do not interfere with the possibility, the urge, or the pleasure of sex relations. The operation (vasectomy) in the males is a trifling one, and in the females (salpingectomy) is by no means serious. A couple, either one of which has been so treated, may enjoy all the normal satisfactions of married life without menacing themselves or society with offspring whose life must always be seriously abnormal.

Relation of Larithmics and Eugenics

Thus the two aspects of the population problem, the larithmic and the eugenic, are seen to be closely related. Neither can be adequately dealt with independently of the other. There is a growing tendency to recognize this truth, and to act upon it, both among theoreticians and practical workers. The population problem is rapidly assuming the rank that actually belongs to it as the most important of all the problems with which society has to deal.

Chapter XXI

THE CONTROL OF PRODUCTION

The growth of civilization has brought with it not only the intensification and complication of many fundamental and primeval problems, but also the creation of numerous new problems, and the reshaping of some old problems in such a way as to make them essentially new. An outstanding case of the last situation is afforded by the problem of the control of the production of wealth. Production has always been a major interest of life, both for the individual and for society. On the earliest stages of culture it was characteristically an individual pursuit, though the hunting stage brought with it some cooperative action. The pastoral and agricultural stages fostered still fuller social relationships, but it remained for the industrial stage to expand the group significance of wealth production to a completely unprecedented degree. During all these ages of evolution the purpose and objective of such social control as there was were almost axiomatic and self-determining. The great desideratum was to increase the aggregate amount of wealth produced to the maximum degree, as upon it depended not only the life of the group, but also the level of comfort and material well-being that they were able to maintain. Social control, therefore, almost automatically directed itself to encouraging industry and thrift, repressing idleness and waste, and organizing the factors of production with an eye to their maximum effectiveness as measured in volume of output.

The results of these efforts have already been noted. They are manifested in a tremendous increase in the population of the globe, concomitantly with a continuous improvement in the standard of living. This branch of control is of the sort where the interests of society and of the individual are closely harmonious, and therefore control is relatively simple. It need take the form merely of regulation or direction; there is little need for repression. As long as each individual's material well-being is dependent primarily upon his own productive exertions, and society's standard is governed by the aggregate of the production of individuals, about all that society needs to do is to promote efficiency, facilitate organization, and prevent gross injustices and aggressions. Until very recent years, therefore, the control of production has not customarily been included among "the social problems."

Problem of Distribution

The problem of the distribution of wealth has occasioned much more social concern. Extreme inequalities, especially when they result in actual destitution, hardship, or even death on the part of the depressed classes, have been regarded as a matter for social attention for centuries. Society's interest in continuity, if not in welfare, has made it deplore the loss of any of its members, however humble. Every civilized society provides some means for the preservation of those of its people who have proved unequal to the task of providing for themselves. In many cases these means have been heartless, niggardly, and arbitrary. For generations they were concerned with relief rather than prevention, and only recently has poverty come to be regarded as just one manifestation of deep-seated societal maladjustments. There are many other aspects of the problem of distribution than mere poverty, but it has held a distinct and prominent place in sociological literature for years.

The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions of the early nineteenth century set in motion chains of influence which were destined to put an entirely new face on the problem of production. At the moment of writing, things have reached such a pass that the outstanding problem in certain areas has become one of restriction of production, and even the destruction of wealth. How could such a bizarre and fantastic reversal take place?

Factors of Production

We have seen that the characteristic social processes in the economic field during the growth of the modern productive system have been mechanization, expansion, consolidation, and super-organization, and that the result has been the development of a typical productive unit that combines such large contingents of labor, land, and capital that no ordinary individual can possibly hope to own it, to say nothing of having the ability to manage it. The prevailing way of getting a living, therefore, is to supply a certain modicum of one or another of these factors, and to receive a compensation for it. Those who supply land are called landlords, and their reward is called rent; those who supply labor are called laborers, and their return is called wages; those who supply capital are called capitalists, and their compensation is interest. Now for reasons inherent in the very nature of a mechanized, or "capitalistic," society the amount of land or capital required is very large and the rewards paid for a given unit of them are very small, relative to the amount of goods and services that are required for a decent livelihood and the prices charged for them. Consequently, only a small minority of the members of society are able to accumulate enough land or capital so that they can live comfortably upon the rewards received for them alone. The great majority, if they are to get their own living at all, must do so by contributing one or the other of the two remaining basic factors, labor or management. And since the management positions are relatively scarce, and require exceptional experience and talents of various kinds, it comes about that the bulk of a modern society gets, and must get, its living by contributing to production the labor that is inherent in their own bodies and minds. It is this situation that has caused "the labor problem" to be one of the outstanding issues of the past century and a quarter, and has thrown the majority of the members of Western societies into the laboring, or wage-earning, class.

Early Ownership

The nature of the problem, or the separate problems, that arise out of this situation is determined by the relations which those who contribute the four factors of production bear to each other, and to society. This can best be understood by considering a fifth factor in production which has been strangely ignored and misunderstood by the conventional and recognized expositors of our productive system, the professional economists. This is the factor of ownership. Emphasis has been laid upon the fact that the modern productive unit is an aggregate, an organized complex; it has an entity by itself, apart from any of the four factors that constitute it. In a society based upon contract and the institution of property, such a unit, particularly in view of its vast importance, must be owned by somebody. There are only three agencies by which it may be owned, by an individual, by a subgroup, or by society. It was an inevitable outcome of the causal sequences that were running through the eighteenth century, and of the philosophical dogmas of egalitarianism and liberty that accompanied them, that the ownership of this new type of productive units, when they first began to appear, should automatically drift into the hands of individuals. The societies of the West were not built upon a philosophy that would cause them to take societal possession of these new instruments. Production had for centuries been individualized, and it naturally remained so. On the other hand, such subgroups based on productive interests as existed—the old guilds and associations—were more concerned with perpetuating the ancient ways of doing things than in acquiring control of the new. There was no one left to own the new units but individuals.

The Entrepreneur

To meet the situation, there sprang up a new productive figure, who came to be known as the "entrepreneur," or enterpriser, or sometimes as the undertaker. (This last appellation has largely dropped into disuse for obvious reasons; perhaps in recent years it might suggest too painful analogies.) To succeed in his new task, or even to be led into it in the first place, the entrepreneur had to have a striking combination of qualities. He had to have courage and venturesomeness, some technical knowledge of machinery and manufacturing processes, organizing and managerial ability, and either land and capital in his own right, or access to land and capital. As the event proved, he all too often found it useful also to be endowed with a high degree of callousness, ruthlessness, and rapacity. The first manufacturing plants of England and elsewhere were built up around personalities of this type. Quite generally, such a man combined in his own person at least two of the basic factors of production, capital and management. Even though he borrowed the capital, to the contemporary mind, obsessed as it was by the power and efficacy of this rapidly developing factor, it was the control of capital that put him at the head of the enterprise. Nobody stopped to recognize that he was the owner of a distinct entity, which, for want of a better name, we may call the "business." As a result, the element of ownership became unconsciously merged with either capital or management, or both, not only in popular thought but also in would-be scientific exposition. In point of fact, the three factors of capital, management, and ownership tended to fuse into a figure of heroic proportions who came to be known as the "capitalist," just as the system characterized by this type of productive plant is known as the "capitalistic system."

Differentiation of Factors

As the system developed, and plants increased in number and size, it became less and less usual for a single individual to be able, or to desire, to furnish all of the land and all of the capital used in the business that he managed and owned. The characteristic procedure came to be for the owner to rent the land and to borrow most, if not all, of the capital. Of course, from the beginning it had been customary and necessary for him to hire all the labor. There thus arose the important relationships of landlord to a business, lender to a business, as well as worker for a business. Like so many other human relationships, rent and interest became depersonalized. They took on the aspect of social institutions. Although governed by the principle of free contract, the relations between the lender of capital and the landlord on one hand, and the owner of the business on the other hand, became relatively standardized, and the rates of interest and rent stabilized, making allowance for variations in risk and other differentials.

Thus the function of capitalist and landlord became quite sharply differentiated from that of the entrepreneur. But all this time the latter continued, characteristically, to manage his own business. As long as he did this, the function of ownership tended to remain obscured; it was identified with the function of organization and management. A still further element of confusion was afforded by the fact that the manager-owner almost always put up a certain amount of his own "capital," although it might not be used for the construction of permanent plant, but for more evanescent purposes. Thus there was still a tendency to identify the manager-owner as a capitalist, although the distinct class of capitalist lenders was becoming obvious.

The Corporation

The final step in the differentiation of functions was brought about largely by the rapid expansion and development of a different form of ownership, represented by the joint-stock corporation. This was not a new device. It had been developed three centuries or so earlier in connection with the adventurous exploring and exploiting ventures which were the big business enterprises of the day. But its extension to other fields of productive activity had been negligible until after the middle of the nineteenth century. Then its applicability to the new type of industrial production became evident. The chief advantages of the corporate form of business organization are three. It permits the accumulation of larger sums of money, and the consequent development of businesses on a wider scale, than would be possible on a purely individual basis. It enables persons of small means, whose savings are too meager to permit them to go into business for themselves, to become part owners of businesses and to share in the rewards of money lending. It provides for the distribution of the risks of industry in two ways; a given industry may divide its risks among numerous individuals, and a single individual may divide his investment risks among several corporations.

SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

These, and other incidental advantages, were weighty enough to cause the corporation to become the characteristic type of business from the ownership point of view, and to introduce a new era not only in the realm of production but in the whole social realm. For the significance of the corporation has proved to be so profound that it has affected practically every phase of societal relationships, as great changes in the economic structure are always likely to do. One of the most important was to bring about a segregation of ownership and management. The far-reaching consequences of this change, even the fact of the change itself, were not discerned by the economists of the day, and in fact are not yet clearly apprehended by many of the profession. This failure is directly responsible for much of the present chaos, for it permitted diverse consequences of a destructive sort to become established before there was an adequate comprehension of what was going on or any intelligent effort to control it.

MODERN OWNERSHIP

Who does own a modern corporation, and who manages it? To find a satisfactory answer to these questions it is necessary to keep clearly in mind the concept of a business as an entity by itself, apart from the four primary factors that enter into it, and of ownership of the business as a fifth factor, just as distinct and just as indispensable, as any of the other four. To clarify this concept, an example may be cited to show how the function of ownership may be entirely distinct in even a privately owned business. Let us imagine, for instance, a young American who has inherited a business from his grandfather. He himself has contributed no land, no labor, no capital, nor any organizing skill. He takes no part in the running of the business; the entire staff including the manager, having come to him with the business. In an extreme case he may not even know what the business produces. He spends his whole time in Europe and comes no nearer to engaging in actual production than supporting the gambling establishments of Monte Carlo and the racetracks at Longchamps and Auteuil. But society not only recognizes his place in the scheme of things, but also compensates him with an income, based solely on his ownership.[1]

Or again, a man may start a business without the ownership of a foot of land or a dollar of true capital.* He may rent all his land, borrow all his capital, hire all his labor, and also hire all his management. And yet he may be the exclusive owner of the business. In strict analysis, "profits" should be regarded as the rewards of ownership, as distinct from rent, interest, wages, and salaries of management. Profits are what society pays the owner, or allows him to take, in return for his exercising the function of ownership. What social justification there may be for this custom is a matter for inquiry too complicated to be entered into at this point.

STOCKS

Now the very essence of a corporation is that its ownership is divided among a large number of individuals known as the stockholders. A share of common stock should be carefully distinguished from a bond. A stock is a certificate of part ownership of the business; a bond is a note given by the company in return for money lent to it which is presumably embodied in real capital. There is supposed to be something tangible to which the bondholder has a certain definite claim. In return for this loan the company pays the bondholder a certain fixed amount of money each year, which is due to him regardless of the degree of success of the business, and at the end of the time for which the loan is made he is entitled to the return of the same number of dollars that he put in. In other words, the purchase of a bond is an investment in the most conservative sense. A share of stock, on the other hand, represents the purchase by the holder of a certain proportional share in the ownership of the business. If there are a million shares outstanding, the holder of ten thousand shares owns one hundredth of the business. There may, or may not, be tangible instruments back of this stock. If the company itself owns capital or land, then the stockholder shares in that ownership. But only because he is part owner of the business. The return that the company makes to the stockholder is not a fixed number of dollars and cents, but is dependent on the success of the business, that is, its capacity to make profits. Moreover, the company does not promise to pay back to the stockholder any specified sum for the surrender of his stock at any time. The true value of a stock is therefore determined by its earnings, discounted at the current rate of interest, making allowance for the risk involved. That is, if safe bonds in a given market are paying regularly six dollars for every one hundred dollars lent, then a share of stock in a perfectly safe company (assuming the existence of such an admirable thing) upon which six dollars a year is paid regularly is worth one hundred dollars. A share upon which only three dollars is paid regularly is worth fifty dollars, and one upon which nine dollars is paid is worth one hundred and fifty dollars. All of this is regardless of the par value of the stock, or any figure printed on the face of the certificate. A dividend in its strictest sense is a proportional share of the profits of a corporation, though it may contain also an element of interest, as suggested above.

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* Throughout this discussion the term capital is used in accordance with the customary definition of the economists, "wealth used in the production of more wealth," with the specific limitation that it applies to the permanent, or pseudo-permanent, plant of an industry rather than funds spent for promotional purposes, such as advertising, insurance, bribery, etc.

Diffusion of Responsibility

Such a form of organization provides for a possible extreme diffusion of ownership. It is therefore impossible for the owners to manage the affairs of the corporation directly.

This function must be delegated to some representatives of the owners. These are customarily the directors, who are theoretically elected by vote of all the stockholders, though in practice their election usually lies in the hands of a small number of large stockholders, or persons who hold the proxies of stockholders. The directors are usually elected more for their presumed financial and business ability than for their knowledge of the technical aspects of the business carried on by the corporation. At least, they seldom devote themselves to the actual management of the plant. This is assigned to one or more managers, chosen for their technical knowledge and experience of the industry, their ability to manage men, their organizing capacity, etc. Thus in the modern corporation the functions of ownership and management are not only differentiated but are separated from each other by a body of intermediaries, the directors.

Absentee Ownership

The modern corporation, therefore, represents absentee ownership in an aggravated form. The evils of such remote, depersonalized ownership have long been familiar in connection with land. The troubles of Ireland have been largely attributed to its evil potency. That even worse consequences would develop when the principle was extended to the great modern institution of business probably no one wholly foresaw. The disasters of the present era leave no room for doubt on the subject. The kind of absentee ownership associated with the corporation results in the creation and alignment of interests peculiarly destructive to society and therefore eventually to individuals. The interests of the stockholders are primarily (and usually exclusively) in the receipt of as large dividends as possible. They have no interest or pride in the business methods of the company or in the standards of the product it turns out. The directors, in turn, are responsible to the stockholders. If a sufficient number of stockholders become dissatisfied they may lose their positions. Being in closer proximity to the business itself, they may have some concern about its methods or standards. They determine broad policies. But their main concern is to see that the business turns out large profits so that they may receive the plaudits of the stockholders. To accomplish this purpose they exert pressure on the manager. Upon him, then, falls the immediate task of making the plant produce profits. He is under the constant strain of keeping costs of production as low as possible, increasing efficiency, enlarging output. He may, and often does, have his own standards of honor, fairness, professional integrity, and social justice, but his job is to turn out goods that will sell for more than the cost of production, and as much more as possible.

THE PROFIT MOTIVE

Such a system inevitably sacrifices everything to the hope of profit-making. If ordinary individual selfishness, general as it is, is a trouble-making trait, this depersonalized, corporate selfishness is immeasurably worse. Responsibility is diffused to such a point that there seems to be no responsibility at all, at least it cannot be definitely located. The outsider has difficulty in finding any person with whom to register an effective complaint, and those within the organization have the sense of being mere cogs in a relentless machine, driven by forces over which they have no control, forced to engage in practices often revolting to their natural inclinations and standards. How gruesome an edifice of dishonesty, greed, trickery, and corruption could be built upon such a foundation is just beginning to be revealed. But the immediate and obvious consequences of the corporate form of organizing production have been manifest for decades, particularly with respect to the conditions that it tended to foster among the working classes. A long and extensive series of measures, known in general as "social legislation," has grown up out of the effort to throw the protection of society around those who were not able to protect themselves in the face of such a system. Of course, the evils which necessitated both these legal measures, and other efforts of a private sort, are not traceable exclusively to the corporation; many of them are inherent in the whole structure of a mechanized, profit-seeking, capitalistic society. But the growth of the corporation intensified them and brought them to a head. Beside these, other socially undesirable consequences have seemed to be inseparable from the corporation, such as destructive competition among producers, the development of monopoly with the consequent exploitation of the consumer, and the pernicious linkage of big business with government. In an attempt to curb these evils the United States and other nations have enacted various pieces of legislation such as anti-trust laws, corrupt practices acts, regulation of unfair competition. The National Recovery Administration of the Franklin D. Roosevelt régime was an extreme effort to impose upon business the restraints necessary to social stability and prosperity while preserving the main framework of the capitalistic system. At present writing it appears that these efforts will prove inadequate and some much more far-reaching and fundamental reorganization of the productive system must be undergone before even tolerable economic conditions can be assured.

Source of Profits

One special reason for believing this is that recent study and analysis have revealed a fundamental structural weakness in the present economic system, the existence of which has been vaguely envisioned by a few penetrating thinkers in the past, but which could not be fully appreciated until the system itself had had an opportunity to develop its mature features. This is concerned with the nature of profits, and the search for them.

As already explained, profits are the specific rewards of ownership. The justification for them, if it be sought, may be found partly in the fact that these typical productive units must be owned by somebody, and if there were no rewards therefor nobody would take the bother to own them, and partly in the genuine services that the owner does render to society, particularly by the assumption of the primary risk of industry. For our present purposes the main thing is to recognize that profits are sanctioned by society, that they are assumed in the system as it exists, and that the attainment of profits is the sole incentive of the business owner, apart from any intangible rewards of status or the pleasure of the game. And since the owner is primarily and immediately responsible for the organization and direction of business, it is accurate to say that the search for profits is the mainspring of business in the prevailing system.

Ownership of Product

The next question is, what provision does society make for the attainment of profits by the owner? What are the particular prerogatives assigned to him that enable him to withdraw a certain portion from the total stream of production? The answer is found in a single basic social form, the importance of which cannot be exaggerated, but which, amazingly enough, has almost completely escaped the attention of the professional exponents of economic theory. One might search through all the conventional economics texts in use in our colleges and universities, and find scarcely a single recognition of it, to say nothing of a clear exposition of it. It is this: *The owner of the business owns the product of industry.* Isn't it well-nigh incredible that since man lives by the product of industry, and since the whole purpose of economic activity is to turn out product, in a society governed by a philosophy of ownership virtually no thought should have been given to the ownership of the product? The reason, such as it is, may be found in the whole historical development of the economic complex. As we have seen, for ages all economic activity naturally centered in the laborer. "Findings was keepings" and makings was keepings. There was no question as to who owned the products of primitive industry. So it continued down through the development of more elaborate methods of production. The maker was the owner. The difficulty has arisen only with the development of a technique of industry where there is no maker of the product. Production now emanates from an impersonal combination of factors, no one of which can claim the entire merit of creation, and the relative shares of which in the productive process have baffled determination by the most expert and erudite methods applied to the task. It is not surprising that during the transition from the man-centered phase of production to the machine-centered phase, those who organized, directed, and owned the new productive units should have arrogated to themselves the ownership of the product without any particular challenge or interference. The full complications of the new situation did not develop until the further change took place which transferred the technical ownership from a single individual or a group of partners to a widely scattered host of stockholders. The ownership of the product of industry now resides in those participants who are most remote from the actual processes of creation, and who have the least personal interest in, or knowledge of, the technical process of manufacture, the nature of the market, or the financial manipulations of modern business and trade. Their function is simply to initiate the original pressure for large profits.

Service of Owner

The basic services which the owner renders to society, in return for which he is granted this important right, are two, the assumption of the primary obligations of business, and the assumption of the contingent or residual risk. The initial obligation consists in agreements (which share the nature of a contract) with those who supply the other four fundamental factors in production. The owner agrees to pay rent to the landlord, interest to the capitalists, salaries to the executives, and wages to the laborers. All of these call for payments of fixed sums of money at given intervals, and all but the last are for specified periods of time. Labor is the only factor of production whose agreement with the owner has no element of duration. Leases are made for a certain period of years, bonds are issued for a given number of years, and high executives—genuine managers or organizers—are usually employed for at least a year. Labor is hired at so much per hour, day, or week, but there is no stipulation as to the length of the period for which the laborer may expect employment. This lies in the discretion of the owner, acting, of course, through the manager, who customarily makes the specific decisions. This is a fact that is strangely ignored by most of those who discuss economic problems. It accounts quite largely for the weak position of labor in the modern industrial conflict and explains its frequent recourse to such expedients as the trade union, strikes, etc. It is interesting to speculate on the changes that would take place in the economic landscape if all employers were compelled to hire their labor on contracts for at least a year.

Having made these contracts, the owner is under moral and legal obligation to fulfil them. They are the basic charge on his resources. His ability to meet these fixed payments obviously depends on the success of his business. So also does any return that he may get for himself. This is what imposes on him the element of risk. In recognition of these services, and in order to give him a chance of getting something for himself, society concedes to the owner the ownership, and right of disposal, of the product. He derives his return typically by selling the product. In order to meet his primary obligations he must sell the product for at least as much as the aggregate of rent, interest, salaries, and wages. To "break even" he must sell the product for at least as much as this aggregate plus all other expenditures that enter into the total cost of production. To get any reward—to "make any money"—he must sell the product for more than the total cost of production.

Conflict Relations

These conditions furnish the basis for the various conflict relations in the modern economic organization. First of all, there is a common interest on the part of all the factors in production, and on the part of society, that there shall be a product and that, normally, it should be as large as possible. Within this circumscribing interest there is a complex of conflicting interests. First of all, there are conflicting interests between the owner and all the other four factors in production. The reward of each of them is derived from the total amount received for the sale of the product. How much each shall get is a matter of proportional division—the great problem of "distribution" as recognized in conventional economics. The owner is the residual claimant. After he has met all his fixed charges, after he has fulfilled all the contracts into which he has entered in the course of production, after he has reimbursed himself for the expenses of operation, a revolving fund* advanced by the owner, which may be thought of as canceling out periodically, then, if there is anything left, it is his, and represents net profit. The owner is therefore under constant pressure to cut down all the items in his cost of production to the lowest possible level. This brings him into direct conflict with the landlord, the capitalist, the manager, and the laborer. Each of these, in turn, is in direct conflict with all the others on the same basis. Each wants to divert the maximum portion of the returns of industry to itself. Of this complex of conflicts, that between landlord and capitalist is probably the least acute. For the land-owning and capitalist classes overlap very largely; they are composed to a considerable extent of the same persons, and an individual may easily shift from one class to the other at will. Every day, bonds are sold and the proceeds invested in real estate, and vice versa. In fact, in many branches of economic analysis, the distinction between land and capital is virtually negligible. The bitterest struggle is that between labor and the land-capital groups. This corresponds to that fundamental demarcation, long ago made clear by Scott Nearing, between service income, and property income—income that you get for doing something on the one hand, and income that you get for owning something on the other hand. Between labor and *management, as a factor in production,* there is relatively little antagonism, though the resentment and resistance of the workers may very generally be directed against the manager as a person; it is only through him that they can reach the owner. The great struggle in the modern economic world is between the haves and the have-nots, and it will probably always remain so as long as those two classes remain distinct, and include the bulk of the population.

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* This fund is composed of such items as cost of raw materials, insurance, advertising, heat and light, bribery, etc., which are expenses that fall directly upon the owner, as owner, rather than upon the capitalist. An enlightening conception of the modern economic situation is greatly helped by considering these expenses as apart from capital, calling them "owner's advances" or something of the sort. In one sense, they are wealth used in the production of more wealth, and so fall within the broad definition of capital in the older economics. But their function and significance are so different from those of the true capital durably invested in an enterprise that only confusion can arise from treating them in the same category. If a rigid adherence to classic definitions insists upon including all money spent for goods used in the production of wealth as capital, then it becomes necessary to divide capital into two distinct types, and to find a new name for each. The confusion in this field is intensified by the common habit of calling all one's savings "capital," no matter what form they are in, how they are invested, or how they are used.

Laissez-faire

It is clear, therefore, that our whole economic system is predicated on the principle of conflict. The laissez-faire doctrine taught that this is the most efficient, if not the only workable, basis for organizing production, insisting that on this basis society would receive the maximum benefits. The laissez-faire doctrine, in return, rests upon the assumption that the only effective spring of individual conduct is self-centered and self-directed self-interest. Many of the greatest problems of today center about the discovery whether or not this is true, and if so, what can be done about it and how can the facts be altered; or if not true, what is the truth, and how can it be brought into effective play.

Fallacy of Profits

Let us return now to the owner and consider his chances of making a profit. These depend, as has been said, upon his ability to sell the product for more than the total cost of production. This leads to an examination of the market. A market consists of two elements, a group of people who desire to buy a certain product, and the prices that they are willing and able to pay for it. If there are as many people who want a given product as there are units of that product produced, and if they are prepared to pay something more than the cost per unit, the owner can make a profit. Or if the number of potential purchasers is less than the number of units, but they are willing to pay a price considerably above the unit cost of production, still the owner may make a profit. But if the total amount of money ready to be spent for a given number of units is less than the cost of producing those units, then there is no chance of a profit for the owner, but instead the prospect of a loss. From the point of view of the market, therefore, the whole population of a society is divided into two groups, owners and non-owners. In a thoroughly capitalized society, that is, one where the tendencies of the past one hundred years have reached their full culmination, the non-owning group would be composed of landlords, capitalists, managers, and laborers, and nobody else. The fact that many persons actually belong to two or more classes should be ignored for the clarity of this theoretical analysis. The aggregate income of the non-owning class, which constitutes the total purchasing power of the market, would be composed of rent, interest, salaries, wages, and of nothing else. But these four items of income are precisely the same four items that constitute the aggregate cost of production of the owners. It appears, therefore, that the total purchasing power of the market is precisely equal to the total cost of production. How, then, can the product be sold for more than the cost of production? Where is the surplus purchasing power coming from? The answer is, flatly, there is no surplus purchasing power. The product cannot be sold for more than the cost of production. In brief, there can be no profits.

This is the great dilemma of the capitalistic system, the incredible paradox of modern life. That profits are impossible seems as absurd a proposition as that the sun does not rise in the morning, or the rain fall from the sky. We have lived so long in the midst of a profit economy, our whole industrial life has been so completely geared up to the concept of profits, and there seem to have been so many evidences of actual profit-making in the past, that we have come to accept profits as thoroughly established in the nature of things. With a slight change of spelling, ''the law and the profits'' have been accepted as symbolic of all that is dependable and immutable.

Basis of Illusion

An understanding of how the illusion of profits has become so deep-seated may be gained by considering a few demonstrable facts. It was stated above that if the owner can sell a part of the product for an amount greater than the total cost of production he may make a profit. We now see that, for owners as a class, this is impossible. But they may sell *part* of the product for an amount just equal to the cost of production. Indeed, this is practically what does take place, for the aggregate money income of the community sooner or later gets spent for something, except for that negligible portion that is buried in the back-yard, or hidden away in an old sock or mattress. When this is done, the owners get back the cost of production, and in addition find themselves in possession of a surplus stock of goods, which they may consider as profit if they like. But it is a commodity profit, not a money profit, and there is no way of turning it into a money profit. Different owners may exchange their surplus products with each other (probably using money as a medium), and so they may acquire supplies of consumable goods far beyond the reach of the ordinary members of society. But the only use they can make of these goods is to consume them. However, the consumptive capacity of an individual, even a rich owner, for goods of a given kind within a given time is limited. To be the most luxurious consumers of their society, pleasant as this is, does not satisfy owners as a class. They are fired with a desire to pile up more and more wealth. But under modern conditions the accumulation of wealth is by investment. This means building more productive plants to turn out more consumable goods to be offered to a market that is already glutted at prices that will offer even the hope of a profit. In this effort, owners as a class are aided and abetted by capitalists and savers of all sorts who are also seeking to accumulate wealth by increased investment. Such a process cannot go on forever. The purpose of investment is to make profits, and if goods cannot be sold profits cannot be made. When surplus investments become too extreme, some sort of a crash is bound to come.

Ancient and Modern Wealth

One key to this dilemma may be found in the nature of modern riches. Before the dawn of the capitalistic era, before accumulated savings could be made a source of income by putting them out at interest, the plutocrat contented himself first with a life of Sybaritic ease and extravagance, and second by piling up his surplus in the form of articles of luxury and ostentation, which, though non-perishable, were really in the nature of consumption goods. Gorgeous palaces, sumptuous raiment, dazzling jewelry, and elaborate furniture could be made to absorb the results of extensive saving or plundering. For example, an inventory of a sale of the collections of the Arabian caliph, Mostanser-Billah, held in 1050, included among other items, the following:[2]

> Precious stones. A chest of emeralds worth at least 36,000,000 francs. A necklace of precious stones worth about 9,000,000 fr. Pearls. Vases of the purest crystal. Gold dishes of all sorts. Chests of inkstands of all sorts, enamel dishes, mirrors of all sorts. Silver household goods, and 6,000 gold vases in which were put narcissus or violets. Thirty-six thousand pieces of crystal. A large number of knives, worth at least 3,600,000 fr. A turban, enriched with precious stones, said to be worth about 15,000,000 fr. A golden peacock set with precious stones. A cock, and a gazelle, similar. A sardonyx table. A garden made of silver and gold, with silver trees, fruits made of precious materials. A golden palm-tree, enriched with superb pearls. It was in a golden chest, and its fruit was made of precious stones, representing dates in every stage of ripeness. This tree was of inestimable value.

Nowadays, the practical desires for such displays on the part of our wealthy classes fall far short of their surplus resources. They are irresistibly driven by the modern *Zeitgeist* to transform their savings into investment. The impulse to do so has been encouraged by the tradition of compound interest, which has been taught to most of them from their childhood, and which seems to be another of the immutable principles of creation. Only recently has the fallacy of this doctrine been fully comprehended by a few perspicacious thinkers, and clearly expounded by Mr. Lawrence Dennis in a truly epochal book.[3] And yet the existence of the fallacy is clear at a moment's objective thought. We often see concrete illustrations of the extraordinary possibilities of compound interest in ac counts of a sum of money put in a savings bank by Benjamin Franklin, or estimates of the number of worlds of solid gold that would have resulted from one cent deposited at compound interest at the time of Christ.* But obviously, the realization of such a result is impossible. There is not that much gold in the world, nor that much wealth of any kind. *Nor could there be.* One of the consequences of the finite character of this globe is that wealth, like all other material things, must be limited. And wealth based on the investment of capital at interest is not less limited, but more, than wealth in the form of glittering baubles. Sooner or later the "principle" of compound interest comes up against the hard facts of mundane reality, and proves not to be an established feature of natural law, but a mere human device, and a very frail one at that.

LOSSES

This leads to the realization of another of the explanations of why profits seem to be possible. The profits that attract our attention are largely offset by losses which we fail to notice, or which seem to us to have been avoidable. Particular owners may make profits continuously, and owners as a group may make them for periods of time. But the periods of general profit-making have been shown to be interspersed with periods of loss-taking. No one has ever struck a complete balance of profits and losses in the United States, for instance, over the past one hundred years, but anyone who has lived

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*A modern illustration is furnished by the following item which appeared in the New York *Times* for December 28, 1933:

> CINCINNATI WAIVES CLAIM TO $32,000,000,000,000
>
> By The Associated Press.
>
> Cincinnati, Dec. 27.—The city of Cincinnati today accepted $345,000 in cold cash on which it can lay its hands now in preference to an estimated $32,000,000,000,000 it might get at the expiration of 500 years.
>
> Miss Florence E. Weaver, former Cincinnati school teacher, left an estate of about $700,000 to the city, to be placed in trust for 500 years at compounded and recompounded interest. The real estate comprising the city's windfall is in Oklahoma City, and the bequest was ruled invalid by Oklahoma courts.
>
> Rather than argue the case through higher courts, John H. Ellis, City Solicitor, announced that he had reached an agreement with other heirs of Miss Weaver to accept half of the amount willed to Cincinnati.

Of course, there was no possibility that tangible wealth corresponding to the specified amount of money could have been available to Cincinnati at the end of 500 years. The City Solicitor was wise.

through the great depression needs no demonstration to convince him that the losses of that period were sufficient to offset the profits of many previous years. Our inoculation with the profit notion is so strong that we have been inclined to think that depressions, like other losses, might be avoided. But the realization is now becoming wide-spread that as long as we have a system based upon the illusion of profit-making, we must be prepared to face periods of depression. We inevitably expand our productive equipment beyond the cost-replacing consumptive power of the community. Estimates have been made, which are not perhaps wholly reliable but nevertheless suggestive, that the average rate of interest on capital over long periods of time is about three per cent, and that the "life" of capital in the United States is about tweny-five years. If this is true, it is plain that it would be better not to invest your money at all. For if you put out your savings at three per cent for twenty-five years, you get back in the aggregate seventy-five per cent of what you put in, and then there is nothing left.

Depletion of Natural Resources

A third explanation of the seeming profits of the past is found in the basic character of the economic history of the past one hundred odd years. The nineteenth century was the great period of profit-taking in all human experience. But what seemed to be the acquisition of profits in the correct sense was actually due to the development of vast latent natural resources, many of which can never be replaced. Gains derived in this way should obviously be considered not as profits, but as the depletion of capital and land .

Need of a New Economics

This whole subject has many technical ramifications, which are interesting and important, but need not delay us here. The vital thing is to realize upon how shaky a foundation our whole economic edifice is built. It may seem incredible that a whole civilization should base its fundamental organization, the economic, on illusion and fallacy. But such things have happened before, and frequently. Every age has its own characteristic illusions. Many societies have been molded by belief in the power of the shaman or medicine man. Witchcraft has played a vast rôle in shaping societal forms and functions. Numerous groups have organized their life about the belief in a personally interested, partisan, and all-powerful divinity who could be counted on to intervene in the daily affairs of his followers. Faith in the military efficacy of holy relics supported and sustained the Crusades. The development of physical sciences has bereft many of the ancient delusions of their power. But social science is still in its infancy. The societal developments of Western civilization during the past century and a half took place largely without scientific direction or control. It is possible that the next century may see the power of social science exerted to sweep away various societal superstitions and anachronisms, and to do for the relations of man to his human environment what physical science has done for the relations of man to his cosmic environment.

CHAPTER XXII

GROUP CONTACTS

The discussion thus far has concerned itself mainly with the relations that exist between societies and their individual members in general. There have been suggestions, however, of relations of great importance and complexity among various groups—relations of subgroups within a society, of societies with each other, and of groups distinct from any societal demarcations.

REALITY OF GROUP SOLIDARITY

The fact of primary importance about these non-societal groups is their reality and vitality, and the intensity of the group feeling that exists among their members. In the case of interest groups, this is not difficult to understand. It is community of interest that creates the group; naturally they feel alike about certain things, and have a sense of being bound together. But in the semi-voluntary, and still more in the involuntary, groups there is a certain element of mystery about the strong we-feeling that exists, the loyalty, sympathy, and devotion that display themselves so continuously. Fortunately, an explanation is not necessary, nor consistent with the conception of sociology. No doubt, the existence of a semi-voluntary or involuntary group tends to create secondary interests that arise from the fact that certain individuals find themselves united in a group. But the existence of group feeling, and the phenomena that arise out of it, are what concerns sociology. As these words are being written the newspaper brings verbal and pictorial descriptions of the vast network of fortifications, largely underground, that France is building along her northern boundary. Why is that boundary so important? What is France, and what is Germany? Why does one group of people roar with enthusiasm at the unfurling of the tricolor, while another group wears swastikas, and shouts "Heil, Hitler!" with upraised right hands? Who knows the complete answer?—but the fact remains that they do.

INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS

Group contacts, as already suggested, may be roughly divided into three categories, inter-societal contacts, intra-societal contacts, and extra-societal contacts. The former class may quite accurately be described as international contacts, for the societies that experience specific relations with each other are almost always closely identified with nations.

The field of international relations is obviously a vast one, to which an enormous amount of expert attention is being devoted at the present time, and concerning which a voluminous literature is growing up. We must content ourselves with examining only some of the broad outlines. In a general way, these relations may be divided into two chief categories, friendly and unfriendly, cooperative and antagonistic, peaceful and hostile. Since it is probable that war was the primeval type of relationship it may be considered first. War arises out of the clash of interests between two nations, for there are practically the same varieties of interests among nations as among societies. The conflicting interests of nations may, or may not, represent actual conflicts between the interests of the individuals in the two nations. This depends primarily upon the type of state that exists in each, whether it is really representative of the attitudes of society, or whether it is dominated by a small group or an individual which can control group behavior in its own interest. But, as already pointed out, in either case the action is genuine societal action. There are certain basic national interests which have been from time immemorial the causes of clashes between these groups. The foremost of these is probably the land interest.

LAND QUEST

We have already seen how fundamental is the interest in land to any society, from the point of view of both continuity and welfare. Very primitive societies must have subconsciously recognized their land as their most precious possession, and more highly developed groups have evolved more deliberate land policies. Land being the primary source of national existence and wealth, the most direct and efficacious means of increasing national well-being or prestige has been to acquire more land. During the long period of dispersion this could be accomplished on a peaceful basis up to a certain extent. As long as there were vast areas of humanly uninhabited land, continuous land appropriation could go on without any human opposition or loss to anyone, and with distinct benefits to the race as a whole. Much of this process was too primitive to be considered true national land acquisition. In more recent times, the process took the form of land aggression by highly civilized peoples upon the territory of tribes so low in culture that their resistance was feeble, and they could be brushed aside much as the natural obstacles to settlement were cleared away. The great colonizing enterprises of the Discoveries Period were largely of this character. Two great milestones in human experience may be thought of as the disappearance of all uninhabited land, and the complete appropriation, if not the actual settlement, of the land of low-cultured peoples by various highly developed nations. With this last culmination, the land quest took on a much more serious and violent aspect, for any further acquisitions must then be against the opposition of other highly developed nations, and that meant war. The only way that a modern nation can get land is to take it from somebody else. This may be, as it has been in the past, by purchase, but it is much more likely to be by conquest.

OVERPOPULATION

The immediate phenomenon leading to an interest on the part of a nation in land acquisition is very frequently overpopulation. The nature of this situation we have already examined, and we are prepared to understand the tremendous impulse to expansion of some sort that exists when the perpetual and urgent force of reproduction is pressing hard against the limits of subsistence or of the customary standard of living. The natural method of relieving this pressure is extension onto new land wherever possible. Man utilized this expedient for ages, and we have seen what a crucial stage in human development was reached when this resource, on a peaceful basis, was no longer available. As long as reproduction continued to take place on the basis of primary biological factors the pressure would continue or perhaps increase. Cataclysmic culminations of this process have been mitigated, and possibly sometimes avoided, by the development of economic culture. But never in his history, over considerable periods of time, has man been able to improve his economic culture fast enough to prevent overpopulation from creating a powerful stimulus to aggression of one sort or another between nations. Sometimes the objective has been the actual acquisition of land, sometimes the appropriation of the products of land, sometimes control over the source of these products without complete ownership of the land. The influence of these factors in causing international war can hardly be overemphasized. The statement has been made repeatedly, and never effectively refuted, that most of the great international wars of history have directly or indirectly represented, to a greater or less extent, struggles over land, or have been caused by overpopulation arising from the inadequacy of land to meet the needs of growing numbers.

War as a Corrective

Out of these truths has arisen the notion, very popular in certain quarters and assiduously fostered by militarists of various types, that war is not only a necessary, but a beneficent, agency in human progress, a salutary means of getting rid of surplus population, and allowing the survivors to move forward. That war is a necessary method of relieving overpopulation, in the sense that it will come into play if no other means are discovered and applied by societies, is undeniable. We have seen that nature's way of exerting the indispensable control over population is by the agency of death. As long as man allows his reproductive activities to be governed by strictly natural forces, he, too, must submit to control by death, and war is one of the forms of death that will do the work. Whether war is beneficent depends on whether any more terrible forms of death are avoided by participation in war. This is quite possible. Death in war may be less undesirable, for various reasons, than death by starvation, pestilence, or murder. If man had no choice but between various forms of death, then his wisdom and intelligence could exert themselves only in seeking to discover the most genial aspects of death, and giving them the preference. The great, world-wide pacifist movement is modern humanity's poignant proclamation that there are other alternatives, and that they must be found. It is to be hoped that pacifists will speedily arrive at an appreciation of the part that overpopulation plays in the causation of war, and devote some of their attention to removing its causes. There is no doubt that a century of stationary population in all the nations of the globe would do more to usher in an era of world peace than all the treaties, disarmament conventions, and pacts that have ever been signed, significant as they are.

Futility of Modern War

A new aspect has been given to this whole sequence by the character of modern warfare. While overpopulation still causes war, it seems quite clear that, whatever may have been true in the past, under modern conditions war does not cure overpopulation or relieve the evils arising from it. Paradoxical as this statement may seem it can be easily explained. We have seen that the ability of a nation to support a given population upon a given standard of living depends on the amount of land under its control, and the stage of its industrial arts. When population increases to the point where it begins to depress the standard of living, there are just four things that can be done. 1. Allow the standard to decline until it reaches the level of control by starvation. 2. Get more land. 3. Improve the economic arts. 4. Eliminate some of the population. We may assume that any alert society will regard a serious deterioration of its standard as a last resort, to be avoided by every available means. We may also assume that the stage of culture is already being advanced as fast as the native capacities of the people allow. The choice remains, then, between adding to land, and eliminating some of the population. War is an expedient that may offer hope in both of these directions, and a conflict that actually produces results in both is probably what some people have in mind when they talk about a ''good'' war. But under modern conditions, the acquisition of land by war is a vain hope for relieving overpopulation. For the land of the world is now pretty completely appropriated by civilized nations, and about as densely peopled as it can be under prevailing conditions. Consequently, when one nation takes land away from another it gets the inhabitants along with the land, and unless it is prepared to exterminate them—which modern nations seldom are, with all their ferocity—the result is simply to increase land and population at about the same effective ratio, and leave no room for national improvement. Sumner discerned this principle very clearly, and set it forth in one of his most notable essays.[1] The real relief from overpopulation, if any, must therefore come through the casualties of war.

DESTRUCTION OF ECONOMIC CULTURE

That such a relief will result, and that it will be closely proportioned to the losses by death, may seem almost axiomatic, and it has probably been true up to recent times. But it is plain that if the war results in injuring, instead of improving, either of the factors below the line the size of the population that can be supported on the customary standard of living will be reduced accordingly. This is precisely what happens in a modern war. In the first place, the land itself is injured. It is cut up for trenches, and torn into ragged and useless contours by high explosives. It is a familiar fact that great areas of the land of France were so thoroughly ruined in the course of the World War that it took years to restore them to full cultivation. Much more important, however, is the injury to the economic culture. Part of this consists in the destruction of physical plants. Factories are razed to the ground, bridges are blown up, railroads rendered useless, and merchant vessels sent to the depths of the ocean. But a still more important part of the injury has to do with the intangible and organizational elements in economic life. Modern economic culture is composed very largely of trade connections, world markets, international finance, relations of good will among diverse peoples, interchange of technical ideas, and a host of other non-material items that support the operation of the physical plant. These are almost without exception seriously harmed by war, if not temporarily destroyed. In former days, an invading army roved over the enemy territory, burning barns and standing crops, slaughtering cattle, and performing various acts of vandalism. But when it retired, the land was as good as ever, and no serious loss had been inflicted on the economic culture of the vanquished. They had their arts of life, they had their physical abilities and dexterities, and they could soon rebuild the barns and replant the fields. If their numbers were reduced considerably, the survivors might find life actually easier after the peace than before. And the victors suffered no loss of economic culture at all. Not so with modern armies. They annihilate the very foundations of economic prosperity, and the victor suffers almost as much as the vanquished—perhaps even more. This result is affected, also, by the nature of modern wealth, most of which cannot be plundered or carried away, but merely destroyed. The economic futility of modern warfare has been so convincingly demonstrated by Sir Norman Angell that it is difficult to understand how it can be longer in doubt.[2] The final consequence is today that after a destructive war the participating nations find themselves worse overpopulated with their smaller numbers than they were before the war with their larger numbers. This was incontrovertibly demonstrated in the case of the World War.*

DIVERSE CAUSES

The ostensible causes of war are usually much more complex than mere land-lust, or the pressure of overpopulation. In fact, the grounds of rivalry, jealousy, and friction are so numerous, and the conflicting interests among nations so complex, that the economic considerations may be obscured, and may be actually subordinate. To really understand the causation of war would be to comprehend all the grounds upon which the interests of nations come into opposition with each other. It would be vain to attempt to untangle this complex in this connection. But is it an encouraging sign that the more intelligent and broad-minded diplomatists and statesmen, as well as the more thoughtful students of international relations, are beginning to recognize that the only possible hope for enduring world peace lies in the understanding of the causation of war, and the development of effectual means to eradicate the causes. Mere verbal expedients, even such epoch-making organizational devices as the League of Nations, will not suffice to stem the tide of national aggressiveness, once important interests become involved. There is a certain inspiration in the sight of sincere and devoted college students pledging themselves to abstain from hostile activities against their fellow men for all time. But all the evidence of social science supports the forecast that if their nation ever becomes involved in a life-and-death struggle their resolutions will be thrown to the winds, and the majority of them will be swept away by the force of concentrated public sentiment and the claims of group loyalty.

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* See p. 331.

EVILS OF WAR

As to the intrinsic evils of war nothing need be said. It is one of the great curses under which mankind labors, though not necessarily the greatest. If there were any evidence that war is a diminishing factor in human experience we might take courage, and hope that in time it might be eliminated. But careful study of the facts of history affords no ground for such a supposition.[3] It must be remembered, nevertheless, that war is a phenomenon that arises from underlying conditions, and that fundamental changes have been taking place in the last few decades in many of the basic factors that affect the motives of hostility, such as the rate of growth of population, and the ability to extract subsistence from the land.

Some slight encouragement can perhaps be drawn from the fact that the area within which the control by the police power is substituted for the exercise of the war power has been steadily increasing in size. In the territory now included in the United States innumerable petty wars used to be fought, although the aboriginal population numbered only about one two-hundred-and-fiftieth of the present. Now the police power of the federal government, supplemented by that of the federated states, makes war highly improbable. The period of nation building in Europe put an end to the prevalence of local wars. Of course, there have been retrogressive movements. The great *Pax Romana* covered a larger area than any modern European state. On the other hand, the world-wide spread of the British nationality has bound together vast territories and huge populations into a practical peace unit. The establishment of the League of Nations was an attempt to organize the machinery of peace and cooperative participation on a world scale. The League is not a state, and hence it cannot be entrusted with police power or any other authority to use force. Undoubtedly the time was not ripe for such an extreme step, though it has been vigorously advocated since. The creation of some form of world state equipped with an international police force appears to be one of the most promising avenues to world peace—perhaps the only effective one. But of course it cannot be formed until world opinion and sentiment are ready for it. In the meantime, the increase in the size of the competing units, although it makes each successive war more devastating, seems to indicate a trend toward the final culminating step when all nations shall unite in a world federation.

Commerce

Turning to the less disturbing subjects of peaceable contacts among nations, we recognize that one of the most important of them is trade or commerce. This is an international relation, not in the sense that trade is actually carried on by the nation in the same way that war is waged, but that the nation sets up the conditions and imposes the regulations under which its individual citizens may trade with those of other nations. This national regulation of international trade is doubtless necessary, but it is a hybrid arrangement that involves many incidental drawbacks, for it creates a spurious appearance of national interest in trade which serves as a cloak for the promotion of various, and not always socially useful, individual interests. Many stereotypes and slogans cluster round the relationship and help to preserve the illusion. "Trade follows the flag," "The merchant marine," "Protection of foreign investments," "The honor of the flag," "A favorable balance of trade" are typical examples. It is not to be denied that a nation may have interests of its own in foreign trade, but they are not necessarily identical or even consistent with the interests of individuals, and in emergencies the interests of individuals or subgroups, parading under the banner of patriotism, may supersede true national interests. Loans by individuals or financial institutions to foreign governments, investments in foreign enterprises, or in home-owned plants located in foreign countries, may occasion pressure upon the government which results in action not at all in accord with general national interest. The relations of the United States with Cuba, for instance, are profoundly influenced by the huge American investments in sugar and other enterprises in that turbulent island.

Facilities for Trade

The immediate participation of the nation in foreign trade, as suggested above, ordinarily takes two forms, the establishment of relations with other nations, and facilities within them—particularly the consular service—that make trade possible among their respective citizens, and the setting up of certain restrictions upon the trade that takes place, such as customs regulations, tariffs, import and export bounties, embargoes, etc. The formulation of such a set of regulations is fraught with immense difficulty and danger. The representatives of the nation are under double pressure to promote the real interests of the nation and to serve the restricted interests of subgroups within the nation. All too often the procedure is dominated by the latter. The problems of free trade and tariff for protection or revenue have occupied a prominent place in political discussions for generations. As to the underlying principles, theoretical experts are in nearly unanimous agreement. World trade conducted without artificial barriers can be shown to be conducive not only to international good will, but also to the best economic interests of all concerned. The general tendency would be to encourage each geographic area to produce those goods for which it was best fitted by nature and the character of its people and culture, and to exchange them on the best possible terms with goods similarly produced in other areas.

Conflicting Trade Interests

But this is a doctrine that it is very hard to instill into the minds of legislators and business leaders, and still harder to "sell" to economic groups that believe their own interests to be dependent upon various special regulations. The intrasocietal bargaining of such interest groups, by the process known as "log-rolling," results in the erection of some amazing monstrosities of legislation known as "tariff laws," under the shadow of which genuine national interests are completely eclipsed. And once a system of tariff building starts among the nations of the world, it displays a cumulative tendency which, fostered by motives of retaliation, protection, and advantage, makes the return to a normal and rational basis exceedingly difficult. This is the situation in which the world finds itself at the present time. The interruptions of trade consequent upon the World War, the rising tide of nationalism, the shrinkage of foreign markets in the face of a vast expansion of productive capacity, the impediments to trade afforded by the war debts and reparations, and finally the blight of the great depression have stimulated nations to engage in a competitive race of tariff wall building which has throttled even the opportunities for international commerce that might exist. In scarcely any other important field of national interest is there a more flagrant disparity between the scientifically established principles of normality and progress and the actual practice of national groups, and a more urgent necessity to bring the two together, than in the field of foreign trade. At the present time there is a rather striking resemblance to those primitive practices, known as "armed trading," which are supposedly characteristic of nature peoples just entering the first phases of friendly group contact. Here exchange is carried on between the two parties, with weapons pointed at each other, while alternate retreats and advances indicate the fluctuations between suspicion and desire to trade.[4]

TRAVEL

Another very important type of peaceable international relations is the movement of people from one national territory to another. This displays several forms, the simplest of which, perhaps, is travel. By this is meant temporarily journeying about for motives other than trade or business, such as pleasure, education, or escape from boredom. As an important social form it is a very recent development, partly because adequate means of transportation and a general standard of living high enough to take advantage of them are modern achievements, and partly because only in the last few generations have even the most advanced countries allowed free ingress to the nationals of other countries. As late as the Middle Ages, movement between European countries for any reason was possible only under very severe restrictions. Today, it is not only a source of great pleasure and edification to hundreds of thousands of people and a source of considerable revenue to many nations, but also an effective instrument for the fostering of understanding and good will among nations. It is one modern social institution that we can contemplate with a high degree of complacency on account of its lack of detrimental features.

MIGRATION

Much more important for the destiny of mankind are those forms of permanent or semi-permanent movement by which the nationals of one country transfer themselves to another country for extended or indefinite periods of time. The most recent of these is immigration, a population movement of definite and unique characteristics which became an important world factor subsequent to the notable discoveries of four and five centuries ago. Following the great primitive phenomenon of dispersion there developed other quite well-defined forms of movement, designated as invasion, conquest, and colonization. But it remained for the cultural changes of the past few centuries to create the conditions for a novel type of movement, modern immigration, possessing certain distinctive features which differentiate it from any previous form. It is a form of peaceful, permitted land aggression, and as such is one of the most remarkable phenomena of human history.*

Culture Areas

Many other international relations of a peaceful and beneficent character are exhibited in the fields of art, music, education, literature, and the esthetic interests in general. Sumner defined a culture area as that section of the world population within which a cultural idea, such as an invention, an art form, or a musical composition, would be quickly disseminated and incorporated into the general social complex. The areas differ according to the different types of ideas. The area of a basic industrial invention is probably larger than that of a particular novelty in dramatic form. But the whole civilized world is rapidly coming nearer and nearer to a single cultural area. A host of international organizations of one sort and another embody and promote these extensive interests. One who has not looked into the matter cannot help being amazed at the number and diversity of such instrumentalities, as described in Hodges' book on international relations and in similar works.[5]

Race Relations

Extra-societal relations are those that exist among groups that are not primarily associated with societies in any way. Prominent among these are racial and religious groups, and one or two nationality groups. Race affiliations cut across

* For a fuller discussion of immigration see Chapter XXV.

societal and national boundaries, and sometimes rise superior to them. The interests of the Negro race, the white race, or the Mongolian race are measurably unified the world over. To just what extent these racial bonds might operate to produce effective power alignments is a matter of some doubt. There is a school of thinkers, represented by Lothrop Stoddard and B. L. Putnam Weale,[6] which holds that the ties of race are so strong that we may anticipate an eventual union of all the colored races in a world struggle against the white race. The logic back of this notion is not convincing. It is not clear, for instance, why, on purely racial grounds, the Mongols should not unite with the white race rather than with the Negroes and Malays. Other considerations, such as the tendency to world domination of the whites, might encourage an alignment that would correspond to racial classification; but the motives would not be racial. Furthermore, the recent vigorous aggression of the Japanese upon the Chinese seems to indicate that for the present other interests are more influential in the Orient than the racial.

Religious Relations

Religious alignments present a more definite picture. The great religions of the world are to a greater or less extent super-societal, super-racial, and super-national. They have intrinsic interests of great intensity, and maintain constant relations with each other that savor more of rivalry and hostility than of friendly cooperation, though often conducted in the name of universal love and the brotherhood of all mankind. The waning power of organized and institutionalized religion may very possibly be a factor tending toward world peace and understanding.

Nationality Relations

The only highly important instance of extra-societal relationships on a nationality basis is furnished by the Jews. This has already been sufficiently discussed so that it need merely be referred to here.

INTEREST GROUPS

The intra-societal groups are mainly interest groups, though in an immigrant-receiving country like the United States there will also be subgroups unified on a racial or nationality basis. Interest groups may be roughly divided into the unorganized and the organized. An unorganized group consists of persons who have a community of interests, but have not bound themselves together in any sort of a formal and recognized unit for the pursuit of these interests. For example, millions of people in the United States are interested in tender beefsteaks, and individually they exert a tremendous influence in making tender beefsteaks available by refusing to patronize butchers who do not sell them, sending a tough steak back to the hotel kitchen, and willingly paying high prices for fine meat. They are, therefore, in a very real sense a group, but if there is a National Association of Tender Beefsteak Eaters it hides its light under a bushel. Again, there is scarcely any other entertainment which interests so large a proportion of the population, young and old, as a good sleight-of-hand performance. The effect of this group of people in keeping the art alive is obvious. But who ever heard of the American Amalgamated Audience for Prestidigitation? But there are Meat Producers' Associations and Societies of Magicians, with their respective headquarters, officers, magazines, etc. These latter are organized groups. The general tendency is for unorganized groups to become organic as soon as they become conscious of the community of their interests and the advantages to be derived from consolidating their social potential. It is a significant feature of the existing social and economic system, the meaning of which will become clearer later, that producers' groups are on the whole much more widely and completely organized than consumers' groups, although consumption interests are really primary over production interests.

These interest groups very frequently involve a clash between themselves and society. The very fact that they are interest groups indicates that they do not represent all the members of society, and though their specific interests may be divergent, parallel, or common with respect to those of society, they are very frequently conflicting. Illustrations have already been given in connection with the tariff. The greatest friction arises, however, from groups within society whose interests are conflicting with each other. Each characteristically seeks to create the impression that its own particular interests are harmonious with those of society, and also seeks to secure the endorsement of society for its interests, and to enlist societal agencies in its behalf.

Political Party

One conspicuous type in this category is the political party. The interests that bind the members of such a group together are usually vague and nebulous, and often not acknowledged. In fact, political parties, as already indicated, are semi-voluntary groups. Yet the sense of affiliation and loyalty is powerful, and the pursuit of interests very active. Obviously, such groups are immediately concerned with gaining control of the agencies of societal control, particularly the governmental. But one of the pernicious features of these groups is that, whereas they are supposed to be organized around differences in political theory, they become in practice nuclei for a variegated mass of other interests, which have nothing to do with the form or structure of government, but which can be promoted through the control of governmental agencies. If a certain party, for instance, has shown itself to be favorable toward the interests of big business, perhaps originally because of a genuine political theory, such as the tariff, that is congenial to the ideas of many big businesses, its control will naturally fall into the hands of men responsive to business appeals, and so it will become the big business party, and its organization, instruments, and loyalties will be used for the fostering of interests far removed from abstract political theory. This accounts, in some measure at least, for the always surprisingly large amounts of money which can be secured for the promotion of political campaigns in the United States. The sums of $4,000,000 spent by the Republican Party, $3,000,000 by the Democratic Party, and $100,000 by the Socialist Party in the presidential campaign of 1928 can hardly be taken as measuring the disinterested devotion of groups of citizens to doctrines of states' rights, federal power, direct or representative participation in state affairs, etc. Indeed, in that particular campaign it was difficult to discover any significant differences in political theory between the two leading parties for which the man of moderate means would have been interested in contributing ten cents. The interests that govern affiliation with, and support of, political parties are of two sorts, corresponding to the semi-voluntary nature of these groups. One set, harmonizing with the involuntary aspects, is traditional, habitual, and emotional. ''Ask Dad, he knows.'' Political leaders seek to influence it through the agencies of public sentiment. The other set rests upon the voluntary features of the group, and represents specific interests, many of them non-political, of the voter which he believes can be promoted through the party of his choice. Also, in frequent cases, donations for both leading parties will be received from the same individuals or interest groups on the principle that it is always expedient to have friends at court. Some of the most pernicious features of the national political parties develop in connection with their application to state and municipal governments, where the actual interests involved have no relation whatever to the broad political theories and objectives that are supposed to differentiate the parties.

Economic Groups

Less conspicuous, perhaps, as unitedly active groups, but certainly no less important in their ultimate influence, are the economic interest groups. These are composed of individuals whose economic interests are sufficiently common to unite them in the pursuit of certain objectives, though very often, perhaps usually, there are also subordinate conflicting interests among them. Thus all the shoe manufacturers in the United States might be interested in having a protective tariff on shoes. But once the tariff was established, they would enter into competition with each other as to who should sell the largest number of shoes behind the protecting wall. In accordance with the prevailing producer's philosophy, of which more will be said later, the most important of these groups are based upon productive alignments; they are occupational groups. They may be classified into almost unlimited categories on a descending order of importance. The foremost, which has already been suggested, is that which divides a whole population into receivers of property income, and receivers of service income. Taken in its strict sense, this corresponds to a division into the leisure class and the working class, for under our system of distribution, one who owns sufficient property need not work at all, while one who owns no property has no other recourse than to work if he is to make his own living. Of course, in real life there are countless individuals who, from necessity or choice, combine the two functions in their own person and receive both forms of income.

Then there is the grouping into owners of businesses, and the suppliers of the other four factors of production. This is a differentiation which is very little understood even by professional social analysts, and the significance of which is egregiously underestimated. Failure to perceive its significance is largely accountable for the existing social chaos.

Within the property-income group, many subdivisions exist, landlords and capitalists, stockholders and bondholders, owners of city real estate and owners of farm land, etc. Within the service-income group the main division is between salary receivers—managers, promoters, executives, etc.—and wage-earners, this group in turn being divided into skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled laborers. The further subdivision may be extended until it corresponds with the most minute classification of occupations.

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYE

The group segregation which is perhaps most characteristic of the modern economic order, and which has been the occasion of the greatest amount of friction and social disturbance, is that between employers and employes. This takes manifold forms, and expresses itself in a wide variety of immediate relationships. Its fundamental differentiation is between those who cannot reap their maximum returns from production except by securing the labor of others, and those who cannot make a living at all except by associating themselves with the productive units controlled by the other class. The nature of this relationship has already been explained at some length. In the present connection, it is important to note that the power of individuals in the two classes respectively is very different. The employing class as a whole enjoys a vastly greater power in the control and direction of industry than does the laboring class. And since the employing class is much smaller in numbers the per capita distribution of power, so to speak, is still more disproportionate. Furthermore, the employing group is, by the very fact of its functioning through coordinated units, highly organized and its power centralized. The employment manager of a huge plant represents in his own person economic power incomparable with that of the single worker who stands before him. It is a matter of infinitesimal concern to the corporation whether Jim Blake is employed or not. If he does not get the job there are a thousand others ready to take it. Indeed, in the routine operations it is not vital to the business whether the single job be filled at all. But to Jim, hungry, worried, with a wife and children half-fed and poorly clothed, and threatened with eviction from their humble home, this particular job is of incalculable importance. In accordance with the underlying principle of our social system, the agreement between these two persons must be in the nature of a "free" contract. But with the power and the stake so unevenly distributed, the terms of the contract are not likely to have the least correspondence with the average man's conception of abstract justice, or of the just claims of the individual on society, or even of social welfare. These are all intuitive and unprovable concepts, and according to the classical economic interpretation of laissez-faire they have no place in a "scientific" social system. But out of bitter experience, and in direct conflict with theoretic economic dogmas, society learned that this free contract was not in harmony with the great societal interest of welfare, or even of continuity. Under such conditions the worker was free only in the sense that he was at liberty to starve if he did not like the terms offered him. It became evident that some form of group control of the employer-worker relationship was socially necessary.

ECONOMIC LEGISLATION

Two forms of control proceeded to develop. One was an authoritative control by society through the agency of the state, exerted primarily in the name of humanity, decency, justice, and sympathy with the weaker members of society. It took the form of economic legislation governing conditions of labor, age of employment, safety in occupations, compensation for disease or accident incurred in the course of occupation, and, in its extreme development, of legal minimum wages and maximum hours. There were special laws governing the work of women and children, passed under the guise of protecting health and morals, which could not be paralleled in the case of males without contravening certain established principles, constitutional or other, of western democratic societies. Legislation of this type has had a tremendous influence in preventing intolerable labor conditions and minimizing the sufferings of those in the employe group. It has not eliminated the inherent inequality of power between it and the employing group.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

The second method of control arose out of the recognition that the weakness of the laborers was partly due to their lack of organization, and absence of concentration of their power. It aimed to correct this defect directly by providing interest groups which should unite all workers of specific types, and eventually, according to the complete vision, combine the aggregate interests of all laborers into a compact body which could deal on equal terms with the employing group. These groups were the labor unions. They found their prototype in the old craft guilds, and it was natural that the basis of unity upon which they were first constructed was similarity of occupation, that is, the identity or uniformity of function performed by the individuals in the great productive process. Thus there developed glass-blowers' unions, stationary firemens' unions, locomotive engineers' unions, teamsters' unions, and innumerable minor subdivisions such as the Doll and Toy Makers' Union, International Pocketbook Workers' Union, and Sheep Shearers' Union of North America.

As the social processes inherent in modern machine production developed it became apparent that greater strength could be achieved by organizing labor on the basis of industries rather than occupations, or even on the basis of plants. There sprang up, accordingly, such unions as the United Mine Workers of America and the United Textile Workers of America.

Unions of these various types, especially when combined into great national or international federations, showed themselves capable of developing great power. Accordingly, they aroused the opposition of the employing class, which fought them by various methods. One of the most effective means was by the organization of great trade associations of employers which were designed to concentrate the power of an entire industry, while still preserving the relationship of competition within the industry. The struggles that resulted from this ever increasing scale of organization on both sides took on titanic proportions. The great weapons of the labor group are the strike and the boycott. Those of the employing group are discharge, the lockout, and the shut-down. This group has also, partly through its special influence over government (as was explained in our discussion of political parties), been able to make effective use of the technically legal instrument of the injunction. According to the precepts of the laissez-faire doctrine, society had no occasion to concern itself with these struggles. Leave the individual interests to work themselves out through a process of conflict within the established framework of sanctions and in the end all will come out well for society and for its members in general. Sumner expounded this doctrine in a notable essay, published in 1889 and entitled "Do We Want Industrial Peace?" He answered this question in the negative. He said, "Industrial war is, in fact, an incident of liberty. It is an inconvenience; it is doubtful if it is an evil."[7]

End of Laissez-Faire

Today, after a century and a third of trial, society is rather rapidly (as social movements go) coming to the conviction that whatever value the laissez-faire doctrine in its economic application may have had is a thing of the past. As a formula for social guidance through a transition period it may have had utility. But as a rule of fundamental and permanent organization after the transition period is over it has demonstrated pernicious and destructive potentialities of intolerable virulence.

The fundamental fallacy and falsity of laissez-faire is that it sponsors conflict as the best basis for the organization of the productive activities of society.

Conflicting Interests

Throughout all these various economic interest groups may be clearly discerned the operation of the principle of conflicting interests, within more or less comprehensive environs of common interests. All genuine economic interest groups have the common interest that production should go on, that there should be a social product, and that it should be as large as possible. But as to how that product should be created, and how it should be distributed, there are innumerable areas of conflicting interests of varying extent. Laborers desire the maximum utilization of human brain and brawn; capitalists prefer the maximum utilization of machinery. Farmers desire a relative shortage of food crops and a surplus of industrial products; factory workers desire just the opposite. Bankers want a large demand for credit relative to the available funds; manufacturers want extensive and easy credit. And so on indefinitely. According to the contract principle of social organization all these matters are to be settled on the basis of a bargain.

THE BARGAIN

A very illuminating theory of economics, far more logical and realistic than any of the conventional ones, could be constructed about the principle of bargaining. In a contract economy, all economic relationships necessarily take on the character of a bargain. There are certain fundamental features of the bargaining process that underlie them all.

A bargain is an arrangement entered into between two parties, within the established framework of sanctions of the society to which they belong, whereby each one agrees to supply the other with the means of satisfying some of his interests, in return for a similar service from the other. In modern societies very few such agreements are entirely free. Practically all are considered to be affected with the social interest to some extent or other. For instance, no modern society would tolerate a contract that involved the payment of the life of one of the parties, or the establishment of the relation of chattel slavery of one to the other. Every society assumes some tenets of abstract justice in the bargains that it sanctions, and undertakes to enforce. But to the extent that the bargain is free, each party is supposed to look after his own interests. Before agreeing to the bargain, therefore, he is supposed to assure himself that he will get more than he is giving. This factor of *more* is very important. In many analyses of economic relations, it is alleged that in a just bargain, or an intelligent bargain, the goods exchanged are of equivalent value. But this equivalence can be of only two sorts, neither of practical value in scientific analysis. First, it may be an equivalence according to some intuitive, abstract concept of "true" value, which is neither measurable nor provable, and hence has no place in a scientific analysis. Second, it may be an equivalence of "value in exchange," which simply means that in this particular transaction one good did exchange for the other good; it does not follow that in any similar transaction, even between the same two parties the next moment, precisely the same bargain would be made. This is therefore a meaningless begging of the question.

Gain from Bargain

The very essence of the bargain in general is that each party *believes* he is getting more than he gives. If he did not, he would not take the trouble to make the bargain. A certain famous literary man is said to have asserted that it did not make the slightest difference to him whether he lived or died. "If that is the case," said one of his hearers, "why do you not kill yourself?" "Because," was the reply, "it does not make the slightest difference." It is this excess of value on both sides that makes bargaining a true productive process, resulting in a net social gain. How great is the gain depends, first of all of course, upon the accuracy of each party's belief, but ultimately upon his own scale of values. This is incapable of measurement by any means yet devised. If a hunter and a fisherman meet at the end of a day's sport, and trade a quail for a two-pound bass, all that can be said with accuracy is that the hunter had a greater interest in that bass than in that quail, and that the situation was the reverse with the fisherman. There is no way of knowing whether, if pressed, the hunter would have given two quail for the bass, or the fisherman two bass for the quail, or whether, if each had secured only one trophy, they would have wanted to trade at all. These facts introduce an element of inexactitude into really scientific economic theory which must ever prevent it (unless and until some method of measuring ultimate values has been discovered) from attaining that character of mathematical precision which many conventional economists have sought to give it, and the effort to attain which has made economics such a disastrously unrealistic and arbitrary guide to social behavior.

Values in Bargains

Since all value is subjective with the individual, and since in all bargains there is a surplus of value on both sides, it follows that the assignment of a specific value to any object or service is impossible. All that can be done is to specify exchange ratios, or prices. In the foregoing example, one quail exchanged for one bass, and the price of a bass was a quail, and vice versa.

If virtually equivalent bargains are made repetitiously, then it is possible to say that the customary ratio of exchange is so-and-so, or that the average price is so much of one for so much of the other. There is no way of determining that it is a ''fair'' or ''just'' price, or of guaranteeing that it will be universal or permanent.

The actual consummation of any bargain is dependent upon four distinct values. Each of the two parties values the thing he is to give and the thing he is to get. Between these two values there may be an indefinite range. The hunter may have had so many quail that a single one was of practically no value to him, while he very much needed the bass for the fish course of a swanky dinner he was giving that night, and the fisherman may have been similarly situated with reference to the game course of his dinner. In other words, in every bargain there is an upper and a lower limit for each party, within which the terms of the final agreement must fall. A is willing to give so much, and will take so little. B is willing to take so little and will give so much. If the maximum that either will give does not equal or exceed the minimum that the other will take no bargain will take place. The essence of clever bargaining, as every visitor to countries where the ''fixed price'' does not prevail knows, consists in creating the impression that you place a very high value on the thing you have to give, and a very low value on the thing you are interested in getting.

Antagonistic Cooperation

The relation between the two parties of a bargain, therefore, is essentially one of conflict, or of antagonistic cooperation. Both want the agreement to be consummated, but both want to give as little and get as much as possible. Just on what point the decision will finally fall depends upon a complex of factors which are never the same in any two unstandardized bargains, involving information, need, experience, honesty, ruthlessness, sympathy, control of expression, and other elements of power. All of the typical economic relationships may be helpfully interpreted as bargains and their results. The great primary bargainer in modern economic life is the owner of a business.

He bargains for his capital on the best terms possible, and the result is expressed in interest. He bargains for his land as shrewdly as he can, and pays rent accordingly. He bargains for his executives and his laborers, and comes to agreements dependent on the scarcity of each and his equipment of bargaining skill and power relative to theirs. He bargains with his customers for the prices of the product and the conditions of sale. His profits represent the aggregate net results of his success in these various bargains.

Now the process of bargaining is more or less congenial to the great majority of mankind, and the sense of freedom in bargaining is very precious to most individuals, at least in western countries. An economic system, therefore, based on the conflict relationship of bargaining, has commended itself highly to the modern mind. Only in the face of overwhelming evidence of the disastrous consequences of the overdevelopment of this principle, and of the price that must be paid for it in the sacrifice of other values, will western societies bring themselves to the point of relinquishing this treasured heritage. The accumulation of such evidence has now reached a convincing stage, and the process of relinquishment is going on. John Strachey, in a brilliant interpretation, has pointed out that the great politico-economic struggle of the last few centuries was for the establishment of the free market,[3] but we are now coming to realize that it is blocking other higher values.

COOPERATION

There are two methods whereby the sway of free bargaining may be reduced. One is to restrict the limits within which bargains are sanctioned, that is, to cut down the freedom. This is essentially the method of censorship, which will be considered later. The other is to remove certain interests entirely out of the field of bargaining, and put them on a cooperative rather than a conflict basis. The former is the method of social legislation, as already explained. It reached its maximum development in the United States in the recovery measures of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. Interpreted from the outside, this program appeared to be a sincere effort to preserve the essential framework of the capitalistic system by placing upon it such drastic restraints as would check its excesses and eliminate its grosser evils, while preserving the motivating principle of competition. The latter method is exemplified in the general program of Socialism and Communism, which propose to lift the basic productive interests entirely out of the realm of competitive struggle and bargaining, and place them upon a communal basis, whereby production would be for service or social welfare, rather than for private profit. In short, these programs are based upon the conviction that the values of individual freedom of bargaining are not sufficient to offset the unavoidable evils that are inherent in the system that grows out of it, however drastically regulated.

DEBT

Another economic grouping of very great importance is that based on the debt relationship. The enormous development of the debt structure in the United States has attracted a large amount of attention lately, on account of the prominence given to it by the Technocrats and for other reasons. The division into debtors and creditors is not a mutually exclusive one, as a single individual may fall into both classes. But as interest groups, the cleavage is positive and influential. Here again there is an element of common interest; both the lender and the borrower wish the loan to be made, or the relationship would not be established. But as to the terms of the loan the opposition is diametric. The lender favors high interest rates, the borrower low ones; the lender desires superabundant collateral or security, the borrower seeks to put up as little as possible. This alignment affects directly the attitude of individuals toward certain aspects of financial and monetary policy. Debtors are naturally in favor of cheap money; creditors in favor of dear money. The value of money is in its purchasing power, and if a man who has borrowed $1000 when money is dear, that is, when a dollar will buy a large amount of goods, can pay it back at a time when money is cheap, that is, when the goods or services that he offers in earning his income will bring in a much larger number of dollars than before, he is a distinct gainer. Consequently, all proposals to cheapen money, such as a policy of inflation, automatically divide a large part of the population into two groups, the debtors who favor inflation, and the creditors who oppose it. Some of the relations will be on personal grounds. But many of them will be based upon the relation which the individual maintains to the typical productive units, the corporations. Bondholders fall into the class of creditors. They are interested in having their annual fixed interest payments, and the eventual payment of the principal, come in the form of dollars worth at least as much as when they bought the bonds—if worth more, so much the better. They therefore deplore inflation. Stockholders, on the other hand, who constitute the real borrowers, are interested in having high prices and cheap money, so that they can pay their obligations with as small a part of the product as possible. Of course both groups camouflage their interests by high-sounding phrases, such as "sound money," "financial integrity," and "national honor" on the one hand, and "good business," "a square deal for the under dog," and "the equalization of benefits" on the other hand.

INTERNATIONAL DEBT

The debt relation between nations is one of extreme potentiality. Never, probably, were its real nature, and its capacities for good and ill in international relations, so clearly revealed as in connection with the stupendous debt burdens that arose out of the World War. One of the seemingly irrefutable principles that world experience with this problem has established is that such debts can never be paid, and that if they could be paid it would harm the creditor more than the debtor.[9] This furnishes an excellent illustration of the truth that societal interests cannot be interpreted as simply individual interests multiplied by a large figure. The principles of societal behavior and welfare are in many respects of a different order from those that apply to individuals. This has been quite clearly demonstrated in the historical refutation of the doctrines of the old economic school known as the Mercantilists.[10] They believed that a nation, just like an individual, can become rich by piling up stores of the money metals. But sounder economic analysis, fortified by the disastrous experience of Spain after the Discoveries Period, proved that the accumulation of such wealth is the surest road to disaster on the part of a nation. The recovery measures of the F. D. Roosevelt administration were largely aimed at straightening out the debt situation in the United States, and were immeasurably hampered by the complexities of that situation.

Diverse Groups

Space does not permit even a cursory treatment of the various other types of interest groups, important as many of them are. They have to do with recreation, education, social enjoyment (in the narrower sense), travel, etc. Many of them are based on the divergent, parallel, or common forms of interest, so that they do not tend to disrupt societal unity, and may even promote it. This is fortunate, for society has an extremely arduous task in dealing adequately with the conflicting interest groups that exist within it.

But even interests that are primarily parallel or divergent may develop conflicting aspects when it comes to the problem of securing support, financial or other, from limited sources. Two neighboring country clubs may seek as president the same prominent individual, who has time for only one. The same thing may be true of a country club and a social settlement located in the midst of the city slums. One day's mail may bring to a benevolent foundation requests for money to build a new library for a fresh-water college in Kansas or to endow a hospital in China. The federal tax funds of the United States may be used to pay a soldiers' bonus, or to dredge a ship channel in San Francisco Bay.

Complexity of Group Affiliation

The pattern of interests in which an active member of modern society may become involved takes on unlimited complexity. The list of groups cited in the opening paragraph of this volume is not an extreme example. In view of the conflicting nature of many of them it is a cause of amazement that contemporary society is able to function at all. Some basis of effective harmonization of all conflicting interests must be found, and even those interests that are not conflicting require more or less social action to keep them in order. This emphasizes, what has already been said, that *the* problem of society is largely the problem of social control. All the intricate sanctions, conventions, taboos, and mores of society are not too much to enable it to prevent the centrifugal forces of its internal constituents from tearing it to fragments. The strain put upon this regulatory system by the accelerating tempo of modern social change has caused society to turn more and more to the law for the exertion of necessary control. The perils of this procedure will be discussed later. We have already seen that the law is really a minor factor in the aggregate control of a modern society. The main reliance is, and must be, on more intangible, subtle, and powerful factors. These operate in a very intricate way. The orderly adjustment of interests and activities in a modern society finds a close analogy in the balance of living organisms in nature. A relatively slight change ramifies out through the whole structure, producing disturbances far out of proportion to the initial impulse. Too much stress cannot be laid on the importance, in preserving order and normality, of various relationships which are essentially spiritual in character—loyalties, standards, emotional reactions, sympathies, and ultimate values—which are the product of the entire previous sequence of cultural evolution. They can be shattered rather easily and quickly by some untoward circumstance, but they cannot be restored or replaced by immediate social action, however intelligently devised. Nothing can take their place. When any important factor of this sort is destroyed society of necessity sinks down to a lower level in some respect, from which it can rise only as a result of a laborious rebuilding of this, or some complementary, feature.

Menace of Internationalism

This is the immediate menace of internationalism. The immensely increased range and variety of contacts among the nations which was the unavoidable consequence of the rise of the modern industrial and commercial era have created the need of understanding and cooperation among world peoples to an unprecedented degree. But there has been no coordinate growth of community of standards and unity of feelings and sympathies on an international scale. On the contrary, the greater familiarity with the ways and ideas, the needs and purposes, of other peoples has operated to intensify the average man's conviction of the rightness and inviolability of his own. Hence the period of intense post-War nationalism in which we are still living.

NEED OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

There is an urgent need for the establishment of a world-wide system of control of groups of every kind, comparable in its effectiveness and operation, if not in its form, to a societal system. How this is to be accomplished no one yet knows. But if it is not accomplished, and that right speedily, the future of civilization is dark indeed.

CHAPTER XXIII

PROBLEMS OF NORMALITY

Normality assumes an articulated structure, in the case of society a functioning structure, each part of which has meaning and validity only with respect to other parts and to the whole. The essence of normality is the capacity to contribute, to the maximum degree possible, to the excellence of the whole. Normality is, therefore, an attribute of a part, not of the whole. There is no such things as a normal society, except in the sense that it is a part of a world society. It is not, however, erroneous to say that a society is in a normal condition, meaning that all its constituent parts are normal. The principle is worthy of restatement, and new emphasis, that the normal is not synonymous with the ideal. In an absolutely perfect society every element of its structure would be ideal. But there never has been a perfect society, and yet society must function and does function. Normality is therefore to be tested by the tendency to secure the best possible functioning from society *as it is*. The examples of coal mining and child labor have already been cited. A further instance that will strike a responsive chord in the hearts of all New Yorkers is furnished by the subway system of that city. There is nothing ideal about a trip on the subways in a rush hour. On the contrary, it would be difficult to find a more conspicuous negation of the principles of comfort, courtesy, and decency on which civilized society prides itself that is afforded by this extraordinary creation. But its operation is one of the indispensable features of metropolitan life. If a successful strike should suddenly tie up the subway system some morning, the city would be very nearly paralyzed. Consequently, the subways are normal in the actual functioning of contemporary New York. To get rid of them, or even of the worst features of them, must involve fundamental changes in the organization of the city.

Source of Abnormality

We have already seen that the source of abnormality is found largely in social change, and particularly in change at differential rates among the constituent elements in society. If society were static, approximately complete adjustment of all its parts would eventually be attained, and normality would be achieved. Any further change would then be for the worse. Whether a static society with complete normality would be more conducive to human happiness than a constantly changing society distorted by perpetual abnormalities is an intriguing field for philosophic speculation. But it is an academic question, for no society has ever been static, and there is certainly not the least indication that modern societies are becoming so. Since it has hitherto proved impossible for any society to devise a system of control whereby all rates of change will be equalized abnormality has been a chronic feature of the societal situation.

Classification of Abnormality

Abnormality can be classified in an indefinite number of ways, corresponding to the different types of likeness and difference that can be discerned in the various parts of the social structure. One basis of classification could be found in the great institutions—abnormalities in the state, in the family, in the school, in the church, etc. Another basis is suggested by the values that are affected by the abnormality—abnormalities that injure health, those that affect longevity, those that increase nervousness, those that hinder recreation, those that prevent desirable matings of young people, etc. A classification that corresponds closely to conventional procedure, and also harmonizes with the general analysis followed in this volume, is based upon the features of the individual that prevent him from participating with the highest effectiveness in the general functioning of society. They are defects or shortcomings in the behavior of the final human particle, viewed solely as a factor in the operation of a given societal whole. It is clear that some currently abnormal traits of the individual might be desirable or ideal in a differently constituted society. For example, during the World War there were many people who signed pledges never thereafter to purchase any goods made in Germany. The qualities that inspired them might have been of the highest order, but to the extent that they carried out their vows during the period of would-be Reconstruction after the Armistice they were definitely impeding the process of international adjustment. On this basis, a working classification of abnormality may be made as follows:

These defects in individual performance are of two sorts. Those of the first type arise out of inherent traits of the individual himself; those of the second type are traceable to his relationship to society. In accordance with the working assumption of will which we have adopted, abnormalities of the first kind may be further divided into two groups, depending upon the volitional character of the unsatisfactory behavior, first those for which the individual is held personally responsible, which may be called "misconduct," and second, those for which the individual is not held responsible, which may be called "incompetence." Misconduct in turn may be subdivided into a number of grades according to the degree of the wrongfulness that society imputes to the act. At the top of the list stand breaches of some of the canons of society where the element of right and wrong is almost negligible. Society sets certain standards that it expects its members to live up to, but which it does not regard as serious enough to associate with any very severe condemnation for violation. These are matters of custom, convention, and fashion. Innovation, unconventionality, and unfashionableness are frowned upon by society, but they are not very sternly repressed nor severely punished. Next in order come such standards as propriety, decorum, and decency. These are regarded as more weighty, and violations receive heavier penalties, but even to these society does not devote a great amount of attention. Still lower come decidedly questionable modes of behavior such as trickery, sharp practice, and overreaching. Finally, at the bottom of the list come actual sin, immorality, vice, and crime. Sin is a general term, not easily defined except in ethical or religious terms. Immorality, vice, and crime are quite definite forms of misconduct, and require some detailed consideration.[1] The nature of the moral code has been sufficiently discussed so that the meaning of immorality should be clear. Immorality illustrates excellently the principle that abnormality is strictly relative to a given social structure; the immoral person may in the end prove to be a very useful member of society.

It is important to realize that morality for the individual is not synonymous, nor necessarily coincident, with normality for society. Societies make grievous blunders in working out solutions of their life problems, and require things in their moral codes that by no means conduce to the smooth functioning of the social mechanism. So while a given society's moral code is always right in the sense of being blameless, it is not always right in the sense of being wise. It is quite possible, if a sufficiently detached point of view can be achieved, to compare and evaluate moral codes (including that of one's own society) on the basis of their adaptability to the end for which they really exist, the promotion of individual welfare. And it is one of the immediate duties of social science to do exactly this. The polygamous, head-hunting, wife-stealing savage on some southern isle, if he is living up to his code, is just as moral as the most impeccable gentleman of New York or London—but he may not be as intelligent, or as well-advised. It is conceivable that the time may come in any Western country when trial marriage will seem right to the young people of the day. It will accordingly be right, but it will not necessarily be socially salutary. Morality is essentially a matter of belief. Social expediency is a matter of science. So while a society as a whole can never be immoral, it may have many abnormal features.[2]

SOCIAL REFORM

Society's efforts to correct abnormalities may be subsumed under the general term "social reform." The word itself is accurate. Every society has a structural form which, though itself mobile, sets the terms of normality at any given time. Failures in *con*formity on the part of individuals or groups cause *de*formities in this structure, which can be eliminated only by a process of *re*form. Social reform, therefore, always implies a pattern or norm, toward the realization of which active efforts are directed. The more immediate and personal aspects of these reform activities are commonly known as "social work." Unfortunately, the necessity of recognizing and defining a norm as a prerequisite to effective reform activity, especially on the part of social workers, has been largely ignored in the past. The very concept of normality has received little attention from either social workers or the more academic leaders of this type of activity. The usual procedure has been to recognize something as bad by rule-of-thumb tests, and to try to make it better without any clearly defined picture of what the desirable or normal situation would be. It has been taken for granted that if one is hungry he should be fed, if he is naked he should be clothed, and if he is in prison he should be visited.

Overemphasis on Abnormality

Undeniably, much alleviation of human suffering has resulted from these methods. But they are obviously wholly unscientific. Most of the textbooks on social problems have presented great masses of harrowing and gruesome details about pathological conditions in society, and have suggested ingenious methods of improving them, without offering any pattern of the normal structure to serve as a guide in reshaping the behavior and relationships of the individuals concerned. Social workers trained in accordance with this approach have just about as much fitness for dealing with the ills of society as would a medical man whose training had been confined exclusively to diseased bodies, and who knew nothing about the aspects of the human organism in a state of normality or health.

Conflict of Individual and Social Remedies

The social detriment of this sort of well-meant activity is intensified by the fact that there are certain types of social evil where the obvious individual remedy, that which presents itself to the average case worker, is no social remedy at all, and may actually work social injury. This is because, as already suggested, social interests are not merely the aggregate of individual interests. As already pointed out, the action of European immigrants in coming to the United States was in the majority of cases a sensible and rational move from the individual point of view. In the case of countless individuals it produced the results hoped for. Social workers in the United States, seeing the great advantages that accrued to Tony Sciaparelli or Aristotle Papanicolaides from taking such a venture were characteristically inclined to favor the open door, to seek to facilitate the admission of "honest and industrious" foreigners, and to oppose the numerical restriction of immigration. So true was this in the pre-War days of heavy immigration that one champion of restriction remarked, perfectly seriously, "Of course social workers are opposed to restriction—they don't want to see any reduction in the raw material out of which they get their living." This was, undoubtedly, a gross misinterpretation of the motives that actually underlay the attitude of this group. What really accounted for it was that they saw the immediate and personal advantages of immigration, and had not been trained to discern the more elusive but more penetrating, far-reaching, and permanent societal disadvantages. These had long been clear to the more objective students of the problem, who had realized that the competition of standards which was set up in the United States as a result of immigration was positively and surely lowering the standard in this country, or at least preventing it from rising as high as it otherwise might, and that, in addition, subtle but pervasive damages were being done to the American nationality, through the mixing of standards, the confusion of ultimate values, and the undermining of the spiritual unity and understanding which are essential to social stability and the preservation of normality. In time this process would have destroyed the very advantages which attracted immigrants here, and removed the differential between the United States and foreign countries, not by elevating the latter but by de-pressing the former. At the same time, in accordance with the basic laws of migration, the departure of hundreds of thousands of dissatisfied persons from European lands was not improving living conditions there, but leaving them as bad as ever, or even worse.* The obvious, logical, reasonable remedy for the individual proved itself a societal poison.

ESTABLISHMENT OF NORM

The establishment of a norm presents varying degrees of difficulty in the different social problems. Nowhere, perhaps, is it easier than in the case of crime, where, by its very definition, there is an explicit and easily accessible norm—the authentic law of the state.

CRIME

Crime is therefore the most definite and objective of all the forms of misconduct. As such, it has received an enormous amount of attention from philosophers, publicists, and political scientists. Whole libraries have been written upon crime and its treatment. Many efforts have been made to define crime, and they cover a wide range of concepts. In many of these definitions, there is evident an attempt to differentiate between crime and that which is not crime on the basis of the inherent badness or wrongfulness of the act. Garofalo's treatment in connection with his concept of the "natural crime" is an excellent illustration of this approach. It must be confessed that none of these efforts has proved very convincing, nor does there seem to be any inherent logic in them. In the first place, they involve the setting up of some arbitrary criteria of badness, and the drawing of an artificial line, below which shall be the area of crime and above which shall be the region of noncriminal misconduct. But there is no method for measuring the inherent badness of an act, and if there were, no two persons could agree as to just where in the scale of badness the crime line should be drawn. "It is a sin to steal a pin; it is a greater to steal a 'tater' " does not necessarily conform to everybody's intuitive sense of sinfulness, nor would all persons agree as to whether both or neither should be listed as crimes, or whether the line should be drawn between them. Our customary usage of the word crime to indicate a particularly deplorable phenomenon—"It's a perfect crime . . ."—should not confuse us as to the significance of crime in sociological analysis. In the second place, the attempt to define crime in terms of wrongfulness necessitates an arbitrary cleavage in the established procedure of society. In real life, deeds running all the way from murder and rape to spitting on the sidewalk or making a right-hand turn at a street corner are included in the same type of prohibition, dealt with by the same agencies of the state, and accorded the same types of penalties. To say that some of these deeds are crimes and some are not would necessitate a break with legislative terminology, and an artificial distinction between the criminal and non-criminal functions of courts, police forces, and penal agencies.

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* See pp. 536-537.

There seems to be no other definition of crime that corresponds with both the psychological and societal realities than the very simple one: **Crime is a violation of the established law of the state.**

The Criminal

Similar difficulties have been met with in the attempt to set up a definition of the criminal. Here, again, there is a current impression that the criminal must of necessity be a particularly "bad" person, and the definition of criminal must in some way indicate this. But precisely the same obstacles preclude any satisfactory definition on this basis. How is the badness of an individual to be measured—certainly the overt act is no criterion. The theft of five dollars by an unemployed man to feed his starving wife and children cannot be put on the same level as a similar theft by a man who intends to buy a revolver for the purpose of committing a murder. Intuitively we recognize that elements of motive, need, temptation, and coercion enter into the inherent badness of a deed. Neither would it be possible, even if an accurate measure of badness existed, to secure agreement as to just what degree of badness should mark the lower limit of non-criminal behavior. The only workable definition of criminal is one that corresponds with the definition of crime:

A criminal is a person who has committed a crime, that is, who has violated a law of the state.

Criminality General

On the basis of this definition it becomes clear that very few adults in such a society as the United States fall outside the category of criminals. This seems like a startling fact, at first meeting, but it is an important one, and the recognition of it produces a very salutary effect upon the average citizen's attitude toward the criminal. Elaborate efforts have been made, particularly by Lombroso and the other members of the Positive School of criminology,[3] to prove that criminals are a different kind of creature from law-abiding men, even that they are a separate biological variation of the human species. But modern research, of a more scientific nature, has thoroughly discredited this doctrine.[4] It is now very generally recognized that the criminal, as such, is a man like the rest of us, whose misconduct, through chance or some untoward twist of circumstance, has been of a sort forbidden by the established law of the land. It may be of no greater intrinsic badness than the habitual behavior of the majority of his fellows. Indeed, many a criminal has been activated by genuinely humanitarian motives, or at worst by ignorance, whereas, on the other hand, many a prosperous and respected citizen has kept out of the ranks of criminals, and built up a handsome fortune while doing so, simply because he was lucky enough or shrewd enough to enjoy the services of a lawyer who could tell him how to do anti-social acts without breaking the law.

Need of Classification

In brief, the concept of criminal is of very little service in sociological analysis aside from its immediate significance in indicating the type of societal agency that is to deal with the case. There are just as many kinds and grades of criminals as there are of honest men. Society's handling of the criminal, if it is to be scientific and effective, cannot be on the basis of any rigid and mechanical set of rules or formulae, but must be based on a classification of the group, and an intensive study of its various types, almost as elaborate as any classification of the whole of humanity.

HISTORY OF CRIME

The customary illusions about the criminal are largely accounted for by the history of the law and crime. As we have seen, the criminal law started with the definite prohibition of certain types of behavior which were particularly detrimental to society either because of their inherent flagrancy or because of the frequency of their occurrence. These acts were naturally of a sort involving inherent badness, as conceived by the group, or, in more rotund language, "moral turpitude." As the necessity of control by coercion grew, and the state increased its scope and power, more and more acts, of less and less gravity, were brought within the reach of the law, and made crimes. During this process, the state, with its official agencies, proved itself a very convenient instrument for society to employ in achieving its ever-increasing and ramifying task of social control. Not only were many very minute breaches of the standards of right and wrong placed in the dread category of crime, but also many acts which had no inherent taint of badness whatever, but were merely matters of security or efficiency, were included in the catalog of legal prohibitions, and thereby made technical crimes. This process has gone on until today there are two distinct types of crime, one involving an element of inherent wrong or *mala per se* as the lawyers say, and the other devoid of such an element, or *mala prohibita*. Once an act has been made a crime, it acquires an element of badness from the mere fact of being prohibited by law. But in one type of behavior the act becomes a crime because it is bad, in the other it becomes bad because it is a crime.

UNIFORMITY OF PROCEDURE

The unfortunate feature of this situation is that both these types of misconduct are dealt with by the same agencies of society—courts, judges, juries, policemen, witnesses, jailers, etc. In other words, a system of control that was built up to meet the characteristics of anti-social, depraved, rebellious, ill-intentioned individuals is now used to secure conformity from self-respecting, well-disposed, and socially minded individuals, who in many cases have meant no harm whatsoever. The results are disastrous. A single experience with the agencies of law enforcement on the part of an individual of the latter type is likely to destroy in him the very traits that are most valuable to society in securing voluntary conformity, and to create in their place an attitude of resentment, rebellion, and contempt for the law which will make him much more difficult to deal with in the future. The great Prohibition experiment afforded a devastating example of this process. Finding themselves subject to legal restriction in matters which to them had no taint of sinfulness, innumerable self-respecting and reputable members of society turned deliberately to a course of law violation, partly from a sense of grievance at infringed rights, and partly as a demonstration of their own independence and freedom of judgment.[5] The traffic regulations so necessary in this era of high mobility furnish another case in point. It is true that in the larger communities there have developed special tribunals to deal with offenses in this field, just as there are in certain other restricted fields, but the procedure is likely to be on a level specially adapted to the ignorant, depraved, and degenerate.

Classical School

The conventional treatment of crime in Western societies owes its origin largely to a set of ideas which we have already encountered more than once, the egalitarian doctrines of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These were applied specifically to the problem of crime by a group of criminologists who have since come to be known as the Classical School. Their two basic assumptions were free will and the equality of all men. The individual was held directly responsible for his conduct, and liable to punishment in accordance with the heinousness of his deed. And since all men were equal, it was logical that the same punishment should be meted out to all who were guilty of the same deed. The task of the jurists, therefore, was to make a comprehensive catalog of all crimes recognized by the law, grade them according to the degree of badness involved, and assign graduated punishments accordingly. These punishments could be fixed in advance, as the only thing that had to be considered was the gravity of the act. The crime was the act itself, a juridical abstraction, quite detached from any personality. There thus arose the system of fixed penalties, written into the law itself that created the crime, which is characteristic of our legal procedure down to the present date. It is important to note that, at the time it originated, this was a distinct advance over the prevailing system, characterized as it was by favoritism, privilege, arbitrary discrimination, and irresponsible high-handedness on the part of legal officials. As in other respects, egalitarianism proved itself true and useful in a time of special need.

THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

Since the law is a method of coercive control it must have teeth. There must be authority assigned to officials to use force, and there must be agencies of punishment, as well as a system of penalties. The assignment of punishments has been a very haphazard and irrational procedure on the part of societies in general. There has been a prevailing notion that the wicked must be made to suffer, but there has been no logical determination of why he must be made to suffer, or how much he must suffer, or what good purpose the suffering is supposed to serve. Retrospectively, it is possible to discern certain fairly well-defined theories of punishment which have really actuated societies, whether or not they were consciously arrived at. The leading ones of these have been designated as the theories of Expiation, Retribution, Deterrence, Reformation, and Social Utility. It is probable that in recent generations deterrence has had the greatest practical influence. This theory holds that the purpose of punishment is to keep people from committing crimes. There are two classes of persons to be considered, the person who has been taken in crime, and other persons who may in the future be tempted to commit crimes. Naturally, the punishment must be applied to the former, but it has the latter at least as much in view. The actual criminal may (according to this theory) be deterred from future crime either by putting him to death or confining him under effectual restraint, or by treating him so roughly that he will never want to take another chance. The potential criminal is to be deterred by making the penalty so dreadful that he will not run the risk of a criminal act. It is this deterrence through fear that has been the main support of this theory. Its strength has been derived from the apparent logicality of it. Assuming free will on the part of everybody, and the fear of consequences as a universal motive, it seems obvious enough that if the penalties for crime are made severe enough practically nobody will choose to commit a crime. The inevitable tendency is to increase the severity of the penalties, for if crimes continue to occur it seems to be evidence that the influence of fear is not powerful enough. Therefore make the punishment heavier. In fact, the influence of this theory in England led to a situation where almost every conceivable crime, even to the theft of only a few pennies, was punishable by death. Seventy-two thousand persons are said to have been hanged in the reign of Henry VIII, who, in a remarkable letter to one of his Dukes, made it clear that he was guided by the deterrence theory.[6] Yet crime went on. In 1837 the death penalty was removed from about 200 crimes in England.

Experience, and the testimony of modern psychology, have demonstrated very clearly that, paradoxical as it may seem, there is no connection between the severity of punishment and the amount of deterrence, nor is there, indeed, much evidence that the fear of punishment is an important influence in preventing crime. The weakness of this expedient is intensified by the delay and uncertainty of conviction in modern judicial procedure, particularly in the United States. Speed, accuracy, and certainty have a much greater deterrent effect than severity.

Positive School

Although Lombroso has been largely discredited with respect to his particular doctrine of the "criminal man," he, and the Positive School that he founded, have rendered a twofold service of great value to the science of criminology and to practical procedure. They have emphasized the necessity of focussing attention on the criminal instead of on the crime, and they have taught us to think of the criminal as an abnormal member of society, instead of as a perfectly normal individual who deliberately chooses to do wrong. Largely as a result of their work, modern criminology and penology are tending more and more to the individualizing of the criminal, and the treatment of him as a pathological case rather than as a man of ill will. Criminal behavior, like every other form of misconduct, is recognized as the resultant of a complex combination of factors involving both heredity and environment. Society's handling of the criminal is tending to take the form of prevention where that is possible, and, where it has failed, of treatment in the therapeutic sense, rather than punishment in the vindictive sense. Suffering is no longer regarded as an end in itself, but at most as a contributory means to the end of reformation.

This has involved a critical revaluation of the conventional forms of punishment. Society has displayed an amazing lack of ingenuity and imagination in the matter of the kinds of penalties. In accordance with the humanitarian movement, many of the old barbarous devices have been abandoned. Torture in its multitudinous refinements of cruelty,[7] exile, the galleys, the stocks and the pillory, the ducking stool and the whipping post, the rack, drawing and quartering, are seldom or never legally applied as means of punishment in modern civilized communities. But nothing more rational has been devised to take their place. With the restriction of the death penalty to a few major crimes, the modern judge in pronouncing sentence has at his command only two expedients, fine or imprisonment, with a possible variation indicated by the words, "Or both."

No matter what the crime, whether it be burglary, arson, rape, forgery, petty theft, or violation of the sanitary or traffic code, no matter what the character of the criminal, rich man, poor man, beggar man, thief, first offender or hardened recidivist, the only things that can be imposed on him in the name of justice are fine and imprisonment in their various degrees. The worst of the matter is that neither fine nor imprisonment has been adopted as the result of any scientific investigation into their merits as deterrent or curative agencies. Both have a wholly fortuitous origin. The fine developed out of the practice, during the transition from the system of personal vengeance to full governmental responsibility, of the state's retaining a certain sum as a fee for the collection of cash indemnity for an injury done. Naturally, the state fell into the habit of progressively increasing its percentage until finally it took it all, and none was left for the injured party—and that was the origin of the fine. Imprisonment is a survival of the time when culprits were cast into dungeons while being held for torture. When society decided to give up the practice of torture, as might be said almost literally, having nothing else to do with its incarcerated victims it simply left them there. It would be difficult to demonstrate any very great direct value in either fine or imprisonment as a preventive or curative expedient in dealing with the modern criminal.

PUNISHMENT

In the light of these new ideas, the whole system of fixed penalties is being discredited. It is regarded as just as absurd that a body of legislators should determine in advance the number of dollars' fine or of years' imprisonment that some individual in the future should incur as a penalty for committing a specified act, as that a body of medical men sitting in conclave should decide for all time to come just how many months a person suffering from tuberculosis should spend in a sanitarium or just how many grains of quinine one should take to cure malaria. In both types of cases the reasonable thing is to keep the sufferer under treatment until he is cured.

MODERN EXPEDIENTS

In pursuance of this policy, several new expedients are being employed, some of which had their earliest development in connection with the juvenile court, a special type of tribunal which has arisen out of the recognition that the child is a different sort of human particle from the adult. These are the suspended or indeterminate sentence, probation, and parole. Probation in particular is proving itself a very useful device. It is interesting to note that many of these modern trends suggest that the criminal is much more like a child than he is like the self-determining, fully responsible, free agent of the Classical School.

NEEDED PENAL CHANGES

To carry out this modern program it will be necessary to make sweeping changes in both the judicial and penal systems. It seems probable that three distinct types of functionaries will be required. First there will be the judicial group, constituted much as at present. Its duty will be to determine objectively whether or not the accused did actually commit the crime alleged, or whether he has committed other crimes, or is living a life that is calculated to lead him into crime. This will be the field for judges, lawyers, witnesses, prosecuting and defending attorneys, juries, etc. If the decision is in the affirmative, the unfortunate individual will be turned over to a second body, composed of a physician, a psychiatrist, a sociologist and possibly other specialists who can help in analyzing the patient's total situation. This body will diagnose the case, and prescribe a course of treatment. The patient will then be transferred to a third body composed of expert practitioners who will put the prescription into effect. They will have at their command whatever kinds of institutions may be required for the restraint, education, and cultural and ethical development of various types of patients. They will also be empowered to call upon all sorts of social agencies to render the specialized service that they are equipped for. The probation officer will play an important rôle in this work of rehabilitation. The treatment will continue until the patient has demonstrated his fitness and capacity to return to the normal life of society without restraint or surveillance.

Need of Persuasive Control

Even more important than these reforms in criminal procedure is the development by society of new and more efficacious methods of persuasive control. The rapidly increasing complexity of society has placed an insupportable burden upon the judicial agencies. Even though some progress were being made in the handling of the basic crimes of murder and theft—of which, alas! there is no evidence—every session of our legislative bodies creates a batch of new crimes which have to be dealt with by the existing machinery. The strengthening of the stimuli to voluntary conformity is one of the urgent, but baffling, problems of the modern era.

Vice

Another type of misconduct is vice. This, in such of its aspects as have not been made crimes, is to be handled through the various agencies of persuasive control, the church, the family, the school, the neighborhood, etc. The injury of vice is directly to the person who practices it, and indirectly through him, if at all, to society. To the extent that vice is brought under the law, it should be done on the basis of the social menace of the habits involved, not of their inherently sinful or immoral character. The state is not well adapted to dealing with problems of simple morality or ethics. The "badness" which has justified the state in taking over the control of certain types of behavior inheres in their potentiality for social injury. Murder and theft are bad because they violate the rights of individuals and undermine the foundations of society. Whatever badness they may have in the light of some abstract moral law of the universe is no concern of the state. The hackneyed saying that "you can't make people good by law" is true enough if it is interpreted to mean that the state has no business trying to make people ethically good. But you can make (or at least attempt to make) people safe, orderly, and efficient by law. And judged by society's interest in continuity and welfare these are traits of goodness. Conformity to expectation, the preservation of normality, is the primary social goodness.

INCOMPETENCE

In the category of incompetence are gathered various kinds of defects for which the individual is not held responsible. The simplest division of these is into mental and physical, though modern psychology would probably suggest a threefold classification, intellectual, emotional, and physical. The detailed forms in which these defects manifest themselves are legion—feeble-mindedness is all its degrees from idiocy through imbecility to moronity, insanity, epilepsy, senility, emotional instability and unbalance, disease, sickness, crippledness, deformity through accident or otherwise, etc. These have long been recognized as evils, and society has developed innumerable empirical agencies and techniques for dealing with them. To enter into even a superficial study of them would be to survey the whole ameliorative mechanism of society. This would be instructive and illuminating, but no new basic principles or group relationships would be discovered.

MALADJUSTMENT

The final main type of abnormality includes those cases where the difficulty is traceable primarily not to defects in the individual himself, but in his relationships with the group. The fault lies rather with society than with the individual. The latter is powerless to correct the situation by his own efforts. Many instances of poverty belong in this class. But poverty is a generalized concept, and even when subdivided into destitution and dependence it displays many varieties of causal sequences, some of which involve personal as well as societal defects. Indeed, almost any kind of inadequacy is likely to eventuate in poverty. This type of abnormality may be called maladjustment. Since its correction involves alterations in societal forms or relations, the methods required will be either social reform or social engineering.

CHAPTER XXIV

PROBLEMS OF NORMALITY *(Continued)*

UNEMPLOYMENT

One of the most serious types of maladjustment is unemployment, in the form that is characteristic of modern society. A certain amount of unemployment is traceable directly to individual causes, and therefore belongs under the head of incompetence rather than of maladjustment. It may be called personal unemployment. The old idea, consistent with the basic doctrines of Classical Economics, was that the great bulk of unemployment was of this type. Thus President Hadley, who was an ardent protagonist of capitalism, lists as the two most important causes of unemployment the shiftlessness of individual laborers and the fluctuations of commercial credit. And Dr. Antonio Stella, a physician who has not hesitated to rush in where professional sociologists tread cautiously, affirms that the ranks of the unemployed are composed of persons who are crippled, disabled, or unwilling to work. A closer acquaintance with the facts reveals the error of this assumption, and shows that the great bulk of unemployment belongs to one or the other of two types that may be called the cosmic and the social. Personal unemployment makes up a very small proportion of the total, not only in periods of depression, but even in boom times. There are very few persons of normal working age who are actually unemployable if times are good enough. This was conspicuously demonstrated during the World War. The first year or two of the European conflict were marked by acute business depression in this country. The park benches in our industrial cities at all times of day were crowded with able-bodied men of working age. Many of them looked bedraggled and seedy enough, and some would have been readily classed as morons by those who had not learned caution from the salutary bit of doggerel:

I don't know what a moron is,
And I don't give a damn.
I'm thankful that I am not one—
My God! perhaps I am.

The casual passer-by would easily have disposed of a large proportion of them with the remark, "Of course, bums like those couldn't expect to get a job." But within a few months those very individuals not only had jobs, and well-paid ones, but were being sought after, cajoled, and enticed away from one employer after another by the beguilements of the labor pirates that the situation brought into existence. Unemployability, therefore, is definitely relative to business conditions. Of course, when a slump comes the persons to be laid off first are the marginal workers, those whose degree of efficiency yields least profit to the employer. Superficially, therefore, it appears that their deficiencies are the cause of their idleness. But as someone has put it, "Personal qualities do not cause unemployment—they determine who shall be unemployed." If personal unemployment were the only kind, it would not be a serious burden, and effective remedies could easily be worked out. We are told that in ancient Alexandria society was so well organized that even the blind and the gouty were busy. If industry were really in need of labor it would be a poor specimen indeed who could not be fitted into the scheme of things. How insignificant a part of the grand total is represented by personal unemployment is revealed by the fact that practically all the figures of unemployment are based on persons who have actually held jobs within a recent period.

Cosmic Unemployment

Cosmic unemployment is that which arises out of certain unalterable features of this particular planet. The most important is the seasonal type. This is due to the fact that certain kinds of labor can be performed only in the warm months, and other kinds in the winter. In the first category come canning, some forms of construction work, and agriculture in general; in the second class are included ice-harvesting, snow-shoveling, and lumbering. There are other occupations which are spread over the year but have busy and slack seasons. In any of these occupations, a worker who belongs to a single one is, as such, almost certain to be unemployed part of the year. Agriculture is the most important, as well as the most easily understood, of these. In the temperate zones agricultural activities are positively controlled by the weather, particularly by temperature and rainfall. A worker whose sole occupation is tilling the soil finds the need of his services greatly reduced at certain seasons. This situation has been intensified by the introduction of machine methods and large-scale operation onto the farms. The odd jobs that used to keep the farmer busy during the winter months have now largely disappeared.

In general, the incidence of seasonal unemployment is greatest in the cold months, because the majority of productive occupations are unfavorably affected by extreme cold rather than heat. This is true not only of agriculture and most of the extractive industries, but also of construction enterprises, and outdoor work in general.

SOCIAL UNEMPLOYMENT

Social unemployment is that which is due to certain social institutions or forms, or the organization of society itself. One type of social unemployment is also seasonal, that which is due to the concentration of certain activities about specific calendar dates like Christmas or the Fourth of July. Such are candy-making, paper-box manufacturing, and mercantile enterprises of various sorts. These are not to be confused with cosmic unemployment, as they have nothing to do with the seasons as such.

TECHNOLOGICAL UNEMPLOYMENT

But far and away the most important of all forms of unemployment is that which is traceable to the basic organization and functioning of society itself. This is not only because it is much the most voluminous type, but also because, as will be shown, it conditions all the other types. This is what is quite frequently referred to in these days as "technological unemployment," in recognition of the fact that it is inseparably bound up with the prevailing economic system, and particularly with the development of mechanical methods of production to which frequent reference has already been made. It is obvious, then, that this form of unemployment must be intimately associated with, and in fact conditioned by, the profit-inspired type of business.

Limitations of Labor

Of the various characteristic features of the modern economic system which have received our attention, three are particularly pertinent at this point. First, labor does not own the business. Consequently, it has no voice in the conduct of business. It exercises no direct control over the processes of production, volume of product, methods of distribution, or prices. Second, labor does not own the product, or any part of the product. Consequently, labor can get the means of livelihood only through the intermediary agency of wages. Third, and most important, labor can participate in production only as it associates itself with a plant comprising land, capital, and management. In the modern day of large-scale production the average laborer is quite unable to own such a plant for himself—the efficiency and economy of mass production are far too great for him to compete with. As a result, his only chance of getting the wages which will enable him to live is to sell his labor to the owner of a business. And if the owners of businesses in general do not wish to buy, he is helpless—there is nothing that he can do. Society offers him no other recourse.

Demand for Labor

Under these conditions, the amount of labor demanded by the owners of businesses obviously depends upon two chief factors, first, the total amount of goods that can be sold at a profit, and second, the relation that labor bears to the entire plant necessary to turn out these goods in accordance with the dominating system of production. If at any time the amount of goods runs in excess of those that can be sold at a profit there arises the situation commonly known as "over-production," and labor will be laid off.

Overproduction

One of the central tenets of the Classical Economists was that there could be no such thing as general overproduction. The mental operation by which they supported this doctrine is strikingly characteristic of their whole approach, with its focus on things instead of on men. It was a very simple argument: "If all the goods produced can be exchanged, there can be no overproduction. Now, goods exchange for goods, and consequently no matter how many goods are produced, there will always be some goods to exchange for other goods. Therefore, general overproduction is an impossibility."

The fallacy of this argument, of course, is that in real life goods do not exchange for goods. Who ever saw a pair of shoes trotting industriously up the street seeking a fountain pen to exchange itself for, or a shiny new automobile dashing madly off to the piano factory to exchange itself for a baby grand. (No, this is not being just silly—it illustrates the point perfectly.) The truth is that the *persons who own goods* do, or may, exchange them for the goods owned by other persons. It is the human element that governs the process, and as soon as you bring in the human element you have to reckon with what we call the will or the power of choice. The whole question of the possibility of general overproduction depends upon whether the persons who own the goods will, or can, exchange them among themselves, to their own entire satisfaction.

In real life this completely satisfactory exchange of all goods does not take place, and with human nature as it is, it cannot possibly take place. The failure of the Classical Economists to perceive this depended, among other things, upon their neglect of the central fact that the product belongs to the owner of the business, and their assumption that human wants are unlimited—two closely related errors.

Limits of Desires

If the product, when completed, belonged to the entire populace, and was distributed among them on a fairly even per capita basis, then there would be little difficulty in exchanging goods for goods until there was such a plethora of goods that everybody had all he wanted—a condition in little danger of being realized in the near future. But with the ownership of the product highly concentrated in a relatively few hands, as has been shown, the possibility of exchange depends first upon whether the non-owning public has purchasing power sufficient to take up the whole product with a profit to the owners—which we have seen to be a mathematical impossibility—and second upon whether the owners can satisfy themselves through the interchange of their surplus product with one another. It has been demonstrated that they cannot. The desire of a given individual for all the material things that are in existence at any given time is strictly limited. Long before a really wealthy person has exhausted his entire income he will have satisfied his material desires—even his desires for personal service—and will be seeking to convert the balance into productive plant—and this simply aggravates the difficulty.

The illusion of the illimitability of human wants arises from the fact that in society as a whole there is such an enormous volume of unsatisfied wants, due to the uneven distribution of goods. We also ignore the fact that consumption, as well as production, takes time. We have been so much engrossed with considering the amount of time it takes to produce a certain commodity that we have forgotten to ask how much time will be left to consume it after it is finished. This is true of goods and services alike. You cannot wear both a blue cheviot and a light gray tweed suit to your office on the same day; neither can you get a permanent wave and go to the opera in the same evening.

Overproduction, therefore, is definitely conditioned by the social and economic system. But given such a system as prevails today, overproduction is not only a possibility, but it becomes periodically a grim reality, and it does not alter the situation, though it does indicate a more intelligent approach to it, to call it "underconsumption." And whereas acute overproduction comes spasmodically, the tendency to overproduction, and the danger and fear of it, are chronic, and operate to impose a permanent restraint upon the amount of labor that can be sold to owners.

Diminishing Importance of Labor

The second chief factor that determines the demand for labor is the relative place that labor holds in the typical productive plant. It is a truism that there has been a tremendous change in this respect in the past century and a half; in fact, it is this change that has given the dominant tone to contemporary western civilization, and labeled it with the familiar epithet, "capitalistic." Having for countless centuries been the dominant factor in production, labor has now slipped into a subordinate position and the machine has taken its place.

It is axiomatic that in a profit economy there will be a continuous striving to reduce the cost of production, and that this effort will be concentrated largely on labor. It will take two forms, first, the reduction of wages to the lowest possible minimum, and second, the substitution of something else for labor whenever that can be done at less cost than it is possible to secure labor for. The ever-present potential substitute is the machine. The phrase "labor-saving machinery" is familiar; in a very real sense, practically all machinery is labor-saving, or more accurately, "labor-dispensing."

The economic history of the past century and a half is characterized by the progressive supplanting of labor by machinery in specific industries or occupations. The question of immediate interest in this connection is, what influence has this process had upon the demand for labor in the aggregate? The prevailing economic theory during this period has been that it did not diminish the total demand for labor, because the individual laborers displaced at each successive stage of the process quickly found employment in other fields, many of them opened up by the process of mechanization itself. Conditions such as exist in a great depression seem to give the lie to this complacent philosophy. What are the facts?

EFFECTS OF MECHANIZATION

The immediate effect of the introduction of mechanical factors into a new field is usually to reduce the direct cost of production. This may, or may not, be the prime reason for the step, but it is usually essential to the step. This means that a smaller amount of money is started on its circular course through the market to appear as purchasing power for the product. This would, in itself, tend to reduce the demand for the product, which in turn would tend toward a future reduction in the amount of product. Thus the circle is a vicious one, in the truest sense of the term. If the reduction in cost of production were accompanied by a corresponding reduction in selling price this would not be true. But there is no reason why this should be the case, and usually it is not. For the extra profits, which are the incentive for mechanization, depend upon an increase in the spread between costs and selling price, which would be lost if prices were reduced proportionally.

But the most important effect results from the difference between paying money for labor and paying it for machines. This difference is the fundamental factor in the whole situation. When money is paid for labor, it becomes purchasing power immediately, and purchasing power in the hands of those who have no other means of providing themselves with economic goods. Almost the entire amount, therefore, very quickly expresses itself in a demand for finished products.

The case is very different when the same amount of money is spent for machines, or more strictly, for the use of machines. Machines do not buy goods. This money passes beyond the machines—where? To other owners, the owners of the machines.

Now, to a very large extent the owners of machines are the same people who own businesses. The effect of mechanization, therefore, is to shift purchasing power from the non-owning classes, who have no products to dispose of but only their labor, and to concentrate it in the hands of those who are owners of businesses, and accordingly have products to dispose of.

Certainly no further demonstration is required to show that this not only reduces the number of persons in the buying market, but correspondingly reduces the total effective demand of the market. Thus we get the paradoxical situation that the more we increase the effectiveness and economy of our productive plant by the process of mechanization, the more we curtail the market for the augmented flow of goods that this plant is capable of turning out. The higher we climb the harder we fall.

The worst of the matter is that we seem to be really only on the threshold of the great achievements in the substitution of machines for labor. There seems to be no limit to the ingenuity of our inventors and engineers in this direction. With all the accomplishments of the nineteenth century in the background, even more remarkable innovations seem to be impending momentarily. It is said that the great modern hydro-electric plants literally run with no human attendants at all. An eminent scientist whose work led him to visit a number of large steel plants observed that the first impression he always received was that there was nobody there. Big things were being done, but not by human hands.

Concrete illustrations might be multiplied almost indefinitely. A few typical instances will suffice. A paint plant that a few years ago employed 500 men has now been so effectively mechanized that it operates entirely automatically. The only men in the plant are a few expert engineers and repair men. The same result has been achieved in a new glass plant. The routine operations are performed without anyone in attendance. Even in such unskilled manual operations as ditch-digging, one of the modern machines with two operators will do the work formerly performed by 20 men. By an improvement in its type of machinery one of the large automobile plants dropped its labor force from over 8000 men to less than 400, and at the same time increased its output. A company manufacturing automobile frames has an automatic plant with a maximum capacity of over 8000 frames per day which requires only 50 men to operate it, while the hand plant next door requires 2000 men to turn out 4000 frames a day. Working conditions are said to be exceptionally fine in the automatic plant, for the 50 men who are there—but how about the conditions of the potential 1950 who do not get a chance to work at all?

So far has this process gone that in the United States, in spite of the growth of population, in the boom year 1929 there were actually over 2,000,000 fewer productive workers employed than ten years previously.

Now all this would be very fine if only the product found its way into the hands of all the members of the American body politic in fairly even quantities. But the wage-earner has no possible way of getting any of the product except as he has a job. What are the 2,000,000 surplus laborers, added to the millions of unemployed who were already there in 1919, going to do? We build up an economic system that makes it impossible for the majority of the population to live unless they can associate themselves with some productive plant. And then we "modernize" this plant so that it does not need more than a fraction of this majority. And this not only condemns the workers to destitution and dependence, if not actual starvation, but it also destroys the possibility of prosperity for those who dominate the situation and are supposed to profit by it.[1]

TREATMENT

The treatment of unemployment would be relatively simple if it were all of the personal and cosmic type. The personal causes could be largely eliminated by various therapeutic means, and the processes of production could be adjusted to the necessities of those whose handicaps could not be entirely removed. The small irreducible residuum of unemployables who remained would not be a heavy burden on society. The cosmic causes could not be removed, but if there was a real demand for labor the maladjustments arising from these causes could be largely smoothed out by a planned coordination of production under centralized social control. The unemployment that remained should be regarded as an unavoidable charge on industry, and provision made that those who were involved in it should not suffer hardship. But the eradication of social unemployment involving the entire recasting of the economic system becomes a problem of engineering rather than of reform.

Individual-Societal Conflict

This type of unemployment exemplifies with especial clarity the principle that personal remedies may be social aggravations. In accordance with the fact that personal qualities determine who shall be unemployed, even in a period of great social unemployment, it is expedient for the individual to improve his personal qualifications to the maximum degree. If 50 per cent of the total labor force in his particular occupation can get jobs it behooves him to be one of the 50 per cent. But when there is a great reservoir of unemployment due to a deficiency of demand compared with supply, the escape of one individual from this reservoir into the ranks of the employed simply means that some other individual must drop down into the reservoir. There is no social gain. And if any considerable number of workers improve their capacities to a marked degree, thereby raising the total efficiency of labor and making it possible to produce a given amount of goods with fewer workers, the total amount of unemployment will be actually increased. Only societal remedies can relieve a situation of this sort.

Family Maladjustments

Many of the most serious maladjustments of modern life center about the great institution of the family. Some of these are directly traceable to the lag between the family mores and the economic mores which has already been pointed out. Western societies have very nearly equilibrated the economic opportunities and rights of men and women viewed as units in the wealth-producing activities of the group. But within the family there still persists a highly differentiated set of rights and duties, prerogatives and responsibilities, for women as compared with those of men. And since the family mores and the economic mores are inextricably intertwined the inevitable result is a disastrous mass of inconsistencies, strains, and conflicts.

DIVORCE

Another outstanding type of abnormality in which both misconduct and maladjustment are present, frequently in combination, is that customarily referred to as "the divorce problem." Here, there is a particular need for clear thinking and accurate sociological analysis. In the first place, it is important to recognize that divorce is a social institution just as truly as marriage. Its processes are just as rigidly prescribed by society, its operation is entrusted to authorized officials, it is surrounded with just as many sanctions as is marriage. It is obviously erroneous, therefore, to think of divorce itself as abnormal. Although it is true that not all established social forms are necessarily normal, yet it would be a very remarkable thing if an institution that has existed for so long, and has tended to increase in societal significance, were entirely abnormal. Divorce is, in fact, just as integral a part of the family system as marriage. Marriage represents the socially authorized means of entering the nuptial bond; divorce the socially authorized means of getting out of it. One is just as legitimate a procedure as the other. Furthermore, the behavior of the individual in availing himself of these instrumentalities is just as normal in one case as in the other. Why, then, has there been such an enormous amount of odium attached to the phenomenon of divorce, and why have those who participated in it been so heavily subject to social penalties of ostracism and discrimination? The answer is that whereas divorce as an institution is normal, and the participation in divorce is normal when conditions warrant it, back of every divorce there may be assumed to lie some circumstances that are not normal. It is inherent in the traditional mores or marriage and the family that marital unions shall be formed for life. "For better for worse, for richer for poorer, until death do us part" are more than mere formal phrases still retained in an ancient ritual. They represent the ideal and the normal expectation of society—much more, for instance, than "with all my worldly goods I thee endow" and "I promise to obey." The continuation of the family unit, not only in the legalistic sense, but also in the factual aspect of a common "bed and board," is a part of the established social pattern. Any departure from it involves some sacrifice of expectation.

Grounds of Divorce

But, on the other hand, society has always had some more or less well-defined expectations as to the relations that should prevail between the married couple, in harmony with the characteristic conception of this central institution. The actual content of these expectations has varied greatly among different societies in different stages of social evolution and among diverse races and nationalities. One feature that is very generally present is the expectation of technical "faithfulness" on the part of both parties, though this has frequently been much more rigid with respect to the female than the male, in accordance with the property concept which has permeated the marriage system from very early times clear down to the present. In modern western societies, these expectations have been elaborated into a very complex set of relations and attitudes, including not only exclusiveness in the sex relation, financial responsibility and support on the part of the husband, the mutual care of the children, and conformity to the ordinary standards of conventional behavior, but also certain emotional relationships involving tenderness, affection, consideration, and the harmonious blending of personalities. In other words, "to love, protect, and cherish," if not actually to obey. All these relationships are considered as essential to a true marital union, and the absence or disappearance of them as a flaw in the family unit. The institution of divorce has been developed out of the recognition that when these requisites are lacking in any serious degree, either because they were never present or because they have been destroyed, a genuine family does not exist, and it may be socially expedient to dissolve the external framework rather than to insist upon the perpetuation of a spurious unit. The real abnormality, therefore, that lies back of the overt phenomena of divorce is a failure in the expected essentials that constitute a true marital bond. Just how much of a failure of this sort shall be recognized by society as affording the correct basis for dissolving the legal bond is a point upon which various societies have differed enormously. The one almost universal ground has been technical infidelity, or adultery, at least on the part of the wife. Desertion, cruelty, and sterility have also been common grounds, and above these an almost unlimited catalog of deficiencies has been created in the divorce legislation of various states.

Modern Aspect of Divorce

These truths should make it clear that an increase in the divorce rate of a society is not necessarily a matter to be deplored. Just as an increase in crime may merely mean that a society is altering its system of control by bringing more trivial offenses under the scope of the law, so an increase in divorce may simply indicate that a society is liberalizing its divorce procedure, and enlarging the grounds upon which a union may be technically broken which has already become intolerable to one or both parties. It is just as incorrect to interpret an increased divorce rate, taken by itself, as an indication of increasing failure in marriage as to consider an increasing crime rate as evidence of growing badness on the part of the people. An accurate understanding of the trends in marital adequacy and fulfilment can be derived only by study of the immediate and intimate facts of family life. There is no doubt that there is a growing tendency among western societies to consider the mere preservation of an external legal relationship as of less and less importance, and to regard the existence of the genuine essentials of family unity as the determinative consideration. Many students of the question take the extreme position that the mere fact that the persons concerned no longer want to live together, or even that one of them wishes to end the relationship, is all that society should ask for. Since the essence of married life is mutual affection and attraction, why should it be forcibly perpetuated when these no longer exist? This position would have greater conviction if there were no children to be considered. One of society's greatest concerns is for its children, and the chief contribution that modern societies expect from the family is the efficient bearing and rearing of children. As between the happiness and satisfaction of adults and the welfare of children modern society is likely to tip the balance in favor of the latter. But this raises the question as to whether the long-time welfare of children is better promoted by permitting them to live in a home from which marital affection has departed, and which is likely to be characterized by friction and bickering, or at best by coolness and a lack of cooperation, or to separate the parents and give the children into the custody of one or the other of them or make some other provision.

Changes in Family

These are questions not easy of solution. It is a commonplace that the family has, within the last few generations, undergone sweeping modifications that have completely altered its character and social significance. Most of these changes have been in the nature of subtractions of important functions. Up to a couple of centuries ago the family was not only a reproductive unit, but a productive, a recreational, an educational, and a religious unit. Practically all the interests and activities of both parents and children were centered in the home. The father might, in some cases, go outside in the course of his major occupation, but quite generally the home was the workshop, the father was the "boss," the workers were the children and an apprentice or two, and the mother might also participate in so far as her other duties permitted. The work of the woman was varied and important, indispensable to the success of the home. Such education as the children received was largely given at home, where also were centered the games, sports, and religious exercises of the family.[2] There is no need to recount in detail the successive changes whereby one after another of these functions has been withdrawn from the family, and whereby in particular the work that formerly gave the wife a position of dignity and indispensability in the home has been largely transferred to factory or shop. To a considerable extent the home today has become merely a place to eat and sleep—often not even that—a "place where you go when you haven't anything else to do." Correlatively, the purely reproductive, affectional, and sexual functions of the wife have increased greatly in relative importance. When these cease to play a significant rôle there is very little left to give any important content or meaning to many a modern home. There is much reason, therefore, in the consideration of divorce to differentiate between the family where there are children and the one where there are not. But even where there are children, it does not necessarily follow that the preservation of the home is of dominant importance. Not long ago in an informal gathering of experts in child welfare the opinion was expressed that, taking the American home as it is (perhaps this was meant to be limited to the city home), the less time a child spends in it the better for the child, and there was general concurrence in this view. This is doubtless an extreme attitude, but there can be little doubt that with the wide variety of child welfare agencies that are now available there is an excellent chance of finding a better environment for a child than a loveless, unsympathetic home.

Significance of Increasing Divorce

All of this, however, does not mean that the rapidly increasing divorce rate, particularly in the United States, is not a tremendously significant sociological phenomenon. Making all allowance for increased facility in dissolving unsatisfactory marriage bonds, and for the changed social attitude toward divorce and divorced persons, there still remains an impressive mass of evidence of the inadequacy of the present marriage system, viewed in the light of the traditional and conventional concept of it. What the final meaning of the facts is it is difficult to say. Are the individuals of today less conscientious and more particular, less adjustable and more irritable, less constant and more fickle than previously? Are the difficulties due to various lags and differential rates of change that could be corrected with sufficient social attention? Is the conventional form of family one that was adapted to a simpler social and economic organization but which does not harmonize with the complex structure of today? Is the basic concept of permanence of union incompatible with the features of a highly dynamic era? Or, possibly, has the whole institution of the family outlived its usefulness, and must some entirely different system be devised for gratifying sex interests and providing for the birth and rearing of children?

Treatment of Divorce

The answers to these questions, could they be determined, would indicate whether the problem of divorce, and related problems of the family, fall within the scope of social reform or of social engineering. Here is a vast and important field for study, and, fortunately, one in which extensive research is being done. While waiting for scientific guidance in these matters, society may well devote its energies to removing or reducing the causes of divorce as far as possible. Quite apart from the appraisal of divorce itself, it is entirely congruous with society's interest in welfare that its married members should be as happy and well satisfied as possible. Any measures that will promote this end are socially desirable, independently of their effect on the divorce rate. There is a growing sentiment that one effective means toward this end is intelligent, sympathetic education of young people for marriage. This is much more than mere sex hygiene; it involves training in the psychological implications of the merging of personalities as related to self-realization, in the understanding of the more elusive elements of sex differentiation, and in the technique of adjustment.

Whatever the actual development of the family, marriage, and divorce may be, it will necessarily be correlated with the changes in the other basic departments of the social structure which are going on with such staggering rapidity. What the ultimate results will be no scientist would venture to predict.

Religious Maladjustments

Another important set of maladjustments is to be observed in the field of religion. In this case the fault—by which is simply meant the primary source of the difficulty—lies more in the institution than in the individual. Organized, formalized, institutionalized religion is something about which the contemporary individual has very little to say. The very essence of this kind of religion—which is the only kind that can be considered to have true group aspects—is a standardized conception of the nature of divinity and of the relation of the individual to it. Since this is a field in which rational proof and demonstration have practically no place, in which objective evidence is either wholly lacking or subject to extrarational interpretation, and in which argument is peculiarly ineffective, it follows that formalized pronouncements in the nature of dogma become the recognized grounds for group unification. One either believes and belongs, or disbelieves and stays out. If he tries to belong and disbelieve, he is usually put out. And since these dogmas are not subject to any continuous process of checking-up, as are scientific beliefs, they tend to become more and more inviolable as they recede further into the background. Their authority depends largely on their antiquity. But if religion is to have any practical influence, particularly any helpful influence, on the lives of its adherents its formulations must have some relationship to their contemporary attitudes, interests, and problems. Consequently, it is in the very nature of religion to be more or less anachronistic at all times. To keep it up to date, especially in a dynamic era, would require constant modifications and adaptations of its forms and expressions which are inherently antipathetic to it. "It's the faith of my fathers, and it's good enough for me" requires and presupposes an attitude on the part of the devotee quite contrary to the empirical and critical approach that is expected in other departments of life. The socially responsive individual, therefore, who has tried to adjust himself to the spirit of his age in the affairs of his every-day life finds himself required to assume an entirely different mood when he moves into the domain of religion. Different individuals succeed in making different adaptations to this situation. Some are able to maintain separate compartments of their thought life, between which they do not seek to establish any harmony. Others treat religion as essentially a matter of emotion, and do not attempt to reason about it. Still others are content, and perhaps glad, simply to lean back on authority in matters of devotion, and to close their minds to questioning of any sort as completely as possible. A further group simply dismisses religion as an outmoded product of an unsophisticated attitude toward reality, with which the modern, scientifically minded individual need not concern himself at all. But individuals of a different stamp, believing that religion is an institution that ought to play an important and practical rôle in human affairs, particularly in human improvement, attempt to establish some basis of reconciliation. For them the problem is indeed serious, and the difficulties well-nigh insuperable.

The Lack of Realism

The problem is not simply one of harmonizing science and religion. This is an undertaking which many modern and intelligent persons, including some of the most eminent scientists, have had no insuperable difficulty in carrying out. There is also the fact that religion relies heavily on symbols, figures of speech, forms, and ritual in making its impress on its followers. The Christian religion serves as an excellent illustration of this. The Christian religion received its outward form and concrete expression two thousand years ago amid a people whose social organization, modes of thought, and habits of expression differed radically from those of modern nations. Miss Semple says, "If the sacred literature of Judaism and Christianity take weak hold upon the western mind, this is largely because it is written in the symbolism of the pastoral nomad. Its figures of speech reflect life in deserts and grasslands. For these figures the western mind has few or vague corresponding ideas. It loses, therefore, half the import, for instance, of the Twenty-third Psalm.'' But this is not all. The language of the sacred books of the Christian religion is not only that of pastoral nomads. It is also that of war and despotism, as is also the diction of the prayers and hymns which follow the Biblical pattern. A few examples will make this clear. The common appellations for Christ are ''Lord,'' ''Lord of Hosts,'' ''Master,'' ''King,'' ''Prince,'' ''Leader.'' His worshipers style themselves his ''followers,'' ''servants,'' ''soldiers,'' ''messengers,'' ''stewards,'' etc. The Christian life is represented as a warfare, or as the orderly working of a great royal household, with loyal servants always ready to do the master's bidding.[3] The practical detriment of this maladjustment is revealed in connection with the movement for world peace. It is expected of modern religion, especially of a religion founded by the ''Prince of Peace,'' that it should promote international amity. Doubtless the majority of leaders in the Christian denominations are favorable to the idea. But the traditional implements put in their hands are largely inconsistent. Imagine a clergyman who devotes a service to an impassioned plea for pacifism, and chooses for the hymns of the morning, ''The Son of God Goes Forth to War,'' ''Fight the Good Fight,'' ''Like a Mighty Army Moves the Church of God,'' and ''Onward Christian Soldiers.'' Of course, the explanation is obvious that all these terms are to be interpreted symbolically, and are meant merely to stimulate the faithful to courage and energy in struggling for a good cause. But the very nature of a symbol or figure is to make the meaning clearer and to avoid the necessity of an explanation or interpretation. A figure that is so out of keeping with familiar experience that it has to go through a process of interpretation before it has the desired appeal loses much of its usefulness, and one that on its face is directly contrary to the intended message is worse than useless. Even the figures of Father and Son have an entirely different meaning today from that which they conveyed to a nomadic, patriarchal people.

DIFFICULTY OF IMPROVEMENT

There is little hope of improving the situation by substituting modern symbols for the antiquated ones. To call Christ the "President," "Manager," or "Boss," instead of the "King," "Prince," or "Shepherd," and to refer to his domain as a "Republic," "Factory," "Shop," or "Farm," instead of a "Kingdom" or "Fold," would not help much. The effort to portray Jesus as a go-getting business man is interesting, but probably adds little to the devotional appeal of the Christian religion.[4]

It seems almost impossible to overcome this element of remoteness and detachment in formalized religion, and many believers regard it as undesirable to do so. Others consider the altruistic principles and humanitarian outlook of religion as indispensable adjuncts to programs of human betterment, and seek to minimize the obstructive tendencies of its anachronistic features.

It is an interesting speculation whether mankind as a whole is more or less religious than formerly. Whatever the answer to this may be, it is indubitable that there still survives a vast amount of religious interest and devotion, and that extensive efforts are being made to make or keep religion a constructive force in the promotion of human justice and welfare.

CHAPTER XXV

POPULATION MOVEMENTS

We have observed that one of the great expedients by which man has hitherto escaped the law of stationary population is movement. Obviously, this great phenomenon has had many other consequences than the one mentioned. Movement has been one of the foremost factors in shaping human destiny in all its phases.

In its general aspects, movement may be divided into two types, intra-societal and inter-societal. Viewed in terms of "the Great Society," all movements are intra-societal. But the concept of the Great Society is hardly applicable except to rather modern conditions, and for practical purposes the distinction has considerable utility.

DISPERSION

On the basis of the forms and characteristics of the movements, two great types may be distinguished, which may be called dispersion and migration. Dispersion includes those movements that took place while man was still in a low stage of development, while his activities were still motivated by a set of impulses not widely different from those of the higher infra-human species, such as are customarily called instincts. On this stage man was closely dependent on the physical environment. His adaptation to it was a natural one, in contrast to the artificial adaptation now so generally practiced. His movements were accordingly governed very largely by the characteristics of the physical environment.

ASPECTS OF MOVEMENT

In studying any type of movement, six features are always to be considered, the causes, means, channels, destination, rate, and consequences of movement. In the case of dispersion, the causes were probably almost exclusively of the same general sort that influences the movements of any group of animals. Foremost among them were the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence due to the natural tendency of the species to increase, and changes in the nature of the environment itself that made it less well adapted to the support of human population. Such causes produce a type of movement that may be considered almost automatic. Any species will take advantage of every opportunity to expand its numbers by enlarging its range in every possible direction. Such a movement may be thought of as an extension of the outer fringes of habitation, rather than actual shifts of specific groups or individuals from place to place. Its limits are fixed by the stretch of the environment that is sufficiently similar to the original to permit the survival of the species with such adaptive modifications as it is able to make in the course of its movement. As we have seen, man is the only one of the large animals that has been able to extend his range over the entire globe without making adaptations of sufficient scope to break it up into more than one species. The greater part of this expansion took place under the form of dispersion, and its cause was primarily the simple biological expansion of a new and vigorous species.

MEANS

During the period of true dispersion the means of movement were chiefly those furnished by nature—man's two legs. In its later phases elementary devices for water transportation came into use; artificial means of land transportation were probably negligible. It follows that the channels of dispersion must have been those that could be negotiated by such means. They were mainly land routes, although small and quiet bodies of water, such as smoothly flowing rivers or small lakes, were also used. On the whole, the routes followed were those of least resistance. River valleys, coastal plains, and the lower levels of mountain chains were favorite avenues. Serious obstacles were presented by large bodies of water, dense tropical forest, arid or frozen plains, and rugged mountain chains. Most difficult of all, in fact, practically the only insuperable ones, were other groups of men already established in a given region. As De Quatrefages says, "Man alone stops man."[1]

DESTINATION

The destination was merely the place to which the line of least resistance led. Dispersion can be said to have no destination in the true sense—that is one of its distinguishing features. Primitive man did not start to go to any definite place; he simply went. Like Yellow-Dog Dingo and the Kangaroo in Kipling's "Just-So Stories," "He had to!" His marching song might well have been that humble ditty, popular in a much later age, the refrain of which ran,

I don't know where I'm going,
But I'm on my way.

Primitive man did not know enough geography, he had not enough vision, foresight, or initiative, to pick out a certain region as preferable to his own, and deliberately set out to go there.

RATE

The rate of dispersion was necessarily incredibly slow, not only on account of the restricted means of locomotion, but still more because of the necessity of physical adaptation to the requirements of the new environment, modified only by such artificial adaptations as primitive man was able to substitute for it. The period of dispersion undoubtedly covered by far the greater span of human existence. But, slow as it was, its consequences were of supreme importance. Through its agency, virtually all the aboriginal populations of the world were established in their respective areas, there to be characterized into the great races and subraces of man.

Since true dispersion is into humanly uninhabited territory, it is essentially a peaceable movement. It infringes on the territory of no one, and benefits those who stay as well as those who go.

As a convenient means of identification, dispersion may be thought of as the type of movement that corresponds to the collection and hunting stages of cultural development.

MIGRATION

The era of migration was ushered in when there were no more unoccupied regions within the reach of the expanding groups of mankind. This is obviously not a chronological date, but a stage in evolution. It was reached much earlier in the primary centers of human development than on the periphery of settlement. On the outer fringes of human expansion dispersion was going on long after migration, in its earlier forms, had set in in the older habitation areas. The primary and outstanding feature of migration is that it is a movement into territory already occupied by one or more human groups. In its intra-societal phases the movement may be peaceable. As an inter-societal movement it is always, except under peculiar circumstances, forcible and hostile, and carried out in the face of opposition.

TYPES OF MIGRATION

The inter-societal division of migration may be divided into four types, differing from each other so radically as to make them distinct sociological phenomena. These are Invasion, Conquest, Colonization, and Immigration. Invasion is the type of movement that appears when a relatively rude, low-cultured, but vigorous and aggressive group forces its way into the territory of a more highly civilized, wealthy, and effete people, with a more settled mode of life and a denser population. The rate of movement in invasion is still slow, according to modern standards, but the invaders usually have some other means of locomotion than their own legs—commonly horses—and they are sufficiently high in culture to be free from immediate dependence on natural supplies, and to be able to move into new environments without the necessity of making physical adaptations. In point of fact, most of the great invasions of history have not involved marked changes in environment. In the typical invasion, the whole group, or a large part of it, participates. It is emphatically a group movement. The group moves together from common causes and for a common objective. Men, women, and children are all included. Being a forcible movement, coordinated action on the part of the group is essential to success. Such a group must be able to live on the march, which means that it must have portable dwellings, and that its characteristic source of support must also be mobile. These conditions are fulfilled on the nomadic stage of culture, and so we may think of invasion as corresponding typically to the nomadic, or pastoral, stage of culture. The channels of movement, accordingly, must be those that will support grazing flocks and herds, that is, grasslands, steppes, and prairies. Dense forests, rugged mountain chains, and sandy deserts are effective barriers against invasion. The causes of invasion are primarily of the same sort as the causes of dispersion, that is, the pressure of population arising from the biological impulse to multiply, or from the deterioration of the present environment. But there is a significant difference; in invasions there is usually also the impetus that comes from comparing the present region with some other one about which the moving people has some vague, often erroneous, but effective ideas. In other words, in invasion there is a true destination. The moving group has picked out a certain region toward which they intend to go, and usually for some fairly definite reasons. This destination is typically a fertile, well-watered plain or river valley, often where trade routes converge or cross, where there is the promise not only of the seizure of much movable wealth, but also of an easier and more profitable mode of existence.

Invasion

The invasions best known to students of Western history are the great Teutonic invasions into the Roman Empire, and the various Mongoloid invasions from western Asia into central Europe, of which that of the Huns was the most spectacular. The underlying cause of both of these was, at least in part, the same—the progressive drying up of the central portion of the Asiatic continent, making it less capable of supporting a given population.[2] This process of desiccation had been going on long before the dawn of the Christian era, and currents of migration had flowed up into northern Europe, accentuating the pressure that was already being felt among the Teutonic tribes on account of their growing numbers. In addition, the Teutons were just beginning to learn the rudiments of agriculture, and were longing for land where they could practice it more effectively than in their own territory, which was still very cold, cloudy, and foggy. Through travelers and merchants they had learned something about the more genial lands to the south, and little by little a flow in that direction began, which eventually became a torrent. It is significant that several of these tribes, specifically the Goths, had no particular ambition at first to break through to the heart of the Empire, but were quite content to live peaceably on its borders, on terms of cooperation with the Roman power, as long as they could have an adequate area of good land for their use. Eventually, however, conditions arose that led one after another of them—the Visigoths, the Ostrogoths, the Vandals—to launch a military attack on the very capital itself. The invasion of the Huns was more spectacular and violent, but of shorter duration.

Characteristics of Invasion

The phenomena of invasion are full of sociological interest and illustrate innumerable sociological laws and principles, but space forbids delaying on them in this connection. Certain features are worthy of especial note. In the first place, it should be observed that in the typical invasion not a single individual who is present at the inception of the movement ever lives to reach the destination. It took the Goths three or four hundred years to get from their original home into the center of Italy. During that time they were coming more and more closely under the influence of Roman civilization, so that a profound cultural transformation had taken place in them by the time they made their final attack on the Empire. A second important generalization is that invaders seldom leave any notable impress on the culture of the lands into which they penetrate. Frequently they do not stay long enough, and when they do their numbers are too small, and the indigenous culture has too much tenacity to yield in any important points. The Goths left no appreciable imprint on the culture of southern Europe. Even the type of architecture that bears their name is not directly traceable to them. Racially, the influence of invaders is directly proportional to their numbers and their length of stay. As has been observed, the relations between contiguous groups are likely to be alternately martial and marital; in any case, two peoples that occupy the same territory for any considerable length of time will almost certainly intermate to such an extent as to absorb the foreign stock thoroughly into the native stock. Such an absorption is positive and permanent, for once an outside stream of germ plasm is introduced into the hereditary endowment of a people there is no way to get it out again. It may become so diffused that it is quite indistinguishable, and its effects may not be obvious—this will depend on the total germinal constitution of the two peoples, and their relative proportions. But it will always be there. You cannot unscramble an egg. The greater frequency, volume, and permanence of the Teutonic invasions into northern Italy, as compared with southern, account for the marked difference in the physical traits of the people of the two regions, which has led the Bureau of Immigration of the United States, for instance, to classify them as separate peoples, and which is certainly partly accountable for the diverse cultural, economic, and social development of the two parts of the peninsula.

Objectives of Invasion

Mesopotamia, Arabia, India, the low lands of China, and other areas of ancient civilization have been the objectives of successive waves of invasion. Practically all true invasions fall within the historical period, because by the time the advanced peoples had become sufficiently differentiated, and sufficiently wealthy, to arouse the cupidity of more backward peoples they had also acquired the arts of permanent recording. But for this very reason, the history of invasion is almost always written by the invaded people, rather than by the invaders. This has the result of distorting the record, particularly in the way of exaggerating the numbers, size, and ferocity of the attackers, in order to give the best possible alibi to the victims. Accordingly, we seldom have as complete and accurate an account of the inception and early stages of an invasion as of its culmination.

Conquest

Conquest is, in a sense, just the reverse of invasion. Here the more settled, cultured, and wealthy people takes the aggressive. The expansion in this case is one of authority, organization, and control rather than of population. In fact, conquest is not primarily a movement of people at all, though a considerable transfer of population may incidentally take place. The purpose of conquest is power, prestige, and wealth, either through tribute or through the control of trade routes, industry, and raw materials. The result of conquest is empire. In the typical conquests of the past—the Persian, the Alexandrian, and the Roman—there was a minimum disturbance of the cultural, economic, and even political life of the provinces and dependencies. As long as the native government could keep its people under control, and remained loyal to the central power, paying its tribute and furnishing its military contingents regularly, the home government cared little how the people married, what laws were enforced, or what gods were worshiped. Such transfer of population as took place was usually the result of the establishment of discharged veterans or disbanded troops, or the incidental settlement of merchants and civil officials, though there might be also a reverse movement toward the imperial center; this, however, was likely to be under rigid control. Conquest is a form of activity so congenial to powerful and aggressive peoples on all the higher levels of civilization that it cannot be identified with any particular stage of culture, though it could not come into existence until the people in question were at least as far advanced as the agricultural stage. The so-called "nomad empires" hardly deserve the name.

COLONIZATION

Colonization is another form of movement in which the more cultured people take the aggressive. But here there is a real movement of people, and the lands toward which it is directed are inhabited by groups so much lower on the scale of culture that they can offer no effective resistance. Usually the region is sparsely settled, perhaps sometimes actually uninhabited. Consequently, though force is usually employed, it is a secondary feature of the enterprise. Like invasion, colonization is a mass movement, but in this case only a small portion of the initiating people depart. A colonizing power is a state with a superabundant population, much native energy and enterprise, a self-conscious governmental attitude, and usually a rapidly advancing culture. The primary purpose of colonization is to provide adequately for the excess population, but also to provide for them in such a way as will redound to the power, wealth, and prestige of the home state. Colonies are therefore planted in regions where not only can the migrants live with a fair degree of comfort and prosperity, but also raw materials or native products useful to the home state can be secured. Several different classifications of colonies have been offered. Perhaps the most useful is that presented by Keller,[3] a twofold division into plantation colonies and farm colonies. The former are located primarily in the tropics, and may also be called colonies of exploitation; the latter are located in the temperate zones, and may be called colonies of settlement.

Colonization, too, has had an ancient and extensive development, and is also full of sociological lessons. It has been effectively treated in numerous volumes, and will repay detailed study. Its effects upon both the culture and the racial features of the newly settled lands are profound. It often results in the virtual extermination or segregation of the native peoples, so that both the culture and the race of the aggressors come to predominate virtually unchanged, except by the influences of the new physical environment, though there may be some cultural contributions from the native peoples. It is noteworthy that the expansion of the white race, and the culture that it carried with it, into the American continents, Australia, and West Africa was accomplished primarily through the medium of colonization. A distinguishing earmark of colonization is that the movement is originated, controlled, directed, and often financed by the home state, and is into a region politically subject to the home state. The colonist does not cross a national boundary, or live under a new flag. Colonization may be thought of as roughly corresponding to the agricultural stage.

Disappearance of Free Land

It would be difficult to find any great transition in human affairs more fraught with potentialities for conflict and suffering than that which marked the disappearance of unoccupied, or "free," land and decreed that all future land accessions must be by force, and in the face of the most effective resistance that the attacked group was capable of putting up. A new era dawned when conditions arose under which the only way to get land was to take it from somebody else. It is highly significant, therefore, that the latest type of population movement should have taken the form, in a measure, of a reversion to the earlier situation.

Immigration

This movement is immigration. Its distinguishing feature is that it is a peaceful, permitted, aggression of foreigners onto the land of a state which has the international right, if not the actual ability, to prevent it if it chose. This is something exceedingly rare in history, and obviously calls for explanation. One item in the explanation is that immigration, unlike all previous movements, is distinctly an individual affair. It may be a mass movement in mere point of volume, but it is not characteristically organized, directed, or financed by the country of origin; indeed, it may be contrary to the wish, or even the law, of that state. Each individual or family in an immigrant stream operates primarily on its own initiative, responsibility, and resources. It may be opposed or encouraged by either the sending or the receiving state, but it is essentially self-directing. Immigration does not, therefore, present the aspect of official aggression.

Even so, however, it would not be long permitted if the receiving state did not either want the immigrants or regard them as harmless. Self-preservation is the first law of nations, as of individuals, and a continuous incursion of foreigners onto the land of a powerful nation can only mean that that nation sees no adequate reason for interfering. How has this situation arisen?

Recent Nature of Immigration

The answer to this question may be sought first of all in a consideration of the period within which immigration has developed and the directions in which it has flowed. Let it be recalled that immigration requires a large number of individuals, living in countries of a relatively high civilization, who are in some measure discontented with their existing situation, and who know enough about some foreign territory and have sufficient financial resources and independence of action, to tear up their roots and start out on their own resources to cast their lot in a region where they hope it will be happier. Add to this the requirement that both the states must be willing to permit this behavior, and it becomes evident that the conditions for immigration have prevailed only in very recent times. In point of fact, true immigration is a matter of only about three centuries. As for direction, all the great immigrant streams have flowed into countries that were opened to settlement by the white race as a result of the great achievements of the Discoveries Period, specifically, the countries of the two American continents, Australia, and various regions in Africa. There have been, of course, innumerable minor streams, but those mentioned have given character to the whole phenomenon of immigration.

Immigrant-Receiving Societies

All of these societies had their origin in colonies of the various nations of Europe. The societies on the North American continent are the outgrowth mainly of English colonies, with minor contributions from France and Holland. Those in South and Central America and the West Indies are traceable to the colonizing activities of Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, and England; Australia was colonized by England, and South Africa by Holland and England. During their colonial stages these societies were the destination of both colonists and immigrants, the distinction, which was clearly recognized by the colonies themselves, depending on whether the individual came from the home state of the colony in question, or from some other nation. The majority of these colonies were in the temperate zone, and belonged to the farm type. It is the manifest destiny of a farm colony, in a relatively short time, to throw off the yoke of allegiance to the founding nation and become an independent state. The Thirteen English North American colonies did this, and became the United States of America. Somewhat later, most of the Central and South American colonies became independent. By the time Canada and the Australian colonies had reached the stage of development where independence might have been expected, England had learned enough by bitter experience about the management of colonies so that she was prepared to make successive concessions, and relax the terms of affiliation, with the result that today these countries are practically independent states, although retaining certain tenuous bonds that keep them parts of the British Empire. South Africa, having passed from Dutch to British control, is now in a similar status.

All of these countries, in varying degrees, represent the establishment of small groups of people with a relatively high economic culture, on vast areas of land abounding in natural resources. They were accordingly in a state of underpopulation, and though they did not reason the situation out in terms of modern larithmic theory they sensed the reality, and felt a definite need for a growth in population that could not be satisfied by their own natural increase, rapid as it was. The prevailing policy, therefore, was one of cordial welcome to new arrivals. Their preference was for persons from the home state, but they were not overly particular about origin, or about economic, moral, or even physical character. There thus grew up, particularly in the United States, the doctrine of "refuge for the downtrodden and oppressed," which gained in strength after the country had thrown off what it regarded as the yoke of tyranny.

As soon as one of these colonies became an independent state, all accessions from abroad, whether from the former home state or elsewhere, automatically fell into the category of immigration. The United States was the first country to take this step, and consequently it became the great original prototype of an immigrant-receiving country. For this and other reasons the study of immigration may be centered on this country.

Growth of Immigration

As the population of the Thirteen Colonies increased, as their economic life became more self-sufficient, and as they began to develop a group consciousness and a rudimentary nationality of their own, their attitude toward transoceanic accessions underwent a gradual change. They became less hospitable toward arrivals from foreign lands, and began to be resentful over the low quality of many of the contributions from the home state. But as long as they retained their subordinate status they could do nothing about it except protest. As mentioned above, colonies are always administered for the presumed welfare of the home state, and in this respect, as in others, England directed the affairs of her American colonies according to the contemporary theories of her own greatest profit. One effect of the success of the War of Independence was to put the control of immigration into the hands of the new nation. For the first three or four decades economic and political conditions, coupled with the limitations and hardships of oceanic travel, kept the actual immigration at a rather low figure, just how low we do not know, for no records were kept until 1820. By the third decade of the nineteenth century, however, the growing industrial and commercial life of the United States, supported by various other factors such as the close of the Napoleonic wars, brought an increase in the movement which passed the 100,000 mark in 1842. Following quickly after this, the famine in Ireland and the revolutionary upheavals on the Continent brought a sudden expansion of the current, until in 1854 it reached the vast total of 427,833. From this time on, with various great fluctuations, immigration to the United States mounted continuously until checked by the World War, constituting one of the most spectacular and significant sociological phenomena in all human history. From 1820 to 1930 the total inward movement amounted to 37,762,012, a shift of population absolutely unprecedented in volume, brevity of time, and ultimate consequences on human welfare and destiny.

Change in Type

Space is obviously lacking for even a superficial study of this great movement, and an abundance of reliable literature on the subject makes it unnecessary. Like other population movements, immigration abounds with demonstrations and illustrations of fundamental sociological laws. The interplay of cosmic and social forces and the reciprocal influence of the geographical and human environments, is particularly illuminating. There are also abundant data for the study of the effects of the contact of different cultures, races, and nationalities, as well as of the inception, methods, and objectives of social control. For about the first sixty years of official records the immigrants came mainly from the countries which had furnished the original colonists—England, Ireland, Scotland, and Germany—and from countries closely allied in culture and race, such as Sweden and Norway. But about 1880 a shift began to take place by which the sources of immigration were transferred more and more largely to the countries of southern and eastern Europe, such as Italy, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and the Balkan States in general. This "new immigration" represented primarily the Mediterranean and Alpine racial stocks with some Mongoloid infusion, as contrasted with the Teutonic, Nordic, or "Anglo-Saxon" stocks of the earlier streams, and also represented quite different nationalities, and cultural and economic backgrounds. This gave a new aspect to the vital question of assimilation. At about the same time a growing current of immigration from China began to arouse the interest and misgivings of the Pacific Coast, particularly California. As a result of a wave of opposition that was characterized more by violence and effectiveness than by fairness and international equity, this movement was definitely checked by the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Acts in 1882.

BEGINNING OF CONTROL. SELECTION

In the same year, the first general interference with the stream of European immigration was instituted. Previous to that time several of the states along the Atlantic seaboard had passed laws designed to protect themselves against the heavy burden of alien pauperism, crime, and disease, but one after another these had been declared unconstitutional. Now, at last, the federal government assumed control. The regulations imposed were not severe to begin with. The principle followed was that of selection, that is, of regulation on the basis of quality. There was no attempt to impose any restriction of numbers. The qualitative selection, moreover, was of a negative character; it aimed to exclude immigrants of certain undesirable classes, such as convicts, lunatics, idiots, or persons unable to take care of themselves without becoming public charges. A head tax of fifty cents for administrative expenses was imposed.

REASONS FOR CHANGE IN ATTITUDE

For our purposes, the important thing is to understand the reasons for this change of attitude. Why, after nearly a century of free immigration, did the United States government finally decide to set up a system of control? What change in the interests of society did this action register? Or was it merely a better understanding of interests that had been in existence from the beginning?

One thing is quite clear—up to the Civil War period there was no prevailing sense of population pressure, or any fear of overpopulation. The vast stretches of the Middle and Far

West were still largely vacant, and our great stores of natural resources had hardly been tapped. The growing industry of the East created a demand for skilled mechanicians and trained factory operatives, and the extensive building of roads, canals, and railroads furnished employment for large numbers of unskilled workers. If any of the older residents of the more thickly settled states began to feel themselves crowded—as many of them did—there was always the westward trail as a way of escape. In the literature of the first half of the nineteenth century it is impossible to find any representative expression of the fear of economic competition from immigrants. The rising tide of opposition to unregulated immigration rested on other grounds. The first of these, as already suggested, was the desperate physical, financial, mental, and moral condition of a large number of the immigrants. The shipping conditions at the time were incredibly bad. The immigrants were mostly carried in sailing vessels, and the voyage was a matter of weeks or even months. Dietary and sanitary conditions on board were of the most primitive character, and disease was rampant. Frequently half or more of the entire passenger list would die on the way over, and many of the remainder would be landed in a state of prostration. Some foreign countries, officially or unofficially, were using the new American nation as a dumping ground for the refuse of their jails and almshouses. The burden and expense of pauperism in the Eastern states were becoming intolerable. Frequently immigrants would be hauled directly from the ships to the poorhouses, some of them dying on the way. This was too heavy a price to pay for the economic advantages of foreign labor, especially as it did not seem to be intrinsically unavoidable.

Yet the earlier attitude still found its champions, as is indicated by the following remarkable outburst which was printed in 1855:

> What though the population which is annually cast upon American shores is all of the filthiest and most degraded kind! The farmer might as well complain of the black and reeking soil into which his seed is dropped, as the statesman

of such materials as these. . . . Let us welcome the houseless and the naked of every land to American shores; in the boundless forests of the north and the south there is room to make a home for them all. Let us invite the ill-fed and the starving of every grade to partake of American abundance; on the fertile fields of the west there grows corn enough to feed them all. Let us urge the oppressed and the down trodden of every name to the blessings of American freedom; the Star Spangled Banner is broad enough to cover, and the eagle that sits over it is strong enough to defend, them all.

The two other principal grounds for opposition were that many of the immigrants, particularly those from Ireland, were Roman Catholics, and that the naturalization laws gave the vote to foreigners much too easily. The Protestant tradition was still strong in the United States, as was also the feeling that civil liberty and the suffrage were boons for which hardships had been endured and blood shed by the Revolutionary fathers, and that they should not be too lightly conferred on later arrivals who had borne none of the brunt of the conflict either in person or vicariously through their ancestors. These two arguments reinforced each other on account of the widespread belief that Roman Catholicism in America represented a state within a state, and that when an adherent of that faith swore allegiance to the United States on the occasion of his naturalization he made a "mental reservation" in favor of the Pope. Out of these sentiments and beliefs arose the Native Americans and Know Nothing movements, which achieved considerable political importance.

BEGINNING OF ECONOMIC OPPOSITION

The current of immigration which had reached staggering proportions in the decades of the forties and fifties receded during the Civil War period, and consequently there was a lull in the agitation for federal immigration regulation. But as the postbellum era began to assume its distinctive features, and as immigration began to soar to even higher crests than before, there followed a recrudescence of opposition. And now a new element was added. A warning note began to be sounded concerning the prejudicial effect of unlimited increments of foreign labor, especially when they represented distinctly lower standards of living, upon the wages and living conditions of the American worker. This feeling was intensified and justified by a change that was taking place in the causes and motives of emigration, viewed from the European end. During the generations when the Thirteen Colonies and the new American nation represented a struggling young society, living on a primitive basis and enduring many deprivations, and when the perils and hardships of the voyage were so extreme, there was little economic appeal here to any well-established and reasonably prosperous denizen of any western European country. Only those whose lot was already desperate and hopeless could anticipate a sufficient improvement in their condition to induce them to face the hazards of migration. But there were many others whose sufferings were not economic, but social, religious, or political. To them, freedom and liberty were the lodestones, and they were willing to undergo some economic sacrifice if necessary in order to breathe the freer air of the new continent. Accordingly, there were two rather distinct elements in the antebellum migration, and the traditional attitude of the American people was affected more by the political and religious refugees than by the economic derelicts.

Change in Motivation

But as democratic institutions and religious autonomy became more firmly established in western Europe, and as pristine individual liberty, in accordance with a general principle of social evolution, was more and more subjected to societal restraint in the United States, the motive of escape from persecution or discrimination sank to an inferior position. At the same time, as the channels of communication and transportation began to reach further into the economically backward countries of Europe, reservoirs of emigration were tapped in which the customary standards of living were so low that an ordinarily prosperous workingman could hope to improve his condition materially by coming to the United States, even though he entered a lower occupational level when he got here. Moreover, there was developing a definite labor, or wage-earning, class in the United States, in conjunction with the expanding factory and machine industry. The powerful argument of the importance to American industry of a large and cheap foreign labor supply became well established, and American captains of industry flooded Europe with their labor scouts, trying to reach ever lower and cheaper sources of supply. From this time on, accordingly, economic arguments concerning immigration became increasingly predominant, the arguments ''pro'' stressing the needs of American industry, and the arguments ''con'' emphasizing the menace to American labor in the devastating competition of foreign standards of living.

Literacy Test

The history of immigration legislation in the United States illustrates admirably the principle, expounded years ago by A. V. Dicey,[5] that even in the most democratic states legislation lags behind public opinion by twenty or thirty years. Having adopted the principle of individual selection, the United States followed it for forty years. The list of excluded classes was enlarged and amplified until it constituted about as comprehensive a catalog of physical, mental, and moral deficiencies as one could wish to find. Its climax was reached in 1917 when a literacy test was added for all aliens, physically capable of reading, over sixteen years of age. The fight for the literacy test is an exceedingly interesting chapter in American social legislation. Long before it was adopted, there had developed a powerful sentiment and opinion in favor of quantitative restriction, that is, a numerical limitation of the immigrant stream, and there can be little doubt that much of the support of the literacy test was animated more by a conviction that it would operate to cut down immigration decidedly, particularly from certain countries, than by any certainty that the individual immigrant who can read is necessarily preferable to the one who cannot. But there seemed to be much more hope of securing some restriction by the extension of an accepted principle than by the introduction of a new and unprecedented principle. By the time the literacy test went into effect the actual flow of immigration had been drastically reduced by the disturbances of the World War, and the time never returned when the effects of this measure could be tested under customary conditions.

RESTRICTION

When conditions became partially stabilized after the cessation of hostilities, the immigration stream began to mount rapidly, and it became quite clear that within a year or two, if not checked, its volume would be limited only by the carrying capacity of the Atlantic steamers. But by this time, certain new motives were operative in the United States. The outlet of great areas of good free land in the West had long ago been closed. Technological improvements occasioned by the urgencies of war had made it possible to turn out larger quantities of goods with fewer laborers, and discharged veterans were returning by the hundreds of thousands to claim such jobs as were offered. Unemployment was becoming a national menace. The country as a society felt no need of more population. At the same time, the accentuated nationalism created by war conditions had produced a more critical, or even antagonistic, attitude toward foreigners in general, particularly aliens (foreigners who have not become citizens), and had stirred up a fanatically hostile attitude toward political doctrines not in harmony with American institutions or the Constitution of the United States, and toward those who espoused them. The country plunged into the Great Red Hysteria, with its wholesale deportations and persecutions of foreigners, and frequent violations of the law of the land in the name of justice. The grimly ironical spectacle arose of the very industries which had previously scoured Europe for ever cheaper labor supplies now posting notices on their employment offices that "Only American Citizens Need Apply." Even wider and deeper than this was the new appreciation of the danger to fundamental American institutions and national solidarity from great masses of unassimilated foreigners, however admirable might be their physical, mental, or moral characteristics as individuals, and also some misgivings about the beneficence of unregulated race mixture.

QUOTA LEGISLATION

All of this agitation, just or unjust, scientific or fanatical, unbiased or prejudiced, convinced Congress that some numerical limitation must immediately be placed on immigration, and in 1921 for the first time a quantitatively restrictive law was passed. It was a temporary measure. After some extension, the principle was embodied in permanent legislation in 1924. The method adopted was that of "quota regulation" on the "national origins" basis. Annual immigration was limited to a flat total of 150,000, which was distributed among the immigrant-sending countries in a ratio corresponding to the proportion of the total population of 1920 which could be attributed to each of those countries respectively. The purpose was so to regulate future immigration that it would not materially alter the proportional distribution in the American population of persons who were derived, either through their own immigration or that of their progenitors, from the different European countries. The effect was to produce a much greater proportional reduction in the annual contributions from southern and eastern Europe than from northwestern Europe. With the coming of the great depression the incentive to immigration largely disappeared. An executive order was issued making it very difficult for even those who wished to come to secure an immigrant visa, while at the same time living conditions became so unpleasant and precarious in this country that many foreigners preferred to take their chance in the old land. Thus eventually the outward flow considerably exceeded the intake, reversing the established direction of migration, and supporting the conclusion that recent immigration is primarily an economic phenomenon.

JAPANESE IMMIGRATION

Early in the present century a special situation arose on the Pacific Coast through the rapid increase of immigration from Japan. Like the Chinese, these quaint Orientals were at first welcomed, but as their numbers swelled, and their economic competition became more tangible, and the significance of race infiltration became more obvious, sentiment changed, and an opposition to them sprang up displaying many of the discreditable features of the earlier attacks on the Chinese. The matter was finally adjusted in 1907 by the famous "Gentlemen's Agreement," whereby Japan agreed to refuse passports to ordinary Japanese laborers. But a good deal of friction still ensued, due in part to a feeling on the part of Californians that Japan was following the letter of the compact more than the spirit. A similar threat of heavy immigration of Hindus was handled by the immigration authorities through the expedient of adjudging them all believers in polygamy, or likely to become a public charge, or both. Finally, when Congress passed the general immigration law of 1924 the whole matter was settled by refusing admission as immigrants to all persons not eligible to citizenship, that is, not members of the white or African races. The matter was badly handled diplomatically on both sides of the Pacific, and a great deal of bitterness was aroused. The difficulties of creating a well-informed and accurate public opinion were demonstrated in the gross misconceptions and misinterpretations displayed by many well-meaning American citizens, including numerous prominent journalists and other leaders of opinion. It is not improbable that some more satisfactory adjustment may be devised in time, but it is not likely that in the predictable future the doors will be opened to Orientals, even as narrowly as they are to the southern European peoples.

End of Immigration

Thus ended the great phenomenon of American immigration. The other great immigrant-receiving countries are following the same general course as the United States, with a degree of parallelism that shows that certain fundamental social forces are at work in them all. In a few more decades the whole era of immigration will have come to a close, for the simple reason that the conditions which created it, always transitory in their very nature, have come to an end. There will be diverse shifts of population between various countries, just as there have been and are among nations outside the great immigration currents, but the willingness to tolerate mass incursions of foreigners onto national territory cannot survive the development of conditions of overpopulation. It is highly improbable that any similar movement on a world scale will ever arise again, unless the rate of natural increase in some great country becomes so definitely a negative quantity that the fear of depopulation causes it to prefer foreign accessions to none at all. Whether such an outcome will ever be a reality, time alone can tell. It seems much more probable that with the new knowledge of larithmic science, any such danger will be apprehended in good season, and special sanctions will be devised to produce the desired increment from native sources.

With the cessation of immigration, the great phenomenon of migration will come to an end, just as dispersion did in an earlier epoch. Immigration is a movement corresponding to the industrial stage of cultural evolution. Whether the new power age will bring its own characteristic form of population movement cannot be foreseen with certainty. However, the probability is that the whole potent expedient of movement has practically run its course. In all its phases, it is fundamentally a function of the man-land ratio, and it appears now that this ratio is nearly enough equalized among all the nations of the world, or that alterations of it are so jealously guarded by the more fortunate nations, that no great mass movements of population, certainly no peaceable or semi-peaceable movements, are likely to recur within the predictable future. An immeasurably important factor is social evolution has departed, probably never to return.

EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION

The effects of immigration arise from shifts of population, from contacts of cultures or nationalities, and from the juxtaposition of races. The larithmic effects of such migration are quite generally misunderstood, even by semi-technical students of the subject. At first thought they might seem to be simple enough. It appears to be merely a matter of arithmetic. If ten thousand persons in a year migrate from one society to another, it would seem to mean a subtraction of ten thousand from one population and an addition of ten thousand to the other. And so it is in the immediate instance. But over a period of time the consequences may be entirely different. In the light of the established larithmic principles of population growth it is evident that when a society has reached the stage of either optimum population or overpopulation a further addition to population from foreign sources is at least as prejudicial to its standard of living as an equivalent increment from natural increase. And if a society is already restraining its own reproductivity in order to safeguard its standard, it is not likely to allow that standard to be reduced merely for the sake of having a host of foreigners added to the population. On the contrary, it will still further restrict its own procreation. In other words, when a balance between population and standard of living has been struck in any society, a moderate, regular stream of immigration will have the effect of checking native increase rather than of increasing the population, except in so far as the lower standard of the immigrants reduces the average standard of the whole society. The foreigners are substitutes for native population rather than additions to it. These principles, obviously, do not apply to an underpopulated society, where there is no pressure of population on the standard.

A correlative situation prevails in the sending country. Such a country is almost invariably overpopulated, that is, it has allowed its procreative impulses to infringe upon its standard of living. Now if such a country sends out regular yearly contingents of emigrants, even quite large ones, the expansive power of population, already under heavy restraint, will prove adequate to fill up the gaps as fast as they are made, and the population will remain the same, or even increase slightly. This can be illustrated by the use of our familiar chart.

CHART VIII



A REGULAR, MODERATE EMIGRATION DOES NOT REDUCE POPULATION A REGULAR, MODERATE IMMIGRATION DOES NOT INCREASE POPULATION

A wedge of population driven into the upper half of the circle cannot enlarge the entire circle, as it adds nothing to the two lower factors upon which the size of the circle depends. It must either reduce the native population (including foreigners already there) or lower the standard of living. Since the standard is already as low as the society will allow it to go for the sake of increased population, the incoming wedge must find a place in the segment of population without enlarging it. Conversely, a wedge withdrawn from an overpopulated society merely leaves a gap which is immediately filled up by the expansive power of the population without enlarging the segment representing the standard of living.

LARITHMIC LAW OF IMMIGRATION

The general law, therefore, may be stated somewhat as follows: Under ordinary conditions, a regular, moderate flow of immigration from one country to another does not increase the population of the receiving country, nor reduce the population, or alleviate the ills of overpopulation, in the sending country. A very drastic and sudden movement, on the other hand, may have the opposite effect on both countries. Thus there is abundant evidence that in the first years of this century, the emigration from Greece was so heavy that the country was actually being depopulated, and local districts in Italy had the same experience.

This law, paradoxical as it may seem at first, is accepted by practically all the impartial and objective students of migration and larithmics. In its application to the United States, it is frequently expressed in the assertion that this country today has no larger population than it would have had if not a single immigrant had been admitted from 1820 to the present. The special Commission of the Red Cross which was sent to China to study the famine conditions of 1928-9 made a remarkable and vivid statement of it:

> It is estimated that if all the ships in the world now engaged in passenger traffic on the seven seas were withdrawn from their usual routes and were devoted solely to transporting Chinese from their native land to other countries, they could not keep up with the growth of population.

INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

It is evident that the validity of this law has a profound bearing upon international obligations and ethical responsibilities in the matter of migration. It has been common for altruistic and liberal-minded persons to assert that a country like the United States has no right to reserve its advantages entirely for its own people, but should share them with the less fortunate of all lands, while spokesmen of such crowded lands as Japan assert that they have a right to demand some share in the thinly settled lands of such countries as Australia. It is clear that all arguments of this sort lose whatever force they might have as soon as it is realized that such a movement merely results in lowering the standard of living of the receiving country without raising that of the country of source, so that, while a few individuals may benefit, more individuals suffer, and mankind as a whole over the long stretch of time is worse off rather than better.

AMALGAMATION

The racial effects of immigration almost always express themselves eventually in amalgamation, that is, the mixture of the racial stocks concerned. There is scarcely an important case on record where two or more racial elements have lived in contact with each other for a period of centuries where some intermixture has not taken place. Racial antipathies, or national barriers of one sort or another, may prevent complete blending for a long time. But it is bound to go on progressively. This is one reason why there are so few pure races to be found in the world today. In the United States, the racial problem resulting from immigration has been wholly secondary to the nationality problem. With the virtual exclusion by law of the Mongolian and Malay races, and the absence from indigenous causes of any appreciable immigration from Africa, the bulk of the immigration to this country has been from European countries, where the racial stock is not sufficiently different from that of the original settlers of the country to constitute any serious problems. The real race problem in this country is the consequence of the special form of movement that may be called forced migration, or the slave trade. Aside from this, what usually passes for race feeling and race conflict in this country is really a matter of nationality.

ASSIMILATION

The contact of nationalities involved in immigration is a twofold one, the effect of immigrants on the receiving country, and the converse effect of returning emigrants on the country of source. This involves the whole question of social assimilation, which is a matter of great complexity and importance. True assimilation involves the transfer of nationality, and anyone who has grasped the real meaning of nationality will readily appreciate how fundamental the process is. Indeed, it is doubtful whether any immigrant who has changed his national environment after reaching maturity can ever possibly become fully assimilated to the new nationality, even under the most favorable circumstances. The primary reason for this is that most traits of nationality do not blend. You cannot mix religions, moral codes, family notions, dress, or even (under modern conditions) languages. The process of assimilation is therefore not one of gradual harmonization, but of abandonment and substitution. And the very nature of the nationality bond makes this a spiritually devastating process. What happens in the second and third generations is a matter of conditions, for assimilation is essentially a matter of the influence of the human environment on the individual. In actual life in the United States, the prevailing conditions have been such as to make the assimilation of even the second generation a very incomplete and inadequate thing. Through no fault of their own, or of their parents, the native-born children of foreign-born parents have shown themselves to be the most disorganized and maladjusted of any of the chief nativity groups. If, as there is some reason to believe, this situation is improving in recent years, it is a reflection of the better conditions incident upon the restriction of immigration. These facts assist in making a correct appraisal of the much-debated question of the influence of foreign immigration upon crime. No convincing evidence has ever been adduced to show that the foreign-born, in proportion to their total numbers, commit any more crimes than the natives. The second generation shows a marked disproportion. But the really serious way in which immigration increases crime is by destroying that national solidarity and responsiveness to common standards and sanctions that support the persuasive modes of social control, thus compelling society to fall back on the harsher methods of forcible control. It is only a matter of speculation what another decade or two of unrestricted immigration would have done to the American nationality, but the prospect is not alluring.

Urbanization

There are various minor forms of inter-societal migration, such as slavery, which well repay study. But our attention must now be turned briefly to the phenomena of intra-societal movement. The most important aspect of this in modern times is the movement from the country districts to the cities, commonly referred to as the process of urbanization. This is, apparently, an inevitable concomitant of the industrial and commercial developments that have marked the past century and a half. The increased use of machinery, factories, power, and mass production in general has called for a larger and larger proportion of the workers in concentrated residential units, while the great improvements in agricultural methods have allowed a progressively smaller proportion of the population to supply the foodstuffs and basic materials needed by society as a whole. Consequently, urbanization has displayed itself in all relatively modern societies, though it has been particularly marked in the United States. The extent of this change has already been noted.* This process has been a corollary of the great advance in the material standard of living of the country. Many of the instruments and services required for the elevation of the standard into the higher reaches above the subsistence level not only are the products of city activities but also can be enjoyed most fully only under urban conditions. On the other hand, urban residence imposes many sacrifices of fundamental enjoyments and pleasures. There is evidence to believe that urbanization, like technological advancement in general, has reached an excessive point and is contributing to the top-heavy character of the modern social structure. There is today an important and influential movement to bring about a reversal of the current.

Many excellent studies have been made recently of urban life and its problems, such as those of Davie, Carpenter, and Sorokin and Zimmerman. For the present, it still remains true that one who wishes to reach a position of eminence in any occupation or profession, whether it be business, finance, music, art, literature, religion, or almost even agriculture, is virtually forced to establish himself in an urban environment. And the same is emphatically true, for at least a part of the year, in the case of those who devote themselves to a life of pleasurable consumption. Here, once more, profound social ferments are at work, and it is impossible to predict what even the near future will bring forth. Many of the space- and time-reducing inventions which are characteristic of the age have the fortunate effect of transferring some of the city advantages into the country. But there are also improvements, such as park construction, elaborate water systems, and air conditioning, that bring some country blessings into the city. It can only be hoped that society will eventually display the intelligence and the grasp of scientific principles which will enable it to set up a salutary balance between these various interests, and enable all the people to enjoy to the fullest all the benefits that technology, invention, and discovery have to offer.

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* See p. 373.

It is also devoutly to be wished that between nations, the whole great phenomenon of migration, even in its much-reduced proportions, may be subjected to methods of control and direction which will be so scientifically conceived, and at the same time so directly centered on social betterment, as to cause this powerful instrument to subserve adequately the basic interest of welfare for the society of mankind.

CHAPTER XXVI

SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

Social engineering is the rational, scientific molding of the structural organization of society with the purpose of promoting social progress. Like progress, therefore, engineering involves the recognition of a goal or objective. Without such a well-defined objective to give direction, progress must be haphazard and fortuitous, and engineering is impossible. The distinction between those who foster social reform and those who promote social progress is essentially that between the technician and the engineer. The technician gets his patterns from the established norms of society. The engineer must create patterns out of the products of idealization on his own part or that of someone else. His task is to alter the terms of normality themselves by improving the aggregate structure and capacity for functioning of society.

CENTRAL OBJECTIVES

Where does the engineer get his objectives? Who sets the goals, who charts the general direction, for him?

It has been the task of philosophers from time immemorial to work out a formula for human progress, to indicate some tangible goal toward which human effort should be bent. Without attempting to examine their conclusions in detail, it may suffice to observe that probably no single term sums them up better than "happiness." But happiness is itself a complex concept, that leaves the way open for a number of more specific inquiries. What are the elements of happiness, and how are they related to one another? There will probably be general agreement that happiness is something more than mere enjoyment or pleasure. It is also something more than the absence of pain. Indeed, it is probable that a certain infusion of pain is essential to the realization of happiness in its fullest sense. Probably few persons, if given the opportunity to choose, would elect to go through life without the slightest contact with sorrow or suffering. That would be to miss something of the richness of experience. Perhaps a more suggestive expression of the concentrated goal is "realization of personality." Every individual is endowed with a certain capacity for experience, subjective and objective, painful and pleasurable. The possession of these capacities seems to be complemented with an intrinsic urge to realize them. It is as if a gifted musician were surrounded with dozens of instruments, all of which he knew he could play. He would want to have a try, at least, at all of them. He might prefer the tone or timbre or range of some more than of others. Certain ones might prove more congenial to his physical and temperamental make-up than others. But he would not be really satisfied until he had played them all, and he would not wish to feel that he had ever definitely bid farewell to any of them.

Personality

So it is with the human personality. Each one of us is conscious of capacities, abilities, potentialities, and we feel that we will never have really lived until we have had some experience of the meaning of them all. The flippant saying, "I'll try anything once," has a greater validity than is indicated on its face. One of the most appealing arguments for personal immortality is that every alert individual is conscious of the capacity to experience and accomplish much more than the finite limitations of life on this globe make possible. It is out of these capacities and potentialities that there arise the more detailed ultimate values to which frequent reference has been made in the preceding pages. It will bear emphasis that these are necessarily axiomatic. Their existence may be proved, but their legitimacy or justifiability cannot be proved. For to prove that a certain thing is, or is not, justifiable it is necessary to judge it by some other value, which simply means that the appeal is made to some more remote value that is considered more truly ultimate, but is no more provable. "If the salt have lost his savour, wherewith shall it be salted."

Reality and Measures

Mr. Bassett Jones, in the Preface to his book, "Debt and Production," says, "The entire investigation rests on Planck's dictum as to the nature of reality for science—'only that which is measurable is real.' "[1] Mr. Jones is an electrical engineer, and that definition of reality may be adequate for his practical purposes. He successfully planned the elevators in the tallest building in the world. But as a postulate of philosophy or social (as distinguished from physical) science Planck's dictum is sheer nonsense. For measurability implies a measure. And how shall the measure be measured? The ultimate measure is never measurable, for there is nothing further to refer it to. Thus, according to Planck's dictum, the real must in the end be measured by the unreal. Unreality determines reality. The true meaning of a measure is not in itself but in the thing measured. If I say, "It is a foot long," the sentence is utterly devoid of meaning until you know what is being measured. If it is a lead pencil you are mildly surprised, if it is a frog you are amazed. If it is a stick of candy you are pleased, if it is a motor-boat you know it is merely a toy. If it is a trout you believe it; if it is an ant you do not believe it. But if it is a foot-rule the sentence is meaningless. Reality is always actually in the value, and a measure is merely a convenient means for comparing one value with another value. A measure, consequently, is appropriate or valid only with respect to the values that it is capable of comparing. That, by the way, indicates the inherent weakness of a monetary system based on a fixed unit of gold. A gold dollar is really a measure of weight, but we use it as a measure of "economic value," that is, the desirability of goods and services. A gold dollar is stable as a measure of avoirdupois; it fluctuates disastrously as a measure of capacity to satisfy human wants.

Ultimates Immeasurable

Ultimate values, therefore, can never be measured, just as they can never be justified or unjustified. They simply *are.*

They are the great final continua upon which all social relationships and activities are based. The real significance of all social forms, of all social processes, of all programs, policies, movements, and ideals must in the last analysis be judged by them. There is, accordingly, no field for intellectual activity in attempting to prove or disprove the validity of these ultimate values, but there is an extensive and tremendously important field in attempting to discover their existence and nature. There can be no intelligent social engineering until the ultimate values of the society in question have been established, for without them there can be no determination of the direction of progress. Any individual of sufficiently high potential can initiate and direct social movement, but only one who understands ultimate values can guarantee that the movement will be progress.

STUDY OF PERSONALITY

The study of ultimate values must begin, at least, with the study of the human personality.[2] Its full capacities for enjoyment, for pain and pleasure, ecstasy and suffering, must be revealed. The possibilities of great symphonies of experiences must be discovered. The best uses of these resources within the limits of cosmic time and space must be explored. Such researches will establish the basis for rational and intelligent individual interests. Then the study must be extended to include the effects of various kinds of groups upon these capacities. It must be ascertained what aspects of self-realization are promoted by group associations, and by what types of groups. It must be discovered whether there are group satisfactions that are something more than the aggregation of the satisfactions of the component individuals, and, if so, how they are to be realized. Thus will be laid the foundation for scientific societal welfare interests.

SHIFT FROM PRODUCER'S TO CONSUMER'S PHILOSOPHY

It is a fact of the greatest significance that researches of this kind have not only never been undertaken on any comprehensive scale, but that they have scarcely been thought of.

Even the most civilized and scientific societies have taken it for granted that men were endowed by nature with the ability to get the maximum satisfaction out of whatever means of enjoyment the technical efficiency of their culture might provide, without any study or training. Science has never devoted itself to the cumulative development of an art and a technique of enjoyment as it has of material production. The primary reasons for this are not far to seek. For all but an infinitesimal fraction of the span of human existence man's great concern has been to get a living out of the earth. We have seen how arduous were the terms of existence on all the earlier stages of cultural evolution. The full exertion of man's energy and ability would scarcely suffice to keep soul and body together. The supplies that he derived from a niggardly environment were of the sort necessitated by the basic requirements of his physical organism. There was no thought of a surplus that could take the form of elaborate comforts or luxuries. Even when he had climbed well above the marginal level of subsistence, and had accumulated a productive capacity far exceeding the demands of simple maintenance, the wants that asserted themselves were of a simple and spontaneous sort—a larger and more weather-tight dwelling, finer weapons, glittering ornaments, more abundant clothing, rare additions to the food supply. For all of these he was dependent primarily upon his own exertions, and the amount of them that he could enjoy was directly proportional to his energy and skill in getting. Accordingly, mankind as a whole became thoroughly permeated and dominated by what may be called a "producer's philosophy." Not only were the survival and welfare of the individual dependent on his own wealth-producing activities, but the progress and prestige of society required the full exertion of the productive capacities of all its members. There thus developed a body of mores, with an explicit set of virtues and vices, based upon the admirableness of wealth-creation and wealth-saving. Industry and thrift came to be regarded as intrinsically meritorious, and idleness and sloth were classed as vices on a par with gluttony, drunkenness, gambling, and licentiousness. Work was exalted as a virtue in its own right—one of the cardinal virtues. It was extolled by poet, philosopher, and prelate, as well as by the hard-headed man of business. This attitude has prevailed down to our very day,[3] and has found embodiment in a number of those stereotyped maxims, the potency of which we have already noted. "If any would not work, neither should he eat." "For Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do." "The right to work." Carlyle described work as "the grand cure of all the maladies and miseries that ever beset mankind."

Like most other important sanctions, work received strong religious endorsement as expressed in numerous hymns. "In work that keeps faith sweet and strong." "Work for the night is coming."

Glorification of Production

The dawn of the Industrial and Commercial Revolutions, accordingly, found the western mind thoroughly prepared to seize with avidity upon the new instruments of production, and to regard machines, engines, and factories as almost divine in nature and origin. Even the accompanying child labor was regarded by many prominent persons, including Alexander Hamilton, with profound admiration. The increases in productive power introduced by these new devices were so prodigious that it is no wonder that men were hypnotized by them. Having been trained by ages of experience and precept into the belief that welfare was directly proportional to the amount of material output, they naturally jumped to the conclusion that they were now on the very threshold of the millennium. Coming just at the time when the vast resources of the American continents were being opened up to exploitation, the new era seemed to offer unlimited hope of material enlargement. The only thing that seemed capable of retarding it was a deficiency of industry on the part of man himself. Linked up with the doctrine of laissez-faire, this apotheosis of production determined the basic principle of the Classical Economic system, which, according to James MacKaye, was expounded in a standard textbook in an argument that might be summed up thus: "Which will be the better off, a people who have plenty, or a people who have not? . . . It is quite evident that the people who have plenty will be the better off. . . . For a people to have plenty they must produce plenty, and to produce plenty they must spend plenty of time in producing. The more time they spend in producing the greater will be their plenty. Ergo, for a people to be as well off as possible they must spend as much time as possible in production. Q.E.D."[4]

Producer Attitude

The custom became established of approaching every economic proposal from the standpoint of the producer, and of discussing it in terms of its effect upon production. Was it proposed to erect a tariff wall? All the popular arguments were based upon the salutary effect upon national trade and industry. Was the restriction of immigration being debated? The matter could be settled by showing how dependent production was upon a continuous inflow of cheap foreign labor. Was attention called to the low rates of wages in various occupations? It was sufficient to point out that wages were an important element in the cost of production, and could not be raised without hampering business. The producer's philosophy was epitomized in numerous pseudo-patriotic slogans: "The Nation's Business," "A Favorable Balance of Trade," "The Needs of Industry."

The hero worship of the day centered upon the capitalist, the big business man, and the captain of industry. Since enlargement of the productive unit, and expansion in general, were characteristic of the new processes there developed a cult of bigness. Size became an ultimate value and was worshiped for its own sake. Megalomania became the typical western psychosis.

Disregard of True Objectives

In all this mad enthusiasm for rapid quantity production the real meaning of wealth and the purpose of production were largely lost sight of. It was forgotten that the ultimate values are served through consumption, and that production is merely a means to an end. The consumer and his interests received scant consideration. The concept of the market was governed by the old Classical doctrines of the illimitability of human wants and the impossibility of general overproduction. When, in the post-War period, the possibilities of excess productive capacity began to be realized, the consumer was at last brought into the limelight, but only as an accessory to maximum production. He was recognized as an indispensable factor in business prosperity. Any reluctance to buy on his part was regarded as sheer stubbornness, to be whipped into activity by high-pressure salesmanship, and credit devices such as instalment buying. Thus Ralph Borsodi, speaking for the manufacturers, said, ''No matter how much the consumer who can afford to pay may resist, he must be made to eat more, to wear out more clothes, to take more drugs, to blow out more tires. He must consume, consume, consume, so that our industries may produce, produce, produce.[5] And Garet Garrett piously observed, ''To be able to say in the evening, 'I have consumed more today than I consumed yesterday'—this now is a duty the individual owes to industrial society.''[6] Fancy the *duty* of consumption!

INVERTED PHILOSOPHY

This is one of the most remarkable philosophical inversions that ever governed an entire era. Inevitably, a society controlled by such a distortion of reality becomes itself twisted and deformed. Every part of its structure is put under strain, and all its functioning is deranged. One of the few compensations for the prolonged miseries of the great depression is that the consumer has at last been brought into his own, at least partially. Practically all advanced thinkers now recognize production as merely an intermediary between interest and realization. The satisfaction of consumptive needs is seen to be the only true guide to the organization of production. It is realized that consumption, as well as production, takes time, and that a well-ordered economic system is one that strikes such a balance between time spent producing and time spent consuming that the maximum satisfaction may be derived during the hours of enjoyment out of the product created during the hours of work. Just where that balance would stand in the contemporary United States it is impossible to say positively. But it is probable that it would not require an average of more than twenty hours' work a week for the normal productive population. This decision is affected by the growing recognition that the realization of personality depends on much more than material supplies. "Man doth not live by bread alone." It seems probable that when there has been adequate research into the technique of enjoyment it will be revealed that the fullest satisfaction requires a relatively much smaller reliance upon material equipment than we now assume.

Prices and the N.R.A.

But the tenacity of the old viewpoint, and the partial character of the victory of the consumer's philosophy, are indicated by the fact that the recovery program of the F. D. Roosevelt administration, although inspired by the most liberal outlook that had animated the White House for decades, was nevertheless formulated in the characteristic features of productionism. One of its central objectives was the raising of prices so that businesses might recover, regardless of the fact that rising prices meant rising costs of living for the consumer. Some lip service was given to the consumer's needs, but the practical provisions for meeting them were so meager that more than one official of the administration resigned his position in protest. In general, the N.R.A. attacked the problem at precisely the wrong end, just as all programs inspired by the producer's philosophy must inevitably do. It failed to realize that the one indispensable step to recovery and permanent prosperity was the great increase, and more equitable distribution, of consumer purchasing power. Another weakness of this program was that it perpetuated the old principle of conflict as the corner stone of industrial relationships. It sought to equalize the terms of the conflict by strengthening the trade unions, but that simply meant that when the conflict came to an acute issue, as it was bound to do in spite of governmental warnings to the unions that they must abandon their weapon of the strike, it would be more bitter and destructive than ever.

The complete lack of a general understanding of the bases of societal welfare, and the need of research in the field, are evidenced by the fact that, whereas in 1933 the accepted means to prosperity was the raising of prices, a quarter of a century earlier the country was convinced that the outstanding cause of distress was "the high cost of living."

REFORM EASIER THAN ENGINEERING

Until such research has been accomplished, neither the practical application of sociological theory, nor even the formulation of that theory itself, can be wholly adequate scientifically. In the meantime, engineering programs must rest upon such rule-of-thumb measures of accepted social values as may be derived from a common-sense, objective reading of public opinion and sentiment. It needs no demonstration to establish the societal interest in health, reasonable longevity, intellectual soundness, wholesome recreation, etc. At the present time, the resources of the social engineers seem to be sufficiently taxed by the necessity of forestalling complete social disorganization and the collapse of civilization. The tasks of reform and of engineering are distressingly mixed, and in some respects are at odds with each other. The function of reform is largely negative, the prevention of pain, suffering, and injustice. It is partly for this reason that it is much simpler than the task of engineering, and has had an earlier development. The recognition of evils is much easier than the creation of ideals. We have already seen this principle exemplified in the difference between negative and positive eugenics. The removal of young children from mills and factories, the elimination of intolerable working conditions, the requirement of safety devices on machines and railroad trains, the establishment of safeguards against industrial disease and accident, the eradication of windowless rooms and back-yard privies in the city slums, the provision of a rest period for working women at the time of childbirth, all the minutiae of typical social legislation are easily demonstrable measures of humanitarianism which will not be permanently denied in an even moderately sensitive society.

Censorship

The method characteristically employed by modern societies to deal with these obtrusive evils has been essentially that of censorship in its broadest sense. Ordinarily this term is used to refer to the control of activities or agencies that have some definitely moral implications, particularly sex-moral, and especially in the fields of art or recreation. But the principle is applicable, without essential change, to a much wider range. The essence of censorship is the establishment of a minimum level below which competition will not be allowed to take place, but above which competition is assumed as the dominating principle. It is socially justified by the existence of a principle, very similar to the familiar Gresham's Law in the monetary field, under the operation of which the bad units in a given area of competition tend to drag all the others down to their level. In the matter of housing, for example, under absolutely free competition the type of apartments available in any general price range will tend to be that which the least conscientious and most grasping builders see fit to erect. In manufacturing, the most greedy and unscrupulous operator will be able to set standards which the more socially minded can hardly escape. The problem becomes particularly urgent and particularly difficult in the recreational field through the process of commercialization. The subjection of the art and recreational interests to the profit motive produces peculiarly unfortunate results. Any restriction based on moral grounds is opposed on the pretext that art must be free and unhampered, while any objection to the artistic quality of the offering is met by the assertion that this is recreation, and the people must be given what they want and will pay for. These considerations obviously apply especially to such agencies as the movies, the theatre, and the self-styled ''art magazines.'' In these fields, as well as in commercial dance halls, recreation centers, excursion boats, etc., it is virtually impossible for the conscientious purveyors, without social support, to meet the competition of those who offer inducements of a socially undesirable sort without sinking to their level. Why it is that the people must be protected against their own weaknesses, why they should not be left free to pay their money for whatever forms of recreation they may choose, and others left free to provide it, are questions too involved to be entered into here. The important fact is that society has decided that here is a field where complete freedom is not socially salutary. The final answer is found in the distinction between individual interests and societal interests.

Evils of Laissez-Faire

It is self-evident that all interference with free competition is inherently repugnant to the laissez-faire principle. As a consequence, all efforts at censorship, whether in the form of child labor laws, industrial compensation laws, regulation of wages, and hours and conditions of labor, or tenement-house regulations have had to fight an up-hill battle in an era dominated by that doctrine. Practically every such "interference of government in business" has been opposed by the interests concerned. In innumerable cases, probably the majority, a restriction imposed in the name of humanity, justice, or social utility has proved in the end to be good business, increasing the product more than the expense. But it has proved very difficult for business to learn this lesson, and only the power of the state has proved adequate to fix the minimum level below which competition could not fall because it would not be tolerated. The "dumb-bell tenement" in New York City is an excellent example. It resulted from certain housing legislation which was intended to bring improvement. But the builders soon discovered the poorest kind of tenement that could be constructed under the law, and for years virtually no other tenements were built in the city.[7]

Conflict between Reform and Engineering

The conflict between social reform and social engineering in such a time as the great depression arises out of the principle, already explained, that steps to individual improvement are not always conducive to societal welfare. There is a saying current in the social work field, with reference to certain types of cases, that "it must get worse before it can get better." The same thing is true in the societal area, but it is difficult for social workers to realize it. At the time of this writing it seems clear that one of the great dangers of the N.R.A. and related programs is that they will be just effective enough to give the old economic system a new lease of life, and enable it to struggle forward for a few years more and gain enough momentum so that when the next crash comes, as it inevitably will, the disaster will be even more devastating than the present.

Passing of Liberalism

It is difficult for even the liberal mind to realize that the very animating spirit of the traditional economic order has proved incongruous under modern conditions. When it does realize it, it ceases to be liberal and becomes radical. Many observers have been puzzled or distressed over the decline of liberalism within the last few years. The explanation is that liberalism is essentially a reform attitude. During the nineteenth century, when the great task of humanitarianism was to lop off one after another of the recurring evils of the so-called "capitalistic" system, and to preserve the maximum degree of normality in the rapidly evolving economic structure, liberalism was a salutary and indispensable aspect of social thought and feeling. But now that the culmination of this evolutionary stage has ended the day of reform, and ushered in the dawn of engineering, liberalism has become feeble and inadequate. Only radicalism, in the sense of a demand for sweeping changes, can meet the situation. It may be that things will have to get a good deal worse before the nature of the malady will become so clear that society will be prepared to see that they get better. We can only hope that this vision will come before civilization has gone down into complete disruption.

ECONOMIC ANACHRONISM

One need not be a complete economic determinist to recognize that one of the most influential factors in our social disorganization is the prevailing economic order. The central activating principle of that order is the competitive profit motive. It has already been shown that this principle involves an intrinsic contradiction, that a system guided by it is relying on a mathematical and physical impossibility. The only wonder is that it could have operated as long as it has, that the collapse did not come sooner. The basic explanation, of course, is found in the extraordinary material munificence of the nineteenth century, to which we have repeatedly referred. Further explanations are furnished by the principle, also noted above, that the features of a transition period are often very different from those of the succeeding period, and by the fact that having emerged from the throes of the development of the machine age we now suddenly find ourselves plunged into the initial stages of the power age.[8]

UNBALANCED PRODUCTION

The outstanding feature of our dilemma is an excess of productive power. That this should be a source of poverty and suffering may seem paradoxical in the extreme. It can be understood only in the light of the traditional producers' philosophy, as, indeed, it could be possible only under the domination of that philosophy. In an economic system actuated by the profit motive, an excess of product is judged, not by the intrinsic needs of consumers, but by the possibility of selling the product in the existing market at a profit satisfactory to the owners of businesses. Superfluity is therefore determined, not by consumer needs, but by consumer purchasing power. And since owners, in their eagerness to reduce the costs of production, are continually introducing measures that have the effect of curtailing consumer purchasing power, it is very easy to turn out more goods than can be sold at the anticipated profit. During the decades of the development of the existing industrial system, a large part of this surplus productive capacity was devoted to the creation of new plant. This occasioned a demand for more labor, and augmented purchasing power. But eventually this developmental period had to come to an end. The existing plant was more than ample to turn out all the goods that could be sold at a price that would yield a profit. The wealthy classes of society had incomes far in excess of their own effective consumer demands. Their desire was to increase their wealth, and their sources of further income, by investment. But investment means the creation of additional wealth-producing instruments, and there is no purpose in creating these if their products cannot be sold at a profit. Hence the modern impasse.

Limits of Plutocracy

This is the nemesis of the capitalistic system. The basic contradiction inherent in it has at last exhausted every alleviating recourse, and has brought society face to face with what seems to be a definite law of cosmic existence, viz., that in the present stage of social evolution it is physically impossible for certain individuals to be indefinitely richer than other individuals. When the limits of the consumptive capacities and inclinations of the favored classes have been reached, the effort to pile up wealth to unlimited further heights plunges the whole of society into calamity.

Shift from Deficit to Surplus Economy

The suddenness with which modern societies have passed from what Simon Patten called a "pain or deficit economy" into a "pleasure or surplus economy" has left us dazed and bewildered, without chart or compass. Having built up a set of social forms and sanctions that for ages were dominated by the necessity of getting a mere living, and then for generations by the aspiration for achieving private profits, we now find ourselves in an era where private profits on the assumed scale are impossible, but where an abundant social surplus is technologically entirely within our reach. But we completely lack the social mechanism for making that surplus a reality. The traditional dogmas, philosophical precepts, and guiding principles have outworn their usefulness and we have not discovered anything else to take their place. ''Honesty'' is doubtless still a social asset where it can be found, but ''industry and thrift'' deserve to be put on part time.

Threefold Task of Engineering

The immediate problem of social engineering is therefore threefold. First, it must achieve a sufficient understanding of ultimate values, and the possibilities of satisfaction inherent in the human personality, so that it can determine in what directions, and toward what objectives of material equipment, the new productive capacities of society are to be employed. Second, it must discover some means of reorganizing the economic resources and structure of society so that its productive activities may function toward the maximum realization of these personality potentialities of the entire population instead of toward the pecuniary profits of a few. Third, it must establish agencies for the training of individuals so that they will be competent to attain the realization of their own personalities to a far greater extent than at present.

Need of Research in Consumption

The last of these requirements probably needs especial development. The prevailing assumption, which may seem almost axiomatic to many persons, is that the human individual is capable of deriving the maximum enjoyment from all the sources available to him without any experience on his own part, or any guidance and training on the part of others. This is a serious error. It is just as absurd to assume that innate, hereditary appetites and impulses, that have changed little since the days of the Cro-Magnon, will enable an individual to get the fullest satisfaction out of an automobile, a radio, or an operatic performance as to assume that inborn mechanical aptitudes will fit him to operate a steam shovel or build a battleship. It is just as erroneous, though less obviously so, to assume that educational and developmental processes which have been largely centered on an occupational objective, and have been entirely dominated by a producer's philosophy, will automatically train the individual for the efficient enjoyment of cultural instruments and opportunities.

The necessity of research along these lines, and of the application of the results of such research, is made doubly urgent by the prospect of the greatly enlarged amount of leisure that should be available to every individual in a society that has adequately solved the problems of the reorganization of production for social welfare instead of private profit, and the apportionment of productive resources in accordance with the maximum capacities for enjoyment of its people. As already suggested, when the balance is struck in the future between the most efficient use of time in producing and in consuming, it is beyond doubt that only a fraction of the twenty-four hours will be devoted to production, that is, to work engaged in for the sake of what it turns out. There will almost certainly be a great deal of activity expended in pursuits which are now called work, but which will then be followed for their own sake. Even now, there is almost no occupation that is pursued by the many as work that is not also indulged in by the few for pleasure—gardening, carpentry, painting (house, portrait, sign, or face), stock-raising, manufacture, photography, navigation, electrical engineering, fishing, etc., etc. There is scarcely any greater and more universal satisfaction than is found in putting the imprint of one's personality upon materials of one sort or another, especially those of a durable nature. But so much of this sort of things has been done in the past under the urge of stern necessity and under conditions of restraint and routine that we have lost sight of the possibilities of gratification involved. Leisure filled with manifold and diversified opportunities for self-realization will no longer be just spare time, to be "killed." But the interest of societal welfare will be realized to the full only as we are able to educate ourselves to utilize these opportunities.

Possibility of an Efficient Society

This brings us to the consideration of the second aspect of the task of social engineering, mentioned above. Is it possible to envision the changes in the general framework of society, particularly in its productive features, that will be effective in diverting the emphasis and objective from private profit to social welfare? According to what plans and specifications can the social edifice be reconstructed so as to adapt it to the vigorous growths that have developed within it? Is a measurably happy state of human society possible? These are questions which have occupied the thought of philosophers from time immemorial, and of social scientists ever since there were any. The answers have been various. Malthus, it will be recalled, decided that a perfected state of human society was an impossibility. But he was reckoning on the unrestrained biological tendency of the species to reproduce. That is now being rapidly brought under rational control, and there is reason to anticipate that in the near future that particular barrier to well-being will be largely eliminated in western societies. Indeed, it has already been so reduced in gravity that it is now subordinate to the general economic structure. Can anything be done to modernize that, and if so, what?

The depiction of imaginary Utopias has long been a favorite pastime of venturesome minds, but within the last few years it has taken on a distinctly urgent and practical aspect. Very unimaginative and hard-headed individuals now realize that undirected social evolution has manifested unbearable potentialities for continuing and cumulative disaster. The years 1932 and 1933 were marked by a flood of "plans" for the revision of the economic features of the social structure. Although varying widely in details, and in degrees of fantasy and ingenuity, they may be roughly divided into two classes. The first includes those which aim to leave the general framework of the economic system unchanged, that is, which contemplate a productive mechanism in which the main dynamic is the profit motive, and where the relationships of the various factors of production to each other are still based on conflict and competition. They seek to extirpate the grosser evils by drastic regulative measures. They therefore belong logically in the category of social reform. The more convincing examples of this type recognize that prosperity and efficiency can be secured only through a much more even distribution of consumer purchasing power. This they seek to achieve in various ways—by an arbitrary limitation of profits, by heavily graduated income and inheritance taxes, by legal minimum wages and maximum hours, and by diverse restraints upon free competition. The N.R.A. program is a measure of this type. This is the sort of proposal that would have been acclaimed by the liberal groups of the nineteenth century. If initiated in the days of exuberant prosperity it might have had some effect in postponing the day of the collapse of the old system. But it is not in keeping with the boom spirit to inaugurate severe restrictions. At any rate, it was not done. Now there is very good reason to conclude that it is too late for this kind of remedy.

Twilight of Reform

The plans that fall under the head of social engineering are animated by the conviction that the day of reform is over, and that only sweeping modifications in the very framework of the economic edifice can provide the setting for real prosperity and general well-being. In this category, the proposals that conform most closely to scientific indications are those that see the root of the evils in the system of private ownership of businesses, and the operation of them for private profit. They see no way of controlling the profit motive adequately to avoid disaster as long as private ownership of businesses survives, especially as a profit-driven economy has demonstrated itself to be autocatalytic. There is nothing fundamentally new about this concept. Not only has the communal ownership of the basic instruments of production been frequent, if not general, on some of the earlier levels of civilization, but numerous portrayers of imaginary commonwealths have constructed societal edifices in which group ownership was a significant feature. More recently Karl Marx and his followers have given concrete form to the ideal in the guise of what is commonly referred to in general terms as Socialism. This has been an important body of thought for three-quarters of a century, and, like all strong currents of thought, has exerted an influence on economic and political developments far more diversified than its conspicuous manifestations. The great Russian venture under the Soviets is the most spectacular consequence up to date.

Marxism

But all formulated doctrines are the products of their own age, and suffer with the course of time and change. If they are based on essential verities, their fundamentals may hold good for a long time, but their detailed features are bound to become incongruous and anachronistic, if not actually untrue. Marxian socialism is no exception to this rule. In spite of his original outlook, and his unconventional interpretation and application, Karl Marx was essentially a Classical Economist. His basic analysis of economic factors and relationships did not differ significantly from those of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill. He was overimpressed with the importance of capital. He had no adequate conception of the nature of profits. He had no comprehension of ownership as a separate and unique factor in production. And he could have no idea of the baleful potentialities of the corporate form of business ownership, as that feature of the modern economic landscape had hardly begun to develop when the Communist Manifesto was written. As a consequence, there developed one of those disturbing lags to which reference has already been made. The accepted formulation of the socialist ideal got left far behind the relentless march of overt fact and theoretical interpretation, and when the time finally arrived that the "capitalistic" system had proved its futility and the world was clamoring for a practical plan of communal participation in production, the spokesmen of the social ideal had nothing appropriate and adequate to offer.

Capitalism

The very term capitalistic, as applied to the prevailing order, is a misnomer, and a source of confusion, misunderstanding, and obstruction. A capitalistic system, correctly interpreted, is one in which the dominating or characteristic factor in production is capital. Its correlatives are a labor system as we look backward and a power system as we envision the future. We have seen how the emergence of capital to a commanding position gave form and color to the nineteenth century. But socialists have never objected to the *use* of capital. Neither Karl Marx nor any important member of his school has advocated the abandonment of capital as a central factor in production, and a return to the old handicraft system of production. There are, to be sure, champions of precisely this doctrine. Probably the most conspicuous is Mahatma Gandhi, whose favorite symbol, the spinning wheel, signalizes his abhorrence of machines and their products. In the United States, also, there are many who think our ills would be alleviated, if not cured, by a return to a simplified economic organization, stressing the human, as contrasted with the mechanical, contributions to production. But these are not socialist doctrines. Witness the leading exponents of practical socialism, the Russians, who, in the pursuit of the communist ideal, have shown themselves ready to endure severe hardship and deprivation in order that their society might build up a huge equipment of capital in its most modern and elaborate forms. What socialism objects to is not the use of capital, but its private ownership. The existing system, considered as an antithesis to socialism, should be characterized, not as capitalism, but as individualism, and specifically, as individualistic capital-ownership.

But, even so corrected, the socialistic ideal is still out of date. For, as our analysis has already shown, it is not the ownership of capital that is the characteristic modern degenerative principle, but the ownership of businesses. If society owned all the businesses, it would not make a great deal of difference who owned the capital. Furthermore, in the coming age, the ownership of capital is going to be much less important than the ownership of power.

Communalized Business

It is not a task of superhuman difficulty to visualize the broad features of the communal ownership of businesses. The land and the capital might, or might not, still be owned by individuals, in whole or in part, and hired out to society. Individuals would still be the owners of their own persons, and would sell their services as laborers or managers to the community. But the businesses would be owned by the community, and with this ownership would go the control and direction of business, and the ownership of the product. The profit motive would be eliminated, as there would be no purpose in the community making profit out of itself for itself. Society would therefore be in a position to coordinate its productive resources, and distribute the various factors, in such a way as to promote the general social welfare. Industry could be viewed as a whole, and certain portions of it could be run at a loss provided other portions could be made to pay the difference, just as under private ownership a railroad can run its passenger trains at a loss if the freight service makes a sufficient gain, and the Post Office is not disturbed by a deficit in the second class department provided the first class shows a corresponding surplus. There need be no unemployment, for the total labor force could be kept busy just long enough to establish that equable balance between time spent producing and time spent consuming of which we have already spoken. The fundamental inconsistency of the individualistic-ownership system would be eliminated, for, with the profit motive removed, the total cost of production would always be precisely equaled by the total purchasing power of the community. With unlimited taxing power at its command, the central government could correct any socially undesirable inequalities in income.

Difficulties of Realization

All this is relatively simple. But when it comes to filling in the details of the sketch, difficulties multiply. The familiar questions are always raised: How will wages be determined? Who will assign jobs? Who will collect the garbage, and who will hunt the foxes? If things are run by a committee, will not the competition for places on the committee be worse than the present competition for profits? How about graft and nepotism? Would we not all be reduced to the status of virtual state slavery? Is not government operation inevitably inefficient? Obvious answers, phrased Yankee fashion in counter questions, to some of these questions suggest themselves. How many years of desperate depression are required to explode the myth of the efficiency of individualistic, competitive business? Is not the chief source of graft today the linkage between big business and government? Is there likely to be any more nepotism under government ownership than there is now under private ownership? Is it worse to be a slave to a governmental system of which you are a part, and which you help to control, than of an intangible economic system over which neither you, nor anybody else, seems to have any rational control?

SOCIALISM *vs.* INDIVIDUALISM

It is not in keeping with our general purpose to enter into a detailed examination of socialist programs, and the arguments for and against them, nor to seek to differentiate between the various exponents of the central socialistic ideal, farther than to note that the essential difference between the two most important representatives, the Socialists proper and the Communists, is one of method and tempo rather than of final objective. What concerns us is to seek to discover what are the actual impediments to such a degree of socialization as can be proved to be really consistent with the nature of economic forces and relationships. There are, of course, the obvious barriers of inertia, habit, fear of change, and lack of understanding that always impede engineering projects that involve any large amount of imagination, information, and venturesomeness. But beyond and beneath these there seem to be two outstanding obstacles. Both are of an ideational character. One is the old doctrine of laissez-faire and the beneficence of unregulated, self-centered, self-seeking competition. We have seen enough of the workings of this dogma to justify the prediction that future historians will recognize it as one of the most baleful philosophic generalizations that ever cursed mankind. The other is the closely related doctrine of individual liberty which is closely affiliated with the equally antiquated concept of "natural" rights. The tenacity with which many persons cling to the individual concept of liberty, in the face of its demonstrated inapplicability to modern conditions, is evidence of its close relationship to some central value cherished by the generality of mankind. Such a force has to be reckoned with. It is not enough to assert, as has been done with much lucidity, that the notion of the individual is sheer myth,[9] nor even to point out that, whatever reality there may have been in the past to the conception of liberty as an attribute of the individual, it no longer holds good, and that the only kind of liberty that is possible today is social liberty, that is, the liberty to choose and determine the kind of a society you want to live in. The fact remains, that so long as a large proportion of the members of society derive satisfaction from the belief that there is liberty for them in a certain form of social organization, that in itself constitutes a value, which is not to be ignored in plans for the promotion of societal welfare.

VARIETIES OF SOLUTION

In just what ways different societies will work out this knotty problem time alone can tell. The evidence all points to the rapid emergence of various forms of communal ownership. Russia has provided a laboratory experiment that can be of inestimable value to the other nations of the world, if they will but interpret it objectively and dispassionately. In some cases, changes will probably be made with sweeping rapidity; in others, the process will be more gradual. Some societies may profit by the counsel of scientific social engineers, and achieve the transition with some degrees of tranquillity. Others may undergo transformation only by the throes of violent revolution. One thing is certain—if social forces actually in operation have started a sequence that must lead to the extension of communal ownership and responsibility, any reactionary effort to dam the current of events must inevitably operate to store up force so that when the cataclysm does come it will be just that much more devastating.

Individualism in Consumption

One method of easing the transition is open to society in its educative aspects. People can be taught to understand that their sense of the importance of independence in productive activities is part of the outworn producer's philosophy. The really important thing, from the point of view of human satisfaction, is independence and abundance in consumptive activities. If, in the future economy, the average individual need spend only twenty hours a week in wealth-producing activities, it will make relatively little difference whether he is his own boss, or whether he works for a corporation or for the state, provided that during the remainder of the time he may be free to devote himself to self-realizing activities under the most favorable auspices, and in ways dictated by his own unhampered choice and inclinations.

Other Engineering Tasks

It is in the field of economic relationships, perhaps, that the need of scientifically engineered reorganization is most conspicuous, and also the general line of progress most clearly delineated. But there are various other departments of the social edifice that must also be thoroughly reconstructed. Mention need only be made of the political, the familial, and the recreational. In all of these, the fundamental engineering approach is the same, and the principles that must guide an intelligently self-conscious society are harmonious. The standards of scientific applied sociology govern them all.

Determination of Values

Coming back, now, to the first task of social engineering, the determination of ultimate values, we find ourselves on the borderland of other sciences or disciplines. Social science can employ itself in the discovery of the values that are actually recognized and cherished in existing societies. These can be ascertained by the study of art, literature, legislation, religion, and of the various activities engaged in by individuals and the agencies constructed and maintained by society. As already suggested, there are various common-sense values about which there can be no doubt, and which are nevertheless so largely unrealized as to leave vast scope for the work of engineers as well as reformers. As long as sixty out of every thousand children die in the first year of their lives, and half of the deaths of women in childbirth are preventable, and the expectation of life in the upper age groups is becoming less, and tens of thousands of city children have only the streets to play in, and there are wars and rumors of wars, and the gangster and the racketeer flourish, while the population of institutions for the socially inadequate increases decade by decade, purposeful social effort need not be deterred by a lack of knowledge about the more abstruse values. Yet all values, even the most remote, are a part of the problem. For the determination of them, however, we perhaps turn logically to psychology, while the guidance and cultivation of them are more the responsibility of philosophy.

At the present moment, one of the outstanding values of American life is apparently to be where you are not. Many of the greatest inventions of the last one hundred years, especially of the later decades, have been devoted to the conquering of space. The railroad, the steamship, the automobile, and the airplane are devices to enable you to get quickly somewhere else. The telephone, the telegraph, the phonograph, and the radio are designed to enable you to hear where you are not. And very shortly television will make it possible to see where you are not. Will Rogers once observed that the principal requirement for a popular song writer seemed to be to have come from somewhere, so that he could yearn to go back. Humanity can never go back. Not Americans alone, but all men, must in the future be somewhere other than where they are now. But it will be a new location, not an old one. The vital question is whether the destination is to be determined by chance and blind impulse, or by a scientific and sympathetic understanding of the capacities and needs of the human personality. As one watches the activities of a typical American population in their hours of play and diversion it is hard to believe that they represent the maximum satisfactions possible to the individuals. It is easy to say that if that is what they want, why should anyone bother about it. But this does not settle the matter. They are parts of society, and society has an interest in welfare. Somebody *will* bother about it. From the societal point of view it is right that somebody should. But it is important that those who represent society should be as wise, well-informed, and well-guided themselves as possible. It is one of the functions of social science to be of service to them in achieving their objectives.

Social problems will always exist. Change is inherent in society, and it appears that, for the immediate future at least, change will take place in a continually accelerating tempo. It can hardly be hoped that all aspects of change will be at the same rate. Lags and maladjustments will occur. The need of reform will be ever present. And the development of humanity and its cultural achievements will forever open up new vistas of higher levels of normality, attainable only through the activities of the engineers. The great pendulums of human interest will swing forward and backward, between democracy and despotism, Puritanism and libertarianism, individualism and socialism, faith and skepticism, standardization and toleration, nationalism and cosmopolitanism. There will be continuing need for wise effort in checking the movement toward extremes and keeping near the middle ground of sanity and moderation. The age-old problem will persist of harmonizing permanence and progression, continuity and variation, security and variety, conservatism and radicalism. The need of an objective, orderly, dynamic social science to aid in the solution is certain to be an increasing, rather than a diminishing, one.

QUESTIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

In a book on general sociology, such as this, almost every specific topic is, of necessity, treated summarily, not to say sketchily. Consequently, practically none of the questions that may be asked upon the text can be answered conclusively or exhaustively from the book alone. They range all the way from those that are based upon unique features of the volume in question to those that could be thoroughly answered only after extensive study of a special field. In suggesting the following questions and topics I have made no effort to make any distinction on this basis. Many of the questions serve merely to point out interesting and fruitful lines of research or inquiry. The teacher and the student are presumed to come to an understanding as to how much is to be expected by the former of the latter.

A similar problem presents itself with reference to the bibliography. To the extent that the book is really a "general" sociology the bibliography might logically be expanded to include the whole range of sociological knowledge. Obviously this would not be either practicable or expedient. The task is one of selection primarily by elimination. This is not a congenial undertaking. One would like to include all his old favorites, and also numerous detailed studies of restricted realms. One would gladly make a place for the old just because it is old, and for the new because it is new. I have adopted the principle of omitting many of the classics on the ground that they are sufficiently familiar so that neither the student nor the teacher needs to be reminded of them. I have also regretfully left out the general texts, unless there is some specialized feature that supplements my own treatment importantly. As it stands, the bibliography has the student primarily in mind, and is designed to aid him in carrying his studies further into whatever fields attract him.

CHAPTER I

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Make as complete a list as possible of all the groups to which you belong.
2. Classify the foregoing list.
3. Does a classification based on choice appeal to you as sound? Justify your position.
4. Make a list of ten pleasant features of your life that come to you from group affiliations, indicating the respective groups.
5. Make a similar list of the unpleasant aspects of your life.
6. What is meant by the "principle of gradation"?
7. Why are the biological groups involuntary?
8. The significant likenesses and differences between man and the anthropoid apes.
9. What are the basic factors in man's rise to dominance over nature?
10. Psychological differences between the sexes.
11. The nature of race. List ten important race criteria.
12. Make a list of the important races of man, indicating a few of the chief distinguishing features of each.
13. Describe briefly the processes of race formation.
14. Find out all you can about your own racial affiliation.

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CHAPTER II

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. What is meant by a semi-voluntary group? Which element comes first chronologically, the voluntary or the involuntary? Why?
2. Which aspects of the family tie are voluntary and which are involuntary?
3. Marriage regulations in other societies than your own, primitive and advanced.
4. Varying degrees of volition in religious, occupational, and political groupings in different societies.
5. Collect as many definitions of society as you can find.
6. What are the essentials in the concept of society?
7. What is meant by the phrase "functioning group" as applied to society?
8. What are the essential features of the state?
9. Give the clearest possible explanation of the concept of nationality.
10. What nationality do you belong to? How did you come to be a member of that nationality?
11. List the important traits of nationality in the order of their importance.
12. How are nationality traits acquired?
13. About which nationality traits of your own do you feel most strongly? Explain your feeling as far as possible.
14. Distinguish clearly between nationality and society, nationality and state, nationality and race.
15. Elements of an ideal nation.
16. Classify the following groups as definitely as possible: The French. The Japanese. The Navajos. Negroes. Russians. Hebrews. Bolsheviks. Buddhists.
17. What groups have you joined in the past ten years?
18. What groups do you hope to join in the next ten years?
19. What groups have you helped to permit others to join?
20. Cooley's concept of "primary group."

21. Characteristic groups among primitive peoples: fraternities, secret societies, etc. Study particularly their volitional character.

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Chapter III

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Non-human societies.
2. What non-human societies are important for the study of sociology, and why?
3. Does the origin of human society fall within the scope of sociology? Why?
4. Physical type of primitive man.
5. Mental traits of primitive man.
6. What are the sciences of archeology, paleontology, ethnology, anthropology, philology?
7. What bonds held the primitive group together?
8. Have you ever been separated from your own society? If so, under what circumstances, and for how long? What were your feelings?
9. The family system of the anthropoid apes.

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CHAPTER IV

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Characteristic features of the collection stage.
2. Significance of primitive tools.
3. Evolution of tools in the series that begins with the stone hammer.
4. The stone age and its successive stages.
5. Characteristics of the hunting stage. What significant cultural changes did it introduce?
6. Characteristic features of the pastoral stage.
7. Examples of contemporary people living on the pastoral stage.
8. Characteristic features of the agricultural stage.
9. The history of land ownership.
10. Relation of cultural stages to the growth of population.
11. Origin of economic capital, and its significance in cultural evolution.
12. Origin of the use of fire.
13. Evolution of fire-making methods and apparatus.
14. Social significance of fire.
15. Economic significance of fire.
16. Sociological importance of commonplace experiences.
17. The bronze age.
18. The development of thrift and of the social attitude toward it.
19. Characteristic features of the industrial stage.
20. What is the basis of classification in the series that begins with the collection stage; of the series that begins with the stone age?
21. Origin of social science.

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Chapter V

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Enumerate and explain the essentials of a science.
2. What are the indispensable steps in the scientific method?
3. What are the personal requirements of an individual that fit him for scientific work?
4. What is the ultimate basis of the exactitude of science?
5. Explain the nature and value of classification.
6. What are natural laws, and how are they established?
7. What is the nature of a scientific explanation?
8. The limits of science.
9. What are the ultimate particles in sociological science? How do their traits which are significant for science compare with those of the ultimate particles of the physical sciences?
10. The distinctive characteristics of sociological science.
11. The scientific significance of repetitiousness.
12. The nature of sociological regularity.
13. The place of experimentation in science, physical and social.
14. Does human nature change? If so, how and to what extent?
15. What kinds of human action are sociologically significant?

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Chapter VI

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Define pure science and applied science.
2. What is a value judgment? What is its place, if any, in science?
3. Explain the statement that all ultimate values are axiomatic.
4. The scientific attitude of the sociologist towards social problems.
5. Can applied sociology be scientific, and if so, in what sense and by what means?

6. The responsibility of the sociologist towards social welfare.
7. In what ways does the equipment of the average person for studying social science differ from that for studying physical science?
8. The relation of social work and social workers to sociological science.
9. The possibilities of studying sociology by the inductive method.
10. List the important sociological predictions you have made in the past twenty-four hours.
11. The illusion of the commonplace.
12. The nature and basis of scientific prediction. Compare physical science and social science in this respect.
13. The nature and varieties of the statistical method.
14. What is meant by the law of chance?
15. Define: interpolation, extrapolation, normal frequency, probability, average.
16. Outstanding dangers in the use of the statistical method.
17. Common misuses of the average.
18. What is the final basis of all statistical data?
19. Is there any such thing as a statistical explanation? If so, what is its nature?
20. The limits of statistical forecasting.

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CHAPTER VII

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. What is meant by a dynamic continuum?
2. What is a sociological phenomenon?
3. Trace the characteristic origin of a sociological phenomenon.
4. What is the nature of the dynamic constants that underlie the physical sciences? Name some of the most important.
5. Discuss the relation between differences in kind and differences in degree.
6. Choice as a form of selectivity.
7. The concepts of will, choice, and free-will in their relation to sociological science.
8. Distinctive features of human choice.
9. Sociological classifications based on desires or feelings.
10. Define an interest.
11. The nature of belief, and its importance in human behavior.
12. The nature and limits of knowledge.
13. What is scientific belief, and how is it acquired? Explain its importance in human affairs.
14. The origin of beliefs.
15. The rôle of fear in human behavior, and its place in sociological classification.
16. Explain the statement that fear is one of the penalties of intelligence.

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CHAPTER VIII

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Name some of the basic interests, showing their relation to various items in other sociological classifications.
2. Explain the basic classification of interests.
3. Explain Sumner's concept of antagonistic cooperation in terms of common-conflicting interests.
4. Give some cases of the harmonization of conflicting interests drawn from your own experience.
5. Compare the interest in life with the instinct of self-preservation.
6. Define egoism and altruism in terms of interests.
7. Give several instances, other than those in the text, of repetitious desires.
8. What is a social force in the general, and in the restricted, sense of the term?
9. State and criticize the argument that the desire for approbation is the most important genuine social force.
10. Give several instances of the desire for esteem as a motive in your own conduct.
11. Discuss Sumner's concept of "vanity."

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CHAPTER IX

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. In what sense can society be said to have its own interests?
2. What are the two main interests of society?
3. Compare society's interest in continuity with some of the basic interests of individuals.
4. Why do societal and individual interests sometimes clash?
5. Define expectation and conformity.
6. Explain the meaning of normality and abnormality in social relationships.
7. What is meant by the principle of predominant egoism? How has it been affected by social evolution?
8. Explain the sociological concept of confidence.
9. Explain the temptation to the betrayal of confidence, and society's attitude towards such betrayal.
10. Different types of "confidence games."
11. Name several instances of normality which are necessary for the functioning of your own society but which are not intrinsically desirable.

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CHAPTER X

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Give several instances in your own experience that demonstrate the fact of social control.
2. Concept of the "group mind."
3. Where does social control originate?

4. Distinguish between persuasive and coercive control.
5. Make a list of actions on your own part during the last twenty-four hours that were governed by the persuasive control of society.
6. The desire for esteem, and related concepts, as developed by different writers.
7. The concept of "the mores."
8. How do codes differ from "the mores."
9. The origin and nature of the moral code.
10. List some of the important items in the moral code of your own society.
11. Can there be such a thing as an immoral society? Why?
12. The relation between morality and goodness or righteousness.
13. Characteristic features of the moral codes of specific primitive societies.
14. Differences in the moral codes of contemporary advanced nationalities.

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CHAPTER XI

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Does the origin of religion have a different place in the study of sociology from that of the origin of the family? Why?
2. With what primitive human trait is the origin of religion most directly connected?

3. Various definitions of religion.
4. What are the common attributes of all true religions?
5. Origin of the notion of the soul.
6. Notions of the soul among living primitive peoples.
7. Origin of the notion of an "other world."
8. Primitive conceptions of the future life.
9. What is meant by "formalism" in religion? How does it develop?
10. Daimonism.
11. The origin and influence of ancestor worship.
12. Survivals of ancestor worship in modern societies.
13. Explain the relation between the moral code and the religious code.
14. The origin, nature, and influence of ethical standards.
15. What is an institution?
16. Distinguish clearly between public opinion and public sentiment.
17. Give a few cases of well-defined public opinion and public sentiment in your own society.
18. The efficacy of logic in social control.
19. Publicity, its uses and abuses.
20. Give some cases of propaganda in contemporary life, showing clearly why you class them as such.
21. The slogan as an instrument of social control.
22. The origin and development of the slogan, "The Forgotten Man."

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CHAPTER XII

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Explain clearly the nature of the rotatory or reciprocal principle in social relations.
2. Theories of primitive promiscuity.
3. Early ignorance of procreation, and its bearing on the form of the family.
4. Economic aspects of the primitive family.
5. Relation of the family to the division of labor.
6. Relation between the family and the state.
7. What are the chief forms of the family based on the relative numbers of the sexes in each unit?
8. Economic factors in polyandry and polygyny.
9. The clan.
10. Totemism.
11. Origin and nature of the tribe.
12. The "Long-House" of the Iroquois Indians.

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Chapter XIII

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Theories of the nature and origin of the state.
2. State and criticize the theory that force is the essential feature of the state.
3. The concept of sovereignty.
4. Define government.
5. The origin and nature of law.
6. The biennial output of laws in your own state—number, classification, objects, etc.
7. Distinguish the principal functions, and corresponding departments, of government.
8. In what sense are we frequently ruled by the minority? Cite cases.
9. Lack of variety in legal procedure. Explain the situation as far as possible.
10. The relative importance of the state in the total volume of social control.
11. Name, if possible, five cases in which you have been consciously prevented from doing something because there was a law against it. What was the ethical or moral nature of the act in question?
12. Compare the application of force and the fear of force as agencies for exerting control.
13. The internal and external applications of force by society.
14. The relation between science and religion.
15. The nature of magic and superstition, and their relation to science and religion.
16. Make a list of instances of magic or superstition that have come under your own observation.
17. Are you conscious of any superstitious motives in your own conduct? If so, what? Can you trace their origin?

18. Define luck. Is there any way of controlling it?
19. Modern aspects of the "conflict" between science and religion.

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CHAPTER XIV

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Basic character of self-maintenance interests.
2. The theory of economic determinism as expounded by various leading writers.
3. Define property. Describe some of the early forms of property.
4. Define "capital" in the economic sense.
5. Trace the probable development of capital from its earliest forms through the agricultural stage.
6. The origin of slavery, and its early social significance.
7. What have been the leading types of slavery in different societies?
8. The origin of wage labor.
9. Describe the essential factors in the production of wealth, in the order of their evolutionary appearance.
10. Explain the meaning and social significance of "labor ownership of business."
11. The relation of increasing economic efficiency to the growth of population.
12. Similarity and diversity in the "stages of evolution" of various societies.
13. The origin and nature of serfdom.
14. The social and economic organization of the medieval English manor.
15. Different types of division of labor.
16. The influence of trade routes on cultural evolution.

17. The development of large-scale trade.
18. Oriental trade in its bearing on European history.

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CHAPTER XV

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Rise of the joint-stock company.
2. The Mississippi Bubble.
3. The "Domestic System" of industry.
4. The development of a free labor class, especially in England.
5. The Black Death, and its influence on European history.
6. Egalitarian doctrines of the early nineteenth century, and their influence on economic development.
7. Social and economic changes that ushered in the industrial era.
8. The expansion of industry and its significance.
9. Give several definitions of the standard of living.
10. State the definition of the standard of living adopted for this volume, and explain the grounds for its adoption.
11. Contrast the average and the ideal.
12. Give reasons for selecting the family as the unit of the standard of living.
13. How is the standard of living measured?
14. Engel's laws.
15. Progress of the standard of living of the unskilled laborer in the United States.
16. The effect of immigration on the American standard of living.
17. The general course of the standard of living over long periods of time.
18. Describe and interpret any evidences of a changing standard of living that you have observed in the past five years.

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CHAPTER XVI

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Describe the general equipment for reproduction of organic species in nature.
2. State and explain the law of stationary population in nature.
3. Define larithmics.
4. The development of census taking among modern nations.
5. What are the uses and advantages of a rate?
6. What are the principal larithmic rates, and how are they computed?

7. The causes of births and deaths.
8. The course of the birth-rates and death-rates of various countries in the past one hundred years.
9. Name and explain clearly the basic factors in the growth of a population.
10. Explain the conflict between population and standard of living.
11. Under what conditions does this conflict not exist?
12. Explain the law of diminishing returns, and show its bearing on larithmic theory.

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CHAPTER XVII

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. What is the nature of applied larithmics? What does it seek to accomplish?
2. Define underpopulation.
3. Define overpopulation.
4. On what value do these definitions rest?
5. Discuss the standard of living as an aspect of the mores.
6. Has underpopulation or overpopulation been more prevalent in human experience, and why?
7. How do expansions in population and standard of living come about?
8. When a chance for expansion occurs, how is it utilized under different conditions? Explain fully.
9. On what grounds can the nineteenth century be said to be unique in human experience?
10. Philosophical consequences of nineteenth century expansion.
11. Give concrete illustrations from art, literature, etc., of a reaction against nineteenth century optimism.
12. Abortion: motives for it; primitive methods; contemporary aspects.
13. The origin and development of infanticide.

14. The Malthusian theory.
15. Neo-Malthusianism in England.
16. Distinctive developments of the sex interest in the human species.
17. The basis and possibilities of predicting population growth.

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CHAPTER XVIII

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. What is meant by factors of stability and factors of change in social movement?
2. The geographical constant in social change.
3. The biological constant in social change.
4. What did Le Bon mean when he said that the dead are the real rulers of the living?
5. Name the most important factors of social change.
6. Why can it be said that ideas are the predominant factor in social change?
7. What is meant by the tempo of social change? What has been the general trend of this tempo?
8. The relation between social change and the origin of social problems.
9. Explain the different types of social problems, and name several actual problems of each type.
10. Cultural lag.
11. Explain the maladjustment between the economic and family mores in Western societies.
12. The nature of social values.

13. The relation of science to ultimate social values.
14. What guides for applied sociology actually exist?
15. The concept of social progress.
16. List a number of evidences of progress in your own society.
17. Name some evidences of retrogression.
18. How can social movement be distinguished from social progress?
19. Distinguish between social reform and social engineering.
20. Define idealization, and explain its importance in social progress.
21. Give several examples of idealization in the non-societal and societal fields.
22. What is meant by social potential?
23. The Great Man theory of history.
24. Discuss the efficacy of the individual in social change. Have modern social conditions brought any change in this factor?

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Chapter XIX

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. What is a social process? What is an action pattern? Compare the two.
2. Scientific importance of repetitiousness.
3. How are beliefs controlled?
4. What are the limits of knowledge?
5. What are correct beliefs, and why are they important?
6. The inevitability of choice.
7. The function of education in relation to belief.
8. Explain the basic dilemma of education in modern life.
9. What are your own ideas about the right to know? If you had absolute control of all knowledge, would you place any restrictions on its availability? If so, what and why?
10. What is the practical value of knowledge?
11. The importance of the symbol in modern life. What is its relation to the slogan?
12. State and defend your views as to the relative importance of the intellect and the emotions as guides to conduct.
13. Why is the control of ideas important to society?
14. The relation between ideas and progress.
15. Explain the dilemma of society with reference to the control of unconventional ideas.
16. If you had power, what ideas in modern life would you seek to suppress, and what methods would you use?

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CHAPTER XX

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Summarize the principal incentives for a large and rapidly growing population.
2. Is it easier for society to encourage or check population growth, and why?
3. What is meant by birth control? Compare it with abortion.
4. Summarize and criticize the typical arguments against birth control.
5. Study the arguments pro and con advanced in recent hearings on birth control bills before congressional committees in Washington.
6. Study the groups represented by the speakers at these hearings.
7. Study these hearings from the point of view of efforts at social control.
8. What are the customary arguments in favor of birth control, including answers to opposition arguments?
9. What is meant by a population policy?
10. Define optimum population.
11. The history of the concept of optimum population.
12. Outline the theoretical process of determining the optimum population for the United States.
13. Origin of the eugenics movement.
14. Define eugenics.
15. Discuss the controversy concerning the relative importance of heredity and environment.
16. Distinguish between negative and positive eugenics. Which is easier and why?
17. What is meant by a breeding program for a human society?
18. If you were dictator over the breeding of the American people, what traits would you seek to eliminate, and what to intensify? Be specific and remember the limitations on a workable eugenics program.
19. Explain the practical differences that exist between the breeding of human beings and of other animals.
20. What are the most promising fields of actual eugenic accomplishment?

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CHAPTER XXI

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. **Contrast society's success in mastering the production of wealth with its success in distribution.**
2. **Trace the history of the ownership of the characteristic unit of production.**
3. **Describe the entrepreneur, and explain his origin.**

4. What important differentiations in the factors of production have transpired in the past fifty years and how did they come about?
5. Describe the characteristic ownership of business in modern society.
6. Distinguish corporation bonds from common stocks.
7. Justify or refute the statement that the modern corporation represents a detrimental form of absentee ownership.
8. Define profits. By what method are they theoretically secured?
9. Explain fully the rôle of the owner in modern business relations, describing the source of his power.
10. Explain the statement that the basic economic organization rests upon conflict relations.
11. Summarize in your own terms the argument that unlimited money profits are a mathematical impossibility.
12. Distinguish between typical ancient and modern wealth.
13. By what means has the illusion of profits been maintained?
14. What changes in economic organization would logically follow the societal acceptance of the impossibility of monetary profits?

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CHAPTER XXII

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Cite several evidences of the solidarity of different kinds of groups.
2. What is meant by international relations?

3. What are the basic interests that bring nations into contact with one another?
4. Overpopulation as a cause of war.
5. War as a corrective of overpopulation.
6. Other causes of war.
7. International trade as an instance of antagonistic cooperation.
8. In what sense do nations engage in trade with one another? What efforts are made to obscure this relationship, and why?
9. Define a culture area.
10. What is meant by extra-societal relations? Discuss some leading cases.
11. What is an interest group? Name several interest groups to which you belong.
12. The party system in the United States, England, and France.
13. What are some of the more important economic groupings in modern societies?
14. The origin and development of the trade union movement.
15. Discover as many trade unions as possible operating in your own community. Classify them.
16. Summarize the nature of the bargain. Show its relation to the laissez-faire doctrine.
17. Define value. Discuss its measurement.
18. Discuss the chief groups created by the debt relation.
19. Show how the spread of group contacts stimulates international hostility.
20. The problem of a genuine international state, equipped to secure control by force.

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CHAPTER XXIII

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Classify the different forms of abnormality.
2. The limitations of typical reform agencies and methods in dealing with abnormality.
3. Show how logical personal remedies may sometimes be socially injurious.
4. Discuss the importance of a recognized norm.
5. Define crime and the criminal.
6. The history of criminal law.
7. The doctrines of the Classical School of Criminologists, and their influence on procedure in western societies.
8. Cesare Lombroso and his work.
9. Leading theories of punishment.
10. Modern conceptions of the criminal man and the criminal class.
11. Modern developments in handling crime and the criminal.
12. Compare the efficacy and social desirability of persuasive and coercive control.
13. Define vice.
14. Define incompetence and maladjustment.
15. Study the probation system in your own community.
16. Collect from periodical literature passages that show belief in the deterrence theory of punishment.

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CHAPTER XXIV

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Distinguish the chief types of unemployment.
2. What different forms of seasonal unemployment are there?
3. Show clearly how unemployment is linked up with the existing system of production.
4. Discuss the theory of the illimitability of human wants.
5. Discuss the classical economic doctrine of the impossibility of general overproduction.
6. Discuss the significance of the statement that "machines don't buy goods."
7. Show why personal remedies cannot cure social unemployment.
8. Criticize the common phrase, "The divorce evil."
9. Divorce rates in this and other countries, and their trends over the past fifty years.
10. Interpretation of changes in the divorce rate.
11. The causes of divorce in American society.
12. Social control of divorce.
13. If you are reasonably familiar with any concrete cases of divorce, try to come to an opinion as to whether it would have been socially preferable to refuse the divorce.
14. Explain the inevitable anachronism in religion.

15. Enumerate some cases of lack of realism, out-of-date symbolism, and meaningless forms in any organized religion with which you are familiar.

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CHAPTER XXV

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Define dispersion.
2. What general features are to be found, and should be studied, in every population movement?
3. Define migration.
4. Distinguish clearly between the different main types of migration.
5. The movement of the Goths as a typical instance of invasion.
6. What are the distinctive features of conquest? The relation between conquest and empire.
7. Fundamental similarities in the great empires of history.
8. Summarize the part played by colonization in the peopling of the Western Hemisphere.
9. Why is immigration necessarily a recent phenomenon?
10. Name the great immigrant-receiving countries of the world.
11. Trace the numerical growth of immigration to the United States.
12. What is meant by selection as a principle in the immigration law of the United States?
13. Analyze the immigration movement to the United States in terms of interests, individual and societal.
14. Social control as illustrated in the immigration movement to the United States.
15. Slogans, symbols, and catchwords in the immigration controversy.
16. The history of the literacy test.
17. What new basic principle was introduced into the United States immigration law after the World War, in what form, and by what means?
18. Give the essential features of the quota system now in force in the United States immigration law.
19. The regulation of Oriental immigration to the United States.
20. The probable future of immigration as a world phenomenon.
21. Explain clearly the larithmic law of immigration.
22. Immigration in the light of international obligations and ethics.
23. Distinguish between amalgamation and assimilation.
24. The urbanization movement in modern societies.

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CHAPTER XXVI

QUESTIONS AND STUDY TOPICS

1. Define social engineering.
2. What is meant by an objective of social effort?
3. What is meant by personality?
4. The significance of a measure.
5. The determination of ultimate objectives.
6. The influence of the producer's philosophy in social evolution.
7. The meaning and justification of a consumer's philosophy.
8. Explain what is meant by an inverted philosophy.
9. Why is reform easier than engineering?
10. Explain the idea of censorship as a general principle.
11. Significant types of social legislation in the past one hundred and fifty years.
12. Explain the meaning of laissez-faire. Discuss the influence of this doctrine on social evolution.
13. Evidences of the inapplicability of the laissez-faire principle to modern conditions.
14. Discuss critically the statement that reform and liberalism are out of date as dominating guides to contemporary social action.

15. Discuss the limits of plutocracy.
16. Why is research in consumption needed? What different aspects would such research display?
17. The significant features of Marxian socialism.
18. Analyze critically the statement that Karl Marx was fundamentally a classical economist.
19. The distinction between Socialism and Communism in their modern manifestations.
20. Summarize the arguments for and against the statements (*a*) that Western society is moving toward a communalized form of organization, and (*b*) that such a movement is in harmony with social progress.
21. Discuss the practical obstacles in the way of a socialistic movement in the United States.
22. State your own conception of the ultimate values toward which social engineering should be directed, showing how you derive these values, and justifying them as far as possible.

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